US-Thai relations: A question of democracy versus obscurity?
Thailand cannot afford to indulge in go-it-alone nationalism at a time when our status as a regional hub is under threat
Amid the fallout from the increasingly vociferous anti-American sentiment being expressed in Thailand, one question comes to the fore: Is the historically close Thai-US relationship truly in jeopardy?
Those who listened carefully to the fairly standard remarks on the need for democratic progress delivered recently by Daniel Russel, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, might well ask what all the fuss is about. Nevertheless, the way in which this story plays out may tell us whether the 182-year Thai-US relationship is under threat.
W Patrick Murphy, the chargé d'affaires at the US Embassy, was invited to appear before the National Legislative Assembly yesterday, where he would likely have been asked to account for the recent statement made by Russel. But Murphy declined the invitation and the US State Department responded by saying it had no desire to further inflame the situation, but neither would it backtrack on its position regarding democracy.
The hollow and bombastic reaction among sections of the Thai public and media is predictable, though it is hardly meant for an international audience, beyond any US policymakers concerned enough to take notice. But, slowly and surely, it is sending out the message that Thailand may no longer be worth the trouble - especially when there are more pressing concerns within the region and further afield.
In other words, what if a broad range of interests begins to take more seriously, and at face value, the histrionic and irascible Thai assertions of unwelcome and unwarranted outside influence? What then for Thailand?
Continuance of the "glory days" of a Thailand at the hub of mainland Southeast Asia is no longer a given. Indeed, it is evident that as important outside actors go about the process of re-evaluating their efforts to engage with Asean, the trend is leading away from Thailand.
In remarks made during his visit to India last month, President Barack Obama said: "In this region, India can play a positive role in helping countries forge a better future, from Burma [Myanmar] to Sri Lanka, where today there's new hope for democracy."
With regard to Myanmar, the European Union lifted its trade sanctions back in April 2013, before sending its first ambassador five months later. In contrast, the EU delegation to Thailand has gradually scaled back its role and presence, downgrading its regional office for mainland Southeast Asia to a national office.
Meanwhile in neighbouring Laos, Japan is funding construction and development of the East-West Economic Corridor as part of the Greater Mekong Sub-region Programme (GMS). The economic corridor will open up regional economic and developmental opportunities and has already attracted a US$5.6-million investment made by Toyota Boshoku in the Savannakhet-Xeno Special Economic Zone in Laos.
Two years ago, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) chose Laos as the base for its newly launched key regional development programme, the "SDC Mekong Region Strategy, 2013-17". Notably, Thailand is the only Mekong-basin country not included in the strategy. (As a medium-income country, it is no longer considered to be in particular need of foreign aid.)
At a time when our regional neighbours are recognising the necessity of building a range of international relationships, hostile attitudes in Thailand may convince outside actors to steer clear of the Kingdom. And if it continues, this tendency will exacerbate the sense of alienation from the West that Thais are already beginning to feel.
Amid this complex field of global influences, Thailand risks outmanoeuvring itself by fixating on a strategy of playing off the US' Asia pivot against greater engagement with China, in an attempt to maximise Thai political, economic and other strategic interests.
Two key recent examples relate to this concern. First is the launch this week of Thai-US Cobra Gold military exercises just days after the latest improved Thai-China military ties were announced by China's Defence Minister, General Chang Wanquan. Second is the emergence of the US' Lower Mekong Initiative as a rival to the China-backed GMS - the leading developmental programme for mainland Southeast Asia.
The interplay of influences that now govern international dynamics - whether political, economic, social or otherwise -necessarily involve both state and non-state actors. For instance, the decision-making of international investors is increasingly contingent on the prospects for democracy and human rights within developing nations.
This is worrying for Thailand, where some observers detect an ulterior motive in the indignant accusations of US "meddling" in Thai affairs. Does the advocating of a new go-it-alone Thailand, then, smack of a form of nationalist sentiment that can usefully distract from more profound and pressing home-grown problems?
The longstanding effort to find others to blame for all and sundry - including the seemingly intractable societal rift - is a strategy that risks running out of enemies. Forever scapegoating either the Shinawatra family, as unduly influential, or the rural poor, by stereotyping them as lacking any understanding of the country's problems, may wear thin with even the most radical. Where better to look then, than in the direction of the predominant foreign superpower with a tarnished reputation?
A more crucial question is whether Thais are sufficiently committed to making the necessary efforts to change an abiding sense of societal division and mistrust, and in this way, aid in the restoration of Thai democracy. This would necessitate a far more reasoned and conciliatory approach than we are now witnessing.
Thais who are able to identify with the very real and valid concerns of the rural poor in particular, must surely recognise a glaring absurdity. Namely, the directing of a similar blame-game strategy against the weakest and most marginalised Thais and, at the very same time, against the strongest world power, the US.
Democracy, in and of itself, is not something that the US has ownership over, but it is something that Thailand can finally choose to abandon, to its detriment. Along with that abandoning would likely go any hope of significant future progress for the Kingdom. Ultimately, Thailand's future prospects hinge on recognising the importance of a swift reorientation back towards democracy, and the acknowledgement that the US remains an enduring ally.
Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.
Those who listened carefully to the fairly standard remarks on the need for democratic progress delivered recently by Daniel Russel, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, might well ask what all the fuss is about. Nevertheless, the way in which this story plays out may tell us whether the 182-year Thai-US relationship is under threat.
W Patrick Murphy, the chargé d'affaires at the US Embassy, was invited to appear before the National Legislative Assembly yesterday, where he would likely have been asked to account for the recent statement made by Russel. But Murphy declined the invitation and the US State Department responded by saying it had no desire to further inflame the situation, but neither would it backtrack on its position regarding democracy.
The hollow and bombastic reaction among sections of the Thai public and media is predictable, though it is hardly meant for an international audience, beyond any US policymakers concerned enough to take notice. But, slowly and surely, it is sending out the message that Thailand may no longer be worth the trouble - especially when there are more pressing concerns within the region and further afield.
In other words, what if a broad range of interests begins to take more seriously, and at face value, the histrionic and irascible Thai assertions of unwelcome and unwarranted outside influence? What then for Thailand?
Continuance of the "glory days" of a Thailand at the hub of mainland Southeast Asia is no longer a given. Indeed, it is evident that as important outside actors go about the process of re-evaluating their efforts to engage with Asean, the trend is leading away from Thailand.
In remarks made during his visit to India last month, President Barack Obama said: "In this region, India can play a positive role in helping countries forge a better future, from Burma [Myanmar] to Sri Lanka, where today there's new hope for democracy."
With regard to Myanmar, the European Union lifted its trade sanctions back in April 2013, before sending its first ambassador five months later. In contrast, the EU delegation to Thailand has gradually scaled back its role and presence, downgrading its regional office for mainland Southeast Asia to a national office.
Meanwhile in neighbouring Laos, Japan is funding construction and development of the East-West Economic Corridor as part of the Greater Mekong Sub-region Programme (GMS). The economic corridor will open up regional economic and developmental opportunities and has already attracted a US$5.6-million investment made by Toyota Boshoku in the Savannakhet-Xeno Special Economic Zone in Laos.
Two years ago, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) chose Laos as the base for its newly launched key regional development programme, the "SDC Mekong Region Strategy, 2013-17". Notably, Thailand is the only Mekong-basin country not included in the strategy. (As a medium-income country, it is no longer considered to be in particular need of foreign aid.)
At a time when our regional neighbours are recognising the necessity of building a range of international relationships, hostile attitudes in Thailand may convince outside actors to steer clear of the Kingdom. And if it continues, this tendency will exacerbate the sense of alienation from the West that Thais are already beginning to feel.
Amid this complex field of global influences, Thailand risks outmanoeuvring itself by fixating on a strategy of playing off the US' Asia pivot against greater engagement with China, in an attempt to maximise Thai political, economic and other strategic interests.
Two key recent examples relate to this concern. First is the launch this week of Thai-US Cobra Gold military exercises just days after the latest improved Thai-China military ties were announced by China's Defence Minister, General Chang Wanquan. Second is the emergence of the US' Lower Mekong Initiative as a rival to the China-backed GMS - the leading developmental programme for mainland Southeast Asia.
The interplay of influences that now govern international dynamics - whether political, economic, social or otherwise -necessarily involve both state and non-state actors. For instance, the decision-making of international investors is increasingly contingent on the prospects for democracy and human rights within developing nations.
This is worrying for Thailand, where some observers detect an ulterior motive in the indignant accusations of US "meddling" in Thai affairs. Does the advocating of a new go-it-alone Thailand, then, smack of a form of nationalist sentiment that can usefully distract from more profound and pressing home-grown problems?
The longstanding effort to find others to blame for all and sundry - including the seemingly intractable societal rift - is a strategy that risks running out of enemies. Forever scapegoating either the Shinawatra family, as unduly influential, or the rural poor, by stereotyping them as lacking any understanding of the country's problems, may wear thin with even the most radical. Where better to look then, than in the direction of the predominant foreign superpower with a tarnished reputation?
A more crucial question is whether Thais are sufficiently committed to making the necessary efforts to change an abiding sense of societal division and mistrust, and in this way, aid in the restoration of Thai democracy. This would necessitate a far more reasoned and conciliatory approach than we are now witnessing.
Thais who are able to identify with the very real and valid concerns of the rural poor in particular, must surely recognise a glaring absurdity. Namely, the directing of a similar blame-game strategy against the weakest and most marginalised Thais and, at the very same time, against the strongest world power, the US.
Democracy, in and of itself, is not something that the US has ownership over, but it is something that Thailand can finally choose to abandon, to its detriment. Along with that abandoning would likely go any hope of significant future progress for the Kingdom. Ultimately, Thailand's future prospects hinge on recognising the importance of a swift reorientation back towards democracy, and the acknowledgement that the US remains an enduring ally.
Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.
