Opinion – Middle and upper class Thais are marginalising the true followers of democracy by their lack of knowledge

By

Titipol Phakdeewanich

August 29, 2022

https://www.thaienquirer.com/43442/opinion-middle-and-upper-class-thais-are-marginalising-the-true-followers-of-democracy-by-their-lack-of-knowledge/?fbclid=IwAR35SabTH7O9yRmxlLJtB4gawuxbfjKaWv8xcjeT7Ou15pO-_NIWAizBtFk

As political parties in Thailand are now starting to prepare for the expected general elections in 2023, the outcome of the polls is unlikely to change the political landscape in the country.

The elections in 2023 would likely be held as the 1st term of the military-led government ends on March 24th, 2023, exactly 4-years after the March 2019 polls that put 2014 military coup d’état leader – General Prayut Chan-o-cha, who was also the leader of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) back in power through the help of the 250 handpicked senators.

The outcome of the 2023 elections is very unlikely to show any significant change in the Thai political landscape, because the military’s drafted constitution of 2017 asserted a legal mechanism to ensure that General Prayut or a NCPO’s surrogate, can remain in power for at least 2-terms, and this is facilitated by the senators who have a vote in picking the Prime Minister.

However, the suspension of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha from office by the Constitutional Court of Thailand last Wednesday has raised a little hope for the pro-democratic Thais, who have been longing to see the change in the country’s power structure. His deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwon is the ‘caretaker’ Prime Minister for now.

Thailand’s acting Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan leaves Government House in Bangkok on August 26, 2022.

Nevertheless, one cannot be too optimistic, given the fact that the court ruled in favour of the prime minister in all cases against him, since he seized power. Thus, it remains very unlikely that the court will eventually rule against him.

This was evident from the fact that not all the 9-members of the Constitutional Court judges, voted to accept a request for a review of 8-year limit and to suspend him, in fact it was only a vote of 5-4. To make matters worse, the 5-4 vote was after 2nd voting took place with the President of the Constitutional Court judges having had to cast his vote in the minority side, i.e. in favour of not suspending Prayut from his duties. The 1st vote was 5:3 with the President of the Constitutional court judge abstaining from voting.

Thailand’s embattled Prime Minister Prayut Chan-O-Cha drives an electric tuk tuk vehicle at Government House

Failed Promises

Over the past 8 years after the coup, none of the key promises made by the NCPO and Prayut himself were implemented. The democratic reforms that were touted as a pretext to undertake the coup have gone nowhere and the world has been observing democratic decline of Thailand.

The failed promises are among the key reasons why people are so desperate to remove Prayuth from office.

This was highlighted after the International non-government organization, Freedom House, classified Thailand as a “Not Free” country ever since the 2014 coup, and briefly upgraded Thailand to be a “Partly Free” country in 2020 after the 2019 General Election.

Today, the political establishment and the Thai middleclass still believe that voting decisions of rural people are dictated by the embedded Thai political culture of vote-buying. They persist to deny the evolution of the structure of political power within the Thai political landscape, especially in Isan, the North-eastern region of Thailand, where rural voters have gained more bargaining power against the candidates in elections.

Since the very first landslide victory of Thaksin Shinawatra, former prime minister, and leader of the Thai Rak Thai party in 2001, his influence on Thai politics remains influential due to the support base in the Isan and the North for the Pheu Thai party, which is the reincarnation of the Thai Rak Thai party and the People’s Power party.

The political loyalty of rural people, in Isan, towards the Pheu Thai Party and Thaksin is demonised by the anti-Thaksin movement, led by the conservative Thais and the elite and therefore the rural Isan voters remain scapegoats for Thai democratic failure.

Thaksin Shinawatra

Patronising Rural Voters

Question arises whether rural people can understand democracy without educational attainment or if they cannot read and write at all?

Despite the patronising perceptions toward rural population, democracy always remains a debatable term, within both the West and the East, within a society and academia. However, the very main democratic values – liberty, equality, and justice, are non-negotiable and cannot be compromised, in order to ensure that all member of a society is treated with respect and can live in dignity.

The middle class continues to feel that money is the most important thing to win elections. Therefore, they have been looking for an electoral system that can help them to win election, while undermining voting rights of the people, especially in the rural areas of Thailand.

Whilst, on the ground it is not just money that influences the outcome of the polls, there are other things one needs to have when they field candidates in the Isan region. Rural people have learned to scrutinise party manifestos, policy priorities. and their ability to deliver and keep promises, which is a key explanation of the success and ongoing influence of the Pheu Thai Party in Isan.

The core democratic values are not at all alienated from Thais who live in the rural areas of the country. Liberty, equality, and justice are not beyond the ability of rural people to understand, even for those who cannot read and write.

“I want to have a voting right. So that I can choose who can help to improve my life in the village. I know that all of them [politicians] are not always good. But if I can vote I can choose who I think can develop our village”, said a Ubon Ratchathani based woman who is illiterate, because her family could not afford to send her to school and had worked in Bangkok in the 1980-1990’s since she was 12-years of age.

The stereotype of those living their lives in rural villages, cannot actively participate in Thai politics and the country’s political power structure, is something that is a prejudice of the establishment and the middle-class. The people living in rural areas do understand that power is expected to serve everyone in the country. They understand that power must not be reserved to serve the interests of those with social privileges, big businesses, and the establishment.

However, the consolidation of power between the military and big businesses significantly undermines the ability of rural villagers to participate actively. Nevertheless, they are enthusiastic to vote in the 2023 general elections, despite the fact that Thailand may well end up with the same General who seized power from the people through the 2014 Coup.

Indeed, democracy cannot simply be treated as a philosophical or academic terms, without conceding that democratic values are simply part of everyone’s lives, and everyone can understand it from the ground. A day-to-day life in rural villages has long been providing a practical experience for villagers to learn and understand how liberty, equality, and justice can be a mechanism to improve their lives, without referring to it in a philosophical or academic term: “democracy”.

Often the case that rural people say that they do not understand democracy when discussing the Thai authorities or academics, which led to the assumption that they will have to learn what democracy is, in order to support Thailand democratic progress. The Thai government and foreign donors have been spending a significant amount of money to promote democratic understanding amongst rural people, in Thailand and the region.

When rural people cannot convey their democratic knowledge and understanding, learning from the ground, the state must at least give them an opportunity to enjoy their inherent rights, as citizens, rather than taking those rights away. Because inclusivity can be an effective means to amend decades of political divide in Thailand. This remains a big question, whether the political establishment and the Thai middleclass are now ready to share power with the marginalised and unprivileged people living outside Thailand’s capital, Bangkok, especially in the rural areas.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.

Quoted in South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3173144/embattled-thai-pm-prayuth-courts-generals-favour-another?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article&campaign=3173144

"Eight-year limit

Debate over the correct end of Prayuth’s tenure has flared in recent months. When he led a coup that toppled Yingluck Shinawatra in May 2014, Prayuth received a royal decree to start his premiership in August.

This means that based on the Thai constitution, which allows a prime minister to serve a maximum term of eight years, Prayuth’s tenure will end in August this year.

However, critics say if Prayuth’s term officially began in March 2019, when his party won the general election, he could remain in the top job until March 2023.

These technicalities are expected to be cleared by the constitutional court, but so far no cases have yet been filed against Prayuth.

“Even if the case is raised at court, from past verdicts, the court interprets the law in favour of the government,” said Titipol Phakdeewanich, a political scientist at Ubon Ratchathani University.

“When Prayuth stayed on in the residence of the army chief long after he retired, the court didn’t penalise him either,” he said, referring to the 2020 constitutional court’s verdict on the case that the opposition said was further evidence of abuse of power.

…

In January, Thammanat and 20 other Palang Pracharath MPs moved to the Thai Economic Party founded by another Prawit aide. Since jumping ship, Thammanat has said his bloc cannot guarantee support for Prayuth.

Out of 475 MPs in Thailand’s parliament, the governing coalition can count on some 250 votes, with a little over 200 for the opposition. The rest are swing votes that will decide Prayuth’s fate in the tentative no-confidence vote in May.

But the result could still be unpredictable, said political scientist Titipol, depending on whether early election was a benefit for either the government or the opposition.

“I think for the government to stay on, factions can increase their negotiating power to source funding for their election campaign. A house dissolution would only result in an early election, but it doesn’t provide an opportunity for MPs to manage a budget allocation,” he said.

“An early election will not benefit the opposition either, because after the election, the [appointed] Senate will vote for Prayuth or his surrogate as PM.”

…

Last month, the party gave Paetongtarn a special title of “Pheu Thai family leader”, in an announcement made in the party’s traditional stronghold of Thailand’s northeast. The move came after her appointment in October as party adviser.

Paetongtarn’s debut attracted much fanfare and occurred as the Prayuth government released a new scheme to fight inflation and higher energy prices as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war.

If she runs as a candidate for prime minister and wins, Paetongtarn will be the fourth person from the Shinawatra family to run the country, after her father, aunt Yingluck, and Thaksin’s brother-in-law, Somchai Wongsawat.

“Unlike in the first years after Thaksin’s exile, the Shinawatra brand no longer monopolises the northeast region,” said Titipol, who is based in Ubon Ratchathani, a major northeastern province. “Paetongtarn might represent the new generation, but there are more choices for the young, like the Move Forward Party.”

…

In a survey conducted by the National Institute of Development Administration (Nida) in March, over 13 per cent of 2,020 respondents aged 18 and over said they preferred Pita as leader, while 12.67 per cent backed Prayuth, and 12.53 per cent favoured Paetongtarn.

The survey came after another Nida poll, conducted at the height of the Delta-fuelled Covid-19 outbreak in Thailand, showed 66 per cent of respondents did not want Prayuth to lead any political party of his own, citing his failure to solve critical issues and a lack of leadership. Over 58 per cent of 1,317 people polled said they wanted him to step down.

But Prayuth’s power depends on a larger, more “well-planned” strategy, a result of the lessons learned from past coups, Titipol said.

“The establishment is careful not to cross the line, unlike the way they usually exercised power after coups in the past,” he said. “They try not to create tension from within and outside the country so they can stay in power for as long as possible.”

https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3173144/embattled-thai-pm-prayuth-courts-generals-favour-another?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article&campaign=3173144

My interview in Society Magazine, in French, about the state of democracy and political movement in Thailand

 

 

Run Against Lung (Uncle)

My interview in Matichon (In Thai), regarding the implication of "Run Against Lung (Uncle)" on the future of Thai politics. I primarily argue that the situation will likely not escalate to violence. Given Thailand's political history, most political confrontations were largely a result of state repression or military intervention in Thai politics.”

A summary and reflection of my interview in Matichon with respect to an interview with Reuters of General Apirat Kongsompong, the Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army.

A summary and reflection of my interview in Matichon with respect to an interview with Reuters of General Apirat Kongsompong, the Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army.

General Apirat’s interview shows the intention of the military to support the government to control—rather than to serve—the people. [Since the 2014 coup d’état, both Thai and foreign observers have witnessed the arbitrary use of power by the military leadership.] His disregard for fundamental democratic norms such as the “freedom expression” undermines the voices of young people who disagree with the military government.

He portrays young Thais as naïve and vulnerable to “fake news”, arguing that they are more likely to be convinced by“alternative” sources of information rather than “the genuine information provided by the government and military. 

However, due to the Internet and other forms of technology, young Thais have better access to information than before. They have become more critical and analytical towards the state of democracy and human rights in Thailand. Furthermore, they are less likely to be intimated by the state and feel more encouraged to scrutinise Thai authority figures. As a matter of fact, the military and the Thai authority are not immune to scrutiny or criticism.


In addition, General Apirat’s interview highlights the embedded and continued hierarchical structure of Thai society. The cultural expectation of respecting adults, or “kaorob phuyai”, does not simply mean to be respectful, it carries a strong connotation of being obedient. The military and the Thai authority actively encourages and advocates for such a hierarchy, and uses it as another form of suppression. In general, kaorob phuyai acts to restrict the ability of people to question authority.

Interview on the Constitutional Court ruling

My interview on the Constitutional Court ruling that the calculation of the Party-List MPs by the Election Commission did not violate the 2017 Constitution. 

I primarily argue that the court ruling was rather predictable and did not have a significant impact on Thailand’s political landscape post-election, largely because Thai politics has been influenced and dictated by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and the military since the 2014 coup. People have been questioning the integrity and neutrality of the country’s independent bodies, especially the Election Commission (EC), specifically whether it is actually assisting the country return to democracy and serving the interests of the people.

Quoted in The Nation , with respect to the 2019 Thai Election Campaign

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/politics/30365119

I was interviewed and quoted in The Nation , with respect to the 2019 Thai Election Campaign:

This time around, though, many other parties are also embracing populist policies.

The main message candidates have been delivering to voters has not changed much, with many parties’ political discourses still “trapped” in either the fight for democracy or populist policies, said Titipol Phakdeewanich, dean of political science at Ubon Ratchathani University.

The Democrat and Future Forward parties are leaning towards populism, while the pro-junta Phalang Pracharat is disguising its policies under the theme of “reconciliation”, he said. 

“But in reality, these discourses do not reflect any changes in Thai politics,” he said. 

For instance, he said, the Democrat and Future Forward parties are offering a welfare state but have yet to show how it will be sustainable or if recipients would be self-reliant.

Phalang Pracharat Party is relying on the reconciliation discourse to explain why the military is still necessary to maintain order. It doesn’t understand true democracy, Titipol said.

The political discourse used by pro-junta parties is undermining the progress of Thai democracy, he added.

However, he said, though the election is not expected to bring massive change to society, it will at least encourage voters to pay more attention to democracy.

“I think this election is more like a referendum on democracy or an indicator of how desperately Thai voters want democracy, rather than actually returning to true democracy. What we will have is just pseudo-democracy,” he said. “This election is being held just so that Thailand can be a part of international democracy. Otherwise it will be difficult for it to promote its economic policies internationally.”

Titipol, who lectures on political communication, said the most important concern was not about what politicians convey to voters, but rather voters being open to two-sided information.

“It doesn’t matter who you support, but you should make time to listen to all opinions so you can make a good decision,” he said.

Election a tipping point for ‘Thai-style democracy’

Election a tipping point for ‘Thai-style democracy’

February 08, 2019 01:00 By Titipol Phakdeewanich 

special to The Nation

Officially, Monday’s registration of election candidates was not a significant milestone for Thai democracy. Nevertheless the excitement it generated among pro-democracy Thais, political parties and their candidates has sparked anxiety for the country’s anti-democratic movement.

This year’s election will certainly be crucial for the future of democracy in Thailand, though the outcome is in reality fairly predictable. The 2017 military-written Constitution incorporates legal mechanisms designed to enable the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), the military junta, to retain its grip on power after the election. 

Before the NCPO finally agreed to hold the poll, there had been ongoing political disputes – both in the real world and on social media – over the merits of elections versus continued military rule. These fights will persist ahead of next month’s election, whose result will indicate whether Thais want a liberal democracy, or the so-called “Thai-style democracy”, in which the universality of human rights is denied. 

Junta’s record 

Last week, Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha spoke to the nation about his achievements during almost five years in power, claiming to have made significant contributions to Thailand. The pro-military Phalang Pracharat Party hopes to capitalise on Prayut’s many populist programmes, such as the much-criticised welfare card for the poor, to gain votes. 

Prayut’s economic achievements will hardly convince the rural population and many other Thai voters, but his claim to have brought political stability, through military suppression, remains convincing to people across the political spectrum. This will not, however, easily transfer into votes. These days, rural Thais make more complex voting decisions than the typical picture of vote-buying suggests.

Meanwhile the persistence of Shinawatra-phobia continues to serve the interests of Phalang Pracharat, the Democrat Party and the Ruam Palang Prachachart Thai Party, especially in wooing urban-middle class voters.

In the rural North, the picture is still very different.     

“I trust Thaksin because his party delivered what they promised us: we can go to hospital when we are ill now. We remember a big drop in the drug problem when Thaksin was prime minister,” said a villager who preferred to remain anonymous, referring to PM Thaksin Shinawatra’s drug war, whose extrajudicial killings were criticised as violating human rights.

Voter loyalty?

The incumbent Pheu Thai party won almost 16 million votes in the 2011 election, sweeping the North and Northeast (Isaan), under the leadership of Yingluck Shinawatra. Although it was thanks to her brother’s legacy that she won 265 of the 500 seats in the House of Representatives, Yingluck also rejuvenated the Shinawatra brand by introducing popular rice subsidies (a policy that eventually brought her downfall) and other policies that were greatly welcomed by rural populations, especially in Isaan. Pheu Thai’s long history and success in the region underscores the loyalty rural voters feel towards the party.

Nevertheless, voter loyalty won’t be the only factor in the party’s performance. Embedded patronage networks – especially in rural villages where politicians tend to portray themselves as generous patrons rather than public servants – will also be key. As a consequence, Pheu Thai may suffer in areas where their former MPs have been poached by Phalang Pracharat.

However, public trust in Pheu Thai’s ability to deliver promises remains high compared to its political rivals, especially the Democrats and Phalang Pracharat.

Will election restore democracy?

The NCPO will likely maintain its grip on power, either with Prayut or another surrogate as next prime minister. The voting power of the 250 NCPO-appointed senators, enshrined in the 2017 constitution, assures that. So the question arises, why have elections at all?

The vote will be a crucial barometer of whether Thailand is moving forward. A regional beacon for democracy and development during the 1990s and early 2000s, Thailand’s democratic progress was abruptly halted and reversed by the 2006 and 2014 military coups.

The erosion of democracy and retrenchment of authoritarianism was hardly new, being a facet of Thai politics since the bloodless 1932 revolution. Since then, a group of conservative Thais among the political establishment have remained convinced that it is premature for the country to become a  “Western-style” or “liberal” democracy. Over time, this group re-enforced its so-called Thai-style democracy, which limits freedom of expression and denies the universality of human rights. 

Thai history over the past decade is in line with a global trend for democratic decline. However, the emergence of newcomers such as the Future Forward Party has not only encouraged a new generation to enter politics but also influenced old parties like the Democrats to provide space for political newbies. 

Of course, the parade of fresh, young faces won’t change Thai politics overnight. The conservative political establishment is deep-rooted and enduring, but political newcomers can bring fresh ideas to Thailand’s democratic movement in the long term.

Effects of campaign restrictions

Despite domestic and international criticism, the junta continues to defend its ability to ensure a “free and fair election”, denying the need for international observers from the European Union or the UN. 

NCPO-imposed restrictions may force more “constructive” campaigning, especially among anti-junta politicians. In Isaan, where campaign rallies are being closely monitored, many Pheu Thai candidates have avoided criticising the NCPO. Instead, they are focusing on a more positive discourse, with slogans such as: “Brothers, it’s your voices, your power to choose in March” and “Brothers, we can take our power back by going to the polls and voting against them.” This helps to instil a core democratic value in the minds of voters – “people power ”.

There’s no doubt however that a cloud of fear and intimidation hangs over the election. The NCPO has not created an equal playing field for all parties. Indeed, the restrictions will likely reward longstanding parties because of existing voter loyalty, with newcomers suffering as a consequence.

Ultimately, the election can only meet international standards if the NCPO takes a neutral stance. Without that neutrality, the national vote is nothing more than a means to legitimise and prolong the military’s political power.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.

A summary of my interview with respect to the 2019 Electoral Timeline

A summary of my interview with respect to the 2019 Electoral Timeline

I personally do not believe the recent Thai electoral timeline, namely that general elections will be held on the 24th of February 2019. The primary reason is that the military-led National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) can still enforce Article 44 in order to protect its current political position.

The NCPO will continue to go ahead with the announced timeline as long as it maintains the ability to compete against any opposition parties with the help of military-allied parties at the polls.

The scheduled 2019 election cannot be described as either free or fair election as long as the NCPO remains active on the Thai political landscape. It is possible that Article 44 will be enforced in favour of parties allied to the military, at the expense of the military’s opposition.

Interview on political ban.

I argued that "a ban on social network political campaigning illustrates how much the NCPO fears losing popularity to its opposition. Whilst the pro-military camp have been granted more freedom to campaign, the upcoming elections will not be not free and fair because the restrictions on social network political campaigning undermines the ability of political parties to freely communicate with the people and their constituents."

My interview on the relaxation of the ban on political activities

My interview on the relaxation of the ban on political activities.

Although the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) allowed political activities to resume, this is not a return of political freedoms to the Thai people and political parties. We should not just focus on a partial political freedom, but we must stay focused on the Thai people’s political freedoms. 

To a certain extent, the NCPO remaining in power is a sign that the upcoming election cannot be described as a free and fair with respect to the international standards. The NCPO can still utilise legal tools to dictate the election. 

A ban on social networks political campaigning illustrates that the upcoming elections are not free and fair, because those restrictions undermines the ability of political parties to freely communicate with the people and their constituents. 

Whilst the NCPO and its supporters are able to make their political moves, their opponents are closely monitored. It has been observed that the NCPO and the military government have been able to mobilise their popularity while the next election is under speculation. 

The NCPO have partially granted political freedom but it is time to fully return political liberty and freedom to the Thai people.

It is important for people to be able to discuss politics within the remit of the law rather than under the control of the NCPO. Therefore, the NCPO should end its role in Thai politics. If the NCPO continues to remain active the legitimacy of the upcoming elections will be undermined and questioned by both the Thai people and the international community. 

A summary of my interview in Matichon, with respect to the restrictions on political campaign online, imposed by the Thai military government.

Whether the political campaigns are on the internet (social medias, online-campaigns) or not, politician should be free to run their campaigns.

The maintaining of restrictions, imposed by the military government, demonstrates that the upcoming election is not “free and fair”, and fail to meet international standards, because of the suppression of freedom of expression and political freedoms.

A free and fair election is not only determined by what happens on the election day, but it is also important to consider the level of liberty and freedom before people vote. Currently, most political parties are allowed to function their political duties and activities. Political parties should be able to freely communicate with their members and supporters.

It has been observed that the supporters of the military have been able to enjoy more liberty and freedom to make their political move. There is not an equal playing filed in Thai politics under the military government.

Indeed, a high level of control, imposing on online-political campaigns, reflects the military’s concerns about young voices, who normally oppose the military rule.

It is time for Thais to question and raise their concerns over the ongoing suppressions of freedom of expressions, and its implication on the future of democracy in Thailand. 

With respect to the legal charges against Mr Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit with online offences, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) demonstrates that fear and intimidations remains a crucial political tactics for the military. The NCPO has been implementing all of the available legal tools to suppress their political oppositions, in order to prevent criticism on themselves. The NCPO cannot claim that they are not politicians, so that they should not be criticised on the same grounds, because their role is now functioning within the Thai political realm. 

It is important for the NCPO to eliminate all of the political restrictions, imposing on their political opponents. At this stage, it is important for politicians and political parties to be able to enjoy the very same liberty and freedom within the Thai political landscape. So that Thai people can properly have a chance to know their potential candidates.

Matichon Editorial Column: Defending Academic Freedom

Quoted in The Nation

Quoted in The Nation:

"Despite all the legal complications having been cleared, political scientist Titipol Phakdeewanich from Ubon Ratchathani University said he had doubts that the election would take place next February.

“After all, it is the National Council for Peace and Order [NCPO] who will make the decision, not the Constitutional Court’s verdict,” he said.“Only when the junta itself announces the election date, can we be sure the election will take place.”

However, Titipol said that the NCPO should want an election as it was the only way to legitimise the military’s power in politics. But its decision to call one depends largely on whether or not it was certain that it could maintain its grip after the election, he said.

Titipol said there was a 70 to 90 per cent likelihood that the poll would be held. Considering the current circumstances – including the inauguration of the Action Coalition for Thailand Party, backed by former protest leader Suthep Thaugsuban – the academic said he believed the NCPO was ready for the election."

Last hurdle to Thai election cleared as parties law approved

Last hurdle to Thai election cleared as parties law approved: Activists sceptical over pledge of February poll, insist on vote this year

A summary of my interview in Matichon regarding the Constitutional Court’s ruling and its implications on the prospects for the 2019 Election.

A summary of my interview in Matichon regarding the Constitutional Court’s ruling and its implications on the prospects for the 2019 Election.

The Constitutional Court ruled that the organic bill on the election of MPs is valid and does not contradict with the 2017 constitution. However, this is not a guarantee for the long-awaited February 2019 Election. Thailand and a large number of its people have long been ready for elections and a return to democracy, whilst the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and the military are not yet ready to compete in the polls.

Despite protesting that military officers are not politicians, the military perceives new political parties, such as the Forward Future Party as political rivals.

The election will take place whenever the military is confident about the support they would get at the polls, as well as in the stability of their grip on power after the election.

One cannot ignore the fact that the NCPO can still implement Article 44 whenever it suits their political interests [including by postponing elections].

Despite numerous postponements to the electoral timeline, the NCPO’s recent indication to ensure the February 2019 election goes ahead may simply be a political ploy to minimise public resistance to the NCPO, and to buy time in the wake of protests and demonstrations of the “pro-election group”. It is too naive to take the NCPO’s election timeline seriously at this stage.

In addition, the post-election political circumstances in Malaysia may have raised some significant concerns amongst the NCPO, in relation to the potential scrutiny if the NCPO’s opposition wins a majority of seats and is able to wrest power. This is because of ongoing questions against the issue of corruption and transparency within the NCPO.

If the NCPO is genuine about returning to democracy, then there is no legitimate reason to ban political activities of political parties, especially of the Democrat Party and the Pheu Thai Party.

The NCPO has been using the mechanism of the state and public resources to mobilise its popularity, whilst preventing its political rivals, such as the Democrat Party and the Pheu Thai Party from campaigning.

In addition, I argued that if there is an indication that the Pheu Thai Party can convincingly win most of the seats in the North and the Northeast, and it is therefore very likely that the February 2019 election will be delayed once again.

In addition to the 250 appointed senators, the NCPO understands that support from MPs are crucial for the post-election politics. Therefore, we have seen the establishment of cosy relationships between the NCPO and many existing political groups.

Quoted in "SPECIAL REPORT: Reform a failure, but junta’s grip still strong", in The Nation

Quoted in "SPECIAL REPORT: Reform a failure, but junta’s grip still strong", in The Nation:

"Despite all this, Prayut has retained a level of support even in the Northeast, a red-shirt stronghold. Here, the military has been clever enough to recruit from among low-income rural families, winning their loyalty by providing livelihoods, says Titipol Phakdeewanich, dean of political science at the region’s Ubon Ratchathani University.

“Except for the anti-coup hardcore, many people [in the region] don’t really hate Prayut although sentiment in the social media is very strong against him,” said Titipol, citing informal research he conducted in Ubon Ratchathani and neighbouring Yasothon and Amnat Charoen.
Some government policies, such as the rice price guarantee, had benefited the locals, he added.

A summary of my interview on Suthep Thaugsuban’s new political party named “Ruam Palang Prachachat Thai".

A summary of my interview on Suthep Thaugsuban’s new political party named “Ruam Palang Prachachat Thai".

...
Because of the mutual interests between Suthep Thaugsuban, the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), and the military, it is very likely that the new political party under Suthep’s leadership will support the military remaining in power.

I don’t think that this party will specifically support Gen Prayut Chan-O-Cha, somehow Prayut might not be the next prime minster. However, Suthep’s party is intended to maintain and strengthen its relationship with the NCPO and the military in order to support the military to remain in power.

There have been a number of indications that the NCPO and the military want to maintain their grip on power after the election, such as by reaching out to local politically influential people in the provinces of Buriram and Chonburi.

Although Suthep is popular in the south, his political charisma is overshadowed by the former Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai. Indeed, I argued that the Democrat party has been able to maintain its stronghold in the south not because of Mr Abhisit Vejjajiva, but largely as a result of Chuan Leekpai’s political charisma and influence in the South.

These pictures were sent to me from police special branch in Ubon Ratchathani. How thoughtful of them to take an interest in my interviews and articles.

Quoted on Pro-Democracy Protest in Bangkok Post

In Bangkok Post: "Titipol Phakdeewanich, dean of Ubon Ratchathani University's Faculty of Political Sciences, said the government was quite careful and tried to prevent violence which could have led to a negative image of the regime and affected its legitimacy." 

Quoted on Academic freedom

In The Nation: "Titipol Phakdeewanich, dean of political science at Ubon Ratchathani University, told The Nation that NCPO and the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) called him yesterday to ask if he was planning to attend the event at Thammasat University and whether he was aware if any other university staff and students were planning to go."