Sunday, 20 December 2015
Sunday, 22 November 2015
The army camp creeps on to the uni campus
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Thursday, 13 August 2015
What hope for Thai democracy when tyranny rules at university?
What hope for Thai democracy when tyranny rules at university?
TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH
Outdated hazing rituals expose Thailand's abiding societal schism
These first few weeks of the new Thai university year again bring into focus the euphemistically titled tradition of "rub nong" - (welcoming the newcomer). These rituals, with a well-established format that plays on the naivete of first-year students, are a thoroughly dehumanising group induction into university life.
Year after year, rub nong and its various hazing-style practices leave their unwitting victims psychologically and sometimes physically scarred. Serious injuries have resulted - and still it goes on, under the noses of university authorities.
Despite this, many former and current university students regard these rituals with surprising affection as part of a Thai cultural tradition of social bonding, where everyone gets to become your "brother" or "sister".
A standard argument is that older and more worldly students can help support their younger and inexperienced counterparts - which, in principle, sounds like a reasonable claim.
But for several generations of students, rub nong has been a calculated enforcement of a rigid social hierarchy on campus that they must endure.
A reality of obedience and subordination outweighs the ideal of friendship and equality, and the practices adopted by senior students who implement these rituals are well-honed and ruthlessly enacted. Over recent years, veiled threats and coercive group psychology have been the trend, though outright violence still takes place on occasion.
The latter help ramp up an overbearing pressure to conform to the norms of this menacing regime.
Fear over who might be singled-out next for displeasing those who run this mini-mafia means most students simply keep their heads down. And so this often fanatical effort to boss student life prevails unchallenged, aided by the indifference (or ambivalence) of university and government authorities.
Advocates often justify the practice by claiming rub nong prepares students for the harsh world waiting for them after graduation. In reality, this claim is an attempt to rationalise their own unthinking authoritarian approach to life.
Do the legions of university seniors already implicated - whether from actions this week or 20 years ago - share any secret sense of shame at their part in the dehumanisation of their innocent fellows, even while they publicly remain shameless and defiant in their advocacy for it? Perhaps. Perhaps not. But either way, rub nong and the cultural climate it helps engender remains as Thailand's shame, regardless of how much we continue to avoid the issue.
"Life on campus is not what I expected. I thought I would have freedom, but I don't think that I have it at all. Seniority is extremely embedded here, and it is secretly supported by the university executive, who believe in this kind of authoritarian system. I don't think that I have any hope for a better student life here, because my rights do not mean anything to the university."
These are the words of a student currently based at a northern university, speaking on condition of anonymity.
It is clear that concerns about rub nong and the welfare of students are not a priority for the authorities, despite lip service paid by the Education Ministry and university authorities in recent years.
Although human rights now often get a mention at the start of the new academic year, this is still largely a token effort. Rub nong's perpetrators can disregard the official platitudes, safe in the knowledge that serious action is seldom taken.
For those of us who once had such high hopes for Thailand's development, it is dismaying to note that rituals which violate basic norms of universal human rights still retain a semblance of legitimacy.
Worse still, rub nong - along with other similarly absurd authoritarian propositions continually spouted by talking heads, street-level wannabes and every totalitarian enforcer - excite those Thais who regard such things as actually worth fighting for.
All this, of course, is taking place at a time when Thailand is subject to increasingly severe scrutiny by much of the international community over its abandonment of democracy.
And the country's already damaged international standing is now being even further undermined by a focus on the broader question of human rights violations. In this context, it is disturbing that the prevalence of rub nong evidences a strong generational desire to disavow basic democratic and human rights tenets. And this, while Thailand is in the midst of a prolonged and worrisome dynamic of social-political disintegration. Such ingrained authoritarianism bodes ill for both our future domestic prospects and our reputation abroad.
Even if a semblance of democracy is re-established in the country, then the ongoing prevalence of pernicious and divisive university rituals that help enshrine the Thai patronage system will inform the much-vaunted and idealised "Thai-style" democracy to come.
Future generations will gain little solace from denouncing the authorities of today. For those generations will, by then, surely be forced to do some soul-searching over the part they played in defending authoritarian norms.
Without a far more determined effort to question the prevailing Thai mentality - and especially its most damaging aspects, which are already penetrating the minds of yet another generation - why should anyone who claims to be serious about the current process of Thai reform expect things to change for the better?
TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, in the UK. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University.
Year after year, rub nong and its various hazing-style practices leave their unwitting victims psychologically and sometimes physically scarred. Serious injuries have resulted - and still it goes on, under the noses of university authorities.
Despite this, many former and current university students regard these rituals with surprising affection as part of a Thai cultural tradition of social bonding, where everyone gets to become your "brother" or "sister".
A standard argument is that older and more worldly students can help support their younger and inexperienced counterparts - which, in principle, sounds like a reasonable claim.
But for several generations of students, rub nong has been a calculated enforcement of a rigid social hierarchy on campus that they must endure.
A reality of obedience and subordination outweighs the ideal of friendship and equality, and the practices adopted by senior students who implement these rituals are well-honed and ruthlessly enacted. Over recent years, veiled threats and coercive group psychology have been the trend, though outright violence still takes place on occasion.
The latter help ramp up an overbearing pressure to conform to the norms of this menacing regime.
Fear over who might be singled-out next for displeasing those who run this mini-mafia means most students simply keep their heads down. And so this often fanatical effort to boss student life prevails unchallenged, aided by the indifference (or ambivalence) of university and government authorities.
Advocates often justify the practice by claiming rub nong prepares students for the harsh world waiting for them after graduation. In reality, this claim is an attempt to rationalise their own unthinking authoritarian approach to life.
Do the legions of university seniors already implicated - whether from actions this week or 20 years ago - share any secret sense of shame at their part in the dehumanisation of their innocent fellows, even while they publicly remain shameless and defiant in their advocacy for it? Perhaps. Perhaps not. But either way, rub nong and the cultural climate it helps engender remains as Thailand's shame, regardless of how much we continue to avoid the issue.
"Life on campus is not what I expected. I thought I would have freedom, but I don't think that I have it at all. Seniority is extremely embedded here, and it is secretly supported by the university executive, who believe in this kind of authoritarian system. I don't think that I have any hope for a better student life here, because my rights do not mean anything to the university."
These are the words of a student currently based at a northern university, speaking on condition of anonymity.
It is clear that concerns about rub nong and the welfare of students are not a priority for the authorities, despite lip service paid by the Education Ministry and university authorities in recent years.
Although human rights now often get a mention at the start of the new academic year, this is still largely a token effort. Rub nong's perpetrators can disregard the official platitudes, safe in the knowledge that serious action is seldom taken.
For those of us who once had such high hopes for Thailand's development, it is dismaying to note that rituals which violate basic norms of universal human rights still retain a semblance of legitimacy.
Worse still, rub nong - along with other similarly absurd authoritarian propositions continually spouted by talking heads, street-level wannabes and every totalitarian enforcer - excite those Thais who regard such things as actually worth fighting for.
All this, of course, is taking place at a time when Thailand is subject to increasingly severe scrutiny by much of the international community over its abandonment of democracy.
And the country's already damaged international standing is now being even further undermined by a focus on the broader question of human rights violations. In this context, it is disturbing that the prevalence of rub nong evidences a strong generational desire to disavow basic democratic and human rights tenets. And this, while Thailand is in the midst of a prolonged and worrisome dynamic of social-political disintegration. Such ingrained authoritarianism bodes ill for both our future domestic prospects and our reputation abroad.
Even if a semblance of democracy is re-established in the country, then the ongoing prevalence of pernicious and divisive university rituals that help enshrine the Thai patronage system will inform the much-vaunted and idealised "Thai-style" democracy to come.
Future generations will gain little solace from denouncing the authorities of today. For those generations will, by then, surely be forced to do some soul-searching over the part they played in defending authoritarian norms.
Without a far more determined effort to question the prevailing Thai mentality - and especially its most damaging aspects, which are already penetrating the minds of yet another generation - why should anyone who claims to be serious about the current process of Thai reform expect things to change for the better?
TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, in the UK. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University.
Thursday, 28 May 2015
The vainglorious constitutional quest of a junta UNDER STRESS
The vainglorious constitutional quest of a junta UNDER STRESS
THE CHARTER DRAFTERS' CLAIM THAT 'THE CITIZEN IS THE CENTRE|OF THIS CONSTITUTION' IS SOUNDING INCREASINGLY HOLLOW
Last week's conciliatory announcement by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) that citizens will have the opportunity to either reject or consent to a new constitution is unconvincing as a show of democratic intent.
One year on from the military coup of May 22, the country remains fundamentally divided as to whether we should even attempt a return to democracy.
What will be the consequences of this seemingly intractable social-political predicament for Thailand?
Growing signs of equivocation in the junta indicate that the intent remains to press ahead with its imperatives for a new constitution - whether or not a referendum is, in the end, held. The protracted pretence would then be over, and with it, any semblance of credibility among those who ache for more tangible democratic foundations.
The various "yeas" and "nays" that continually emerge from the junta and its subordinate institutions - only to be followed by more dashed hopes for Thailand's democratic progress - only risk further alienating the now tantalised voters-in-waiting. It is also worrisome that this protracted Thai impasse contains so many echoes of our pre-democratic and authoritarian eras of history.
All the while, voices from the international community - including the United Nations, the European Union, the United States and Japan - have remained resolute in their insistence that Thailand must return power to its people through an open and democratic election. The resulting economic pressure being brought to bear on Thailand makes the options for its leadership that much more stark.
So it seems strange that a leadership whose declared intent is to forge a successful transition towards democracy is so unenthusiastic about the opportunity to establish democratic norms.
Such a discrepancy only further undermines the credibility of this Thai leadership among critics both in Thailand and beyond.
Despite a new timeline that suggests democratic elections could be held soon as late next year, delays in ratifying the new constitution indicate Thailand is unlikely to attain democratic normalcy anytime soon. Nevertheless, the current draft of what is intended to be the 19th Thai constitution is still being determinedly scrutinised by citizens as they look for ways to assert their voices as Thailand's stakeholders-at-large.
It is thus becoming incumbent on all sides to recognise the importance of an open civil society as a means of promoting constructive dialogue, learn the value of cooperation, and make reasonable concessions as part of an undertaking to bridge Thailand's pernicious societal divide.
Without a greater general sense of reason and flexibility, it is likely to matter little whether the question of the constitution is settled via a supposedly exhaustive redrafting, or through a disjointed series of amendments. Thai history indicates that any such result will be thoroughly unsatisfactory and unworkable.
Provincial Thais, especially those from the North and Northeast, remain the scapegoats of choice over Thailand's continuing ills. Both the emerging urban middle class and the establishment continue to make the most of any opportunity to characterise the rural poor as "uneducated" and "self-serving".
Disenfranchised rural Thais
"The drafting of a constitution is not my job, I am only a rural person. What I say doesn't mean anything to anyone. I want the constitution to work for us [people within his village], but we're not part of it. Only people in the city or Bangkok can say what they want, not us [rural people]."
These are the words of a rural Thai voter, who wished to remain anonymous, living by the Mekong River on the Thailand-Laos border in Khong Chiam district, Ubon Ratchathani province.
His words are profound because they convey a simple, clear and direct truth that withstands the inane stereotyping to which rural Isaan (northeastern) Thais are routinely subjected. They also undermine the convoluted rationalising of those who would seek to contrive reasons for why a population that is already among the most marginalised should be continually disregarded and disenfranchised.
Fortunately for Thailand, the question of the correlation between educational attainment and the right to vote was also raised by political philosopher John Stuart Mill: "I regard it as wholly inadmissible that any person should participate in the suffrage [have voting rights] without being able to read, write and, I will add, perform the common operations of arithmetic." In other words, the attainment of basic literacy was his simple prerequisite for access to the ballot box.
Even though Mill was not advocating voting rights for all, he was in favour of more inclusion. And this was in the context of a still rather undemocratic 19th-century Britain, where women did not have the right to vote, and an era far removed from our own 21st-century information age. It was also at a time when only about three-quarters of the British population had attained basic literacy - a figure now exceeded by the Thailand of today.
Most Thais, wherever they live, now enjoy increased access to information, in one way or another. The fact that even remote rural areas of Thailand can sometimes have better Internet access than urban areas is acting to support greater critical thinking among the rural population. The stereotypes of irredeemably naive or ignorant rural citizens are becoming more and more outdated, and more politically untenable.
Historically, a common argument made against Thai liberal democracy is that Thailand is not ready because the people are "not well-educated". This mentality is reflected in the main arguments of the People's Democratic Reform Committee in 2013 and 2014, during the build-up to the coup. We could characterise these as the "never-quite-ready-yet" arguments of Thai political rhetoric.
Mill's Britain never did adopt a written constitution. But post-revolutionary France and America did go in that direction, making significant social-political advances in the meantime, as their emerging democratic systems adapted and evolved even amid the inevitable ups and the downs. In contrast, Thailand's hesitant and unconvincing stop-start attempts at democracy are evidence of its own failures - and the fallout is its plight.
Democracy means inclusivity
Ultimately, the value that a political system places on inclusiveness is a key indicator of democratic progress.
Thai leadership must now recognise this fact by holding a free, fair and open constitutional referendum, followed by bona fide democratic elections. After all, the Constitutional Drafting Committee, which operates under the authority of the NCPO, has repeatedly highlighted, that: "[The] citizen is the centre of this constitution, where power is in the hands of the citizen."
For the Thai junta to summarily declare that a "perfect" constitution has now been drafted - after 18 failed and jettisoned "attempts" - is an incredible claim. In a country where groundless, bombastic public rhetoric has been the order of the day for so long, is there any good reason why such claims should be regarded favourably this time around?
TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, in the UK. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University.
One year on from the military coup of May 22, the country remains fundamentally divided as to whether we should even attempt a return to democracy.
What will be the consequences of this seemingly intractable social-political predicament for Thailand?
Growing signs of equivocation in the junta indicate that the intent remains to press ahead with its imperatives for a new constitution - whether or not a referendum is, in the end, held. The protracted pretence would then be over, and with it, any semblance of credibility among those who ache for more tangible democratic foundations.
The various "yeas" and "nays" that continually emerge from the junta and its subordinate institutions - only to be followed by more dashed hopes for Thailand's democratic progress - only risk further alienating the now tantalised voters-in-waiting. It is also worrisome that this protracted Thai impasse contains so many echoes of our pre-democratic and authoritarian eras of history.
All the while, voices from the international community - including the United Nations, the European Union, the United States and Japan - have remained resolute in their insistence that Thailand must return power to its people through an open and democratic election. The resulting economic pressure being brought to bear on Thailand makes the options for its leadership that much more stark.
So it seems strange that a leadership whose declared intent is to forge a successful transition towards democracy is so unenthusiastic about the opportunity to establish democratic norms.
Such a discrepancy only further undermines the credibility of this Thai leadership among critics both in Thailand and beyond.
Despite a new timeline that suggests democratic elections could be held soon as late next year, delays in ratifying the new constitution indicate Thailand is unlikely to attain democratic normalcy anytime soon. Nevertheless, the current draft of what is intended to be the 19th Thai constitution is still being determinedly scrutinised by citizens as they look for ways to assert their voices as Thailand's stakeholders-at-large.
It is thus becoming incumbent on all sides to recognise the importance of an open civil society as a means of promoting constructive dialogue, learn the value of cooperation, and make reasonable concessions as part of an undertaking to bridge Thailand's pernicious societal divide.
Without a greater general sense of reason and flexibility, it is likely to matter little whether the question of the constitution is settled via a supposedly exhaustive redrafting, or through a disjointed series of amendments. Thai history indicates that any such result will be thoroughly unsatisfactory and unworkable.
Provincial Thais, especially those from the North and Northeast, remain the scapegoats of choice over Thailand's continuing ills. Both the emerging urban middle class and the establishment continue to make the most of any opportunity to characterise the rural poor as "uneducated" and "self-serving".
Disenfranchised rural Thais
"The drafting of a constitution is not my job, I am only a rural person. What I say doesn't mean anything to anyone. I want the constitution to work for us [people within his village], but we're not part of it. Only people in the city or Bangkok can say what they want, not us [rural people]."
These are the words of a rural Thai voter, who wished to remain anonymous, living by the Mekong River on the Thailand-Laos border in Khong Chiam district, Ubon Ratchathani province.
His words are profound because they convey a simple, clear and direct truth that withstands the inane stereotyping to which rural Isaan (northeastern) Thais are routinely subjected. They also undermine the convoluted rationalising of those who would seek to contrive reasons for why a population that is already among the most marginalised should be continually disregarded and disenfranchised.
Fortunately for Thailand, the question of the correlation between educational attainment and the right to vote was also raised by political philosopher John Stuart Mill: "I regard it as wholly inadmissible that any person should participate in the suffrage [have voting rights] without being able to read, write and, I will add, perform the common operations of arithmetic." In other words, the attainment of basic literacy was his simple prerequisite for access to the ballot box.
Even though Mill was not advocating voting rights for all, he was in favour of more inclusion. And this was in the context of a still rather undemocratic 19th-century Britain, where women did not have the right to vote, and an era far removed from our own 21st-century information age. It was also at a time when only about three-quarters of the British population had attained basic literacy - a figure now exceeded by the Thailand of today.
Most Thais, wherever they live, now enjoy increased access to information, in one way or another. The fact that even remote rural areas of Thailand can sometimes have better Internet access than urban areas is acting to support greater critical thinking among the rural population. The stereotypes of irredeemably naive or ignorant rural citizens are becoming more and more outdated, and more politically untenable.
Historically, a common argument made against Thai liberal democracy is that Thailand is not ready because the people are "not well-educated". This mentality is reflected in the main arguments of the People's Democratic Reform Committee in 2013 and 2014, during the build-up to the coup. We could characterise these as the "never-quite-ready-yet" arguments of Thai political rhetoric.
Mill's Britain never did adopt a written constitution. But post-revolutionary France and America did go in that direction, making significant social-political advances in the meantime, as their emerging democratic systems adapted and evolved even amid the inevitable ups and the downs. In contrast, Thailand's hesitant and unconvincing stop-start attempts at democracy are evidence of its own failures - and the fallout is its plight.
Democracy means inclusivity
Ultimately, the value that a political system places on inclusiveness is a key indicator of democratic progress.
Thai leadership must now recognise this fact by holding a free, fair and open constitutional referendum, followed by bona fide democratic elections. After all, the Constitutional Drafting Committee, which operates under the authority of the NCPO, has repeatedly highlighted, that: "[The] citizen is the centre of this constitution, where power is in the hands of the citizen."
For the Thai junta to summarily declare that a "perfect" constitution has now been drafted - after 18 failed and jettisoned "attempts" - is an incredible claim. In a country where groundless, bombastic public rhetoric has been the order of the day for so long, is there any good reason why such claims should be regarded favourably this time around?
TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, in the UK. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University.
Wednesday, 6 May 2015
The English translation of my interview with Matichon
On the 4th of May, 2015, I was interviewed by a journalist from Matichon. The journalist wanted to know about my positions, with regard to the case that is now being made within Thailand, for a constitutional referendum to be a prerequisite for the new Thai constitution. Relative to most of the rest of the main Thai media publications, Matichon has been generally considered to be a strong advocate for just such a referendum.
The following is my translation-interpretation into English (as it is not possible to make a direct translation or transliteration from Thai into English) of the interview, which appeared in print, on the 6th of May, 2015. I have taken it upon myself to insert a certain amount of additional contextualisation within the brackets, in order to account for the places where the print interview paraphrased my arguments - something, which would have been done, either, because the publication may now regard such details as being fairly self-evident to their Thai readership, or, because of print-space constraints:
“[I would argue that in terms of the questions relating to the legitimacy of the new Thai constitution, and therefore, the importance of holding a constitutional referendum…] In principle, once they are agreed upon, the laws should then be accepted by all the stakeholders within the country. However, although some of the members are, evidently, properly qualified and trustworthy [in terms of their educational background], there remains the question of the overall legitimacy of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC). All of those on the CDC were appointed by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), and so this has raised these questions of legitimacy, and those [questions] of the draft of the new constitution.
There are a number of problems with the current draft of the new constitution. It contradicts with a major statement made by the CDC, which highlighted that: “[The] citizen is the centre of this constitution, where power is in the hands of the citizen.” Nevertheless, there are a number of articles within this draft of the constitution, which act to undermine the power of the citizens of Thailand, such as the introduction of more selected and appointed members to replace the elected members. The process of selection and appointment will result in questions over the qualifications and the legitimacy of those who would be appointed. [This is because it has already been observed that appointments can also bring about the problems of conflict of interest, and abuse of power and public resources for personal gain. Examples include cases of appointing family members to be assistants and secretaries of the members of the existing National Legislative Council.]
I would like to emphasise that the holding of a referendum [for any new Thai constitution] is an important matter, which has to be recognised and prioritised by those who are in power, today. The holding of a constitutional referendum will bring a greater sense of legitimacy to an attempt to confirm that the constitution is actually being accepted by all of the stakeholders within Thailand, and this will then provide the CDC with more legitimacy. The sooner a [democratic general] election is held within Thailand, the better it will be for the country, overall. However, I remain rather pessimistic about this issue. I do not believe that Thailand will hold such an election in the very near future.
Indeed, if the NCPO and the government were to hold elections soon, then the pressure from the international community, such as that from the European Union and the U.S., would decline. Thailand need not perceive these kinds of pressures and their opinions as a form of [unwarranted] intervention, because Thailand is [itself] part of the international community. Moreover, Thailand cannot truly isolate itself from the international community, because of the complexity of economic relations and other interests between this country, and the rest of the world.
There are two main things that those who are in power, would have to do now; firstly, holding a referendum for the new constitution, and secondly, holding an [a general] election. However, I am not optimistic that they would listen to academics, or take any of my advice. There have been a number of statements from different groups of stakeholders within Thai society, which have been ignored by those who are in power, today. Nevertheless, given the current political circumstances, at least we still have a bit of room to speak out, even if there is, now, very limited space for much freedom of expression.”
Thursday, 12 February 2015
US-Thai relations: A question of democracy versus obscurity?
US-Thai relations: A question of democracy versus obscurity?
Thailand cannot afford to indulge in go-it-alone nationalism at a time when our status as a regional hub is under threat
Amid the fallout from the increasingly vociferous anti-American sentiment being expressed in Thailand, one question comes to the fore: Is the historically close Thai-US relationship truly in jeopardy?
Those who listened carefully to the fairly standard remarks on the need for democratic progress delivered recently by Daniel Russel, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, might well ask what all the fuss is about. Nevertheless, the way in which this story plays out may tell us whether the 182-year Thai-US relationship is under threat.
W Patrick Murphy, the chargé d'affaires at the US Embassy, was invited to appear before the National Legislative Assembly yesterday, where he would likely have been asked to account for the recent statement made by Russel. But Murphy declined the invitation and the US State Department responded by saying it had no desire to further inflame the situation, but neither would it backtrack on its position regarding democracy.
The hollow and bombastic reaction among sections of the Thai public and media is predictable, though it is hardly meant for an international audience, beyond any US policymakers concerned enough to take notice. But, slowly and surely, it is sending out the message that Thailand may no longer be worth the trouble - especially when there are more pressing concerns within the region and further afield.
In other words, what if a broad range of interests begins to take more seriously, and at face value, the histrionic and irascible Thai assertions of unwelcome and unwarranted outside influence? What then for Thailand?
Continuance of the "glory days" of a Thailand at the hub of mainland Southeast Asia is no longer a given. Indeed, it is evident that as important outside actors go about the process of re-evaluating their efforts to engage with Asean, the trend is leading away from Thailand.
In remarks made during his visit to India last month, President Barack Obama said: "In this region, India can play a positive role in helping countries forge a better future, from Burma [Myanmar] to Sri Lanka, where today there's new hope for democracy."
With regard to Myanmar, the European Union lifted its trade sanctions back in April 2013, before sending its first ambassador five months later. In contrast, the EU delegation to Thailand has gradually scaled back its role and presence, downgrading its regional office for mainland Southeast Asia to a national office.
Meanwhile in neighbouring Laos, Japan is funding construction and development of the East-West Economic Corridor as part of the Greater Mekong Sub-region Programme (GMS). The economic corridor will open up regional economic and developmental opportunities and has already attracted a US$5.6-million investment made by Toyota Boshoku in the Savannakhet-Xeno Special Economic Zone in Laos.
Two years ago, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) chose Laos as the base for its newly launched key regional development programme, the "SDC Mekong Region Strategy, 2013-17". Notably, Thailand is the only Mekong-basin country not included in the strategy. (As a medium-income country, it is no longer considered to be in particular need of foreign aid.)
At a time when our regional neighbours are recognising the necessity of building a range of international relationships, hostile attitudes in Thailand may convince outside actors to steer clear of the Kingdom. And if it continues, this tendency will exacerbate the sense of alienation from the West that Thais are already beginning to feel.
Amid this complex field of global influences, Thailand risks outmanoeuvring itself by fixating on a strategy of playing off the US' Asia pivot against greater engagement with China, in an attempt to maximise Thai political, economic and other strategic interests.
Two key recent examples relate to this concern. First is the launch this week of Thai-US Cobra Gold military exercises just days after the latest improved Thai-China military ties were announced by China's Defence Minister, General Chang Wanquan. Second is the emergence of the US' Lower Mekong Initiative as a rival to the China-backed GMS - the leading developmental programme for mainland Southeast Asia.
The interplay of influences that now govern international dynamics - whether political, economic, social or otherwise -necessarily involve both state and non-state actors. For instance, the decision-making of international investors is increasingly contingent on the prospects for democracy and human rights within developing nations.
This is worrying for Thailand, where some observers detect an ulterior motive in the indignant accusations of US "meddling" in Thai affairs. Does the advocating of a new go-it-alone Thailand, then, smack of a form of nationalist sentiment that can usefully distract from more profound and pressing home-grown problems?
The longstanding effort to find others to blame for all and sundry - including the seemingly intractable societal rift - is a strategy that risks running out of enemies. Forever scapegoating either the Shinawatra family, as unduly influential, or the rural poor, by stereotyping them as lacking any understanding of the country's problems, may wear thin with even the most radical. Where better to look then, than in the direction of the predominant foreign superpower with a tarnished reputation?
A more crucial question is whether Thais are sufficiently committed to making the necessary efforts to change an abiding sense of societal division and mistrust, and in this way, aid in the restoration of Thai democracy. This would necessitate a far more reasoned and conciliatory approach than we are now witnessing.
Thais who are able to identify with the very real and valid concerns of the rural poor in particular, must surely recognise a glaring absurdity. Namely, the directing of a similar blame-game strategy against the weakest and most marginalised Thais and, at the very same time, against the strongest world power, the US.
Democracy, in and of itself, is not something that the US has ownership over, but it is something that Thailand can finally choose to abandon, to its detriment. Along with that abandoning would likely go any hope of significant future progress for the Kingdom. Ultimately, Thailand's future prospects hinge on recognising the importance of a swift reorientation back towards democracy, and the acknowledgement that the US remains an enduring ally.
Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.
Those who listened carefully to the fairly standard remarks on the need for democratic progress delivered recently by Daniel Russel, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, might well ask what all the fuss is about. Nevertheless, the way in which this story plays out may tell us whether the 182-year Thai-US relationship is under threat.
W Patrick Murphy, the chargé d'affaires at the US Embassy, was invited to appear before the National Legislative Assembly yesterday, where he would likely have been asked to account for the recent statement made by Russel. But Murphy declined the invitation and the US State Department responded by saying it had no desire to further inflame the situation, but neither would it backtrack on its position regarding democracy.
The hollow and bombastic reaction among sections of the Thai public and media is predictable, though it is hardly meant for an international audience, beyond any US policymakers concerned enough to take notice. But, slowly and surely, it is sending out the message that Thailand may no longer be worth the trouble - especially when there are more pressing concerns within the region and further afield.
In other words, what if a broad range of interests begins to take more seriously, and at face value, the histrionic and irascible Thai assertions of unwelcome and unwarranted outside influence? What then for Thailand?
Continuance of the "glory days" of a Thailand at the hub of mainland Southeast Asia is no longer a given. Indeed, it is evident that as important outside actors go about the process of re-evaluating their efforts to engage with Asean, the trend is leading away from Thailand.
In remarks made during his visit to India last month, President Barack Obama said: "In this region, India can play a positive role in helping countries forge a better future, from Burma [Myanmar] to Sri Lanka, where today there's new hope for democracy."
With regard to Myanmar, the European Union lifted its trade sanctions back in April 2013, before sending its first ambassador five months later. In contrast, the EU delegation to Thailand has gradually scaled back its role and presence, downgrading its regional office for mainland Southeast Asia to a national office.
Meanwhile in neighbouring Laos, Japan is funding construction and development of the East-West Economic Corridor as part of the Greater Mekong Sub-region Programme (GMS). The economic corridor will open up regional economic and developmental opportunities and has already attracted a US$5.6-million investment made by Toyota Boshoku in the Savannakhet-Xeno Special Economic Zone in Laos.
Two years ago, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) chose Laos as the base for its newly launched key regional development programme, the "SDC Mekong Region Strategy, 2013-17". Notably, Thailand is the only Mekong-basin country not included in the strategy. (As a medium-income country, it is no longer considered to be in particular need of foreign aid.)
At a time when our regional neighbours are recognising the necessity of building a range of international relationships, hostile attitudes in Thailand may convince outside actors to steer clear of the Kingdom. And if it continues, this tendency will exacerbate the sense of alienation from the West that Thais are already beginning to feel.
Amid this complex field of global influences, Thailand risks outmanoeuvring itself by fixating on a strategy of playing off the US' Asia pivot against greater engagement with China, in an attempt to maximise Thai political, economic and other strategic interests.
Two key recent examples relate to this concern. First is the launch this week of Thai-US Cobra Gold military exercises just days after the latest improved Thai-China military ties were announced by China's Defence Minister, General Chang Wanquan. Second is the emergence of the US' Lower Mekong Initiative as a rival to the China-backed GMS - the leading developmental programme for mainland Southeast Asia.
The interplay of influences that now govern international dynamics - whether political, economic, social or otherwise -necessarily involve both state and non-state actors. For instance, the decision-making of international investors is increasingly contingent on the prospects for democracy and human rights within developing nations.
This is worrying for Thailand, where some observers detect an ulterior motive in the indignant accusations of US "meddling" in Thai affairs. Does the advocating of a new go-it-alone Thailand, then, smack of a form of nationalist sentiment that can usefully distract from more profound and pressing home-grown problems?
The longstanding effort to find others to blame for all and sundry - including the seemingly intractable societal rift - is a strategy that risks running out of enemies. Forever scapegoating either the Shinawatra family, as unduly influential, or the rural poor, by stereotyping them as lacking any understanding of the country's problems, may wear thin with even the most radical. Where better to look then, than in the direction of the predominant foreign superpower with a tarnished reputation?
A more crucial question is whether Thais are sufficiently committed to making the necessary efforts to change an abiding sense of societal division and mistrust, and in this way, aid in the restoration of Thai democracy. This would necessitate a far more reasoned and conciliatory approach than we are now witnessing.
Thais who are able to identify with the very real and valid concerns of the rural poor in particular, must surely recognise a glaring absurdity. Namely, the directing of a similar blame-game strategy against the weakest and most marginalised Thais and, at the very same time, against the strongest world power, the US.
Democracy, in and of itself, is not something that the US has ownership over, but it is something that Thailand can finally choose to abandon, to its detriment. Along with that abandoning would likely go any hope of significant future progress for the Kingdom. Ultimately, Thailand's future prospects hinge on recognising the importance of a swift reorientation back towards democracy, and the acknowledgement that the US remains an enduring ally.
Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.
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