Asean Way means no respect for human rights of the Rohingya

September 29, 2017 01:00

By Titipol Phakdeewanich  Special to The Nation

Western Myanmar is under the world’s spotlight for what the United Nations calls a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya people. From the other side of the globe, the European Union has slammed the crackdown in Rakhine state as “a human rights crisis with serious humanitarian consequences”. 

That concern is apparently not shared by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, of which Myanmar is a member. Asean has remained largely silent on the Rohingya crisis. 

Myanmar’s de-facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her government have been widely condemned for insufficient efforts to resolve the crisis. Fellow Nobel laureate Desmond Tutu recently branded the crisis “slow genocide” and urged Suu Kyi to speak out for justice and human rights. Amnesty International also calls the Myanmar military’s crackdown in Rakhine a “genocide”, intended to erase the minority Rohingya from the map.   

It took Suu Kyi almost four weeks before she finally spoke out against the human rights violations last week. Many suspect her televised address merely intended to dampen criticism from the UN General Assembly session in New York, rather than to protect Rohingya Muslims’ rights. 

Although almost half the population of Myanmar’s Rohingya – more than 400,000 – have already fled to Bangladesh, the exodus is apparently not significant enough for Asean or its members to take a stance on rights violations.

The huge humanitarian crisis in Myanmar confirms a now common observation – that the “Asean Way” fundamentally fails to recognise human rights.

The regional bloc claims that such recognition is in fact enshrined in its Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, leading to the introduction of the 2012 Asean Human Rights Declaration.

The Declaration was strongly criticised by the UN Human Rights Council for failures to embrace and synchronise with the international language of human rights. Nevertheless, it has gone unchanged, with its implementation overruled by the bloc’s fundamental principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs of member states”. Effectively this means that beliefs in cultural supremacy have been maintained at the expense of common humanity.

Despite Asean’s commitment to “strengthen democracy” and “to promote and protect human rights”, the institution and its member states continue to deny the universality of democracy and human rights. This results in the further alienation of their citizens from universal norms.

Asean countries do not welcome criticism of their democracy and human rights records, especially when it comes from the West. Bloc members often resort to combative “East versus West” rhetoric to defend their failures to comply with international commitments, as observed since the 1990s in the discourse of “Asian values” first championed by Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew. 

Of course, East and West have never and never will be the same, but fundamental human rights do not have borders, national identity or ownership. They are simply a birthright and entitlement of all of us.

Increasing international criticism of the Myanmar government’s handling of the Rohingya crisis is a clear signal that Asean must reconsider its non-interference policy in this case, if its human rights mechanism is to retain any credibility. 

However, there is no indication that Asean countries will suspend that policy, which it claims is crucial for the national sovereignty of its members. 

Support for the Asean Way has been growing among neighbouring countries since the previous Rohingya exodus in 2014-’15.

A nationalistic policy of non-interference in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand has been spurred by fears of the financial and security burdens that large numbers of refugees would bring.

These fears are fanned by the social media, while human rights and humanitarian concerns are dismissed by nationalist groups.

 “Take them [the Rohingya] to stay in your home if you are so worried about them!”, is a familiar refrain among Southeast Asian Facebook users. This nationalist mentality allows the non-interference norms to be wielded expediently by the region’s leaders, while the Rohingya suffer as victims of the effective collusion between the Myanmar state and its Asean partners. 

Southeast Asia’s leaders have indicated that changing the Asean Way by removing its focus on the supremacy of cultural norms and non-interference is not an option. This is seen, for example, in the denial of same-sex marriage in Singapore in 2015, and the increasing limitations placed on freedom of expression in Thailand since the 2014 military coup.

Asean leaders will find that human rights cannot be tailored to suit the Asean Way, since this universal value is a birthright and not something that can be limited or dictated by the bloc’s leadership.

The limited humanitarian aid now being offered by Asean is only in recognition of “pseudo-rights” expediently granted to the Rohingya. For as long as the regional bloc fails to protect their full rights as human beings, the existing 2012 Asean Human Rights Declaration will remain merely ornamental, rather than a mechanism to meaningfully promote and protect the fundamental rights of Asean citizens.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England. 

My interview with respect to the meeting between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and his cabinet members, and Chart Thai Party.

My interview with respect to the meeting between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and his cabinet members, and Chart Thai Party during the mobile Cabinet meeting in Supanburi Province, and its implication on the continuing role of the military in Thai politics.

Regardless of the support for the military among politicians or political parties, there is already a strong indication that the military intends to maintain their grip on power, and continue to govern Thailand for perhaps the next ten years or so. The military has already structurally embedded itself in the Thai political landscape through the 2017 Constitutions, through the creation of new government agencies, and via military appointments to various independent organisations.

The meeting between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and Chart Thai Party is not unprecedented in the context of Thai political history. Instead, the meeting merely demonstrates a repetition of the game of power, in which it is quite common for Thai politicians to submit to the military for their own political gains when the military is in charge.

Unfortunately, the cosy relations between the military and politicians only reflects their mutual interests at the expense of democracy. The Chart Thai Party’s support for the military will continue to damage the Thai democracy.

Indeed, the military should have only a very small role, or even none at all in the democratisation of the country. Therefore, the continued role of the military in Thai politics does not indicate a bright future for Thai democracy.

Academic freedom is dying under military rule: Universities must step up

Academic freedom is dying under military rule: Universities must step up
opinion September 09, 2017 01:00 By Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation

Ever since it interrupted Thailand’s democratic progress by seizing power from the people in the 2014 military coup, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) has maintained that suppressing freedom of expression is crucial to its timeline for a return to democracy.

This is despite continuous criticism from within and outside the country over the state of civil liberties under junta rule.

For the past three years, the NCPO has been fairly successful in integrating itself into everyday public and political life. Its critics, meanwhile, have attempted to regain public space to speak out against the current politics of fear and intimidation, enforced in the name of “national security” and “political stability”.

This “new normal” of public acceptance for suppression of dissent against the military raises a question: will Thailand forever overrule the universal concept of free expression and instead develop its own version of democracy without endorsing certain basic civil liberties?

In its 2017 rankings for countries, rights NGO Freedom House rated Thailand’s “Political Rights” at 6, and “Civil Liberties” at 5, using a scale of 1-7, with 7 being “Least Free”. Overall it rated Thailand as “Not Free”. This reflected the position of a country under military rule – though the report was largely rejected by the military’s supporters.  

Out of Thailand’s 65 million people, only a small group – including some academics – have been monitored, harassed or labelled as troublemakers by the NCPO and its supporters.

This relatively small number might explain why Thai people in general have shown little concern at such suppression.

Between 2014 and 2015, during a number of interactions with the military that included “invitations” to its base in Ubon Ratchathani province, I was asked not to organise a public seminar on democracy and human rights, and instead support the democratisation process under the NCPO. The question then arose of whether it is possible to leave democracy and its return in military hands.

In July 2015, the military sent invitations to me and several other representatives from four universities in Ubon Ratchathani. Attached was NCPO Order No 3/2015 on Maintaining Public Order and National Security, which cited Article 44 of the interim constitution, granting absolute power to the prime minister. The invitation said the attachment was merely official procedure, with no intention of threatening the recipients. In reality, it could only be understood as part of the deliberate cultivation of a climate of fear and intimidation against the academic community – a move which demanded a strong response from Thailand’s universities. Unfortunately, the universities remained silent and bowed to NCPO rule.  

On Tuesday, I was again invited to the military base in Ubon Ratchathani, regarding an upcoming seminar on the role of the Thai Human Rights Commission, to be held by the Political Science Faculty at Ubon Ratchathani University. The military warned the event could not go ahead on campus without permission from the NCPO.

A more serious attack on the academic community came recently with the charges laid against Professor Chayan Vaddhanaphuti, organiser of the 13th International Conference on Thai Studies, and a number of attendees. The charges came after criticism of the conference by the NCPO, criticism which Thai universities have remained silent towards. Indeed, none of the country’s 120 private and public universities has shown the courage to defend academic freedom.

Over the past decade, a number of Thai universities have functioned as a political machine against democracy.

(We note here a stark contrast with the pro-democracy movement at Thammasat University and others in the late 1970s.)

Arthit Ourairat, the president and owner of Rangsit University, one of Thailand’s top private universities, was actively involved in the 2013-2014 protests by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC). A large number of senior executives and leading academics from public institutions such as Chulalongkorn, Thammasat and Mahidol universities were also heavily involved in the PDRC, and some continue to serve the military regime.

While leaning towards the junta, Thai universities have been reluctant to protect freedoms on campuses, in part because they consider the military’s attacks on academic freedom as personal problems. Once universities take a lead in endorsing military rule, then academic freedom is in jeopardy.

It is time for Thai universities to re-examine their commitment to protecting academic freedom. The prime purpose of a university is to serve the public and the academic community, not to function as a government agency whose duty is to follow the orders of the junta. Academic voices and events must not be denounced as a threat to national security and the NCPO’s timeline for democracy. This dangerous trend has been inflated by growing distrust in politicians amid polarisation in Thai politics over the past decade, at the expense of freedoms.

Democracy functions on the principles of freedom and liberty, while the military functions by orders and obedience. Thus, democracy and the military are mutually exclusive, existing in opposing realms. Thai universities cannot afford to mislead the public if they want democracy to survive and prosper.

Unfortunately we are unlikely to see Thai universities find the courage to step up and protect academic freedom anytime soon. The ongoing decline of academic freedom in Thailand is therefore not merely the consequence of military pressure, but also due to universities actively permitting that freedom to suffocate under junta suppression.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at  the University of Warwick in England.

A summary of my interview in Matichon

A summary of my interview in Matichon, in relation to uncertainty surrounding the proposed 2018 general elections.

It should be no surprise if the scheduled 2018 elections are postponed due to the possibility of the Pheu Thai party winning. However, the 2017 Thai constitution will generate 250 appointed senators, which is in the interests of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and the military. This will reassure the military that they can secure the appointment of the ‘Prime Minister’.

In fact, I believe that the government also wants to hold the general election because it will be a stamp to legitimise their position in power, and are bolstered by the certainty that they can maintain power after the election. As a result, the international community will have fewer objections to their position in power.

The need for being accepted in the international community is key a factor for the NCPO to stick to its election road map. 

Thaksin founded the Shinawatra dynasty, but the military empowered it

Thaksin founded the Shinawatra dynasty, but the military empowered it 

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH 

SPECIAL TO THE NATION 

The departure of the former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, who fled the country prior to a Supreme Court verdict on her rice-pledging policy, leaves various questions concerning the future of herself and the Shinawatra family, the Pheu Thai Party, and changes in the Thai political landscape. 

It is premature to see her exit as the end of the Shinawatra era in Thai politics, since events after the two military coups of 2006 and 2014 demonstrate that the clan’s influence cannot be abolished simply by military force. Instead, the coups did the reverse, keeping the Shinawatras politically alive and empowered. 

The 2006 coup, led by the Council for Democratic Reform, ousted then-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai government – but it did not diminish his influence. 

In 2014 the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) staged a coup amid escalating violence surrounding protests by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) in 2013- 2014, and removed prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, the Pheu Thai Party leader, from office. 

Her 2011 electoral success had obviously capitalised on the popularity of her brother, Thaksin. Yet her candidacy was perceived by some as a battle to represent Shinawatra family interests, rather than the interests of Pheu Thai voters. During electoral campaigning, she repeated the point she was Thaksin’s sister and reiterated his achievements as a means to gain support. 

After she was ousted by the military in 2014, Yingluck began to establish her own, separate power base during multiple trips across the country, particularly in the North and Northeast, her party’s stronghold. She was successful in boost- ing her popularity and keeping Pheu Thai relevant to its constituents, and also portraying herself as a victim of an illegitimate military intervention and faulty justice system. 

Yet for the Shinawatras’ political opponents, who advocated the coups, the clan is not a victim of military intervention but rather the root of the political divisiveness and problems that made it necessary. 

That leaves an elephant in the room. A large swathe of the Thai middle-class and anti-Thaksin groups have rejected democracy and now embrace military rule. This works in the interests of the Shinawatra family, and allows them to embed and empower themselves in the Thai political environment. 

The Thai Rak Thai Party and its incarnations have not lost an election since coming to power with a landslide victory of over 11 million votes in 2001. In the most recent election in 2011, its successor Pheu Thai won 15.7 million votes, under the guidance of Thaksin from outside Thailand. 

The 2006 and 2014 coups were intended to curtail the power and influence of the clan, but they badly backfired. Meanwhile the military’s continuing role in Thai politics is unlikely to weaken the Shinawatras’ grip in the long term because the military cannot establish trust through coercion. 

Another Shinawatra victory at the polls could well be followed by another military intervention, further empowering the clan. 

If they want to break this cycle, the Thai middle-class and elite cannot continue to blindly dismiss the very core democratic principle of one-man-one- vote, while embracing military rule on the pretext that rural voters are victims of populist policies and vote-buying. 

While vote-buying was indeed a significant problem in Thailand from the 1970s into the 2000s, today it has little significant impact because most voters are fully aware of party manifestos and their implications on public policies. Moreover, middle-class assumptions that rural voters are naive are not only outdated and erroneous, but emphasise the inherent socio-political inequalities which gave rise to Thaksin in the first place. 

Therefore, the 2010 red-shirt protest was not primarily an endorsement of the Shinawatra family, but rather an outcry by the long-ignored rural poor, who wanted to protect their voting rights under the Thai constitution and the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Thailand is a signatory. 

On the one hand, democracy offered Thaksin the opportunity to establish his Shinawatra political dynasty. But on the other, the same democracy offers voters a mechanism to remove the Shinawatra family through an election. 

Political popularity can last a long time, but not forever. When a party in power can no longer satisfy voters’ needs, voting decisions change. This is how representative democracy functions. 

Pheu Thai’s victory was no miracle, but rather a result of research by the party that enabled it to respond to the demands of voters, who were regarded as stockholders in the arena of public policy. This is a fundamental notion of representative democracy, in which parliamentary members represent the interests of the constituents who provided them with a mandate. 

Whether the Shinawatras will now maintain their involvement with Pheu Thai is unclear, but the departure of Yingluck is unlikely to signal the end of the clan’s influence on Thai politics. 

Meanwhile the military has indicated it intends to control the country for the next decade or two, pending permission from the political elite and middle class and their continuing willingness to limit democracy to prevent the return of the Shinawatra clan. 

Nevertheless, we might still see a day when the Shinawatra family vanishes from the Thai political landscape altogether. But only when a genuine democracy is given the opportunity to function without military intervention. 

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.