Quoted in The Nation

Quoted in The Nation:

"Despite all the legal complications having been cleared, political scientist Titipol Phakdeewanich from Ubon Ratchathani University said he had doubts that the election would take place next February.

“After all, it is the National Council for Peace and Order [NCPO] who will make the decision, not the Constitutional Court’s verdict,” he said.“Only when the junta itself announces the election date, can we be sure the election will take place.”

However, Titipol said that the NCPO should want an election as it was the only way to legitimise the military’s power in politics. But its decision to call one depends largely on whether or not it was certain that it could maintain its grip after the election, he said.

Titipol said there was a 70 to 90 per cent likelihood that the poll would be held. Considering the current circumstances – including the inauguration of the Action Coalition for Thailand Party, backed by former protest leader Suthep Thaugsuban – the academic said he believed the NCPO was ready for the election."

Last hurdle to Thai election cleared as parties law approved

Last hurdle to Thai election cleared as parties law approved: Activists sceptical over pledge of February poll, insist on vote this year

A summary of my interview in Matichon regarding the Constitutional Court’s ruling and its implications on the prospects for the 2019 Election.

A summary of my interview in Matichon regarding the Constitutional Court’s ruling and its implications on the prospects for the 2019 Election.

The Constitutional Court ruled that the organic bill on the election of MPs is valid and does not contradict with the 2017 constitution. However, this is not a guarantee for the long-awaited February 2019 Election. Thailand and a large number of its people have long been ready for elections and a return to democracy, whilst the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and the military are not yet ready to compete in the polls.

Despite protesting that military officers are not politicians, the military perceives new political parties, such as the Forward Future Party as political rivals.

The election will take place whenever the military is confident about the support they would get at the polls, as well as in the stability of their grip on power after the election.

One cannot ignore the fact that the NCPO can still implement Article 44 whenever it suits their political interests [including by postponing elections].

Despite numerous postponements to the electoral timeline, the NCPO’s recent indication to ensure the February 2019 election goes ahead may simply be a political ploy to minimise public resistance to the NCPO, and to buy time in the wake of protests and demonstrations of the “pro-election group”. It is too naive to take the NCPO’s election timeline seriously at this stage.

In addition, the post-election political circumstances in Malaysia may have raised some significant concerns amongst the NCPO, in relation to the potential scrutiny if the NCPO’s opposition wins a majority of seats and is able to wrest power. This is because of ongoing questions against the issue of corruption and transparency within the NCPO.

If the NCPO is genuine about returning to democracy, then there is no legitimate reason to ban political activities of political parties, especially of the Democrat Party and the Pheu Thai Party.

The NCPO has been using the mechanism of the state and public resources to mobilise its popularity, whilst preventing its political rivals, such as the Democrat Party and the Pheu Thai Party from campaigning.

In addition, I argued that if there is an indication that the Pheu Thai Party can convincingly win most of the seats in the North and the Northeast, and it is therefore very likely that the February 2019 election will be delayed once again.

In addition to the 250 appointed senators, the NCPO understands that support from MPs are crucial for the post-election politics. Therefore, we have seen the establishment of cosy relationships between the NCPO and many existing political groups.