Tuesday 29 May 2012





ECONOMY

Arguing the B300 minimum wage case

'The minimum wage will destroy the industrial sector of Thailand"...
Employers worry that introducing the 300 baht minimum wage will hurt Thailand’s competitiveness. Yet cheaper wages are not the only way to achieve comparative advantage, and this argument should not be used as a justification for keeping the minimum wage as low as possible. APICHART JINAKUL
"We are entering the Asean Economic Community in the very near future, so how can we compete with our neighbours?"... "Foreign investors will move away from Thailand, to places where labour is cheaper, such as China, Cambodia, and Vietnam"...
These are the opinions of the business sector and many economists, apparently prioritising the competitiveness of the Thai economy even if it comes at the expense of workers' living standards.
However, the fact is that in a capitalist free-market economy, undercutting the international price of labour is not the only way to achieve comparative advantage. Such arguments should not be used as a justification for keeping the minimum wage as low as possible.
Indeed, in the transition towards becoming a developed nation, countries must accept that this strategy is unsustainable in the long term, as no developed economy has ever been able to maintain this comparative advantage over developing nations.
What about the future of unskilled workers? Are they expected to resign themselves to a lifetime of low wages to support the supposed "national interest" of Thailand's economy?
When speaking to red shirt supporters in Laos at his public appearance during the Songkran festival, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra said: "Brothers, life will be better now. Prime Minister Yingluck has already implemented the '300 baht' policy. Your children will earn more from work."
As we know by now, any such statements coming from Thaksin will be jumped on immediately by opponents who will level accusations of irresponsible political populism at him.
The income gap in Thailand today is glaringly obvious to anyone who can face up to this fact. To categorically dismiss as irresponsible populism attempts to correct this injustice, however imperfect they may be, implies a serious lack of concern for the plight of millions of decent yet underprivileged Thais.
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker have argued: "Thaksin's populism was more complex than his policy offerings, in that it developed over time in response to social demands. Thaksin may indeed have been opportunistic, but there would have been no opportunity if there had not been a social demand."
As Warren Buffet once argued: "A market system has not worked in terms of poor people."
The intrinsic injustice of this system is interpreted within the anti-capitalist discourse of Thailand as tunniyom samarn, or "evil capitalism".
Moreover, what is often referred to as the "free market" is far from being free of market manipulation.
Notably, when we look at the examples of the most advanced capitalist countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, we find many forms of government intervention.
Indeed, as far as we can recall, there has always been evidence of market failure. And it has been quite common for there to be some degree of government intervention within the market which distort both prices and costs, including labour costs.
Every Friday, a truck takes mothers and fathers from the village of Ban Tadop in Si Sa Ket province to visit their children, by now mostly in their 20s, who are working in factories in Samut Sakhon.
The main reason for the families to undertake this journey is to collect remittance money from their children, and at the same time, to bring them staple foods such as the rice they have grown in the village.
Such efforts are undertaken in order to minimise their child's cost of living, which is higher in Samut Sakhon than in the villages.
Labour migration from the Northeast has been both permanent and seasonal. Both have made an important contribution to improving the quality of life for rural villagers.
To a significant extent, these remittances can help make life more comfortable in the rural provinces, and is an example of how market mechanisms can contribute towards raising living standards when the state does not.
Hoi Kambongsa, a 53-year-old worker from Ban Don Chot, Ubon Ratchathani, said: "The 300 baht [minimum wage] is good for our family, living in a rural village. I don't have a full-time job.
"I receive money from my six children who work in Bangkok, although not very often. But this really helps to make my life a lot easier."
A high percentage of the rural population in the northeastern region today depend on these remittances to at least some degree.
Older generations living in rural areas of provinces such as Ubon Ratchathani typically receive approximately 5,000 baht a year in remittances. Although this figure might not appear to be particularly significant for the urban middle-class, this extra money is needed for their subsistence.
This is also the main contribution of remittances in relation to the economy, boosting grassroots incomes and spending which have the positive benefit of stimulating Thailand's macroeconomy.
The supply of both permanent and seasonal labour from the region stems from what economists call the "opportunity cost" of workers not having a job in their village or district. Moving to work in a factory for even a very low wage becomes the "rational choice".
Some economists make the argument that if there is enough supply of labour for jobs available, there is no need to increase the minimum wage.
It follows from this statement that if workers remain in their current employment, they must be happy with the status quo. However, can this argument be justifiably made if workers have no other options available to them?
Of course not.
Ultimately, there is a moral for us in all of this. We are speaking here of the demographic which has so often come under attack during the political blame game that has accompanied the conflicts afflicting Thailand in recent years.
This demographic is the rural population of the Northeast provinces, who realistically have few choices in life.
To live viably at all, they must work in the fields and subsist by producing rice and selling their surplus. They seize the opportunity of employment as seasonal migrant workers in factories in distant provinces. Very often, they are not even paid the 300-baht figure which is now being introduced as the minimum wage for Thailand.
These are the people from the poorest region of our country who are routinely patronised by other Thais and made to feel as though they are second-class citizens because of their "shortcomings" and their lack of education.
We may only become more genuinely concerned for their well-being and future if we take the time to realise that these very people are the ones producing Thailand's staple rice crops which keep food prices low and help to fuel the lives of all Thais.
Then, perhaps, we would think about the fact that they so often take these low-paying jobs in factories that most other Thais would certainly not undertake. To argue their case then becomes the least we can do.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.
http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/295497/arguing-the-b300-minimum-wage-case


Thursday 10 May 2012



Will Ampon's death see democracy reborn in Thailand?






The death of Ampon Tangnoppakul, better known as Ah Kong, once again has thrust Section 112 of the constitution into the public limelight. News of his death was widely circulated through online social and alternative news networks before the mainstream and international media picked it up.
The news generated a great deal of emotion among activists, who called for changes to the lese majeste law. But there are few indications at this stage that his case will become a "cause celebre", and serve as the kind of catalyst for democracy that famous or infamous prisoners of conscience have, at times, around the world, like Nelson Mandela of South Africa, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn of Russia, Ai Weiwei of China and Bradley Manning of the United States.
Established political dissidents can take on the power of a state with the political savvy and allies they have developed. Ampon was in the end, a man out of his depth, likely caught up in a game of political intrigue that the 62-year-old man could not have expected.
Ampon was sentenced to 20 years in prison and had not been granted bail prior to his conviction, which violated his human rights because of the disproportionate punishment, and heavy-handed treatment. This was a person who was already suffering from cancer before his arrest, and who had neither the resources nor the level of fitness to escape, if bail had been granted. Neither was he given the opportunity to stay at a hospital for prisoners because of the rationale that his condition was not sufficiently serious. All of this may indicate some political interference in the case.
"It may seem that the impact of disparities of political power has been to distort both the content and the application of human rights doctrines in ways that serve the interest of powerful actors at the expense of others," Charles Beitz, an academic from Princeton University in the US, wrote in an observation not long ago. His words give some insight into our own predicament.
Neither the current government nor the opposition want to take up the case, because the political risks outweigh the potential benefits, and both sides have already fallen victim to the questions relating to Section 112. When the arguments vis-a-vis the law are polarised to such an extent, that any push for reform can lead to the accusation that an attempt is being made to bring down the monarchy itself, then political expediency wins out.
If Thailand is to truly mature as a democracy, politicians need to be encouraged out of their inertia. However, this can perhaps only be done when the population at large demands in sufficient numbers that the principles of fighting for liberty, objectivity and integrity overrides any existing political calculations and manoeuvrings.
In November 2011, the Asian Human Rights Commission named Ampon as a political prisoner, and asked the government to facilitate his immediate release. At the same time, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, an outspoken academic who is now based at Kyoto University's Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, launched his "Free Ah Kong" campaign. This received the support of more than 1,000 people, and more than 500 people sent in their photos with the words "Ah Kong" imprinted on their hands in order to show their support. Although these are in the scheme of things, not high numbers; it is significant in giving weight to the fact that there are people who perceive the injustice below the surface in the Land of Smiles, as Thailand is so often called.
Ampon's death will not change Thailand overnight and may not bring about much extra support in favour of the Nitirat group's proposal to reform the lese majeste law. This is because there are still a large number of powerful royalists in Thailand who refuse to openly acknowledge the impact of the abuse of Section 112 on human rights. Nevertheless, his death will draw attention to the question over the interpretation of the law and the decision by the judges. Furthermore, his death will at least bring into focus the issues of freedom and human rights when it comes to the debate on democracy, which may generate momentum for the progress of democracy in the long term. After all, the push for reforming Section 112 is being done in the name of protecting and promoting the rights of all the citizens of Thailand. And through the story of Ah Kong, we have now learnt how precious life is.
Ampon was like any other citizen of Thailand, in that he was a relatively insignificant person when it comes to the state structures.
There are still questions regarding the veracity of the argument that he even sent the now infamous four text messages at all.
His only mistake then, was to unwittingly become caught up in the larger game of politics, where he quickly found himself out of his depth, and subject to forces far greater than himself. Which is no mistake at all. Does this prove that the human rights of the individual are now being negated in Thailand, simply in order to send out a message for the big picture narrative? Namely, that if you step out of line, this could happen to you also. Was the case of Ampon an opportunity to fire a shot across the bows of the Thai people in order to make it known that you too, might be dispensable if it is politically expedient for that to be done?
Does the death of Ampon mean anything to us, as a society? Maybe not if we are talking about any tangible impact on the reform of Section 112, which he fell victim to. He may yet come to be seen as an icon of the pro-democracy activists, who might take an opportunity to use his memory as a weapon in their fight for change.
This could be the legacy for an individual of this world, who took a chance to speak out, but prematurely lost his life in prison, as a result. Too late for him now. Ah Kong, may you rest in peace. Soon we will find out what the future holds for any others who may also fall victim to abuse of Section 112.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.
http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/292590/will-ampon-death-see-democracy-reborn-in-thailand