THAI-US RELATIONS
The lords of democracy
Thailand is now most of the way through the first term of the Obama administration, and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has introduced and implemented the concept of "smart power" in relation to US foreign policy, which attempts to strategically combine elements from both "hard power" and "soft power" approaches.
In 2010, Mrs Clinton indicated an adjustment in US foreign policy and emphasised that, "America's future is linked to the future of the Asia-Pacific region; and the future of this region depends on America." But in a period of immense global flux, both economically and politically, and at a time when the long-accepted paradigms are being thoroughly reassessed by all actors on the world stage, how can the United States hope to reassure its Asian allies that the enduring imperative of maintaining good relations with the US can work to promote mutual interests between them and thus be a win-win scenario for both sides into the future?
In the post-global financial crisis period of uncertainty, opportunities relating to the US economy and its markets have become less promising for Thailand, whilst in relation to China the opposite is actually the case. However, positive economic relations with Washington certainly remain one of the leading priorities for Bangkok. Indeed, at the Council on Foreign Relations in 2010, then prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva commented on the bilateral relationship between Thailand and the US: "I think we can continue to expand on our economic relations ... In the wider picture, of course, the US presence in the region is important for our security, and there are also new areas where we hope to see greater US participation."
However, Thailand cannot expect to simply pick and choose the economic and security benefits from this, or indeed any other, bilateral relationship because there comes with such relationships an obligation to responsibly engage with the wider concerns of other nations, if one can expect such bilateral relationships to further develop and prosper.
Moreover, a reluctance to embrace the opportunities intrinsic to such bilateral relationships will, in any case, only act to weaken Thailand's strategic position within the increasingly multilateral relationship-oriented world of the early 21st century. And from the Western perspective, the pressure is increasingly on from within its own civil society and social discourse, for their governments and corporations to engage more responsibly with developing nations and emerging markets. Accordingly, there is an expectation of tangible progress on issues relating to democracy, freedom of speech, human rights, and the overall development of civil society.
Although we are not yet witnessing the era of absolute decline of US hegemonic power, much of the international discourse is excited by the potential of the emerging powers, in particular China, which is the front-runner. The US continues to believe strongly in its responsibilities when it comes to the promotion of democracy around the world, and is still a primary source of international funding for civil society projects and educational programmes. Nevertheless, what are the indications as to when and whether this engagement can be considered to be a positive contribution, or an intervention in the process of democratisation in another country?
As for China, it is moving towards democratic reforms in its own convoluted way. At the 2011 World Economic Forum, China's Premier Wen Jiabao indicated that his country should introduce more democratic reforms, and emphasised that it would be more practical to begin with the promotion of democracy within the Communist Party itself.
Meanwhile, China's foreign policy remains officially one of "non-interference" in the domestic affairs of other countries, which is in stark contrast to official US policy in this regard.
Overall, when it comes to the process of democratisation and the promotion of civil society, the Chinese state is rendered irrelevant in the context of these discussions.
The history of US "hard power" interventions in Asia, which were by definition undemocratic, has evidently complicated relations between much of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the US, as Noam Chomsky has argued: "The Vietnam affair might end ... in an attempt by our former allies to construct a counterweight to American power."
Even if Thailand's relationship with the United States is made somewhat more difficult by the historical legacy, it would only be self-defeating for Thailand if opportunities for positive engagement with the US both now and into the future, were to be rejected for this reason.
In 2009, Mrs Clinton highlighted that, "We stand for democracy not because we want other countries to be like us, but because we want all people to enjoy the consistent protection of the rights that are naturally theirs ... Democracy has proven the best political system for making human rights a human reality over the long term." And in relation to the fundamental regard for human rights, one can argue with, and even reject, the current US standard or other internationally established standards. But does this then necessarily lead us to argue that human rights are not, indeed, natural rights that we are all entitled to enjoy, for as long as we do not violate the rights of others?
Thailand can sincerely hope not.
Nevertheless, attempts by the West to promote democracy, freedom of speech and expression, and the empowering of civil society around the world, are often perceived as promoting frameworks which fail to give primacy to what can universally be agreed upon. And such perceptions often turn into heightened concerns when it is the United States which is taking the lead in these dynamics. Scepticism over the West, and the US in particular, remains. As Samuel Huntington argued, "What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest." Indeed, the historical and established promotion of human rights and civil society by the West, which has tended to be the main driver in this regard, can never be a claim of ownership over the belief in the imperative for democratic principles and freedoms.
Worldwide, the roles of non-state actors are being promoted more and more, at both national and international levels. Diplomacy is no longer limited to merely the interactions and negotiations between governments and official state representatives, and there is a trend around the world to broaden the interpretation, in order to involve all stakeholders, as foreign policy impacts both directly and indirectly upon the citizens of countries.
After nearly 180 years of US-Thai relations, which have primarily been focused at the level of the state-to-state relationship, it is now incumbent upon all actors to engage in the transition towards a broader level of engagement, and to bring all stakeholders to the table. Notwithstanding the national interests and priorities of state actors, and governmental and non-governmental institutions, the very fact of bringing civil society and the citizenry more and more into the dynamic of relationships, in order that they become more informed and streetwise, is key to any reform. This rebalancing of the power structure in relation to the process of democratisation empowers the people, and keeps the pressure on state actors and institutions to continue to reform and to act more responsibly, regardless of whether or not these powerful players are foreign or domestic.
Titipol Phakdeewanich is a lecturer at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.
