Getting to the root of Thailand’s woes

28 Dec 2013 

The Straits Times By TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH

Getting to the root of Thailand’s woes

THAILAND’S politics is again attracting the interest of the international community, with the very survival of Thai democracy increasingly brought into question. There is seemingly no end in sight to Thai political brinksmanship, and the opposition Democrat Party – which retains the support of much of the old-guard establishment – stands by its decision to boycott the general election, scheduled for Feb 2 next year.

Despite the Puea Thai government’s determination to ensure that the election will still take place, whether or not the vote can be held remains in question. The People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) – a coalition of Democrat members and anti-government protesters – remains adamant that the current democratic arrangement be suspended and that an unelected “People’s Council” assume the role of running the country.

The PDRC has already tried, albeit in vain, to disrupt the electoral process by preventing candidates of political parties from entering the venue for party-list registration in Bangkok. They also plan to disrupt the constituency-based registration across the country when the process begins today. They continue to insist that the networks of patronage relating to former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra be dismantled before any election is held.

However, a historical and deeply embedded patronage system continues to permeate Thai society at all levels. It is, therefore, impossible to separate this factor from the corruption that so strongly informs the political character of Thailand today.

Corruption undoubtedly predates any notion of democracy in the country. Yet, there is now a general tendency for Thais to assume that corruption and patronage are a consequence of the existing electoral system. For many Thais, therefore, the integrity of the existing election process remains questionable. And this in turn provides a pretext for those who would attempt to undermine the democratic mandate of the current government.

It is regularly contended that were it not for the inordinate power of key political figures such as Thaksin, Thailand would be able to move forward. But is it realistic that corruption in Thailand – disappointingly ranked 102 out of 177 nations on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 – can be effectively remediated through non-democratic means?

The last decade has been a difficult one for Thai democracy. There was a coup in 2006, a constitutional redrafting in 2007, and a series of public protests and crackdowns. Throughout this period, it has been the long disregarded and disaffected majority of Thais from the provinces who have, relatively speaking, retained the most confidence in Thailand’s democratic forms.

It is these rural poor who have, to an increasing degree, come to view what passes for democracy as something that can at least begin to respond to their legitimate claims for increased recognition. Significantly, these are the voters who were historically ignored by an indifferent political elite ensconced primarily in Bangkok. Any significant and tangible response to the situation of the rural poor should understandably be expected to attract a certain loyalty.

This is the context that has provided the recent Thaksin-inspired populist governments with the opportunity to retain a plausible legitimacy and an enduring appeal with the majority of Thais. Accordingly, fresh elections will likely result in another clear endorsement of the Puea Thai party, led by Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra.

The now highly Thaksin-phobic protesters appear to be aware of this to some extent. Nevertheless, they are prepared to endorse almost any contrivance or ostensible rationale to undermine the established tenets of democracy and representation, in order to see a swift end to the influence of the Shinawatra family in Thai politics.

Ultimately, Thailand’s broad societal impasse may demonstrate to the world that its outward show of advancing representative democracy was merely a pretence. The country’s assumed status as a democratic standard-bearer for mainland South-east Asia may soon be over as well.

An anonymous onlooker from undemocratic Laos (living close to the Thai border in Savannakhet province) voiced her concern: “I am not sure about democracy because I can see a lot of problems in Thailand from Thai TV. One day “red shirts” (pro-Thaksin supporters), and another day some others come out on the street. So I don’t think democracy is good for Laos.”

Much of the international community – including the United States and the European Union – has been focusing on a number of specific issues. These include the right to protest, the weakening of voting rights, and the likely impact on foreign investments. Moreover, many foreigners are evidently concerned about how the issue may affect economic prospects throughout the wider region. The recent crisis has coincided with a close to four-year low for the Thai baht against most of the major international currencies.

Although vote-buying still persists as a result of the deep-rooted influence of patronage, it is no longer as decisive a factor in electoral outcomes as it used to be. Rather, voters have increasingly come to value the importance of holding politicians to account in relation to policy delivery. Farmer Nu Keawmanee, from Ubon Ratchathani province, said: “I like the 30-baht health-care policy because it really helps poor people. So, I want a government that has policies to meet the demands of rural people like me.” She was referring to the universal health-care programme introduced by the Thaksin government in 2002.

In their desperate desire to put an end to Thaksin’s influence, his opponents continue to discount the broader reality when making their case. The fact is that the misdeeds of any Thai government have always reflected the inherently anti-democratic patronage system.

This is a historical injustice, which remains largely in place today. It enables those from within the Thai political and business elite to maintain their privileged positions. The failure to deal with this central issue, and instead remain preoccupied with the political fortunes of one man, is to distract attention from a perennial problem of critical importance.

Weakening voting rights will only provoke greater division

Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation December 13, 2013 1:00 am

A society in which we disregard the voice of others when they dare to disagree with us can no longer address social, political and economic challenges

Thailand's contentious and fragile democratic arrangement has come under increasing pressure in recent days, culminating in a remarkable concession from the Pheu Thai government led by Yingluck Shinawatra. On Monday it dissolved Parliament ahead of another anti-Thaksin march on Government House. 

However, the move is unlikely to assuage protesters' anger at corruption in government. Meanwhile, for hardline government supporters, this concession was a step too far.

Anti-government protesters led by former Democrat MP Suthep Thaugsuban are pursuing a campaign to free Thai politics of Shinawatra family influence. Although still uncertain, their main proposal is to suspend electoral democracy and establish a "people's council" as the country's interim leadership. 

The members of this council will almost certainly be unelected, which inevitably brings its legitimacy and representative nature into question. Unsurprisingly, many sceptics have described this idea as little more than a coup in disguise.

What kind of a future society is Thailand then creating for itself, when a mass of citizens are now prepared to ignore their constitutionally enshrined voting rights in an attempt to challenge entrenched political corruption? How can such a regressive move - rescinding long-fought-for democratic rights - help achieve resolution to this latest national dispute?

The right to vote extends to the underprivileged majority in rural provinces. Although this demographic may not be regarded as having minority status, their experiences and overall quality of life indicate just such an inferior position.

Millions of Thailand's rural population continue to subsist as an effective underclass, without the privilege of a secure economic status or the realistic possibility of accessing high-quality education. In their stereotypical perceptions of this majority, the Bangkok middle-class remain harsh and closed-minded, behaving towards them as if they were second-class citizens. 

Such social division and injustice was thrown into sharp relief last week by the death of Nelson Mandela. Reflecting on the life and legacy of this rare individual, we may find ourselves better able to understand that it is the quality of moral fortitude that challenges injustice, and that this is what history will ultimately recognise. 

During his time in office, Mandela was able to support the rights of the disenfranchised black majority and also those of minorities not only because of his established political capital, but also because of his essential humanity. And importantly, South Africans were increasingly coming to accept, sometimes against their own immediate self-interest, that the apartheid status quo was no longer tenable.

"We have travelled too far along the road to freedom to turn back now," said Mandela, after a 1992 massacre of protesters in Bisho and before he became president. "We shall not be deterred by the threats or the actions of the forces of the past. Our people have the right to hope, the right to a future, the right to life itself. No power on this earth can destroy the thirst for human dignity."

It is alarming to hear protesters in Bangkok attempting to blame the problem of vote-buying on a lack of education among the rural majority. Is Thailand now witnessing the attempt to establish a precedent of removing individuals' right to vote (an inherent human right) because of their alleged failings?

Isaan resident Rattana Kampui is one among many who strongly disagrees with the anti-government protesters: "I am from Ubon Ratchathani but I have a national ID card so I should have the right to vote. I only want my voice to be heard just like those in Bangkok. Suthep's 'people's council' will only make me feel like I am no longer a citizen of Thailand, because my voice and my vote will mean nothing to this council." 

With millions of disaffected Thais now feeling the same, and with the reconciliation process evidently stalled, there is little hope that the divide between Bangkok and the rest of Thailand can be bridged any time soon. 

A society in which we disregard the voice of others when they dare to disagree with us can no longer intelligently address escalating social, political or economic challenges. Yet, this is Thai society today as we observe it, where voters often question the motives or rationale of those with different perspectives, without bothering to question their own. 

The anti-government coalition seeks to justify its stance by focusing on the problem of vote-buying. But the reality is that in Shinawatra strongholds and elsewhere, vote-buying is no longer the decisive factor it once was. Voter behaviour today has become a much more complex matter. 

Furthermore, that a populist political mandate was at all achievable, first by Thai Rak Thai and now by Pheu Thai, is indicative of the many historical injustices that existed before most Thais had even heard of Thaksin. No amount of evasive political argument can change this fact, despite continual attempts to divert attention away from the "elephant in the room" of Thailand's social inequality.

The unfolding of the current crisis has an air of inevitability given the seeming refusal of most Thais to consider the possibility they might be blinded by prejudice, or that those of a different political persuasion might have valid claims. 

Is it really credible to deny the link between deep-rooted political corruption and the voting decisions of millions? When those decisions continue to be dictated by short-term decision-making and motivations that are essentially self-serving, then politics will play out accordingly. 

Until Thai voters prove themselves capable of examining such questions with greater objectivity, we cannot expect a miraculous change. In the meantime, the game of brinkmanship being played by our political class will very likely push Thailand to the edge of yet another abyss. And the damage will, as usual, be felt most by those who are already the most marginalised in society.

Tony Blair in Thailand: What we can learn

Wed, 28/08/2013 - 17:17 | by prachatai

Titipol Phakdeewanich

Much has now been written in an attempt to make sense of the dramatic confrontation that we witnessed in parliament last week, which resulted in the sadly not unprecedented scenario of having police on the floor of the House. Thailand likely senses that the political drama between the government and the opposition will almost inevitably continue, and realistically, why should the country expect otherwise? Their respective positions are already well established, and we now see a demonstration of what amounts to a zero-sum game, too often favoured by Thai political strategists.

Whilst the rules-of-the-game established through various interpretations of parliamentary democracy around the world are intended to discourage such unbecoming scenes, it has not yet been possible to prevent such examples from recurring in Thailand. This does not at all mean that Thailand should be resigned to the mentality of fatalism, as it can still learn to manage more effectively and challenge the underlying reasons for the recent events in parliament.

There is a more than unfortunate irony in the continued inability of Thailand’s political representatives to debate convincingly such fundamental reforms as the terms of democracy itself. Recent events are rather indicative of the health of the system as it is today, and so this problem is especially significant now.

Could it even be possible that we are now witnessing an unconscious cry-for-help from the Thai political class? Is this their way of demonstrating to Mr Tony Blair, the former British Prime Minister, just how needed he might be in Thailand at this time? Although Mr Blair is due to visit next week as part of a foreign delegation to assist Thailand with its stalled reconciliation process, he may also have the skills needed to help the country’s politicians after their faltering attempts in the crucial debates over Senate reform.

It is true that most of the political opposition and many others across the country are now unsympathetic to the idea of bringing Mr Blair to Thailand. Yet his premiership saw a historic accomplishment in ending over thirty years of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, and a near equivalent to the challenge of the Thai reconciliation process in attempting to heal profound societal divisions. Although an immediate significant breakthrough seems unlikely, the approach that Mr Blair brings to the table may well prove instructive.

At the time of his ascendancy in British politics, Mr Blair was recognised for his ability to perceive before others could the political opportunity to bring together a variety of antagonists. He arguably achieved this not only in Northern Ireland, but also over British constitutional reform, the modernisation of his own Labour Party, and in shifting the British political spectrum towards his way of thinking.

The Senate reform debates so far reveal one overriding concern of the opposition, as their argument has focused on a reading of Thai political history as power in the grip of a small, yet powerful group in the political arena. Their fear seems to be that if the amendment to the constitution passed with the introduction of an all-elected Senate, the Pheu Thai party would inevitably wield unrestrained power over House and Senate.

Whilst it is unsurprising that they take this position, and its exponents clearly have every right to voice their concerns, a number of representatives in the House have resorted to the questionable tactic of hyperbolic fear-mongering to make their point. As a consequence, this approach has inevitably conveyed a message of distrust in the ability of the Thai people as a whole, to think sufficiently rationally or tactically, when it comes to voting.

The tone of the debate in the House explicitly reflected the concern that the Pheu Thai party, and by implication former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, would achieve absolute control of both the House and Senate. Thaksin’s detractors apparently fear that the political arena has become his fiefdom, supposedly because the Pheu Thai Party can expect to secure forever its support in the North and Northeast of Thailand, where most of the Thai population live.

But for a country to be continually obsessed over the intentions of one man in exile, is to miss the point when we observe the way society operates. In acting to challenge the everyday inequalities found all around them, Thai people would learn more about why they find themselves in a situation where power brokers wield inordinate power.

The stalling tactics used during the debates are a form of gamesmanship. Yet this approach also reveals how unsustainable it is to rely on a strategy that goes against both the essential tenets of democratic representation, and the imperative to modernise and reform. After all, resistance to progress is the refuge of those who are losing the argument.

We only have to ask Mr Blair’s primary political opponents from within the British Conservative Party – who lost power for over a decade – for an answer as to why they took so long to respond positively to his challenge. The question may be asked whether the Thai opposition will persist with their existing approach.

In his autobiography, Mr Blair acknowledged the inherent problem of an appointment-based system: “The danger with appointment is cronyism, placemenship, patronage and so on, but that can be countered by a different system of nomination…”

When Mr Blair was Prime Minister, the British government introduced the House of Lords Act 1999, which sought to phase out the hereditary nature of the upper house through the introduction of a majority of appointees. This historic step forwards in the reform of the House of Lords was not the end of the question, as the debate continues. 

We should also consider the words of Thomas Jefferson, an early US President and cosignatory of the US Constitution: “I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome direction, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education. This is the true corrective of abuses of constitutional power.”

Continually finding one reason or another to deny the fullest democratic representation of the people is not the way to support an emerging democracy. This only serves to justify a resistance to reform that encourages the opportunism of vested interests and further delay what will be, for Thailand, a difficult yet necessary learning experience.

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Titipol Phakdeewanich is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University

Thai-US friendship: the next stage

A stateless refugee from Ban Bahai, Ubon Ratchathani

Much has already been made of this year's 180th anniversary of bilateral Thai-US relations, and with it a tendency perhaps to idealise a shared history. What is missing, however, is a more convincing expression of future purpose and direction that would communicate to the Thai public the relevance of this relationship in the future. What then, of the roles likely to be played by both Thailand and the US within the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) in particular, over the next few years?

As argued earlier this year by the former US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, during a speech in January: "America today is stronger at home and more respected in the world." Nevertheless, the question arises as to what extent this statement reflects current perceptions within the countries of the GMS.

There has been a long history of the Western powers' involvement across Southeast Asia, and its a mixed record, with the case of Laos in particular a close-to-home reminder of this legacy. This involves Thailand too, with the still unresolved and largely disregarded question of the status of Lao refugees from the time of the Vietnam War, who are now situated in Thailand's northeastern.

In the remote village of Ban Bahai, in Ubon Ratchathani, within a few kilometres of their homeland, Lao people continue to suffer from a lack of acknowledgment by the Thai government. Approximately 100 of its population of 900 have remained stateless in the decades since they were forced to from Laos due to the war.

One villager spoke anonymously: "I worked for the US army as a military support in Laos during the war, before I moved to Thailand. I want to return home, but my children think of themselves as Thai. They are Lao ethnically, but they were born here, so they feel more Thai than I do. I remain stateless, with no rights or access to basic social benefits."

Questions remain as to why there is so little progress on this matter, and why the problems must apparently continue until such a time when a resolution becomes more politically opportune. This situation may be, at least in part, because Thailand has yet to more fully reflect on its own involvement in the Vietnam War. This is the war that Lao people so often describe as "The American War against Laos", in which Thailand was assisted both economically and militarily.

Because many within the region, quite understandably, remain suspicious of the US's intent, an approach to "soft-power" diplomacy - that more tangibly demonstrates that it is taking responsibility for its role in Laos - may be for the US one of the most effective ways it can revitalise its reputation in the region.

The emphasis on soft power in the years immediately preceding its "Asian pivot", reveals a definite understanding by the US of the work that is yet to be done. Moreover, this is also a reflection of the more limited capacity of the US to directly implement the kinds of changes that it would like to see in the world.

However, US interests in the GMS today are not isolated, narrow interests, and they are no longer seemingly exclusive to the US. Its networks of interest continue to grow in complexity, despite the apparent fact that its ability to act unilaterally is now diminished. It is with the recognition of this that the US launched the Lower mekong Initiative in 2009, and this is charged with supporting the environment, education, health, agriculture, energy and connectivity across Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam, as well as Thailand.

The GMS is now a nexus zone that demonstrates the multifaceted nature of international relations, and this requires more nuanced understanding that mitigates the temptation of political and economic short-term expedience. Among the many complex issues, recognition of rights from a responsive government is increasingly seen as a barometer of trust between nations. This is therefore, not the time for regional players such as Thailand to be waiting for others to provide vital direction and leadership.

We are now in an era when the US will increasingly look to its most reliable partners to demonstrate their commitment, and thus their reputation, in promoting progress around the world. Thailand can recognise this as an opportunity, as well as a moral responsibility. The continuing plight of stateless refugees along Thailand's northeastern border is one such case in point.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University,

Rethinking the rice policy: A moral and financial issue

Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation June 25, 2013 1:00 am

A worker amid sacks of rice stored under the government

In recent weeks, the debate relating to the widespread desire to amend Thailand's current rice price-pledging scheme has increasingly focused on over-simplified partisan arguments, while the interests of farmers themselves are seemingly being further neglected. But when we consider making changes to what has become a heavily subsidised and regulated rice market, it would be premature to jump into making an expedient, short-term decision between either of the two options currently on offer.

Of these, there is a proposed update to the rice price-pledging scheme introduced by Yingluck Shinawatra's government and supported by the majority of rice farmers. The alternative is seemingly a reintroduction of the rice price-guarantee programme of Abhisit Vejjajiva's former government, which is supported by farmers who benefited from this previous policy, and also by many landowners. 

The suggestion that we need to further reflect, gains merit when we recognise that it is precisely because both policies have their own strengths and weaknesses that a more fully thought through policy can provide for a solution with greater feasibility in the long term. Moreover, it is no secret that other approaches to promote agricultural policy have been suggested, originating from Thailand, and also from around the world.

We may well ask the question why Thailand's political decision-making process remains as narrowly defined as this major example of policy formulation appears to be on the verge of suggesting. In order to attempt to better respond to this challenge, there are a number of important concerns that can be more fully brought into the debate, but have so far been somewhat neglected.

There are obvious questions that policy-makers should be asking, regardless of political affiliation. These ought to relate directly to what we can expect to achieve in subsidising rice farmers, the implications on rice production and the wellbeing of farmers in the long run. If policy-makers have truly answered such questions, then we can expect a greater degree of success in the effectiveness of their policy instruments. 

It is true to say that the rice price-guarantee programme proved a viable policy to respond to the natural uncertainty that comes with agricultural production. Indeed, both during and after the flood of 2011, rice farmers that were affected claimed that they would have been better off if this policy had still been in place. 

Essentially, under that programme, farmers received the difference between the market price and the price-guarantee regardless of their production, because each payment was calculated on the basis of the land each had registered as their rice farm. However, a moral hazard undoubtedly existed, whereby opportunists were able to enjoy the benefits of these subsidies without having to produce any rice at all. 

Under the current rice price-pledging scheme, farmers are only able to claim its benefits as and when they trade their rice within the market, which has mitigated the moral hazard and acted to elevate rice-farmer incomes. Nevertheless, the artificially high level of the price has been perceived by many as an unnecessary burden on government spending, and this argument was made even before Prime Minister Yingluck took office. In addition, this policy has been questioned by many, over issues relating to transparency and corruption.

Among rice farmers, the perception has become increasingly widespread that the current price-pledge is their entitlement, and it is now the obligation of the government to act to promote their standard of living. It only follows therefore, that rice farmers who benefit from the policy are overwhelmingly dissatisfied with the government's decision to reduce the price-pledge from Bt15,000 to Bt12,000. Their response had been predicted because of their expectation of receiving the higher level of subsidy, although their meeting with Prime Minister Yingluck in an attempt to negotiate for a restoration of the Bt15,000 price-pledge will likely prove unsuccessful. 

Yet in certain key respects, today's Thai farmers are not so different from farmers from across the world. Even in the developed West, farmers seemingly cannot survive the market without considerable support from their governments, as evidenced by the Farm Bill in the US, and the Common Agricultural Policy in the European Union. 

In his Common Agricultural Policy blog regarding "Farmers and the EU", Wyn Grant, a professor of politics at the University of Warwick, recently wrote: "When I said 'many' farmers could not survive without the single farm payment, I was corrected by the word 'all'. If this is the case, it is worrying in terms of the viability of British farming. An arable farmer did emphasise that most farmers would prefer to earn a living from the market if they could get a fair price and this led us into a discussion of the economic power of the supermarkets."

We must of course, recognise that the agricultural sector remains a politically sensitive issue from the local level all the way up to the international level. Moreover, the World Trade Organisation has agreed to allow its members all kinds of exemptions, in order that they can support and protect their agricultural markets. 

Nevertheless, a trend has now emerged internationally, which seeks to unwind support for subsidies, overall. This arguably began with the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the forerunner of the WTO) between 1986-1994, which was the first time in which the liberalisation of agricultural trade was so seriously addressed. Reforms such as these have, since then, often acknowledged a stated aim of intending to act to ensure that farmers can develop greater self-reliance.

Today, many rice farmers are not completely dependent on income from their farms, as alternative sources of income, such as seasonal labour migration or remittances from the younger generations who work in the industrial sector, increasingly assist in supporting rural farming families. Therefore, a comprehensive re-examination of the underlying structure of the country's rice economy would be an important starting point, in attempting to more effectively reconsider the role of the government in this. 

The intention to support rice farmers need not be restricted of course to the use of various methods of market intervention. Therefore, in order to realise a more effective long-term strategy when it comes to important matters such as rice policy, it is incumbent on Thai policy-makers that they act to transcend the existing debate, which has thus far, only got us so far.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, in the UK. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University.

Fight for human rights focuses on Thai university tradition

Fight for human rights focuses on Thai university tradition

Titipol Phakdeewanich May 29, 2013 1:00 am

As new students head in to their first term at university, the spotlight is once again on

As a new academic year begins for university students across Thailand, the ongoing problem of human rights violations on campus is once more being raised. For first-year students, this rite-of-passage should of course be their opportunity to feel welcomed and fully respected as adults within an institution of learning.

But it is a sad fact today that thousands of students are at this moment only too well aware of the very real possibility of being caught up in this year's euphemistically entitled university tradition of rub-nong ("welcoming the newcomer"). Those who continue to defend its practices - which borrow from the historical British public school system, the more contemporary US university fraternity system, and Thailand's military service - may see it as little more than high jinks, or as an opportunity for peer bonding. 

However, with the passing of every academic year, the evidence for more extreme abuse mounts - and not only through photos and video but also through the claims of those who are increasingly inclined to speak out. It follows that what we are witnessing on Thai university campuses today could often be more accurately described as ritualised abuse, and violations of human rights. 

These concerns are evidently well founded, as every year we observe serious physical injuries as a consequence of these university rituals. Regardless of the facade behind which they operate, or the pretext under which they are tacitly permitted, the suffering remains very real for the victims in this scenario. Allegations of abuse tend to indicate that it is psychological manifestations of abuse that are the most endemic. These typically involve menacing threats, intimidation and a lot of shouting.

Although many have accordingly argued that these practices should have been stamped out years ago, it is essentially the case that little has fundamentally changed, despite some recent attempts to tinker around the edges of this entrenched problem. Today, its advocates typically attempt justifications by arguing that rub-nong, through incorporating the so-called SOTUS (Seniority, Order, Tradition, Unity, Spirit) system, promotes a respect for seniority, discipline and unity.

So what then, do recent graduates of the Thai university educational system make of all this? 

Krisanapong Jobsanjohn, an alumni of Ubon Ratchathani University, argues: "In Thailand, we are taught to believe in seniority, and so the SOTUS system fits with the Thai culture." 

More critical is Kobchat Vichieansri, a graduate of Chulalongkorn University: "The SOTUS system is not at all relevant to university education. Also, it supports the existing patronage system within Thai society. This is why I think it should stop."

Just recently, as reported across a number of media outlets (and especially through online social media that students typically follow), a serious complaint was submitted to the Office of the Higher Education Commission. Furthermore, the complainants are seemingly prepared to take their case to the United Nations representatives in Thailand if necessary. 

Should this development mark the beginning of a trend whereby individual students take on the responsibility of asserting both their basic human rights and constitutional rights, then this may be a form of progress. Nevertheless, the culture of hazing raises further questions as to whether institutions and the state truly recognise their responsibilities to act against this serious abuse. 

There is now the very real potential for a spike in the number of incidents, as those students who increasingly resent the SOTUS system attempt to exercise their freedoms in the face of those who are determined to exert their status and role as rub-nong ringleaders and retain their stranglehold on campus.

For its part, the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRC) has begun making tentative steps towards a fuller recognition that a problem exists. It has published on its website a news report about allegations of abuse taking place within the higher educational system, and has begun working with four universities in the north of Thailand on the broader question of human rights. Thus we now have an important opportunity to observe whether the NHRC is prepared to take serious action on this matter. In previous years, it has typically remained rather quiet. 

When attempting to demonstrate they recognise the problem, the Ministry of Education and university executives have tended towards standardised, token statements over the past few years. These announcements have informed existing students that they have no right to force new students into the SOTUS system, and that within the SOTUS system, violence is not acceptable. Nevertheless, this limited approach to the problem has now proven ineffectual. Without further steps, this approach will increasingly appear to be serving the purpose of providing legal cover for those in positions of power, rather than being a genuine attempt to resolve this issue. 

In order to air their concerns, a group of university students in 2012 formed the Anti-SOTUS Group, which now has 10,000 Facebook members. But this is probably just the tip of the iceberg - there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest that students are reluctant to speak out about institutionalised bullying.

The quality of higher education within Thailand can only suffer when an issue such as this remains as an unnecessary distraction and preoccupation for thousands of its students. Considering the relative status of Thailand's higher education system on the world stage, the quality of its university education cannot at all be taken for granted.

The Times Higher Education Asia University Rankings 2013, released in April, saw Thailand claim only three places within the top 100. The latest equivalent figure for the world rankings was published for the year 2012-2013, and no Thai university was placed within the top 350 (King Mongkut's University of Technology, Thonburi was ranked within the top 400).

It follows therefore, that it would be a dereliction of duty on the part of any Thai government to remain in denial when it comes to recognising how the SOTUS system contributes towards undermining both educational attainment and human rights within the country. But the question remains as to whether Thailand's politicians and policymakers have either the will or motive to enact effective reforms for the sake of this latest generation.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, in the United Kingdom. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University.

Thatcher's legacy continues to teach us when we go wrong

Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation April 17, 2013 1:00 am

Over the past few days, we have read and listened to many perspectives relating to the life and legacy of Margaret Thatcher, who was in every sense a politically dominant figure of the 1980s. We have heard about her pioneering role as Britain's first female prime minister, and also about her unique character and style.

So then, what does all this mean in the context of Thailand today? The death of a political leader of such rare force and influence does perhaps give us, regardless of our particular perception of her, a rare opportunity to reflect on the direction Thailand has been taking. Perhaps out of this, we can more properly question some of our long-held assumptions about the policies we have embraced as a nation, and therefore, make some much-needed changes. 

One of the principal policy approaches for which Thatcher is most famed, or notorious, is the way in which she forcefully decoupled the British economy from a damaging over-reliance on the post-Second World War consensus relating to state intervention and a nation's economy. 

During the 1980s, her approach was considered divisive, acting as it did to further polarise a nation. Even today, senior members of her own political party continue to be at odds over her ultimate methodology and approach. Nevertheless, it is now more than two decades later, and Britain has corrected its image as "the sick man of Europe", despite the significant impact to its economy in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. 

The enduring questions relating to the balance between the free market and the state, so often cause us to reconsider this aspect of Thatcher's formidable legacy. This is precisely because so many of the major, and still controversial, aspects of Thatcherite economics have since been emulated and implemented throughout the world. 

Indeed, alongside a programme of privatisation, over the past 10 years or more, successive Thai governments have implemented a number of somewhat populist, but much-needed policies through the state mechanism. This has certainly contributed toward raising the level of public spending overall, and although this has so far been accomplished without raising Thailand's public debt to unsustainable levels, the trend over the past few years has been on the rise. 

According to The Economist, Thailand's public debt as a percentage of its GDP was 45.8 per cent in 2012, and is projected to rise to 51.7 per cent by 2014. This is a significant increase over a two-year period, especially when we consider that further policies are being considered, including the contentious Bt2-trillion infrastructure development project, which is currently being scrutinised in Parliament. Accordingly, it seems rather likely that public debt is only set to further increase over the short and medium terms, and this is also at a time when Thailand must still consider the uncertainty that surrounds the outlook for the world economy.

For several decades, Thailand's primary national developmental framework has been the National Economic and Social Development Plan, and since 1997 there has been a move away from a growth-oriented approach toward what is now described as a "people-centred development" approach. This has been sold to the Thai public as something that will promote a fairer distribution of income across the demographics, and in addition will act to enhance political participation and dialogue between citizens and the state.

But as this has evidently not delivered on its promise, many now argue that its primary effect has been to contribute toward a significant increase in the sense of dependency many Thais now exhibit with regard to the state. This trend is particularly apparent when we observe the increasing demands being made for public goods and services such as healthcare and education, and also in terms of how individuals now so often aspire to gain long-term employment with the state. 

But for Thatcher, such a trend toward the Keynesian model had proven problematic. As she recalled later, after her term in office: "There was no point in setting targets for 'full' employment. Instead, government should create the right framework of sound money, low taxes, light regulation and flexible markets (including labour markets) to allow prosperity and employment to grow."

From the perspective of policy-makers, understanding how to maintain a proper balance between the roles of the free market and the state is already a significant challenge. This issue involves much more than the question of government policies and frameworks, the role of institutions, or the move toward privatisation and deregulation. It is also about the fundamental relationship between citizens and the state, and this relates to the fluctuating perceptions of people within a society. 

The mentality of simply wanting to work within the public sector, without particular regard for the eventual repercussions of such a widespread attitude, remains relatively pervasive in Thailand today. Also, as a consequence, this sector of the employment market continues to become increasingly competitive. Those who have newly graduated typically carry the perception that a public-sector job is secure, and therefore their focus is primarily on securing such a position, with relatively little regard for their role thereafter.

Moreover, they are frequently encouraged in this outlook by elders within the family, because not only their children, but also their parents will gain state benefits as a result. Indeed, we cannot avoid the implication in all of this that many Thais are now sceptical that the market mechanism can truly work for them. 

Although most of us now recognise that there is a role for the state in regulating market failure, attempts to flee from the private sector en masse may only further undermine a desire for balance within the system overall, and this is a challenge that the current government now faces. 

As we now stop to reflect on Thatcher's legacy, perhaps we can recognise this one key aspect: that despite her apparent divisiveness, and the heated disagreements over her more notorious policies during and since her time in office, many British people have finally been persuaded that there is one thing she certainly did achieve. This was to transform the dynamics in the relationship between the individual, the free-market and the state. Such a correction, in and of itself, may have been enough to assure her legacy, despite the fact that many of her individual policies were considered by many to be lacking in compassion when it came to their effects on ordinary lives. 

For Thailand, this is a time to reopen the debate and re-examine the state's major policy instruments, in order to encourage people to enquire into these questions more fully, with the hope that we too may act more effectively to make such a transformation. 

Is Readiness Our Problem, or Lack of Ambition?

Titipol Phakdeewanich 

Special to The Nation April 10, 2013 1:00 am

People walk under train tracks in Bangkok

Political gamesmanship relating to the Bt2-trillion infrastructure loan bill is now playing itself out through parliamentary debates, as well as through the mainstream media and social media. Although both the Pheu Thai Party and the Democrat Party claim in principle to be in favour of the proposed infrastructural development project, the counter-arguments to the bill have primarily focused on both the means of funding and the seemingly inevitable and ever-present factor of corruption.

According to an official statement by the government led by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, this project will "make Thailand a strategic hub connecting Asean and its 600 million citizens under the conceptual framework of 'connectivity'". This argument appears to synchronise with findings from a joint study conducted by the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank Institute in 2009, entitled "Infrastructure for a Seamless Asia". This stated: "Building roads, railways … across the region should be a priority for the region's policymakers. In these uncertain times, Asia must not pause or turn back.… Such integration will help boost economic growth and disperse its benefits more widely." 

In the broader context therefore, we can perhaps see why Thai policymakers would not want to appear to be resisting Southeast Asian regional integration at a time when we are talking about the build up to the Asean Economic Community in 2015. Nevertheless, we should not be dissuaded from asking legitimate and pertinent questions when the country is committing itself to its greatest ever borrowing requirement, when corruption remains so pervasive, and when unprecedented levels of inter-generational indebtedness are being advocated, in order to support such an ambitious project. 

When considering the approaches taken in arguing their respective cases, we can observe that the stakes are obviously high for both Pheu Thai and the Democrats, whilst also recognising how critical the implications are for the country. The way this scenario plays out therefore, will be a significant learning process for Thailand.

If we also look back to consider the development of Suvarnabhumi Airport as a case study on infrastructural development at the nexus point of politics and corruption, this may well indicate something about the way in which politicians are approaching the Bt2-trillion loan bill today. In relation to both scenarios, the Pheu Thai coalition has been bold in acting as the driving force behind these large-scale projects, with the Democrats taking the more circumspect position.

Now we can begin to see the current scenario in the context of the apparent success of the airport project, which has nevertheless succeeded quite well, despite the questions asked relating to corruption. On their part, the Democrats are presumed to be concerned about being outmanoeuvred over the proposed infrastructural projects, and paradoxically this may indeed indicate their belief in their ultimate potential.

It is evident that the public overwhelmingly considers politicians of all persuasions to be corrupt and to be compromised by conflicts of interest, regardless of whoever leads the government. Accordingly, many Thais now argue that corruption is okay if it generates economic growth. Although this "pro-growth corruption" mindset is understandable in attempting to be realistic about the ongoing state of the Thai political system, unless we tangibly act to mitigate the problem, such a mindset may actually help to both support and perpetuate this very same problem. 

The Democrats have indicated the possibility of challenging a parliamentary bill in the Constitutional Court, if the financing relating to such a bill was unacceptable to them. In addition, a number of the drafters of the 2007 Constitution have now submitted their request that the National Counter Corruption Commission investigate whether the Bt2 trillion loan bill is constitutional. 

The fact that Thailand is as corrupt as it is today - Transparency International's 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Thailand 88th out of 176 countries and territories - indicates that regardless of the potential opportunities provided by such infrastructure projects, there is the very real possibility that they may not ultimately deliver on promise. Therefore, although its advocates assert that the projects should be a net benefit for Thailand and will make a return on investment over the next fifty years, should this not ultimately be the case, then such words will count for little in assuaging the anger of future generations. 

But if we can recognise we are now engaging with that age-old question of ambition versus readiness, then we can also recognise that Thailand has perhaps reached a certain level of maturity within its emerging democracy. This important question should not dissuade the country from attempting to make real progress by forging ahead with viable and well-thought-out strategies towards societal advancement. 

We can look to our neighbour Laos and the progress it has already made in committing to the Laos-China high-speed railway project, costing US$7 billion. Accordingly, many Thais have asked the question as to why Thailand has not made such progress. 

At the same time, we should also consider the historical example of the UK, which pioneered the development of railways during the Industrial Revolution. At that time, Britain seemingly had no lack of ambition, but sceptics still quibbled as to whether that country was ready for such a ground-breaking undertaking. 

Today, however, Britain is more advanced yet less sure of itself as a nation, and lacks something of that Victorian spirit. Nevertheless, its policymakers continue to understand the importance of investing in Britain's future. Despite the current uncertain economic climate in the UK, in his Autumn Statement in 2012, George Osborne, the UK chancellor of the exchequer, stated, "All the money saved in the first two years will be re-invested as part of a 5 billion-pound capital investment in the infrastructure of our country. It is exactly what a government equipping Britain to compete in the modern global economy should be doing." 

For this political generation in Thailand, one of the key challenges to overcome is the temptation to resort to political gamesmanship as a way of distracting from an often serious lack of genuine resolve to bring about tangible, bona fide progress. As John Locke, the British political philosopher of the 17th century, once stated: "If we were never to act on our opinions, because those opinions may be wrong, we should leave all our interests uncared for, and all our duties unperformed." 

Thailand must seriously consider its ability to compete in the global economy, and in doing so, its capacity to connect with the rest of the world. When we contemplate Thailand's future, and the progress that can be achieved through large-scale projects, we should realise that political expediency must not overshadow national dialogue, for it is the quality of debate on all levels that will tell us the most about Thailand's readiness and ambition. 

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.