My interview with respect to the NCPO’s Announcement No. 53/2560 (2017), relating to the implementation of Article 44 to amend the Political Party Act, in order to allow political activities.

My interview with respect to the NCPO’s Announcement No. 53/2560 (2017), relating to the implementation of Article 44 to amend the Political Party Act, in order to allow political activities.

This Announcement will affect the membership of political parties, which is likely to effect the Democrat Party more than the Pheu Thai Party. The existing political parties claimed that this amendment might result in a reduction of party members, however, this might not significantly affect the election results.

In relation to the voting decisions of constituents, party membership is not as important as party manifestos and the political stance of the political parties, whilst higher membership levels do not necessarily translate into higher votes in an election.

According to observations, the Democrat Party has more registered members than the Pheu Thai Party, however the Democrat Party has failed to win any general election since the implementation of the 1997 ‘Democratic’ Constitution in 2001.

With respect to the Thai political culture, local influential figures can normally influence voting decisions more than party membership.

Despite being political allies, the Democracy Party cannot take the support from the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) for granted, because there is an indication that the PDRC is leaning towards the military.

In Southern Thailand, Suthep Thaugsuban, the leader of the PDRC has, and continues to be more influential than Abhisit Vejjajiva, the leader of the Democrat Party. Therefore, there it is likely that the Democrat Party will maintain its cozy relationship with Suthep in order to ensure continued support in the South.

Additionally, voters may also consider the extent to which parties are supportive of either democracy or the military when deciding on which party to vote for.

Nevertheless, the NCPO must set one rule to apply for all parties, rather than rules for existing political parties which are distinct from newly registered parties. The NCPO’s Announcement No. 53/2560 (2017) raises a question of whether it is intended to pave the way for the military to maintain its central role after the election.

My interview with respect to the National Legislative Assembly of Thailand’s decision to allow the commissioners of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) to remain in their positions until the end of their 9 year-term.

My interview with respect to the National Legislative Assembly of Thailand’s decision to allow the commissioners of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) to remain in their positions until the end of their 9 year-term.

Whether the NACC commissioners were to remain in power or be replaced by new appointments there will not be a significant difference, because it has been observed that the NACC has not been functioning absolutely independently.

If the existing commissioners were to be replaced by new appointments, it is very likely that the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) would exercise its influence over the appointments. Therefore, the influence of the NCPO would have a significant implication for the functioning of the NACC.

Recently, we have already observed that the NACC has not yet indicated clear actions against the case of the expensive watches of General Prawit Wongsuwan, Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense.

The existing NACC commissioners have been functioning well with regards to scrutinising politicians – which is politically expedient for the NCPO - whilst neglecting to effectively scrutinise corruption cases against other government officials such as the military, police, and senior government officials. Instead, the NACC has been acting as a machinery of the NCPO in scrutinising the NCPO’s political opposition.

Apparently, a decision not to replace the NACC commissioners is because the NCPO is now facing a number of politically sensitive issues, especially the case of General Prawit’s watches, which the NACC is rushing to end in the interests of the NCPO and the military. The sooner the case ends, the sooner the NACC can help to diminish political resistance against the NCPO.

Therefore, I argued that a decision to keep or replace the NACC commissioners is primarily based on the political expediency of the NCPO, rather than a qualification to serve the interests of Thailand.

BBC: A summary of my commentary relating to the Thai Constitution

A summary of my commentary relating to the Thai Constitution, in an interview conducted with BBC Thai, in the context of Thai Constitution Day:

I argued that politicians are not the main contributing factor in Thai constitutional failure [i.e. the resorting to military coups d’état, and the multiple rewriting of constitutions]. Rather, it is the more fundamental problem of law enforcement within Thailand, and its often evident favouring of those who are in power.

Also, we continue to observe the more overt abuse of power. Although Thaksin Shinawatra may have been one of the contributing factors in the 1997 constitutional’s eventual failure [with the military coup d’état of 2006], obviously enough, Thailand’s political problems did not stem from him.

Recently, we have observed many well publicised corruption scandals that then went quiet without being properly scrutinised, or investigated.

[Of course, Thailand, like other countries, has never had a perfect constitution, nevertheless…] The probable main reason that Thailand has had so many constitutions, is because such a large number of Thai reject many of the notions of democracy. I therefore argued that more Thai must learn to advocate for democratic means in the amending of their constitution - instead of this resorting to military coups d’état, which should now be totally unnecessary. Indeed, I stated that Thai people need to better understand that independently functioning agencies [outside of the military] must be in place, in order to better challenge Thailand’s endemic problem of corruption.

http://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-42286951

If we understood human rights, we wouldn’t sacrifice them for military rule

If we understood human rights, we wouldn’t sacrifice them for military rule
opinion December 09, 2017 01:00 By Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation

Tomorrow, the United Nations (UN) will commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

Meanwhile Thailand, a state party to the declaration, remains under military rule with rights and freedoms curtailed ever since the 2014 coup carried out by the National Council for Peace and Order.

Ahead of the scheduled November 2018 elections, Thais are now calling for the return of normal civil liberty and freedoms. The two main political parties, Pheu Thai and the Democrats, have been pushing the NCPO junta to lift the political ban imposed over national security concerns.

The junta has continuously denied basic rights, including political rights, through strict control of public expression. Although the NCPO recently announced “human rights” as a policy priority and a national agenda, the military continues to contest the universality of human rights, claiming that national peace, security and the need to reunify have priority.

One crucial question for the NCPO is, if rights are granted by the military, can they be considered human rights?

Supporters of the military should consider a further question: Is Thailand sacrificing its commitments to the universal principle of human rights in order to facilitate the NCPO’s timeline for a return to democracy, or to maintain the military’s continued grip on power?

Throughout Thailand’s 85 years of attempts at democracy, the military has been able to reassert its central role in the political system by claiming it is defending Thailand’s cultural heritage and social order and eliminating corruption.

With a history of 19 attempted and 12 successful military coups, political rights have repeatedly been taken away, with no unified voice among Thais against the actions of the military. This was particularly so with the 2006 and 2014 coups, when a vast majority of Thais were willing to sacrifice their voting rights for military rule under the illusion that the military was an anti-corruption agent.

The concept of voting rights is enshrined in Article 21 of the UDHR: “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government”. But that concept is still poorly understood by many in the Thai establishment and middle class. They continue instead to disparage voting rights for the rural poor, citing their low levels of educational attainment.

Meanwhile the poor have no one in power to represent their interests and alleviate their condition. 

“The economy is doing so badly for me, I am desperate for elections so that I can vote for who I want to be in Parliament,” a local farmer from Si Sa Ket province said recently, speaking anonymously. 

It is time Thailand placed the universal principle of human rights on the education curriculum, alongside Thai history and cultural heritage. That move would help the nation break through the cultural barrier that exists around human rights.

While Thailand has abided by its commitments to the United Nations, including on human rights, since the inception of the UN in 1946, many Thais barely recognise the concepts of human dignity, equality and liberty because of an overriding social hierarchy they are told is central to being Thai – their Thainess. 

Embracing the principles of human rights, however, does not diminish the quality of being Thai, because being born as a Thai person is after all being born as a human in a country called Thailand. Hence, it is a mistake to view national boundaries as a border that must be defended from the intrusion of “alien” human rights.

Indeed, accepting the universality of human rights cannot be simply equated with the destruction of the uniqueness and dignity of Thai culture. Instead, cultural change is a normal consequence of development, in order to create a just society where everyone is equally respected as a human. 

Therefore, arguments about the need to preserve both Thai cultural uniqueness and national security not only delay the progress of human rights in Thailand. They also undermine the development of an equal and democratic society and deny the ability of Thai people to scrutinise and hold authorities to account.

Absolute trust in state authority simply lends absolute power to those who have it, leaving the public interest unprotected. 

The promotion and protection of universal human rights is not only a mechanism to promote dignity, rights and liberty of individuals, but also to take back power from the state, so that people are empowered to challenge its authority. 

Unfortunately, the Thai military and their supporters continue to rely on the notion of Thainess (Thai exceptionalism) to justify their lack of commitment to universal human rights. 

This remains an ongoing challenge for Thailand, because the military has successfully consolidated its power, and embedded itself at the centre of the country’s politics. This presents a challenge to the UN Human Rights Council in its efforts to promote fundamental rights for Thai people, as it celebrates the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.

A summary of my interview in Matichon, with respect to comments from the Pheu Thai Party on the ban of political activities by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO)

A summary of my interview in Matichon, with respect to comments from the Pheu Thai Party on the ban of political activities by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO)

I argued that all of the justifications announced by the NCPO and military are unreasonable and invalid because those justifications were driven solely by the NCPO’s perceptions.

Indeed, no political activities should have been prohibited in the first place, and political parties should have been permitted to function freely soon after the 2014 military coup d’état.

I argued that the central reason for the continuation of the political ban is fundamentally based on the NCPO securing and maintain its grip on power; by limiting freedom of expression, there is no credible threat to the NCPO’s absolute power. Meanwhile, the political ban is also an effective way of controlling what people know, through the NCPO’s control of access to alternative sources of information ensuring that people only get a one-sided view.

It has been observed that the ban of political activities have been implemented in a very selective manner, because a few members of the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) are able to meet with local communities without being identified for what they are; a political organisation. Similar actions from opponents of the NCPO, however, are normally accused of being politically motivated.

Disagreements are normal in a democratic society, therefore, if the NCPO argues that disagreements are a threat to security, this reflects a lack of understanding of some basic principles of a democratic culture.

It has been rather clear that the NCPO and the military will maintain its grip on power if there is a General Election in 2018. Thus, elections are not an indication for the end of military control and dictatorship. Instead, it is likely that the military is consolidating a Thai version of “illiberal democracy,” characterised by imposing limitations on freedoms and liberty. This form of democracy will not be in the interests of the country, because such a scenario will ensure that the state will have greater power than the people. As a result, the state machinery will be less transparent, and exacerbate Thailand’s existing corruption problems.

-Titipol Phakdeewanich-

A summary of my interview with respect to the maintaining of the political ban by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO)

A summary of my interview with respect to the maintaining of the political ban by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO):

The current state of Thai politics is mostly interpreted by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), while its justification to deny the lifting of political ban is political disorder.

Question arise again over the NCPO’s definition of political disorder. I argued that when there are disagreements with the NCPO, the disagreements cannot be simply classified as political sedition and inciting dissent.

Denying the ability for political parties to organise any political activities is a denial of democracy, which undermines confidence in the NCPO’s democratic timeline to return to democracy in November 2018.

I argued that the NCPO continues to maintain its political ban, partly,  because of diminishing pressure from the international community, for example Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-O-Cha’s trip to Washington was a form of endorsement from the US.

The US administration, under President Donald Trump, has sent out a rather clear message that it intends to turn a blind eye towards Thai democracy, almost giving a green light to the Thai military government.

The maintenance of the political ban demonstrates that Thailand has been intentionally violating its international commitment to the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

Indeed, the political ban does not only affect political parties but it is also disadvantageous for Thai constituents. Instead the political ban only serves the interests of the NCPO itself, as beyond the NCPO itself, information is very limited.

My interview with respect to the interpretation of the 2017 Constitution; Section 268

My interview with respect to the interpretation of the 2017 Constitution; “Section 268: Election of members of the House of Representatives under this Constitution shall be held within one hundred and fifty days as from the date the organic laws under Section 267 (1), (2), (3) and (4) have come into force.”

            According to the 2017 constitution, there are two main interpretations of Section 268; by the government; and by politicians.

            If the government argues that Section 268 did not clearly state the election timeline, then the law must be interpreted in the interests of the people, meaning that elections must be held within 150 days. This period is sufficient for elections to be completed.

            Indeed, the Thai electoral timeline has been delayed multiple times by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), and it is time to return power to the people.

            The NCPO interpreted the “one hundred and fifty days” in Section 268 as a period to set the election date rather than the period for elections to be completed. This interpretation raises a question about the November 2018 election timeline, as announced by Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-O-Cha, as to whether it is to be postponed, or if there will be election at all in 2018.

            Additionally, the interpretation of Section 268 by the NCPO and the Government demonstrates the apparent intention to once again extend the election timeline, which is not in interests of democracy.

            The interpretation of the “one hundred and fifty days” in Section 268 by politicians is more beneficial for the people and democracy, because they argued that elections must be completed within 150 days of the date the organic laws under Section 267 (1), (2), (3) and (4) have come into force.

            If either party requests the court to interpret this Section, it will further delay a return to democracy, despite the law already clearly stipulating that the “Election of members of the House of Representatives under this Constitution shall be held within one hundred and fifty days."

 

Prayut’s trip to Washington confirms US non-interventionist foreign policy opinion

Prayut’s trip to Washington confirms US non-interventionist foreign policy opinion

October 03, 2017 01:00 By Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation
Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha answered President Donald Trump’s invitation yesterday by paying a call at the White House.

The trip cannot be simply treated as a restoration of US-Thai relations that were soured by the 2014 coup staged by Prayut and the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO).

The meeting between the two leaders in fact signals a departure from America’s role as democratic champion in Thailand and Southeast Asia, while establishing a comfort zone for the military government to operate both in the Thai political landscape and in US-Thai relations. 

The Trump administration is now establishing a non-interventionist foreign policy in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world, echoing China’s foreign policy stance since the mid-1950s. 

In the diplomatic language of the White House, Trump and Prayut were to “discuss ways to strengthen and broaden bilateral relations and enhance cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region”, with Thailand hoping that this would re-energise their relations.

The photo opportunity for Prayut and Trump, against the backdrop of the world’s most powerful office, reaffirms speculation that Trump’s “America First” foreign policy platform is putting US national interests above the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights.

Whether intended or not, the White House yesterday endorsed the NCPO’s “Thai-style democracy” – characterised by the suppression of political freedoms and free expression – and also accepted its rhetoric that Thailand is “not ready for democracy”. This could result in further delays in the Thai democratic timeline set by the NCPO.

The meeting rejects the democratic principle in the US constitution embodied in the words “We The People”, while endorsing the authoritarian and elitist model of governance in Southeast Asia. 

Despite growing criticism of Trump’s democracy and human rights record, the US remains a global leader of liberal democracy. As such, a meeting with the US president is a visa for dictators and strongmen to enter the democratic world and whitewash themselves and their records. It enables them to legitimise their position at home and redefine democratic norms in a way that fits their regimes. 

Thus, democracy without liberty and freedom is labelled illiberal democracy. Is this the form of democracy that best fits Thailand? Is this a form of governance that the US seeks to promote across the globe, following its engagement in the infamous Vietnam War it claimed was for democracy?

Washington’s imitation of Beijing’s “non-interference policy” not only undermines democratic progress in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world, but it also raises questions about America’s competence to review and criticise the state of democracy and human rights in foreign countries.

The US State Department’s 2017 Trafficking in Persons report kept Thailand on the “Tier 2 Watch List”, due to its failure to meet minimum standards. Yet Thailand is working hard to meet benchmarks set by the US, which proves that criticism from outside can improve human rights in the country.

Former secretary of state Madeleine Albright emphasises that the promotion of democratic freedoms beyond America’s borders is a duty of the US government. Thus, if the US decides to compromise on the current state of Thai democracy and human rights, it will work in favour of the junta and against the Thai people. 

In his inaugural speech at the United Nations, Trump said “we do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example for everyone to watch”. Nevertheless, the president must understand that protecting universal values of democracy cannot be considered as intervening in a foreign country’s affairs, while lending support to a dictator certainly constitutes intervention. 

The US Embassy in Bangkok has remained aloof to persisting anti-American and anti-democratic sentiment in Thailand, especially in the Thai political divide of the past decade. 

Trump’s compromise with the Thai junta will help soften anti-American sentiment among conservative Thais, while damaging the United States’ core foreign policy values – democracy and human rights. 

“I don’t think the US should have invited him [Prayut] to the White House, because he did not come to power by an election. As such, he cannot represent the country”, comments a student from a university in the Northeast of Thailand, speaking anonymously.

Although US non-interference is not entirely a replication of its Chinese counterpart, Washington appears to be leaning further towards Beijing’s understanding of foreign policy.

Today, the world is increasingly concerned that Trump’s “America First” actually means “America Alone”, especially since the US departure from the Paris Climate Agreement. Under Trump, invitations to the White House are primarily intended to serve private US interests, while traditional American values and concern at the human rights records of allies take a back seat. One glaring example is the invite extended to Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, whose war on drugs has seen at least 7,000 people assassinated in extra-judicial killings. 

If the Trump administration wishes to maintain US leadership in promoting democracy beyond its borders, then it must reconsider its non-interference foreign policy stance. Otherwise the US will become just another China in Southeast Asia.   

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.

My in-depth interview with respect to the state of Thai politics

My in-depth interview with respect to the state of Thai politics:

Although the literal translation of the headline is rather provocative; “The Military Must Leave Politics”, I discussed various topics related to the current state of Thai politics.

In summary, I argued that:

• Many Thais are now in denial to accept that they are rejecting democracy as a form of governance and are instead resorting to an authoritarian form of governance.

• The current state of normalcy is a result of political suppression by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), which undermines the necessity of democracy because people are misled by the fabricated calmness. Therefore, they have become more convinced that Thai democracy requires the military.

• Primarily, the timeline to return to democracy largely depends on the ability of the military to maintain its grip on power.

• Since the 2014 coup, many Thais have been misled into believing that the problem of corruption fundamentally stems from politicians, and it is, therefore, important to get rid of politicians. However according to various research, corruption is embedded in all sectors, so it is important to look beyond politicians and promote transparency in order to enhance people’s ability to monitor those in power.

• The military have signaled that the country’s democratic timeline will be delayed.

• I believe that the military is desperate for elections because it offers a means for their power to be legitimized, but the tendency for a Phue Thai Party victory increases paranoia.

• I do not think there will be a violent confrontation or bloodshed if the general elections are postponed from 2018. This is in part because compromise is a key component of the Thai mentality.

• I think military coups d'états will continue to be part of Thai politics, because it has taken root in the Thai political system as a correcting mechanism for when democracy fails. This creates problems for the progress of democracy in Thailand, because large numbers of Thai people do not believe that democracy has the ability to correct itself.

Asean Way means no respect for human rights of the Rohingya

September 29, 2017 01:00

By Titipol Phakdeewanich  Special to The Nation

Western Myanmar is under the world’s spotlight for what the United Nations calls a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya people. From the other side of the globe, the European Union has slammed the crackdown in Rakhine state as “a human rights crisis with serious humanitarian consequences”. 

That concern is apparently not shared by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, of which Myanmar is a member. Asean has remained largely silent on the Rohingya crisis. 

Myanmar’s de-facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her government have been widely condemned for insufficient efforts to resolve the crisis. Fellow Nobel laureate Desmond Tutu recently branded the crisis “slow genocide” and urged Suu Kyi to speak out for justice and human rights. Amnesty International also calls the Myanmar military’s crackdown in Rakhine a “genocide”, intended to erase the minority Rohingya from the map.   

It took Suu Kyi almost four weeks before she finally spoke out against the human rights violations last week. Many suspect her televised address merely intended to dampen criticism from the UN General Assembly session in New York, rather than to protect Rohingya Muslims’ rights. 

Although almost half the population of Myanmar’s Rohingya – more than 400,000 – have already fled to Bangladesh, the exodus is apparently not significant enough for Asean or its members to take a stance on rights violations.

The huge humanitarian crisis in Myanmar confirms a now common observation – that the “Asean Way” fundamentally fails to recognise human rights.

The regional bloc claims that such recognition is in fact enshrined in its Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, leading to the introduction of the 2012 Asean Human Rights Declaration.

The Declaration was strongly criticised by the UN Human Rights Council for failures to embrace and synchronise with the international language of human rights. Nevertheless, it has gone unchanged, with its implementation overruled by the bloc’s fundamental principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs of member states”. Effectively this means that beliefs in cultural supremacy have been maintained at the expense of common humanity.

Despite Asean’s commitment to “strengthen democracy” and “to promote and protect human rights”, the institution and its member states continue to deny the universality of democracy and human rights. This results in the further alienation of their citizens from universal norms.

Asean countries do not welcome criticism of their democracy and human rights records, especially when it comes from the West. Bloc members often resort to combative “East versus West” rhetoric to defend their failures to comply with international commitments, as observed since the 1990s in the discourse of “Asian values” first championed by Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew. 

Of course, East and West have never and never will be the same, but fundamental human rights do not have borders, national identity or ownership. They are simply a birthright and entitlement of all of us.

Increasing international criticism of the Myanmar government’s handling of the Rohingya crisis is a clear signal that Asean must reconsider its non-interference policy in this case, if its human rights mechanism is to retain any credibility. 

However, there is no indication that Asean countries will suspend that policy, which it claims is crucial for the national sovereignty of its members. 

Support for the Asean Way has been growing among neighbouring countries since the previous Rohingya exodus in 2014-’15.

A nationalistic policy of non-interference in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand has been spurred by fears of the financial and security burdens that large numbers of refugees would bring.

These fears are fanned by the social media, while human rights and humanitarian concerns are dismissed by nationalist groups.

 “Take them [the Rohingya] to stay in your home if you are so worried about them!”, is a familiar refrain among Southeast Asian Facebook users. This nationalist mentality allows the non-interference norms to be wielded expediently by the region’s leaders, while the Rohingya suffer as victims of the effective collusion between the Myanmar state and its Asean partners. 

Southeast Asia’s leaders have indicated that changing the Asean Way by removing its focus on the supremacy of cultural norms and non-interference is not an option. This is seen, for example, in the denial of same-sex marriage in Singapore in 2015, and the increasing limitations placed on freedom of expression in Thailand since the 2014 military coup.

Asean leaders will find that human rights cannot be tailored to suit the Asean Way, since this universal value is a birthright and not something that can be limited or dictated by the bloc’s leadership.

The limited humanitarian aid now being offered by Asean is only in recognition of “pseudo-rights” expediently granted to the Rohingya. For as long as the regional bloc fails to protect their full rights as human beings, the existing 2012 Asean Human Rights Declaration will remain merely ornamental, rather than a mechanism to meaningfully promote and protect the fundamental rights of Asean citizens.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England. 

My interview with respect to the meeting between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and his cabinet members, and Chart Thai Party.

My interview with respect to the meeting between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and his cabinet members, and Chart Thai Party during the mobile Cabinet meeting in Supanburi Province, and its implication on the continuing role of the military in Thai politics.

Regardless of the support for the military among politicians or political parties, there is already a strong indication that the military intends to maintain their grip on power, and continue to govern Thailand for perhaps the next ten years or so. The military has already structurally embedded itself in the Thai political landscape through the 2017 Constitutions, through the creation of new government agencies, and via military appointments to various independent organisations.

The meeting between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and Chart Thai Party is not unprecedented in the context of Thai political history. Instead, the meeting merely demonstrates a repetition of the game of power, in which it is quite common for Thai politicians to submit to the military for their own political gains when the military is in charge.

Unfortunately, the cosy relations between the military and politicians only reflects their mutual interests at the expense of democracy. The Chart Thai Party’s support for the military will continue to damage the Thai democracy.

Indeed, the military should have only a very small role, or even none at all in the democratisation of the country. Therefore, the continued role of the military in Thai politics does not indicate a bright future for Thai democracy.

Academic freedom is dying under military rule: Universities must step up

Academic freedom is dying under military rule: Universities must step up
opinion September 09, 2017 01:00 By Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation

Ever since it interrupted Thailand’s democratic progress by seizing power from the people in the 2014 military coup, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) has maintained that suppressing freedom of expression is crucial to its timeline for a return to democracy.

This is despite continuous criticism from within and outside the country over the state of civil liberties under junta rule.

For the past three years, the NCPO has been fairly successful in integrating itself into everyday public and political life. Its critics, meanwhile, have attempted to regain public space to speak out against the current politics of fear and intimidation, enforced in the name of “national security” and “political stability”.

This “new normal” of public acceptance for suppression of dissent against the military raises a question: will Thailand forever overrule the universal concept of free expression and instead develop its own version of democracy without endorsing certain basic civil liberties?

In its 2017 rankings for countries, rights NGO Freedom House rated Thailand’s “Political Rights” at 6, and “Civil Liberties” at 5, using a scale of 1-7, with 7 being “Least Free”. Overall it rated Thailand as “Not Free”. This reflected the position of a country under military rule – though the report was largely rejected by the military’s supporters.  

Out of Thailand’s 65 million people, only a small group – including some academics – have been monitored, harassed or labelled as troublemakers by the NCPO and its supporters.

This relatively small number might explain why Thai people in general have shown little concern at such suppression.

Between 2014 and 2015, during a number of interactions with the military that included “invitations” to its base in Ubon Ratchathani province, I was asked not to organise a public seminar on democracy and human rights, and instead support the democratisation process under the NCPO. The question then arose of whether it is possible to leave democracy and its return in military hands.

In July 2015, the military sent invitations to me and several other representatives from four universities in Ubon Ratchathani. Attached was NCPO Order No 3/2015 on Maintaining Public Order and National Security, which cited Article 44 of the interim constitution, granting absolute power to the prime minister. The invitation said the attachment was merely official procedure, with no intention of threatening the recipients. In reality, it could only be understood as part of the deliberate cultivation of a climate of fear and intimidation against the academic community – a move which demanded a strong response from Thailand’s universities. Unfortunately, the universities remained silent and bowed to NCPO rule.  

On Tuesday, I was again invited to the military base in Ubon Ratchathani, regarding an upcoming seminar on the role of the Thai Human Rights Commission, to be held by the Political Science Faculty at Ubon Ratchathani University. The military warned the event could not go ahead on campus without permission from the NCPO.

A more serious attack on the academic community came recently with the charges laid against Professor Chayan Vaddhanaphuti, organiser of the 13th International Conference on Thai Studies, and a number of attendees. The charges came after criticism of the conference by the NCPO, criticism which Thai universities have remained silent towards. Indeed, none of the country’s 120 private and public universities has shown the courage to defend academic freedom.

Over the past decade, a number of Thai universities have functioned as a political machine against democracy.

(We note here a stark contrast with the pro-democracy movement at Thammasat University and others in the late 1970s.)

Arthit Ourairat, the president and owner of Rangsit University, one of Thailand’s top private universities, was actively involved in the 2013-2014 protests by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC). A large number of senior executives and leading academics from public institutions such as Chulalongkorn, Thammasat and Mahidol universities were also heavily involved in the PDRC, and some continue to serve the military regime.

While leaning towards the junta, Thai universities have been reluctant to protect freedoms on campuses, in part because they consider the military’s attacks on academic freedom as personal problems. Once universities take a lead in endorsing military rule, then academic freedom is in jeopardy.

It is time for Thai universities to re-examine their commitment to protecting academic freedom. The prime purpose of a university is to serve the public and the academic community, not to function as a government agency whose duty is to follow the orders of the junta. Academic voices and events must not be denounced as a threat to national security and the NCPO’s timeline for democracy. This dangerous trend has been inflated by growing distrust in politicians amid polarisation in Thai politics over the past decade, at the expense of freedoms.

Democracy functions on the principles of freedom and liberty, while the military functions by orders and obedience. Thus, democracy and the military are mutually exclusive, existing in opposing realms. Thai universities cannot afford to mislead the public if they want democracy to survive and prosper.

Unfortunately we are unlikely to see Thai universities find the courage to step up and protect academic freedom anytime soon. The ongoing decline of academic freedom in Thailand is therefore not merely the consequence of military pressure, but also due to universities actively permitting that freedom to suffocate under junta suppression.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at  the University of Warwick in England.

A summary of my interview in Matichon

A summary of my interview in Matichon, in relation to uncertainty surrounding the proposed 2018 general elections.

It should be no surprise if the scheduled 2018 elections are postponed due to the possibility of the Pheu Thai party winning. However, the 2017 Thai constitution will generate 250 appointed senators, which is in the interests of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and the military. This will reassure the military that they can secure the appointment of the ‘Prime Minister’.

In fact, I believe that the government also wants to hold the general election because it will be a stamp to legitimise their position in power, and are bolstered by the certainty that they can maintain power after the election. As a result, the international community will have fewer objections to their position in power.

The need for being accepted in the international community is key a factor for the NCPO to stick to its election road map. 

Thaksin founded the Shinawatra dynasty, but the military empowered it

Thaksin founded the Shinawatra dynasty, but the military empowered it 

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH 

SPECIAL TO THE NATION 

The departure of the former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, who fled the country prior to a Supreme Court verdict on her rice-pledging policy, leaves various questions concerning the future of herself and the Shinawatra family, the Pheu Thai Party, and changes in the Thai political landscape. 

It is premature to see her exit as the end of the Shinawatra era in Thai politics, since events after the two military coups of 2006 and 2014 demonstrate that the clan’s influence cannot be abolished simply by military force. Instead, the coups did the reverse, keeping the Shinawatras politically alive and empowered. 

The 2006 coup, led by the Council for Democratic Reform, ousted then-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai government – but it did not diminish his influence. 

In 2014 the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) staged a coup amid escalating violence surrounding protests by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) in 2013- 2014, and removed prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, the Pheu Thai Party leader, from office. 

Her 2011 electoral success had obviously capitalised on the popularity of her brother, Thaksin. Yet her candidacy was perceived by some as a battle to represent Shinawatra family interests, rather than the interests of Pheu Thai voters. During electoral campaigning, she repeated the point she was Thaksin’s sister and reiterated his achievements as a means to gain support. 

After she was ousted by the military in 2014, Yingluck began to establish her own, separate power base during multiple trips across the country, particularly in the North and Northeast, her party’s stronghold. She was successful in boost- ing her popularity and keeping Pheu Thai relevant to its constituents, and also portraying herself as a victim of an illegitimate military intervention and faulty justice system. 

Yet for the Shinawatras’ political opponents, who advocated the coups, the clan is not a victim of military intervention but rather the root of the political divisiveness and problems that made it necessary. 

That leaves an elephant in the room. A large swathe of the Thai middle-class and anti-Thaksin groups have rejected democracy and now embrace military rule. This works in the interests of the Shinawatra family, and allows them to embed and empower themselves in the Thai political environment. 

The Thai Rak Thai Party and its incarnations have not lost an election since coming to power with a landslide victory of over 11 million votes in 2001. In the most recent election in 2011, its successor Pheu Thai won 15.7 million votes, under the guidance of Thaksin from outside Thailand. 

The 2006 and 2014 coups were intended to curtail the power and influence of the clan, but they badly backfired. Meanwhile the military’s continuing role in Thai politics is unlikely to weaken the Shinawatras’ grip in the long term because the military cannot establish trust through coercion. 

Another Shinawatra victory at the polls could well be followed by another military intervention, further empowering the clan. 

If they want to break this cycle, the Thai middle-class and elite cannot continue to blindly dismiss the very core democratic principle of one-man-one- vote, while embracing military rule on the pretext that rural voters are victims of populist policies and vote-buying. 

While vote-buying was indeed a significant problem in Thailand from the 1970s into the 2000s, today it has little significant impact because most voters are fully aware of party manifestos and their implications on public policies. Moreover, middle-class assumptions that rural voters are naive are not only outdated and erroneous, but emphasise the inherent socio-political inequalities which gave rise to Thaksin in the first place. 

Therefore, the 2010 red-shirt protest was not primarily an endorsement of the Shinawatra family, but rather an outcry by the long-ignored rural poor, who wanted to protect their voting rights under the Thai constitution and the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Thailand is a signatory. 

On the one hand, democracy offered Thaksin the opportunity to establish his Shinawatra political dynasty. But on the other, the same democracy offers voters a mechanism to remove the Shinawatra family through an election. 

Political popularity can last a long time, but not forever. When a party in power can no longer satisfy voters’ needs, voting decisions change. This is how representative democracy functions. 

Pheu Thai’s victory was no miracle, but rather a result of research by the party that enabled it to respond to the demands of voters, who were regarded as stockholders in the arena of public policy. This is a fundamental notion of representative democracy, in which parliamentary members represent the interests of the constituents who provided them with a mandate. 

Whether the Shinawatras will now maintain their involvement with Pheu Thai is unclear, but the departure of Yingluck is unlikely to signal the end of the clan’s influence on Thai politics. 

Meanwhile the military has indicated it intends to control the country for the next decade or two, pending permission from the political elite and middle class and their continuing willingness to limit democracy to prevent the return of the Shinawatra clan. 

Nevertheless, we might still see a day when the Shinawatra family vanishes from the Thai political landscape altogether. But only when a genuine democracy is given the opportunity to function without military intervention. 

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England. 

A summary of my interview in Matichon, with respect to the appointment of the first 12 experts, including military and businessmen to the 34-member National Strategy Committee

A summary of my interview in Matichon, with respect to the appointment of the first 12 experts, including military and businessmen to the 34-member National Strategy Committee.

Theoretically speaking, the appointment of businessmen as members of the National Strategy Committee would be good for the country. However, the political attitudes of these committee members must also be considered, in terms of whether they believe in democracy, which is important for the future of Thailand’s political and economic reforms. It will not be in the best interests of Thai democracy if these businessmen only seek to serve their own business interests.

Currently some business groups are satisfied with the current state of “perceived political stability” under the military. However, I would argue that the state of calmness and normalcy under military suppression can not be equated to “political stability”; the two are not the same. The more we accept the military involvement, the less opportunities that are available for democracy to prosper in Thailand.

The appointments demonstrate that the military sticks to the same set of people. It is time to consider appointing new people, and new voices into the circle of this administration. 

The military’s declarations that it has no intention of maintaining its power is unconvincing, because they continue to appoint military officers to the National Strategy Committee, whilst abandoning highly qualified Thai civilians. For example, the appointment of military officers as experts on environmental issues in the National Strategy Committee is unnecessary, because Thailand has a number of environmental experts outside the military circle.

If the military wants to convince the general public that they have no intention of maintaining their grip on power in Thai politics, the first thing they must do is to reduce or cease appointing military personnel to various government committees or bodies. Thus far, we have seen the appointment of military officers in every facet of government.

Time to end hazing culture in universities

By TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH

Special to The Nation

Students’ human rights being violated by execs turning a blind eye to the excesses

This year is just another year in which we witness a compromise on the infamous Thai university culture of hazing, referred to at Thai universities as “rub-nong”. Although the severity of hazing has gradually scaled down with each annual intake, concerns remain over the violation of human rights and the humiliation of human dignity on campuses, as well as criticism about whether this culture of hazing benefits the students’ ability to learn at all.

This culture is criticised for violating human rights because of a mechanism called the “SOTUS system” (seniority, order, tradition, unity, spirit). This does not simply translate as respect for senior students in order to maintain a hierarchy on campus, but insinuates a form of social suppression for first year students, and treats them as inferior.

Despite rules and regulations to promote and protect human rights at Thai universities developed by the Office of the Higher Education Commission (OHEC) and the Ministry of Education (MOE), there are violations every year, and in some cases there are even fatalities. Will Thai universities continue to compromise on their infamous rub-nong, and allow it to pass on to another generation, even whilst there are increasing numbers of student voices in opposition to it?

All Thai universities claim to strictly implement the rules and regulations of the OHEC and the MOE, and maintain that they actively protect first-year students’ human rights. However, university executives across the country have typically turned a blind eye to such violations on university campuses.

First-year students, especially in universities outside Bangkok, are often forced to behave in a certain way, and are sometimes ordered by their seniors to humiliate themselves and trained as if they were serving in a military.

Eradication of this Thai university culture is not inevitable in the foreseeable future, because it has been both openly and secretly supported by many Thai academics in universities and schools, and also by Thai authorities who believe that this culture helps to reinforce Thailand’s hierarchical structure.

Therefore, the promotion and protection of human rights and human dignity are compromised and sacrificed for perceived campus unity as students conform to SOTUS and remain obedient to their seniors. Thai universities work as machines to reproduce and clone an obedient population for the country instead of equipping younger generations with the knowledge to empower themselves and improve the country.

Supporters of this SOTUS culture, including students, university lecturers and the general public, are deluded by the romantic idea of the Thai concept of “family”, regarded as a core Thai value, especially the concept of “brothers and sisters”. This fantasy ignores the fact that the SOTUS culture involves many elements of human rights violations.

In Thailand, this concept does not simply mean love, affection and kindness between family members, supporting each other in difficult times, but also includes obedience. Under the SOTUS culture, a “family” carries a strong connotation of “obedience” and “submission” towards senior members, while “inferior” members should be looked after by their seniors. Consequently, this university culture acts as a catalyst for the establishment and reinforcement of a Thai patronage system via a romantic delusion.

The concept of professionalism and meritocracy in the Thai labour market and the Thai bureaucracy, in which knowledge, skills and devotion are crucial in getting a job or a promotion, is undermined by the SOTUS culture which directly and indirectly perpetuates the patronage system. This is ironic because a vast majority of students are opposed to the Thai patronage system, while simultaneously hoping to benefit from it in one way or another. This allows the SOTUS culture to maintain its momentum on campus.

Indeed, the persistence of this university culture and its human rights violations demonstrates how Thai academia tolerates and ignores universal concepts of human rights, while embracing instead a Thai definition of human rights, which is far lower.

The second periodic report of Thailand in 2017 by the United Nations Human Rights Committee raised concerns about “the severe and arbitrary restrictions imposed on the right to freedom of opinion and expression”. It therefore recommended Thailand “take all measures necessary to guarantee the enjoyment of freedom of opinion and expression in all their forms”

A call for the eradication of this culture has been growing among younger generations and human rights defenders. For example, the Anti-SOTUS Facebook page has garnered almost 300,000 “likes” and “followers”. However, a social media campaign is ineffective under the current political circumstances in which the country is controlled by the military.

Indeed, allowing SOTUS to continue works for, not against, the military government because many students opposed to the 2014 coup d’etat accept the SOTUS culture. Insofar as the military is concerned, the SOTUS system serves to reinforce subservience and obedience in wider society.

Thai universities can no longer afford to allow the SOTUS culture to persist and reproduce obedient graduates, because the ability to question and challenge seniority or authority is important, and is necessary for Thailand’s future development.

After the introduction of the first National Economic and Social Development Plan in 1961, it took Thailand at least another 35 years to realise that an active population is crucial for development. Consequently, in 1997 the country emphasised human development in its eighth plan. It aimed at substantive educational reforms, specifically in relation to both learning and teaching processes in order to generate active learners. But, after two decades of this ambition, university students remain mostly unchanged.

The persistence of SOTUS will only delay this process and constrain the ability of university students to learn and question.

It is now time for Thai universities to take real action against it, or otherwise let this decay continue to erode the future of the country and its students.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.

My interview in Matichon with respect to whether the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) should grant permission for political parties to organise political activities

My interview in Matichon with respect to whether the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) should grant permission for political parties to organise political activities:

We should not have asked this question now because political parties should have been allowed to function a long time ago. The NCPO perceive political activities as a threat to national security, which I disagree with. In order to prepare Thailand’s return to democracy, political parties should be able to function normally. They should be able to organise party-meetings or other political activities. If these activities are banned it would not be in the interest of Thai democracy.

I argued that it is important for political parties to meet and communicate with the people and their constituents. I do not think that Yingluck’s court case (over allegations of corruption surrounding the implementation of Yingluck’s rice-pledging policy) is the main contributing factor to the NCPO’s ban of political activities. The NCPO might be concerned about the political movement of Yingluck’s power base and their distrust in other political parties.

Indeed, I argued that the NCPO is quite scared of the functioning of democracy, scared of elections, scared of voices of the people and of freedom of speech.

I believe that the NCPO will not grant permission for political parties to organise any political activities until they have set a precise timeline for elections.

If the NCPO truly want to return Thailand to democracy, then it is important to give a permission to political parties to function now. Delaying such permissions will not be in the interests of the NCPO in the long term.

Social tolerance not a substitute for LGBT rights

August 07, 2017 01:00 By Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation

it is time for formal legal recognition of human rights, including LGBT rights and equal marriage

After US President Donald Trump’s distasteful tweet announcing his intention to ban transgender people from serving in the military, there was a strong reaction. His announcement backfired as people within and outside of the United States called on him to uphold the principles of human rights, namely, equality, dignity and rights.

Trump’s tweet reaffirmed public speculation over his LGBT policy, which is starkly different from former president Barack Obama’s recognition of LGBT rights as human rights.

This is of little public concern in Thailand, since most transgender people are not inclined to serve in the military. Though this illustrates the different national perceptions towards the rights of LGBT people in Thailand and the US, the violation of LGBT rights remains an ongoing challenge for both nations and the rest of the world.

Thailand is neither one of the 72 countries where homosexuality is illegal and people can potentially be arrested, as recently observed in the arrest of 40 Nigerian men for performing homosexual acts, nor those eight countries where homosexuality is punishable by death.

With its famous “ladyboy” performances in Pattaya and elsewhere, Thailand is perceived as a very gay-friendly land, and can hardly be described as an anti-gay or anti-LGBT society, in part because there is a high level of social acceptance and tolerance towards members of these minority groups.

Same-sex marriage occasionally receives mainstream media and social media coverage in Thailand, reinforcing its high public support. A cultural ceremony, a marriage ceremony without the accompanying legally binding status of marriage, misleads some Thai people to believe that our country is one of the 24 nations across the globe in which same-sex marriage is legal. Consequently, people are distracted from discussing LGBT rights in a serious manner, and have entered a social comfort zone in which there is an illusion of rights where they don’t actually exist in law. This illusion continues the poor public awareness of the inequalities between genders and sexual orientation in the country.

For example, there are few formal complaints of job discrimination made by LGBT people, but this does not mean that there is no job discrimination against LGBT people in Thailand. Indeed there are instances of discrimination, but they are not normally considered violations of the rights of LGBT people. Rather, they reflect the Thai job market in general, which is dominated by the problem of personal connection and the belief in luck and destiny. Accordingly, there is little connection made with the concept of rights and equality in the job market.

In 2011, at the United Nations convention in Geneva, Switzerland, the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasised that LGBT people are no less human than others, and so LGBT rights are human rights and must be protected by the state. In the same year,  Obama signed a presidential memorandum entitled “International Initiatives to Advance the Human Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Persons,” in order “to ensure that US diplomacy and foreign assistance promote and protect the human rights of LGBT persons”.

US commitment

The declaration reaffirmed the US commitment to the promotion of LGBT rights. To a certain extent, low levels of commitment from the Thai state, and the different values and social practices between Thailand and the West, holds back our country from making progress on LGBT rights.  A majority of Thais, regardless of their sexual preferences or orientation, are confused by the gulf between the existence of widespread social tolerance and officially recognised rights. This confusion leads to a widespread, but erroneous, belief that social tolerance is a legitimate substitute for legally recognising the rights of minorities.

Thailand is little different from its ASEAN neighbours and the rest of Asia, where minority rights are not normally protected and enshrined by the state because cultural walls are erected in the name of national pride. Consequently, what is considered normal and accepted beyond the continent are not often embraced by Asian countries. This prevents Thailand from fully appreciating the universality of rights as proclaimed by the United Nations: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”

In 2015 Singapore announced that the country was not yet ready for same-sex marriage. The same year, in the West, the US legalised same-sex marriage. This summer, Germany became the 15th European country allowing same-sex marriage.

In part, the lack of progress with LGBT rights in Thailand is related to the focus of society and the LGBT community on HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.

The health issues have attracted resources to support work in that area from international donors such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The country’s leading LGBT NGO, the Rainbow Sky Association of Thailand, has also been primarily working on HIV issues rather than the struggle for rights recognition. Also, domestic funding sources focus on HIV because LGBT people and prostitutes are considered to be at a high risk of infection.

However, this year we have observed a shift of support among international donors to a focus on rights and equality. The Embassy of Sweden in Bangkok, in collaboration with USAID and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), have implemented the “Being LGBT in Asia” project to support basic LGBT rights, and address discrimination against LGBT people across the continent.

In Thailand and the rest of Asia, the debate on the promotion of rights is often framed in terms of a clash of values between the East and the West. This is a false argument. LGBT rights are not advanced as Western values. They are an acceptance of fundamental and inalienable human rights and equality for all people of the world. Including the people of the Eastern part of the world.

Appointing envoys

Indeed, one of the most effective Western foreign policy instruments to promote LGBT rights across the globe is the appointment of gay diplomats and ambassadors. They include Ted Osius, appointed as US ambassador to Vietnam in 2014 by Obama, and Brian Davidson, appointed as British ambassador to Thailand in 2016.

These appointments send a strong message to the rest of the world that being gay does not devalue their humanity, and that they are no less capable of performing such senior roles.

This is a call for Thailand and the rest of Asia to wake up and truly reconsider their support for LGBT rights. After all, they are simply recognition of human rights, which Thailand already claims to promote and respect. Nothing else can substitute for that formal recognition.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University.