My interview in Matichon with respect to the role and contribution of the National Reform Council

My interview in Matichon with respect to the role and contribution of the National Reform Council:

Since the 2014 coup, Thailand has changed little. Reform is a long-term and ongoing process. Indeed, Thailand and Thai people tend to deny changes, for example Thais accept a military culture within the democratic process.

There are different areas of reform such as economic, social, and educational reforms. However, for example, we have seen little educational reform under the current government. We have seen too many tutorial schools in Thailand, and it has become a part of Thai-education culture that students must pay for private tuition at such tutorial schools. Indeed, a large number of these school reflects a failure of the Thai education system which must be addressed before the Thai education system can be improved.

The very same metaphor can be applied to the country. When the government cannot properly function, Thailand should restructure its organisations and ministries in order to improve their long term effectiveness, instead of simply establishing a reform council.

I argue that most problems and recommendations, such as income inequality and education issues which have been highlighted by the National Reform Council are not significantly different from what we already heard from the existing governmental organisations such as the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB).

Indeed, after the 2014 coup we observed greater centralisation and the expansion of bureaucratic power. Government officials remain unresponsive to the demands of the people.

In addition, prior the 2014 coup government officials were rather submissive towards politicians, and they are now very submissive towards the military. It has been observed that government officials work to please the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), rather than seeking to solve the country’s problems.

Thai rice politics and the FUTURE of agricultural subsidies

THE NATION Saturday, July 29, 2017
TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH
SPECIAL TO THE NATION

Each wet season, Thai farmers begin cultivating their annual crop anticipating both natural and market uncertainties. For these farmers, nothing can be taken for granted. Last year excessive rain destroyed much of their crop, this year too little or too much water could do the same. Nevertheless, the uncertainties confronting Thai farmers are typical of the problems farmers face worldwide, thus subsidies remain crucial for the survival of farmers.

The previous Yingluck administration implemented one of the most controversial and expensive farming subsidy policies in Thai history, allegedly costing the state more than Bt500 billion. Her rice-pledging policy was criticised for a lack of substance to help farmers survive in the capitalist market, instead simply putting cash in their hands.

Yingluck’s rice policy has also been fiercely criticised by her political opponents for destroying market mechanisms, and perhaps violating Thailand’s world trade commitments. In a 2013 meeting of the WTO Agriculture Committee, Canada, the US, Australia and the EU questioned whether Thailand had breached its domestic support limits.

Although, 86.5 per cent of farmers were reportedly satisfied with the policy, the rice-pledging scheme was politicised and became one of the main contributing factors to Yingluck’s ouster by military coup in 2014, resulting in allegations against her of corruption and charges she neglected her duty to over- see the scheme.

The Supreme Court rules on August 25, and a guilty verdict would have serious ramifications for the political futures of Yingluck and her Pheu Thai Party, as well as for the ongoing Thai political conflict. But it would also indicate the future prospects of farm subsidies in Thailand.

That there was corruption in the implementation of rice-pledging is undeniable, and rigorous law enforcement is required to handle the case. Indeed, corruption was also observed during the implementation of the rice price-guarantee policy under her predecessor, Abhisit Vejjajiva.

In addition, a number of corruption allegations made against rice-pledging were targeted not at its implementation, but at pre-existing problems in the Thai rice industry, one example being the rigging of scales to measure moisture in farmers’ paddy in the rice mills. It is crucial to scrutinise all stakeholders involved, rather than primarily focusing on politicians.

The public is now questioning whether Thailand should maintain such policies to support rice farmers. Is there any future prospect for rice subsidies?

“I cannot survive with the money from selling rice, now. I used to make just enough money from the [rice- pledging] policy. You don’t understand why it [the subsidy] is important, because you are not a farmer. I still hope this [Prayut] government restores the rice-pledging policy to help us. I borrowed money to buy lots of things for farming,” stated a rice farmer in Si Sa Ket province.

Thai farmers have always received sympathy for their hard work from the urban-middle class, and they have been regarded as the backbone of the nation for centuries. Nevertheless, public sympathy doesn’t necessary translated into support for rice subsidies, especially since the rural populace has been stereotyped as easily falling into debt and expecting to be rescued by the government. The urban-middle class respect is often based on an idealised and romanticised vision of rice farming that fails to reflect the financial vulnerability.

Indeed, the very high price of rice during the Yingluck government was a double-edged sword. Not only did it help provide household liquidity for rice farmers, but it also encouraged farmers to increase their production in order to increase their household income, resulting in oversupply of rice to the market. Rural farmers are typically attracted by economically viable crops, so it is logical that they would seek to maximise their potential profit.

Of course, farm subsidies must not be treated as a form of entitlement, especially in the form of cash payments. Subsidies should be provided as a form of relief programme, which can financially support farmers to be able to compete in the market in the long run.

The military government and its supporters are not entirely convinced of the need for rice subsidies and their importance for the growth of the Thai economy. Indeed, few Thais are aware of the historic contribution rice farmers have made to the economy, since this rarely features in the history books.

Between 1950s and 1970s, the “rice premium” (export tax) was a crucial source of government revenue, used to boost the country’s industrialisation. In 1953, government revenue from rice was 32 per cent of the total revenue. This missing piece of information pre- vents new generations from appreciating the transfer of public resources to subsidise the Thai agricultural sector today.

Rice and agricultural subsidies are often dismissed as populist policy, motivated by politicians’ desire to win elections. A vast majority of Thais still believe that subsidies represent a wasteful use of public resources.

They are correct to an extent, but not entirely. At the very least, farmers have to produce crops in order to obtain support from the government, so there is no such thing as a free lunch for rice farmers. In addition, working in a rice field is not a dream career for any Thai youngster, even those doing degrees in agriculture. Therefore, rice subsidies can also be utilised as a long-term national strategy that secures our ability as a nation to feed ourselves.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.

Thailand’s reconciliation trap is preventing democratic progress

July 22, 2017 01:00 
By Titipol Phakdeewanich 
Special to The Nation

This week, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) launched a nationwide “social contract” as part of its reconciliation plan, which began in March. In essence, the military-drafted social contract aims to reunite the country in the hope that Thai people can move forwards together.

The NCPO says this is a significant step forward since the 2014 coup, and should resolve Thailand’s decade-long political division.  However, military-led reconciliation has met with sceptical responses both inside and outside the country. Observers question whether it can truly reunite Thailand as a nation, or whether it is simply a political ploy for the military to gain trust and legitimacy, rather than allow reconciliation led by all parties involved.  So, can the junta’s dream of forced reconciliation become a reality?

The military is fully aware of public scepticism over its role and involvement in the reconciliation process. Thus it has made clear that it will attend the public reconciliation forums only to listen, not to express any opinion or discuss issues, so as to ensure that “invited participants” are free to express their views on conflict solutions and reconciliation.  

One such forum was held this week at the 21st Military Circle in Nakhon Ratchasima province. An impression it left was that foreign countries and institutions are a potential threat to national security, and their actions and criticism directed at Thailand – particularly in relation to its politics, democracy and human rights since 2014 – are interpreted as a form of intervention. Freedom House classified Thailand as “Not Free” in its 2017 report on political and civil rights. 

Though organised by the military, the NCPO’s reconciliation process is in fact little different from the process pursued under the administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva. Following the 2010 crackdown on red-shirt protesters, Abhisit initiated the National Reform Committee (NRC), chaired by former prime minister Anand Panyarachun. In 2013, we also witnessed reconciliation attempts under the government of Yingluck Shinawatra, who invited the former British prime minister Tony Blair to speak on reconciliation. 

The NCPO’s public forums have delivered similar information to those held under Abhisit’s NRC, with proposals for economic, social and political reforms aimed especially at more equable allocation of public resources. In fact, this latest reconciliation effort is providing no new information, instead only mirroring and repeating data already known to the Thai public and international observers from the earlier process. 

The junta outwardly claims that Thailand is a democratic country moving towards a more democratic environment. However there is plenty of cause for scepticism over whether the military believes that Thailand’s political divide can be bridged through a more democratic environment. 

Throughout the three years since the May 2014 coup, the NCPO has attempted to introduce a military culture as an integral component of “Thai-style” democracy. Inside barracks, power and force, order and commands, are vital to the proper functioning of the Thai military. Seniority based on rank and the strict enforcement of a hierarchical structure is the mechanism that creates unity. Indeed, this kind of military culture is almost identical to the prevailing concept of “Thainess” enshrined in the NCPO’s “Twelve Core Values for a Strong Thailand”. 

The military’s prioritising of reconciliation ahead of democracy and human rights makes complete sense to the vast majority of Thais. This is reinforced by memories of the economic damage caused by chaotic rallies in Bangkok and elsewhere, particularly during the protests in 2010 by the red shirts and in 2013-2014 by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC). 

So what would Thailand be like under a social contract enforced by the military? 

Despite its claims go the contrary, the contract is nothing other than a rejection of genuine representative democracy, in favour of establishing a “Thai-style” democracy, in which liberty and freedom are secondary to “order” and “stability”. The NCPO has repeatedly told the Thai people and the international community that Thailand’s cultural uniqueness cannot be undermined by its international commitments and international law, particularly human rights.  

Instead of falling into a reconciliation trap, the military and other Thai authorities must be more open-minded in acknowledging the issues surrounding country’s political conflicts, which are much wider than income inequality and imbalances. Indeed, Thailand’s political conflicts are seated in a poor understanding and perhaps rejection of the universal concept of human rights, which embrace and endorse dignity, rights, liberty, equality and freedom. These key values are given only a token place in the Thai education system, and have not yet been fully integrated.  

From school to university, young Thais are taught to respect adults, and to “live in harmony and promote unity” so that Thailand can be a peaceful, strong and independent society. These characteristics of “Thainess” are not necessarily anti-democratic and anti-human rights, but the ways in they are taught to young generations are an obstacle for Thailand’s democratic progress. 

Today, it is increasingly difficult to convince a majority of Thais that promotion of democracy and human rights can produce natural reconciliation and minimise conflicts, through greater equality and respect for individual dignity regardless of social background. 

Of course, democracy cannot guarantee equality and unity. But the rule of law is a democratic means to ensure that people’s rights are protected from violation by the state and individuals. In Thailand the law is not always applied equally across all groups. 

Unity and harmony cannot be forced, but are rather a product of the true and honest promotion of equality and rights. This challenge will persist as long as Thailand continues to overrule the universal concept of human rights, and keeps falling into the reconciliation trap and historic pride in its Thainess.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.

My interview in Matichon with respect to the government’s initiative of its new public relation mechanism and body

My interview in Matichon with respect to the government’s initiative of its new public relation mechanism and body: The government seems to believe that there is a communication problem between them and the people, therefore they wanted to ensure that people can receive more information from them than from other sources.

I argued that people have received sufficient information from the government, and it is therefore important for people to receive information from alternative sources rather than receiving one-sided information.

Every government has made good decisions and made mistakes. Thus, people should be able to access both positive and negative reflections on the government.

The problem is that the government tends to deny that mistakes have been made, such as the rejection of the problems concerning freedom of expression and human rights. The government should not accuse criticism as false or misleading information, and stop claiming that such information is a threat to national security.

The problem with Thailand today is that the government has been claiming that itself is the only trustworthy and reliable source of information. This is rather worrying for Thailand.

Indeed, I argued that the government does not really require any PR, because they speak on their own behalf to advertise the good job they are doing. Instead, if the government denies their mistakes, their reputation will be undermined.

Thai-US relations must rest on democratic values, not military ties

opinion July 15, 2017 01:00
By Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Naton


After long speculation on the future of Thai-US relations under the new administration in Washington, a phone call and invitation to the White House from President Donald Trump to Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha sent a clear message that Thailand remains America’s strategic partner.

Although the trip has been postponed, the invitation raised significant concerns among democracy advocates in Thailand. They are worried first that Washington’s new priorities could delay Thailand’s timeline for return to democracy, and second that Trump’s diplomacy is a de facto endorsement for the Thai military to extend its grip on power and gain legitimacy on the global political stage. 

Trump has been clear all along with both the American people and the rest of the world that his administration is all about “America First”. His political rhetoric has been criticised both at home and abroad by many who fear his administration is eroding “American values”, specifically of democracy and human rights, and also US global leadership.

In Bangkok, the US Embassy has attempted to demonstrate that America does and will continue to support democracy and human rights within Thailand. However, the unpredictable nature of Trump leaves pro-democracy groups with significant concerns that Washington could make a U-turn in its foreign policy direction whenever it chooses.

Trump’s speeches typically contain keywords we normally hear from US presidents, such as “democracy”, and “shared interests and values”. Indeed, these are essentially template messages from US presidents and State Secretaries, mentioned repeatedly when they speak to their global partners. Nevertheless, “security” has emerged above these as the most important keyword that Trump uses to address his domestic and foreign audiences. 

How far can the Trump administration continue to be a democratic partner with Thailand?  Trump and General Prayut share a low tolerance of criticism, particularly from the media. With his war against US media giants such as CNN and the New York Times – which he describes as bastions of  “fake news” – Trump has undermined the United States’ role in promoting global press freedom. 

Between 2010 and 2015, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) implemented the Sapan Programme, which was intended to promote democracy in Thailand. One of the main objectives was to empower civil society and the media to function as a check-and-balance mechanism within the political system. Is Trump capable of convincing his Thai partner to believe in this very American democratic element?

Washington’s policy stance towards Bangkok under President Trump’s predecessor Barack Obama appeared to be shaped by principles of democracy and human rights. The Obama administration made clear it regarded human rights as integral to US foreign policy. This is a rather different tone from that we are hearing from the Trump administration. 

Addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated: “It is unreasonable to expect that every foreign policy endeavour will be driven by human rights considerations alone, especially when the security of the American people is at stake.” This statement is in line with Trump’s focus on security, and with Trump as a market-capitalist president – human rights shouldn’t get in the way of American businesses making money.

According to the US government website ForeignAssistance.gov, the 2017 plans forThailand under the Trump administration are weighted 58 per cent towards “Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance” and 42 per cent towards “Peace and Security”. Although these figures may boost hopes for American democratic engagement with Thailand, scepticism remains.

Pursuing security issues might be attractive for the Thai military government, but not necessary for the vast majority of Thais. If Trump’s bilateral dealings with Thailand are overshadowed by US policies on wider regional security issues, particularly the South China Sea and North Korea, then Washington cannot afford to overemphasise its military strength, since this could rekindle  memories of its infamous military engagement during the Vietnam War. Today, a generation of Thais politicised by that war and other events of the 1970s remains sceptical of the US role, and questions its commitment to democracy. 

“I thought I was free to read and believe in what I wanted regarding democracy. I didn’t understand why the Americans and the Thai army went after us, when we believed in communism, if they [America] said that democracy is freedom of expression. I had to choose between escaping to China or being killed like my friends in my hometown [Amnat Charoen],” said a woman who fled Thailand on foot to live in exile in China for almost 18 years during the US insurgency against communism in Indochina.

Before Trump became president Thailand saw occasional protests against the US, especially by Thais annoyed at its “unwelcome” opinions on the state of democracy and human rights here. One might assume these protesters were part of an anti-American movement. However, closer analysis reveals they fall primarily in to two categories – namely anti-American and anti-democracy. 

In order to advance the interests of the US and protect American people in a country like Thailand, the exercise of soft power should be emphasised.

With respect to contemporary American history, most secretaries of state under the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations acknowledged and highlighted the importance of US soft power, “smart” power, and people-to-people diplomacy. 

In 2006, Secretary Condoleezza Rice introduced her idea of “transformational diplomacy”, a move away from depending exclusively on state-to-state relations. Instead, Rice suggested it was time for diplomacy to go beyond foreign capitals, using people-to-people contacts to enhance America’s reputation and interests.
Accordingly, social media have enabled the US Embassy in Bangkok to reach out and engage with young people, in addition to their conventional diplomacy in the capital. This younger generation generally celebrates liberty and freedoms, and craves for a more democratic environment. 

Washington must not dismiss younger people from the equation of Thai-US relations, since they are the driving force for Thai democratic progress. And after all, promoting democracy within Thailand is not only in the interests of the country and the Thai people, but it also serves to benefit US engagement within the region. 

Titipol Phakdeewanich is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.

Thai universal healthcare: Should it be a right with responsibility?

July 11, 2017 01:00 

By Titipol Phakdeewanich 

Special to The Nation 

In 2002, universal healthcare coverage was initiated by the Thai Rak Thai government. Nicknamed the Bt30 healthcare programme in reference to the cost of each medical visit, the scheme gave 49 million people living both above and below the poverty line almost free access to healthcare services.

Universal healthcare was overwhelmingly welcomed by the rural poor, especially in the North and Northeast (Isaan) – the political base of the Pheu Thai Party and its predecessor Thai Rak Thai. The policy remains a cornerstone of Pheu Thai’s platform, allowing it to maintain support and popularity by portraying itself as representing the rural poor.  

Since 2002, however, discussion on revising universal healthcare has been politicised and become politically sensitive. Increasing numbers of people have begun to perceive healthcare as an absolute right, with little consideration of it as a personal responsibility. This has triggered concerns over public expenditure on the programme. 

It is undeniable that a universal healthcare scheme is necessary, and it was originally introduced in compliance with Section 52 of the 1997 Constitution. Indeed, at that time the public was not fully aware that universal healthcare was a constitutional right that the state must provide. 

Most supporters of Thai Rak Thai perceived universal healthcare as a gift from the party, failing to realise it was a duty and responsibility of their representatives to pursue such a policy. This allowed the party to establish a personal bond with them – which in fact is typical of Thai political culture regardless of who is in government.  

Since 2014, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) has pushed for reform of the universal healthcare bill in order to introduce a co-payment scheme. This is partly because so many hospitals and doctors are complaining about the financial burden on the system, and claim that the people have been “spoiled” by the system and are now making too many unnecessary hospital visits. 

However, it is too simplistic to view the rising number of hospital visits and conclude that the universal healthcare scheme has spoiled the people, since the costs of healthcare are not just a medical bill for the rural poor.  

Patients, especially the rural poor, incur expenses every time they access medical treatment, including for travel and lost income from not working. Such expenses are a serious financial burden for a large number of patients and mean that rural people often can’t access hospital treatment even when they need it. However, this fact is generally missing from the healthcare debate among doctors and the middle class. 

“I have to get up at 1am to get here early for the hospital queue,” reports a villager who travelled from a district of Khemarat to the hospital in the city of Ubon Ratchathani recently. “Travelling from a rural part of the province to the hospital is not that easy. Sometimes we have to contribute Bt100 each to rent a truck to take us to the hospital. There are many things that we have to pay for to get here [hospital]. Paying the small amount of Bt30, or not paying at all, really helps us.”  

Healthcare should be free and considered a right for the rural poor, particularly for the 10.5 per cent of population that lives below the national poverty line – but not for all. For those who can afford it, healthcare should be considered a responsibility, for which a co-payment scheme should be applied. 

In addition, Thailand is now considered to be an ageing society, with about 7.5 million people or 11 per cent of the population over the age of 65. The World Bank estimates this figure will rise to 17 million by 2040. Public expenditure on healthcare will almost certainly rise as a result, presenting a big challenge for which the government must be prepared. 

The introduction of a co-payment scheme by the NCPO makes clear financial sense for the government. However, the validity of the move has been undermined by the priorities set for public expenditure under this administration. The NCPO has demonstrated that its spending often does not synchronise with the needs of millions of Thais. Recent examples include the US$393 million spent on submarines from China, and the agreement to purchase four Black Hawk helicopters from the United States. The NCPO claims these purchases are important for national security, despite the country not being at war.      

In his 2016 speech at the UN general assembly, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha highlighted the importance of healthcare: “We also have a continued policy of providing quality healthcare services for all.”  So where does the government’s priority lie now – with national security or with human security? 

This is an important question that must be answered by the military leadership. Can a country be secure without a healthy population? Can the economy prosper with a populace that is left prey to illness?  

Another important question is how much the junta can successfully reduce the public financial burden of healthcare through the introduction of a co-payment scheme. This is not entirely a question of spending priorities, however, but also a matter of political games, in which politicians will play an important role. Providing social welfare is always rewarding for politicians and those in power, because such policies help ensure they maintain public popularity.  

Exactly how much individuals will need to contribute to the co-payment scheme has not yet been finalised. However, this scheme must not become a barrier to accessing healthcare for those who live in poverty. 

Titipol Phakdeewanich is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England. 

Interview: Matichon (In Thai)

My interview in Matichon with respect to the "Police Reform": I disagree with the structure of the reform committee which is chaired by the military. I believe that it should be led by the those who are experts in their respective fields. For example, educational reform cannot be done by the military, for the same logical reason that police reform should be done by the police. However, it is also important to include various groups of stakeholders such as NGOs or representatives of the civil society. #reform #politics #police#politicalscientist