Fight for human rights focuses on Thai university tradition

Fight for human rights focuses on Thai university tradition

Titipol Phakdeewanich May 29, 2013 1:00 am

As new students head in to their first term at university, the spotlight is once again on

As a new academic year begins for university students across Thailand, the ongoing problem of human rights violations on campus is once more being raised. For first-year students, this rite-of-passage should of course be their opportunity to feel welcomed and fully respected as adults within an institution of learning.

But it is a sad fact today that thousands of students are at this moment only too well aware of the very real possibility of being caught up in this year's euphemistically entitled university tradition of rub-nong ("welcoming the newcomer"). Those who continue to defend its practices - which borrow from the historical British public school system, the more contemporary US university fraternity system, and Thailand's military service - may see it as little more than high jinks, or as an opportunity for peer bonding. 

However, with the passing of every academic year, the evidence for more extreme abuse mounts - and not only through photos and video but also through the claims of those who are increasingly inclined to speak out. It follows that what we are witnessing on Thai university campuses today could often be more accurately described as ritualised abuse, and violations of human rights. 

These concerns are evidently well founded, as every year we observe serious physical injuries as a consequence of these university rituals. Regardless of the facade behind which they operate, or the pretext under which they are tacitly permitted, the suffering remains very real for the victims in this scenario. Allegations of abuse tend to indicate that it is psychological manifestations of abuse that are the most endemic. These typically involve menacing threats, intimidation and a lot of shouting.

Although many have accordingly argued that these practices should have been stamped out years ago, it is essentially the case that little has fundamentally changed, despite some recent attempts to tinker around the edges of this entrenched problem. Today, its advocates typically attempt justifications by arguing that rub-nong, through incorporating the so-called SOTUS (Seniority, Order, Tradition, Unity, Spirit) system, promotes a respect for seniority, discipline and unity.

So what then, do recent graduates of the Thai university educational system make of all this? 

Krisanapong Jobsanjohn, an alumni of Ubon Ratchathani University, argues: "In Thailand, we are taught to believe in seniority, and so the SOTUS system fits with the Thai culture." 

More critical is Kobchat Vichieansri, a graduate of Chulalongkorn University: "The SOTUS system is not at all relevant to university education. Also, it supports the existing patronage system within Thai society. This is why I think it should stop."

Just recently, as reported across a number of media outlets (and especially through online social media that students typically follow), a serious complaint was submitted to the Office of the Higher Education Commission. Furthermore, the complainants are seemingly prepared to take their case to the United Nations representatives in Thailand if necessary. 

Should this development mark the beginning of a trend whereby individual students take on the responsibility of asserting both their basic human rights and constitutional rights, then this may be a form of progress. Nevertheless, the culture of hazing raises further questions as to whether institutions and the state truly recognise their responsibilities to act against this serious abuse. 

There is now the very real potential for a spike in the number of incidents, as those students who increasingly resent the SOTUS system attempt to exercise their freedoms in the face of those who are determined to exert their status and role as rub-nong ringleaders and retain their stranglehold on campus.

For its part, the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRC) has begun making tentative steps towards a fuller recognition that a problem exists. It has published on its website a news report about allegations of abuse taking place within the higher educational system, and has begun working with four universities in the north of Thailand on the broader question of human rights. Thus we now have an important opportunity to observe whether the NHRC is prepared to take serious action on this matter. In previous years, it has typically remained rather quiet. 

When attempting to demonstrate they recognise the problem, the Ministry of Education and university executives have tended towards standardised, token statements over the past few years. These announcements have informed existing students that they have no right to force new students into the SOTUS system, and that within the SOTUS system, violence is not acceptable. Nevertheless, this limited approach to the problem has now proven ineffectual. Without further steps, this approach will increasingly appear to be serving the purpose of providing legal cover for those in positions of power, rather than being a genuine attempt to resolve this issue. 

In order to air their concerns, a group of university students in 2012 formed the Anti-SOTUS Group, which now has 10,000 Facebook members. But this is probably just the tip of the iceberg - there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest that students are reluctant to speak out about institutionalised bullying.

The quality of higher education within Thailand can only suffer when an issue such as this remains as an unnecessary distraction and preoccupation for thousands of its students. Considering the relative status of Thailand's higher education system on the world stage, the quality of its university education cannot at all be taken for granted.

The Times Higher Education Asia University Rankings 2013, released in April, saw Thailand claim only three places within the top 100. The latest equivalent figure for the world rankings was published for the year 2012-2013, and no Thai university was placed within the top 350 (King Mongkut's University of Technology, Thonburi was ranked within the top 400).

It follows therefore, that it would be a dereliction of duty on the part of any Thai government to remain in denial when it comes to recognising how the SOTUS system contributes towards undermining both educational attainment and human rights within the country. But the question remains as to whether Thailand's politicians and policymakers have either the will or motive to enact effective reforms for the sake of this latest generation.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, in the United Kingdom. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University.

Thatcher's legacy continues to teach us when we go wrong

Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation April 17, 2013 1:00 am

Over the past few days, we have read and listened to many perspectives relating to the life and legacy of Margaret Thatcher, who was in every sense a politically dominant figure of the 1980s. We have heard about her pioneering role as Britain's first female prime minister, and also about her unique character and style.

So then, what does all this mean in the context of Thailand today? The death of a political leader of such rare force and influence does perhaps give us, regardless of our particular perception of her, a rare opportunity to reflect on the direction Thailand has been taking. Perhaps out of this, we can more properly question some of our long-held assumptions about the policies we have embraced as a nation, and therefore, make some much-needed changes. 

One of the principal policy approaches for which Thatcher is most famed, or notorious, is the way in which she forcefully decoupled the British economy from a damaging over-reliance on the post-Second World War consensus relating to state intervention and a nation's economy. 

During the 1980s, her approach was considered divisive, acting as it did to further polarise a nation. Even today, senior members of her own political party continue to be at odds over her ultimate methodology and approach. Nevertheless, it is now more than two decades later, and Britain has corrected its image as "the sick man of Europe", despite the significant impact to its economy in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. 

The enduring questions relating to the balance between the free market and the state, so often cause us to reconsider this aspect of Thatcher's formidable legacy. This is precisely because so many of the major, and still controversial, aspects of Thatcherite economics have since been emulated and implemented throughout the world. 

Indeed, alongside a programme of privatisation, over the past 10 years or more, successive Thai governments have implemented a number of somewhat populist, but much-needed policies through the state mechanism. This has certainly contributed toward raising the level of public spending overall, and although this has so far been accomplished without raising Thailand's public debt to unsustainable levels, the trend over the past few years has been on the rise. 

According to The Economist, Thailand's public debt as a percentage of its GDP was 45.8 per cent in 2012, and is projected to rise to 51.7 per cent by 2014. This is a significant increase over a two-year period, especially when we consider that further policies are being considered, including the contentious Bt2-trillion infrastructure development project, which is currently being scrutinised in Parliament. Accordingly, it seems rather likely that public debt is only set to further increase over the short and medium terms, and this is also at a time when Thailand must still consider the uncertainty that surrounds the outlook for the world economy.

For several decades, Thailand's primary national developmental framework has been the National Economic and Social Development Plan, and since 1997 there has been a move away from a growth-oriented approach toward what is now described as a "people-centred development" approach. This has been sold to the Thai public as something that will promote a fairer distribution of income across the demographics, and in addition will act to enhance political participation and dialogue between citizens and the state.

But as this has evidently not delivered on its promise, many now argue that its primary effect has been to contribute toward a significant increase in the sense of dependency many Thais now exhibit with regard to the state. This trend is particularly apparent when we observe the increasing demands being made for public goods and services such as healthcare and education, and also in terms of how individuals now so often aspire to gain long-term employment with the state. 

But for Thatcher, such a trend toward the Keynesian model had proven problematic. As she recalled later, after her term in office: "There was no point in setting targets for 'full' employment. Instead, government should create the right framework of sound money, low taxes, light regulation and flexible markets (including labour markets) to allow prosperity and employment to grow."

From the perspective of policy-makers, understanding how to maintain a proper balance between the roles of the free market and the state is already a significant challenge. This issue involves much more than the question of government policies and frameworks, the role of institutions, or the move toward privatisation and deregulation. It is also about the fundamental relationship between citizens and the state, and this relates to the fluctuating perceptions of people within a society. 

The mentality of simply wanting to work within the public sector, without particular regard for the eventual repercussions of such a widespread attitude, remains relatively pervasive in Thailand today. Also, as a consequence, this sector of the employment market continues to become increasingly competitive. Those who have newly graduated typically carry the perception that a public-sector job is secure, and therefore their focus is primarily on securing such a position, with relatively little regard for their role thereafter.

Moreover, they are frequently encouraged in this outlook by elders within the family, because not only their children, but also their parents will gain state benefits as a result. Indeed, we cannot avoid the implication in all of this that many Thais are now sceptical that the market mechanism can truly work for them. 

Although most of us now recognise that there is a role for the state in regulating market failure, attempts to flee from the private sector en masse may only further undermine a desire for balance within the system overall, and this is a challenge that the current government now faces. 

As we now stop to reflect on Thatcher's legacy, perhaps we can recognise this one key aspect: that despite her apparent divisiveness, and the heated disagreements over her more notorious policies during and since her time in office, many British people have finally been persuaded that there is one thing she certainly did achieve. This was to transform the dynamics in the relationship between the individual, the free-market and the state. Such a correction, in and of itself, may have been enough to assure her legacy, despite the fact that many of her individual policies were considered by many to be lacking in compassion when it came to their effects on ordinary lives. 

For Thailand, this is a time to reopen the debate and re-examine the state's major policy instruments, in order to encourage people to enquire into these questions more fully, with the hope that we too may act more effectively to make such a transformation. 

Is Readiness Our Problem, or Lack of Ambition?

Titipol Phakdeewanich 

Special to The Nation April 10, 2013 1:00 am

People walk under train tracks in Bangkok

Political gamesmanship relating to the Bt2-trillion infrastructure loan bill is now playing itself out through parliamentary debates, as well as through the mainstream media and social media. Although both the Pheu Thai Party and the Democrat Party claim in principle to be in favour of the proposed infrastructural development project, the counter-arguments to the bill have primarily focused on both the means of funding and the seemingly inevitable and ever-present factor of corruption.

According to an official statement by the government led by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, this project will "make Thailand a strategic hub connecting Asean and its 600 million citizens under the conceptual framework of 'connectivity'". This argument appears to synchronise with findings from a joint study conducted by the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank Institute in 2009, entitled "Infrastructure for a Seamless Asia". This stated: "Building roads, railways … across the region should be a priority for the region's policymakers. In these uncertain times, Asia must not pause or turn back.… Such integration will help boost economic growth and disperse its benefits more widely." 

In the broader context therefore, we can perhaps see why Thai policymakers would not want to appear to be resisting Southeast Asian regional integration at a time when we are talking about the build up to the Asean Economic Community in 2015. Nevertheless, we should not be dissuaded from asking legitimate and pertinent questions when the country is committing itself to its greatest ever borrowing requirement, when corruption remains so pervasive, and when unprecedented levels of inter-generational indebtedness are being advocated, in order to support such an ambitious project. 

When considering the approaches taken in arguing their respective cases, we can observe that the stakes are obviously high for both Pheu Thai and the Democrats, whilst also recognising how critical the implications are for the country. The way this scenario plays out therefore, will be a significant learning process for Thailand.

If we also look back to consider the development of Suvarnabhumi Airport as a case study on infrastructural development at the nexus point of politics and corruption, this may well indicate something about the way in which politicians are approaching the Bt2-trillion loan bill today. In relation to both scenarios, the Pheu Thai coalition has been bold in acting as the driving force behind these large-scale projects, with the Democrats taking the more circumspect position.

Now we can begin to see the current scenario in the context of the apparent success of the airport project, which has nevertheless succeeded quite well, despite the questions asked relating to corruption. On their part, the Democrats are presumed to be concerned about being outmanoeuvred over the proposed infrastructural projects, and paradoxically this may indeed indicate their belief in their ultimate potential.

It is evident that the public overwhelmingly considers politicians of all persuasions to be corrupt and to be compromised by conflicts of interest, regardless of whoever leads the government. Accordingly, many Thais now argue that corruption is okay if it generates economic growth. Although this "pro-growth corruption" mindset is understandable in attempting to be realistic about the ongoing state of the Thai political system, unless we tangibly act to mitigate the problem, such a mindset may actually help to both support and perpetuate this very same problem. 

The Democrats have indicated the possibility of challenging a parliamentary bill in the Constitutional Court, if the financing relating to such a bill was unacceptable to them. In addition, a number of the drafters of the 2007 Constitution have now submitted their request that the National Counter Corruption Commission investigate whether the Bt2 trillion loan bill is constitutional. 

The fact that Thailand is as corrupt as it is today - Transparency International's 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Thailand 88th out of 176 countries and territories - indicates that regardless of the potential opportunities provided by such infrastructure projects, there is the very real possibility that they may not ultimately deliver on promise. Therefore, although its advocates assert that the projects should be a net benefit for Thailand and will make a return on investment over the next fifty years, should this not ultimately be the case, then such words will count for little in assuaging the anger of future generations. 

But if we can recognise we are now engaging with that age-old question of ambition versus readiness, then we can also recognise that Thailand has perhaps reached a certain level of maturity within its emerging democracy. This important question should not dissuade the country from attempting to make real progress by forging ahead with viable and well-thought-out strategies towards societal advancement. 

We can look to our neighbour Laos and the progress it has already made in committing to the Laos-China high-speed railway project, costing US$7 billion. Accordingly, many Thais have asked the question as to why Thailand has not made such progress. 

At the same time, we should also consider the historical example of the UK, which pioneered the development of railways during the Industrial Revolution. At that time, Britain seemingly had no lack of ambition, but sceptics still quibbled as to whether that country was ready for such a ground-breaking undertaking. 

Today, however, Britain is more advanced yet less sure of itself as a nation, and lacks something of that Victorian spirit. Nevertheless, its policymakers continue to understand the importance of investing in Britain's future. Despite the current uncertain economic climate in the UK, in his Autumn Statement in 2012, George Osborne, the UK chancellor of the exchequer, stated, "All the money saved in the first two years will be re-invested as part of a 5 billion-pound capital investment in the infrastructure of our country. It is exactly what a government equipping Britain to compete in the modern global economy should be doing." 

For this political generation in Thailand, one of the key challenges to overcome is the temptation to resort to political gamesmanship as a way of distracting from an often serious lack of genuine resolve to bring about tangible, bona fide progress. As John Locke, the British political philosopher of the 17th century, once stated: "If we were never to act on our opinions, because those opinions may be wrong, we should leave all our interests uncared for, and all our duties unperformed." 

Thailand must seriously consider its ability to compete in the global economy, and in doing so, its capacity to connect with the rest of the world. When we contemplate Thailand's future, and the progress that can be achieved through large-scale projects, we should realise that political expediency must not overshadow national dialogue, for it is the quality of debate on all levels that will tell us the most about Thailand's readiness and ambition. 

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.

Bangkok election will also have national repercussions

Bangkok election will also have national repercussions

Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation February 26, 2013 1:00 am

The fight for political supremacy in Bangkok reflects the city's innate sense of superiority. Regardless of the eventual result of the upcoming Bangkok gubernatorial election, the wider unfolding political scenario we are witnessing across Thailand will inevitably affect the country's fortunes well into the future. Moreover, the interest surrounding the debate over the latest election is not limited to those entitled to vote on election day, because Thais across the nation are sensing that matters concerning Bangkok may likely concern them, also.

To a significant extent, this reality is well understood, at least implicitly, by both the political class and by the Thai population more broadly, and it is in this context that several million Bangkokians are now being asked to decide whom to vote for.

As pre-election polling attempts to discern between the two leading candidates - Sukhumbhand Paribatra of the Democrat Party, and Pongsapat Pongcharoen of the Pheu Thai Party - there is increasing speculation that the later now has a good chance to win in the "land of the Democrats".

The strategies embraced by the respective teams have significantly reflected the current trend towards political polarisation, and political analysts will consider this election to be an important opportunity to gauge the relative strengths of both Pheu Thai and the Democrats, overall. Indeed, even a close second place for Pheu Thai would be considered something of a moral victory in this regard.

In this context, much of what has constituted the various arguments vis-a-vis this election, has tended towards hyperbole and hammed-up political rhetoric, and this has played itself out within the public debate. Notwithstanding the apparent question over whether the key issues are being properly raised, there are now indications that, before too long, the Thai electorate will begin to more effectively cajole the political class into more thoroughly and transparently addressing matters of real substance. 

As a Bangkokian who is considering the various factors at play, Atthayudh Ittatirut states: "I will vote for the Democrat candidate, since I want the Democrats to balance the power of the Pheu Thai government."

It is typical in more established democracies for an electorate that mistrusts the political class to vote in a somewhat contrarian fashion when they believe that institutional checks and balances, and the political system itself, are failing them. In Europe and North America, even relatively popular presidents and prime ministers often come up against broad oppositional majorities at local or state electoral level, and this dynamic is almost continually in flux.

How then will the Thai political system adapt and respond, when voter decision-making becomes increasingly considered and sophisticated, as the democracy itself grows? There is, as things stand, an almost overwhelming sense of mistrust between the major demographics of the Thai electorate, and perhaps this is most especially seen in terms of the rural-urban divide. 

Broadly speaking, these dynamics have been essentially subsumed into the red-yellow colour-coded political paradigm, and so it is elected politicians who are now being tasked with giving voice to the feelings and concerns of local constituents, while also attempting to cohesively reflect the party line. 

But what is perhaps of most concern about the tone of the current debate as it relates to the Bangkok election is the implication that either side may believe it can benefit from an escalation in political rhetoric. Let us hope that both sides, in their zeal for political victory, have only temporarily lost sight of the bigger picture, which is their shared responsibility to find ways to best represent the interests of all Thais. 

Thailand's faltering emergent democracy can hardly afford further fragmentation between the Bangkok-centric perspective and the growing sense of rural and provincial alienation from the capital. When we consider Thai history, an important factor comes into play, which perhaps began with the relocation of the centre of power, over time, from Sukhothai, to Ayutthaya, to Thonburi, then finally to Bangkok. 

The impulse to further draw power into the centre has remained. This is reflected in the primacy Bangkok exhibits in relation to almost all the major considerations, which significantly affect the social, economic and political fortunes of most ordinary Thais. 

Paradoxically, although Bangkok has become a place unto itself, it cannot truly stand by itself. For its sustenance the city depends on daily supplies from outside, just as it depended on the transfer of resources from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector, and also on foreign direct investment, in order to help finance the Bangkok boom of the 1980s and early 1990s.

As the US historian Jerry Muller has recently argued: "… a useful starting point might be the rejection of both the politics of privilege and the politics of resentment and the adoption of a clear view of what capitalism actually involves. …" 

In this era of social and political unrest, therefore, it becomes rather less easy to argue for a sustainable economy for the provinces when Bangkok itself is hardly self-reliant, dependent as it is on the significant compliance of the rest of Thailand. 

The arguments advocating the role of Bangkok as the much-needed commercial and administrative hub of Thailand have of course been made many times, and it is a balancing act to be sure. But within our capital, the hardheaded capitalist mindset so often takes precedence, just as the political drive to win at all costs is equally heightened. This current state of imbalance is unlikely to be sustainable when it comes to the health of the Thai democracy and economy, and the cohesiveness of society overall. 

Ultimately, when individuals from even disadvantaged demographic groups such as the rural poor, learn to cooperate more effectively to challenge the existing paradigm, a solution to injustice has been found. After all, despite the plutocratic allusions of the current societal rift, there is a truth to be found in the words of the philosopher John Rawls: "Society is not so divided that one fairly small sector controls the preponderance of productive resources." When people can truly live with the understanding that force, suppression or fear-mongering cannot correct states of imbalance, then even a less-than-perfect system can begin to learn how to make the necessary corrections. 

Titiplol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University. 

Is our debate over freedom forever in conflict with Thai culture?

Is our debate over freedom forever in conflict with Thai culture?

Wed, 30/01/2013 - 20:58 | by prachatai

Titipol Phakdeewanich

The recent 11-year sentence against Somyot Prueksakasemsuk relating to lèse majesté and Thailand’s defamation laws has, once again, brought into focus questions that seek to fairly examine the current status of human rights and freedom of expression within Thailand. 

Moreover, with arguments referencing the “implication” of what was or what was not said being made explicit within the verdict of this case, a significant precedent has now been set, which will have a profound effect upon many future court decisions.

Such a scenario may not be particularly new to those who closely follow such matters within Thailand, but nevertheless, what may be most problematic is the cementing of a societal context in which it becomes less and less possible to constructively engage with what many Thai people consider to be sensitive issues, and where certain topics are therefore, considered to be off-limits. 

This is all taking place within a society that wants, of course, to be able to make the case to both itself and to the wider world, that it is becoming freer and more democratic. So how then will Thailand respond to this growing societal paradox, without acting to encourage further fragmentation and schism?

As soon as the verdict was announced, across-the-board criticisms emerged out of the international community, and this was in clear contrast to the response from Thai human rights institutions, which were generally rather muted in terms of their own public pronouncements.

Incredibly, despite the attention drawn to this latest case, no official statement concerning this verdict has yet been released by the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand. Inevitably therefore, for as long as there remains such a vacuum within the Thai human rights arena, individuals will necessarily be left to draw their own conclusions from such a notable silence.

In particular, a number of leading international institutions highlighted the problem of placing a priority on defending a sense of national pride as this relates to culture and tradition, over that of human rights, which are internationally recognised, and to which Thailand is a signatory.

This aspect to the case was picked up by a number of Thai defenders of the court decision, who then appealed to arguments implicitly advocating in favour of a sense of Thai exceptionalism, which would in their view, act to justify such a court decision.

The official response from the European Union Heads of Mission in Thailand made the case: “The verdict seriously undermines the right to freedom of expression and press freedom. At the same time, it affects Thailand’s image as a free and democratic society...”

Whilst Navanethem Pillay, a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights argued: “The conviction and extremely harsh sentencing of Somyot sends the wrong signals on freedom of expression in Thailand. The court's decision is the latest indication of a disturbing trend in which lèse majesté charges are used for political purposes.”

In response to the EU, an anonymous message was sent out on Facebook that went on to be shared by a large number of Thai royalists’ online social networks. In the highly politicised context of the ongoing Red-Yellow paradigm, politicking remains a key dynamic of course, in almost any social-political equation.

Nevertheless, it read: “Preserving our beloved Monarchy is the right of the Thai people - not the business of the EU... we have our own distinct culture, much of which has evolved around our beloved monarchy…This may be difficult for Europeans to understand: It is our long-held tradition to pay the utmost respect to our King, with a type of respect that is unique to Asian cultures.”

However, this attempt to conflate the issue of human rights with Thai cultural identity necessarily implies that within Thailand, an individual’s rights are respected only when they do not conflict with the cultural imperative, and that they are therefore, to be considered to be of only relative importance, and not something absolute.

In this regard, this Facebook message is apparently correct in its assertions, as its rationale appears to be rather in line with this latest court decision. This does not however, mean that it must at all follow that such a rationale is a viable approach to resolving such a given situation.

Implying as it does, that those who for what ever reason are not identified with a particular cultural paradigm would do better to stay well out of the way, smacks of intolerance towards the outsider, and is not indicative of a constructive debate.

Moreover, the EU statement might have been made by any dispassionate observer of the situation, and it evidently did not appeal to a sense of wanting to in any way diminish Thai culture. Therefore, it is unfortunate whenever there is an appeal to a sense of indignation that non-Thais are unduly interfering in Thai domestic affairs.

But the thing to remember here, is that it is not so easy to convincingly dismiss the key point that was actually made by the EU. Moreover, such a critique remains just as valid, whether or not it happened to have been made by a Thai or non-Thai observer of the Somyot case.

To some extent, Thai NGOs have been outspoken in openly challenging the court’s decision. Yet for many, these NGOs are considered to be so purely aligned to the aspirations of the Red Shirt movement, that their arguments are almost entirely disregarded by those who may happen to disagree with their politics.

Despite the reasoning of many who continue to perceive the question of freedom of expression as contingent on how it relates to the political Red-Yellow paradigm, this limited perspective only acts to relegate the question of human rights to the level of political gamesmanship.

That Somyot was an editor of a Red Shirt publication means that for many Thais, they cannot see through to the essential importance of the principle of rights, which must be applied equally to all under the law, regardless of political affiliation. It is this state of moral confusion that ultimately acts to undermine all of our intrinsic rights.

If we believe in rights at all, then fundamental human rights cannot be regarded as something negotiable, to be applied as and when it suits any one particular interest group, when it finds itself in the fortuitous position of power.

Historically, and around the world, where significant progress has been made in relation to these essential questions, it is precisely because human rights have been held up as an issue of such fundamental importance, that it must transcend politics and societal variances. So, in the words of Mahatma Gandhi: “Freedom is not worth having if it does not include the freedom to make mistakes.”

This may be a perspective that all Thais would do well to consider, especially when discussing freedom of expression in the context of the Thai cultural heritage. As the world changes over time, we should now more than ever before, fully consider the freedoms that we have never had, in order to create for ourselves a democratic spirit favourable to a constructive national debate, and most importantly perhaps, the necessary commitment to freedom of expression for all.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.

http://prachatai.com/english/node/3503

Red-shirt influence and the constitutional question

Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation January 2, 2013 1:00 am

It is now two years since the phenomenon of the red-shirt "Villages for Democracy" emerged across Thailand, and since December 2010 over 16,000 villages have declared themselves, as this movement continues to evolve and adapt.

Nevertheless, it is extremely significant for both the red shirts and the country at large that the implications of these efforts are yet to be fully realised at the national level. With the arguments over constitutional reform dominating the national political discourse, and also the apparent determination exhibited by the anti-Thaksin coalition to resist reform, the question of the red shirts continues to be the source of much political intrigue.

The capacity to link an emerging grassroots movement to a national political agenda is of critical importance when it comes to an essential question such as this, which relates to the possible return to Thailand of the former prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. This does, of course, do much to explain the political ploys and cryptic arguments from both sides relating to a further rewriting of the Thai Constitution at this time, revealing the high stakes involved.

Then, when we consider the legal requirement for a majority of registered voters to vote on a constitutional referendum, voter turnout and political mobilisation take precedence over the simple technical victory that is sufficient for parliamentary elections. This helps to explain the questionable and anti-democratic rationale of some Democrat Party politicians in attempting to minimise turnout, should the constitutional referendum go ahead as planned.

In this context, it may paradoxically be in the long-term interests of Thaksin, if his opponents are in fact wrong in their assertions that the red-shirt movement is effectively a wholly owned subsidiary of his. Indeed, few red shirts would actually wish to be perceived in such a light. For those within the red-shirt umbrella, the motivation to continue to politically mobilise must therefore be linked to a strong belief that their relationship to Thaksin is both rational and advantageous.

When it comes to the question of the red-shirt villages, for the majority of Thais there continues to be much uncertainty surrounding their formation. Arnon Sannan, who is credited with having established the red-shirt village concept, has recently argued: "I've made it very clear that the red-shirt villages aim to promote democracy and differences. So the non-red shirts should not feel excluded if they believe in democracy."

However, only a few months after the official launch of a number of red-shirt villages in Ubon Ratchathani, Rattana Kampui, the leader of Serichon Ubon - or Free People of Ubon - noted: "I observed rising conflicts within these red-shirt villages, and acknowledgement that some of the villages are more divided. And a number of the locals are in fear of talking politics."

This context reveals that if the red-shirt village movement is dominated by a core of activists who act with the expectation that all community members will inevitably come on board, then they will ultimately face disappointment. If, when facing resistance, they become dogmatic and inflexible in their aims and objectives, then their reasonable claims will be lost in the argument, as the remainder of society feels increasingly isolated from their demands.

As Robert Dahl, a noted writer on democracy, once argued: "Yes, individuals and groups may sometimes be mistaken about their own good. Certainly they may sometimes misperceive what is in their own best interests."

Despite the evident frustration felt by many rural Thais, it remains in their interest to find ways to connect their message with the hearts and minds of the wider Thai population, and this strategy would not be well served by a retreat into isolationism, which has the very real potential to significantly backfire.

The establishment of a red-shirt village creates a geographical zoning, which acts to further alienate these villages from the rest of Thai society, and both sides are now feeling this sense of division. Furthermore, there is the suggestion that these villages are the cause of emerging fragmentation within the broader red-shirt movement, which is weakening their overall position within the red-shirt coalition. Consequently, they risk undermining any opportunity they do have, to effectively contend with the existing power structures of the political establishment.

Indeed, as Francis Fukuyama has recently argued: "It requires a great deal of hard work to persuade people that institutional change is needed in the first place, build a coalition in favour of change that can overcome the resistance of existing stakeholders in the old system." 

In time, the red-shirt movement does have the potential to develop its approach, in order to emerge as a responsive interest group within the Thai political paradigm. This, in and of itself, would assist in better holding government accountable, and if the significance of this prospect was more fully understood, then the opening that this suggests would be more positively accepted by the broader Thai demographic.

In other words, if the red-shirt villages movement can expect to be able to make a strong case to the wider Thai society that they are effective in perceiving problems and constructive in providing solutions, then the evidence for this must be there. As a lack of regard for the rights of the individual, which must be set aside for the alleged benefit of the group collective, has many dangerous precedents, if red-shirt villages can demonstrate that they are developing more democratic and cohesive communities than typically exist across Thailand today, then this achievement will become apparent to the outside observer.

Their recent strategic shift towards the development of more economically oriented cooperatives has the potential to include those who are unaffiliated with the red shirts, and also to reconnect those who have felt themselves marginalised by the often overtly political aspects of this movement. The success stories would greatly assist in the development of an inclusive grassroots undertaking, which could then act to powerfully inform the newly emerging social dynamics of Thailand.

It can be established, therefore, when making the case for Thai democracy and the desire of social-political movements to affect change, that the democratic underpinning in fully respecting the rights of the individual and of political representation is not a partisan case. This concerns all Thais, regardless of their political affiliation or perspective.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.