An academic reflects on his experience at a Thai military base

Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation December 11, 2014 1:00 am

Since the coup in May, speculation has been rife about what really goes on behind the scenes when Thai civilians find themselves face-to-face with military officers. On December 1, I found myself in that position. As an academic in the political science faculty of a university in the heartland of the opposition to the current government, I was understandably wary.

As we approached the Ubon Ratchathani military base I recalled stories others had told about their experiences with the military over these past few months.

The number of Thais who have been "invited" for "attitude adjustment" is probably in the hundreds, though the exact figure remains unclear. Some have made claims of human rights abuses, but these are often difficult to prove, and this has encouraged speculation. Also, much of the reporting of these episodes has been sensationalised for political purposes, as both sides of the Thai socio-political divide resort to exaggerated allegations in the battle to influence the public debate.

I must acknowledge that, on that day, we were respectfully treated throughout our time at the base. Yet this cannot be taken as evidence that academic freedom is guaranteed under the current administration. This is especially so given that an increasing number of academic activities are now subject to close monitoring and scrutiny by the military.

As Thailand attempts to address and correct the historical failures which have brought the country to this point, the importance of defending academic and student freedom needs to be continually argued for. In modern Thai history, celebrated advocates for such freedoms have also recognised the responsibility that comes with speaking out.

In the attempt to heal the societal rift, universities, academics and students have a vital role to play, in helping to find ways to break through the cultural barriers, by supporting a vigorous but also tolerant public dialogue. To this end, a learning process that more openly explores the ideas and experiences of those from both within Thailand and beyond will bring more creativity to the area of problem-solving.

While efforts are made to evolve a more viable democratic system, a new level of understanding must also be achieved. Democracy is not just about elections. Thailand has much work to do in the development of a more informed social-political involvement, where citizens maintain the right to speak out in holding their government accountable.

If academic activities are considered a threat to the security of the state, then all Thais should be concerned for the future of reform. Millions of Thais have placed their hope in reforms as a means of getting Thailand to a better place. But the question is whether the country can make real progress without academic and intellectual freedoms that come as part of freedom of expression.

It is true that some of the military's recent decision-making has seemed unnecessarily arbitrary and reflexive. But we should also be able to acknowledge their difficulty, in that this is all happening at a time when they are adapting - for better or worse - to their new role as enforcers for a government forging policy without a democratic mandate.

Unfortunately, this has only exacerbated the breakdown of the relationship between Thai citizens and the state, and it is in this context that the recent Thai student protests have gained international attention.

Things took a turn for the worse following protests by the Dao Din student group against Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, during his visit to Khon Kaen province on November 19. It's no surprise that since then, the military has focused more attention on academic activities.

The military has asked universities in the Northeast to keep student activists under control, claiming that Dao Din is plotting a regional protest network against the government and the National Council for Peace and Order.

Critics point to this as evidence of the military's excessive desire for control.

This controlling mentality has likely been exacerbated by increasing doubts within the military of its ability to retain public belief that its continued authority is both necessary and justified. All this is the result of six months of mediocre and unpersuasive attempts to convince the public that it is making sufficient progress in returning the country to democracy.

Our meeting with military officers focused on the position and role of our university. It was something of a relief that the discussion took the form of an open dialogue, and it was significantly more informative and constructive than I had anticipated.

In recognising the need for reform - and with it, the need to hear all voices - an open dialogue that allows for concessions and compromises provides the different sides with the opportunity to make climb-downs and to rebuild trust. This must be better than risking further clamp-downs, and with them, an even more poisonous and pernicious sense of public mistrust.

An escalation of confrontation and suppression leading to a tragedy like the 1976 student massacre in Bangkok is something no one wants to see.

Recent global history furnishes plenty of examples of authorities becoming increasingly hardline in attempts to suppress radical elements. And the battleground has so often been the universities, with both academics and students sometimes targeted.

In the Thai case, with the outcome still uncertain, it is the responsibility of all sides to work towards a common understanding, before the misunderstandings escalate tensions further.

In the end, Thai students and academics could aid progress amid this undemocratic status quo by acting to raise the standard of the societal debate through the force of reasoned argument. In contrast, dramatic (and likely futile) sloganeering is likely to provide those with a more authoritarian zeal with the ammunition they need. This will only act to further quell the voices of those who continue to legitimately question the direction that Thailand is currently taking.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani.

An apparently impromptu visit from three military personnel, who are from the Ubon Ratchathani military base.

At around 5pm this afternoon, our faculty received an apparently impromptu visit from three military personnel, who are from the Ubon Ratchathani military base. I was personally told that this visit was simply a routine check, and they also claimed that, each day, one of the ‘teams’ from their military base, visits some part of the Ubon Ratchathani University campus. They walked around, taking the photographs that they wanted; not only of the Faculty of Political Science building, but, also, of the students. All this happened on the day following a human rights event that I organised - which was principally supported by the Delegation of the European Union to Thailand, along with the United Nations Development Programme and the Law Reform Commission of Thailand as the event’s co-supporters - which was held on our university campus.

To all those who share an interest in the proceedings relating to the Human Rights event, which was held at Ubon Ratchathani University, on the 10th of December, 2014, and was entitled: “Democracy and Human Rights within Thailand and the EU - a Forum of Exchange”: 

I would like to take this opportunity to say a few words about this human rights event, which was held, today, at Ubon Ratchathani University, Thailand. The event was entitled: “Democracy and Human Rights within Thailand and the EU - a Forum of Exchange”, and we intended that it should reflect a shared spirit of recognition and celebration, being held, as it was, on this ‘International Human Rights Day’, 2014.

With regard to the raising of questions relating to the state of human rights within Thailand at the present time, we understood that these matters must, of course, be necessarily approached with the requisite degree of sensitivity, and caution. Such concerns remained in the forefront of our minds, in the lead-up to the event, itself.

Indeed, there had been quite a concern as to whether the event would, ultimately, be able to take place, given the current social-political climate within Thailand. After various discussions with officials and officers from both the military and police in the weeks leading up to event, we were in the end, allowed to hold the event as planned, but with a certain caveat. This was with the understanding that we “must not discuss politics”. In addition, outside observers were in attendance at the event, in order to monitor what was said.

The event was principally supported by the European Union, and, in addition, the United Nations Development Programme and the Law Reform Commission of Thailand were the co-supporters. Therefore, I would especially like to thank the Delegation of the European Union to Thailand for its generous support in this effort to promote issues relating to democracy and human rights within Thailand. 

I must particularly thank Miss. Sandra De Waele, the First Counsellor, Head of Political, Press and Information Section, from the Delegation of the European Union to Thailand, and also, Dr. Nirun Pitakwatchara, and the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, for their very much appreciated contributions.

In addition, I would also like to thank Mr. Luc Stevens, the United Nations (UN) Resident Coordinator and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Representative to Thailand, for his kind support, and attendance at this event. 

I would also like to thank Mr. Erik Svedahl, Minister Counsellor / Deputy Head of Mission from the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Bangkok, and Ms. Pichaya Fitts, a Political Officer from the Embassy of Sweden in Bangkok, and all those others who travelled all the way to Ubon Ratchathani, in order to be in attendance.

We hope that we will, indeed, be able to continue in our efforts to support a process of positive reform for Thailand. The promotion of human rights within Thailand cannot, surely, be limited to the holding of one-off-events, and so, therefore, we remain committed in our endeavours, as we continue in this work.

We were invited to the Royal Thai Military base in Ubon Ratchathani, in order to discuss, with senior military officers, the position and role of Ubon Ratchathani University, in relation to the possible student and academic activities, which are planned to take place within Isan (the North-eastern region of Thailand). Furthermore, we discussed the role of the political scientists who are based at Thailand’s universities, in the context of the current social-political climate. We also explored the important question of how much academic freedom there is, at present, in the undertaking to both promote and improve the study of political science; as this is a discipline, which retains its importance, especially at this critical juncture in the evolution and reform of Thailand’s political system. I believe that for all of us present, this was both an informative and constructive dialogue.

History Makers Series with Hillary Rodham Clinton

HBO History Makers Series with Hillary Rodham Clinton

Utopian visions cannot justify Thai democratic sabotage

Sun, 02/02/2014 - 11:37 | by prachatai    

Titipol Phakdeewanich

       

Today’s Thai general election results are now looming, and with the Pheu Thai Party government positioned to secure a likely victory, anti-government protesters will be intent on finding more ways to delegitimise their nation’s political process. Over recent years, the Thai political system has been able to resist the pressure to concede much to the demands of the Bangkok protesters who still remain defiant.

 

This is in large part because it is now over a decade since millions of relatively poor rural Thais began to experience a sense of political mobilisation. Because they are now visibly able to express priorities that are rather different from those of the more middle class anti-government protesters, the risk that voicing opinions will only intensify national polarisation remains as a key sticking point in promoting democratic ideals.

 

So it seems that we can expect Thailand’s continuing political crisis to only ratchet up further, in the aftermath of the implications of the results becoming clear to a population now on the edge. This election result may soon come to be recognised as the watershed moment, when it became impossible to reconcile a political polarisation that has seemingly escalated out of control.

 



The prevailing question in the run-up to the election focused on whether Thailand must institute political reforms before or after the electoral process could unfold. It is now implicit that voter turnout and the percentage share of the result can be considered as a form of referendum on the democratic legitimacy of the country. So in a certain sense, this may remind us of the Bangladesh elections of just last month.

 

Increasingly resolute stances were expressed during the pre-election public debate, and this also indicates that the sought-after fix to avoid a more extreme response will not likely be found in time. Whether or not serious violence is immediately triggered in the aftermath of the results, a marked change in thinking across Thai society is now desperately needed.

 

The prevalent uncompromising attitudes will ensure that a significant break with the past will be that much more difficult to accomplish, and this will be self-defeating for the great majority of Thais, who remain socio-economically marginalised by the establishment interests operating out of Bangkok.

 

Despite their public denials, the anti-government coalition led by the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) have entertained ideas that might be seen to encourage physical action by protesters to impede the rights of Thais to access many polling stations. This will probably happen mainly within Bangkok and the south. Resort to such measures will clearly undermine both the election, and also the democratic process itself.

 

With their carefully stage-managed battle plan about to be realised soon, we will discover their level of determination to fight this cause to the end. Although they have often proclaimed their message with an extreme air of self-righteous, many from within their own ranks may have still hoped that things could have been achieved without recourse to anything more than political bluster.

 

Nevertheless, they apparently remain committed to seeing out their campaign for reform, with their current slogan “Shut Down Bangkok, Restart Thailand”. In time for the election, it was revealed that Suthep Thaugsuban, the Secretary General of the PDRC, wrote to the United States President Barack Obama: “I will argue that Thai citizens are morally responsible to rise up and demand removal of both Yingluck and the influence of Thaksin, then define and implement the reform necessary to ensure that the Kingdom of Thailand remains free from unjust and corrupt leaders in the future. Most importantly, a reform that will bring about free and fair elections and a truly representative government.”

 

Suthep might reasonably maintain that his group represents the interests of all those who are in agreement. Despite this, concerns should rightly be raised, if some interpret the subtext as a claim to be speaking on behalf of an entire country. Also, whilst the PDRC is entirely within its rights to argue that democracy is not merely about elections, it is also basic common sense to understand and respect the essential right of all to be able to cast their votes freely.

 

When the PDRC is already advocating that it is right and even necessary to violate the voting rights of others – as happened during the recent advance voting process – then why should anybody be expected to take on trust the notion that the PDRC reforms are truly intended to promote democracy and equality for all Thais?

Thomas Paine, the political philosopher and activist of the 18^th century, in attempting to contend with the challenges of his own time, once wrote: “Common sense will tell us, that the power which hath endeavoured to subdue us, is of all others, the most improper to defend us.” Evidently, the political scenario unfolding within Thailand today is not unique.

 

Problems of concentrated political power, patron-client relationships and conflicts of interest exist in all countries, to differing degrees. Despite the concerns relating to the continuing influence of the Shinawatra name, any amount of legislation and reform must be balanced with the requisite level of intent to implement policy.

 

Despite its rather different context, the United States has its own history of political dynasty making. This has been most apparent in recent times of course, with the Bush family, the Clintons and perhaps, most famously, the Kennedys. As we speak, we know there is much talk of Hillary Clinton and her chances of becoming president in 2016. Although the power of the US political lobby has long been recognised, it has over recent years been subjected to increased levels of scrutiny, and is now frequently criticised as being corrupt and riddled with conflicts of interest.

 

In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has continued to dominate the Diet (Japanese parliament), since the party’s establishment in 1955. For Japan, the cost of farm subsidies has been a major criticism, and the way in which the LDP government allocates its budget attracts the criticism that the LDP’s relationship to its rural constituent power-base remains rather too cosy.

 

One way or another, corrupt undercurrents – such as the Thai patronage system – can be observed in political systems all around the world, and so it is no secret that such problems persist. Despite this, the most effective democratic mechanisms act to support and evolve a range of checks and balances. This way, whatever has been historically instituted can be corrected within a more symbiotic and cooperative relationship.

 

For it is the revolutionary zeal of history that is now being encouraged by the modern Thai protesters, as they seek to overcome societal problems with a blank slate approach often taken by political fundamentalists. It is highly dangerous for Thailand to entertain such a prospect, because the political divergences are so sectarian in their nature, and are based on provincial, ethnic, and class-based distinctions.  

 

In the context of the current disintegration that millions of Thais are now actively playing a part in encouraging, it is incumbent on more Thais to be asking the pertinent questions. For instance, in claiming to be challenging injustice – allegedly perpetrated by those who may be misusing the power of the state – when does it become legitimate for you to then violate the basic rights of others, in order to accomplish your supposed goal?

 

Ultimately, the recognition of key safeguards such as due process may appear, to an embittered and agitated public, to be an unsatisfactory compromise. Yet it remains the case that little else holds open the possibility of effectively bringing corrupt politicians to account, without otherwise encouraging a culture in which it continues to be acceptable to resort to the necessarily divisive mentality of further encouraging a climate of mob rule.

 

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a Visiting Research Scholar at the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University, Japan. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University, Thailand.

Getting to the root of Thailand’s woes

28 Dec 2013 

The Straits Times By TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH

Getting to the root of Thailand’s woes

THAILAND’S politics is again attracting the interest of the international community, with the very survival of Thai democracy increasingly brought into question. There is seemingly no end in sight to Thai political brinksmanship, and the opposition Democrat Party – which retains the support of much of the old-guard establishment – stands by its decision to boycott the general election, scheduled for Feb 2 next year.

Despite the Puea Thai government’s determination to ensure that the election will still take place, whether or not the vote can be held remains in question. The People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) – a coalition of Democrat members and anti-government protesters – remains adamant that the current democratic arrangement be suspended and that an unelected “People’s Council” assume the role of running the country.

The PDRC has already tried, albeit in vain, to disrupt the electoral process by preventing candidates of political parties from entering the venue for party-list registration in Bangkok. They also plan to disrupt the constituency-based registration across the country when the process begins today. They continue to insist that the networks of patronage relating to former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra be dismantled before any election is held.

However, a historical and deeply embedded patronage system continues to permeate Thai society at all levels. It is, therefore, impossible to separate this factor from the corruption that so strongly informs the political character of Thailand today.

Corruption undoubtedly predates any notion of democracy in the country. Yet, there is now a general tendency for Thais to assume that corruption and patronage are a consequence of the existing electoral system. For many Thais, therefore, the integrity of the existing election process remains questionable. And this in turn provides a pretext for those who would attempt to undermine the democratic mandate of the current government.

It is regularly contended that were it not for the inordinate power of key political figures such as Thaksin, Thailand would be able to move forward. But is it realistic that corruption in Thailand – disappointingly ranked 102 out of 177 nations on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 – can be effectively remediated through non-democratic means?

The last decade has been a difficult one for Thai democracy. There was a coup in 2006, a constitutional redrafting in 2007, and a series of public protests and crackdowns. Throughout this period, it has been the long disregarded and disaffected majority of Thais from the provinces who have, relatively speaking, retained the most confidence in Thailand’s democratic forms.

It is these rural poor who have, to an increasing degree, come to view what passes for democracy as something that can at least begin to respond to their legitimate claims for increased recognition. Significantly, these are the voters who were historically ignored by an indifferent political elite ensconced primarily in Bangkok. Any significant and tangible response to the situation of the rural poor should understandably be expected to attract a certain loyalty.

This is the context that has provided the recent Thaksin-inspired populist governments with the opportunity to retain a plausible legitimacy and an enduring appeal with the majority of Thais. Accordingly, fresh elections will likely result in another clear endorsement of the Puea Thai party, led by Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra.

The now highly Thaksin-phobic protesters appear to be aware of this to some extent. Nevertheless, they are prepared to endorse almost any contrivance or ostensible rationale to undermine the established tenets of democracy and representation, in order to see a swift end to the influence of the Shinawatra family in Thai politics.

Ultimately, Thailand’s broad societal impasse may demonstrate to the world that its outward show of advancing representative democracy was merely a pretence. The country’s assumed status as a democratic standard-bearer for mainland South-east Asia may soon be over as well.

An anonymous onlooker from undemocratic Laos (living close to the Thai border in Savannakhet province) voiced her concern: “I am not sure about democracy because I can see a lot of problems in Thailand from Thai TV. One day “red shirts” (pro-Thaksin supporters), and another day some others come out on the street. So I don’t think democracy is good for Laos.”

Much of the international community – including the United States and the European Union – has been focusing on a number of specific issues. These include the right to protest, the weakening of voting rights, and the likely impact on foreign investments. Moreover, many foreigners are evidently concerned about how the issue may affect economic prospects throughout the wider region. The recent crisis has coincided with a close to four-year low for the Thai baht against most of the major international currencies.

Although vote-buying still persists as a result of the deep-rooted influence of patronage, it is no longer as decisive a factor in electoral outcomes as it used to be. Rather, voters have increasingly come to value the importance of holding politicians to account in relation to policy delivery. Farmer Nu Keawmanee, from Ubon Ratchathani province, said: “I like the 30-baht health-care policy because it really helps poor people. So, I want a government that has policies to meet the demands of rural people like me.” She was referring to the universal health-care programme introduced by the Thaksin government in 2002.

In their desperate desire to put an end to Thaksin’s influence, his opponents continue to discount the broader reality when making their case. The fact is that the misdeeds of any Thai government have always reflected the inherently anti-democratic patronage system.

This is a historical injustice, which remains largely in place today. It enables those from within the Thai political and business elite to maintain their privileged positions. The failure to deal with this central issue, and instead remain preoccupied with the political fortunes of one man, is to distract attention from a perennial problem of critical importance.

Weakening voting rights will only provoke greater division

Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation December 13, 2013 1:00 am

A society in which we disregard the voice of others when they dare to disagree with us can no longer address social, political and economic challenges

Thailand's contentious and fragile democratic arrangement has come under increasing pressure in recent days, culminating in a remarkable concession from the Pheu Thai government led by Yingluck Shinawatra. On Monday it dissolved Parliament ahead of another anti-Thaksin march on Government House. 

However, the move is unlikely to assuage protesters' anger at corruption in government. Meanwhile, for hardline government supporters, this concession was a step too far.

Anti-government protesters led by former Democrat MP Suthep Thaugsuban are pursuing a campaign to free Thai politics of Shinawatra family influence. Although still uncertain, their main proposal is to suspend electoral democracy and establish a "people's council" as the country's interim leadership. 

The members of this council will almost certainly be unelected, which inevitably brings its legitimacy and representative nature into question. Unsurprisingly, many sceptics have described this idea as little more than a coup in disguise.

What kind of a future society is Thailand then creating for itself, when a mass of citizens are now prepared to ignore their constitutionally enshrined voting rights in an attempt to challenge entrenched political corruption? How can such a regressive move - rescinding long-fought-for democratic rights - help achieve resolution to this latest national dispute?

The right to vote extends to the underprivileged majority in rural provinces. Although this demographic may not be regarded as having minority status, their experiences and overall quality of life indicate just such an inferior position.

Millions of Thailand's rural population continue to subsist as an effective underclass, without the privilege of a secure economic status or the realistic possibility of accessing high-quality education. In their stereotypical perceptions of this majority, the Bangkok middle-class remain harsh and closed-minded, behaving towards them as if they were second-class citizens. 

Such social division and injustice was thrown into sharp relief last week by the death of Nelson Mandela. Reflecting on the life and legacy of this rare individual, we may find ourselves better able to understand that it is the quality of moral fortitude that challenges injustice, and that this is what history will ultimately recognise. 

During his time in office, Mandela was able to support the rights of the disenfranchised black majority and also those of minorities not only because of his established political capital, but also because of his essential humanity. And importantly, South Africans were increasingly coming to accept, sometimes against their own immediate self-interest, that the apartheid status quo was no longer tenable.

"We have travelled too far along the road to freedom to turn back now," said Mandela, after a 1992 massacre of protesters in Bisho and before he became president. "We shall not be deterred by the threats or the actions of the forces of the past. Our people have the right to hope, the right to a future, the right to life itself. No power on this earth can destroy the thirst for human dignity."

It is alarming to hear protesters in Bangkok attempting to blame the problem of vote-buying on a lack of education among the rural majority. Is Thailand now witnessing the attempt to establish a precedent of removing individuals' right to vote (an inherent human right) because of their alleged failings?

Isaan resident Rattana Kampui is one among many who strongly disagrees with the anti-government protesters: "I am from Ubon Ratchathani but I have a national ID card so I should have the right to vote. I only want my voice to be heard just like those in Bangkok. Suthep's 'people's council' will only make me feel like I am no longer a citizen of Thailand, because my voice and my vote will mean nothing to this council." 

With millions of disaffected Thais now feeling the same, and with the reconciliation process evidently stalled, there is little hope that the divide between Bangkok and the rest of Thailand can be bridged any time soon. 

A society in which we disregard the voice of others when they dare to disagree with us can no longer intelligently address escalating social, political or economic challenges. Yet, this is Thai society today as we observe it, where voters often question the motives or rationale of those with different perspectives, without bothering to question their own. 

The anti-government coalition seeks to justify its stance by focusing on the problem of vote-buying. But the reality is that in Shinawatra strongholds and elsewhere, vote-buying is no longer the decisive factor it once was. Voter behaviour today has become a much more complex matter. 

Furthermore, that a populist political mandate was at all achievable, first by Thai Rak Thai and now by Pheu Thai, is indicative of the many historical injustices that existed before most Thais had even heard of Thaksin. No amount of evasive political argument can change this fact, despite continual attempts to divert attention away from the "elephant in the room" of Thailand's social inequality.

The unfolding of the current crisis has an air of inevitability given the seeming refusal of most Thais to consider the possibility they might be blinded by prejudice, or that those of a different political persuasion might have valid claims. 

Is it really credible to deny the link between deep-rooted political corruption and the voting decisions of millions? When those decisions continue to be dictated by short-term decision-making and motivations that are essentially self-serving, then politics will play out accordingly. 

Until Thai voters prove themselves capable of examining such questions with greater objectivity, we cannot expect a miraculous change. In the meantime, the game of brinkmanship being played by our political class will very likely push Thailand to the edge of yet another abyss. And the damage will, as usual, be felt most by those who are already the most marginalised in society.

Tony Blair in Thailand: What we can learn

Wed, 28/08/2013 - 17:17 | by prachatai

Titipol Phakdeewanich

Much has now been written in an attempt to make sense of the dramatic confrontation that we witnessed in parliament last week, which resulted in the sadly not unprecedented scenario of having police on the floor of the House. Thailand likely senses that the political drama between the government and the opposition will almost inevitably continue, and realistically, why should the country expect otherwise? Their respective positions are already well established, and we now see a demonstration of what amounts to a zero-sum game, too often favoured by Thai political strategists.

Whilst the rules-of-the-game established through various interpretations of parliamentary democracy around the world are intended to discourage such unbecoming scenes, it has not yet been possible to prevent such examples from recurring in Thailand. This does not at all mean that Thailand should be resigned to the mentality of fatalism, as it can still learn to manage more effectively and challenge the underlying reasons for the recent events in parliament.

There is a more than unfortunate irony in the continued inability of Thailand’s political representatives to debate convincingly such fundamental reforms as the terms of democracy itself. Recent events are rather indicative of the health of the system as it is today, and so this problem is especially significant now.

Could it even be possible that we are now witnessing an unconscious cry-for-help from the Thai political class? Is this their way of demonstrating to Mr Tony Blair, the former British Prime Minister, just how needed he might be in Thailand at this time? Although Mr Blair is due to visit next week as part of a foreign delegation to assist Thailand with its stalled reconciliation process, he may also have the skills needed to help the country’s politicians after their faltering attempts in the crucial debates over Senate reform.

It is true that most of the political opposition and many others across the country are now unsympathetic to the idea of bringing Mr Blair to Thailand. Yet his premiership saw a historic accomplishment in ending over thirty years of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, and a near equivalent to the challenge of the Thai reconciliation process in attempting to heal profound societal divisions. Although an immediate significant breakthrough seems unlikely, the approach that Mr Blair brings to the table may well prove instructive.

At the time of his ascendancy in British politics, Mr Blair was recognised for his ability to perceive before others could the political opportunity to bring together a variety of antagonists. He arguably achieved this not only in Northern Ireland, but also over British constitutional reform, the modernisation of his own Labour Party, and in shifting the British political spectrum towards his way of thinking.

The Senate reform debates so far reveal one overriding concern of the opposition, as their argument has focused on a reading of Thai political history as power in the grip of a small, yet powerful group in the political arena. Their fear seems to be that if the amendment to the constitution passed with the introduction of an all-elected Senate, the Pheu Thai party would inevitably wield unrestrained power over House and Senate.

Whilst it is unsurprising that they take this position, and its exponents clearly have every right to voice their concerns, a number of representatives in the House have resorted to the questionable tactic of hyperbolic fear-mongering to make their point. As a consequence, this approach has inevitably conveyed a message of distrust in the ability of the Thai people as a whole, to think sufficiently rationally or tactically, when it comes to voting.

The tone of the debate in the House explicitly reflected the concern that the Pheu Thai party, and by implication former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, would achieve absolute control of both the House and Senate. Thaksin’s detractors apparently fear that the political arena has become his fiefdom, supposedly because the Pheu Thai Party can expect to secure forever its support in the North and Northeast of Thailand, where most of the Thai population live.

But for a country to be continually obsessed over the intentions of one man in exile, is to miss the point when we observe the way society operates. In acting to challenge the everyday inequalities found all around them, Thai people would learn more about why they find themselves in a situation where power brokers wield inordinate power.

The stalling tactics used during the debates are a form of gamesmanship. Yet this approach also reveals how unsustainable it is to rely on a strategy that goes against both the essential tenets of democratic representation, and the imperative to modernise and reform. After all, resistance to progress is the refuge of those who are losing the argument.

We only have to ask Mr Blair’s primary political opponents from within the British Conservative Party – who lost power for over a decade – for an answer as to why they took so long to respond positively to his challenge. The question may be asked whether the Thai opposition will persist with their existing approach.

In his autobiography, Mr Blair acknowledged the inherent problem of an appointment-based system: “The danger with appointment is cronyism, placemenship, patronage and so on, but that can be countered by a different system of nomination…”

When Mr Blair was Prime Minister, the British government introduced the House of Lords Act 1999, which sought to phase out the hereditary nature of the upper house through the introduction of a majority of appointees. This historic step forwards in the reform of the House of Lords was not the end of the question, as the debate continues. 

We should also consider the words of Thomas Jefferson, an early US President and cosignatory of the US Constitution: “I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome direction, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education. This is the true corrective of abuses of constitutional power.”

Continually finding one reason or another to deny the fullest democratic representation of the people is not the way to support an emerging democracy. This only serves to justify a resistance to reform that encourages the opportunism of vested interests and further delay what will be, for Thailand, a difficult yet necessary learning experience.

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Titipol Phakdeewanich is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University

Thai-US friendship: the next stage

A stateless refugee from Ban Bahai, Ubon Ratchathani

Much has already been made of this year's 180th anniversary of bilateral Thai-US relations, and with it a tendency perhaps to idealise a shared history. What is missing, however, is a more convincing expression of future purpose and direction that would communicate to the Thai public the relevance of this relationship in the future. What then, of the roles likely to be played by both Thailand and the US within the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) in particular, over the next few years?

As argued earlier this year by the former US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, during a speech in January: "America today is stronger at home and more respected in the world." Nevertheless, the question arises as to what extent this statement reflects current perceptions within the countries of the GMS.

There has been a long history of the Western powers' involvement across Southeast Asia, and its a mixed record, with the case of Laos in particular a close-to-home reminder of this legacy. This involves Thailand too, with the still unresolved and largely disregarded question of the status of Lao refugees from the time of the Vietnam War, who are now situated in Thailand's northeastern.

In the remote village of Ban Bahai, in Ubon Ratchathani, within a few kilometres of their homeland, Lao people continue to suffer from a lack of acknowledgment by the Thai government. Approximately 100 of its population of 900 have remained stateless in the decades since they were forced to from Laos due to the war.

One villager spoke anonymously: "I worked for the US army as a military support in Laos during the war, before I moved to Thailand. I want to return home, but my children think of themselves as Thai. They are Lao ethnically, but they were born here, so they feel more Thai than I do. I remain stateless, with no rights or access to basic social benefits."

Questions remain as to why there is so little progress on this matter, and why the problems must apparently continue until such a time when a resolution becomes more politically opportune. This situation may be, at least in part, because Thailand has yet to more fully reflect on its own involvement in the Vietnam War. This is the war that Lao people so often describe as "The American War against Laos", in which Thailand was assisted both economically and militarily.

Because many within the region, quite understandably, remain suspicious of the US's intent, an approach to "soft-power" diplomacy - that more tangibly demonstrates that it is taking responsibility for its role in Laos - may be for the US one of the most effective ways it can revitalise its reputation in the region.

The emphasis on soft power in the years immediately preceding its "Asian pivot", reveals a definite understanding by the US of the work that is yet to be done. Moreover, this is also a reflection of the more limited capacity of the US to directly implement the kinds of changes that it would like to see in the world.

However, US interests in the GMS today are not isolated, narrow interests, and they are no longer seemingly exclusive to the US. Its networks of interest continue to grow in complexity, despite the apparent fact that its ability to act unilaterally is now diminished. It is with the recognition of this that the US launched the Lower mekong Initiative in 2009, and this is charged with supporting the environment, education, health, agriculture, energy and connectivity across Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam, as well as Thailand.

The GMS is now a nexus zone that demonstrates the multifaceted nature of international relations, and this requires more nuanced understanding that mitigates the temptation of political and economic short-term expedience. Among the many complex issues, recognition of rights from a responsive government is increasingly seen as a barometer of trust between nations. This is therefore, not the time for regional players such as Thailand to be waiting for others to provide vital direction and leadership.

We are now in an era when the US will increasingly look to its most reliable partners to demonstrate their commitment, and thus their reputation, in promoting progress around the world. Thailand can recognise this as an opportunity, as well as a moral responsibility. The continuing plight of stateless refugees along Thailand's northeastern border is one such case in point.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University,

Rethinking the rice policy: A moral and financial issue

Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation June 25, 2013 1:00 am

A worker amid sacks of rice stored under the government

In recent weeks, the debate relating to the widespread desire to amend Thailand's current rice price-pledging scheme has increasingly focused on over-simplified partisan arguments, while the interests of farmers themselves are seemingly being further neglected. But when we consider making changes to what has become a heavily subsidised and regulated rice market, it would be premature to jump into making an expedient, short-term decision between either of the two options currently on offer.

Of these, there is a proposed update to the rice price-pledging scheme introduced by Yingluck Shinawatra's government and supported by the majority of rice farmers. The alternative is seemingly a reintroduction of the rice price-guarantee programme of Abhisit Vejjajiva's former government, which is supported by farmers who benefited from this previous policy, and also by many landowners. 

The suggestion that we need to further reflect, gains merit when we recognise that it is precisely because both policies have their own strengths and weaknesses that a more fully thought through policy can provide for a solution with greater feasibility in the long term. Moreover, it is no secret that other approaches to promote agricultural policy have been suggested, originating from Thailand, and also from around the world.

We may well ask the question why Thailand's political decision-making process remains as narrowly defined as this major example of policy formulation appears to be on the verge of suggesting. In order to attempt to better respond to this challenge, there are a number of important concerns that can be more fully brought into the debate, but have so far been somewhat neglected.

There are obvious questions that policy-makers should be asking, regardless of political affiliation. These ought to relate directly to what we can expect to achieve in subsidising rice farmers, the implications on rice production and the wellbeing of farmers in the long run. If policy-makers have truly answered such questions, then we can expect a greater degree of success in the effectiveness of their policy instruments. 

It is true to say that the rice price-guarantee programme proved a viable policy to respond to the natural uncertainty that comes with agricultural production. Indeed, both during and after the flood of 2011, rice farmers that were affected claimed that they would have been better off if this policy had still been in place. 

Essentially, under that programme, farmers received the difference between the market price and the price-guarantee regardless of their production, because each payment was calculated on the basis of the land each had registered as their rice farm. However, a moral hazard undoubtedly existed, whereby opportunists were able to enjoy the benefits of these subsidies without having to produce any rice at all. 

Under the current rice price-pledging scheme, farmers are only able to claim its benefits as and when they trade their rice within the market, which has mitigated the moral hazard and acted to elevate rice-farmer incomes. Nevertheless, the artificially high level of the price has been perceived by many as an unnecessary burden on government spending, and this argument was made even before Prime Minister Yingluck took office. In addition, this policy has been questioned by many, over issues relating to transparency and corruption.

Among rice farmers, the perception has become increasingly widespread that the current price-pledge is their entitlement, and it is now the obligation of the government to act to promote their standard of living. It only follows therefore, that rice farmers who benefit from the policy are overwhelmingly dissatisfied with the government's decision to reduce the price-pledge from Bt15,000 to Bt12,000. Their response had been predicted because of their expectation of receiving the higher level of subsidy, although their meeting with Prime Minister Yingluck in an attempt to negotiate for a restoration of the Bt15,000 price-pledge will likely prove unsuccessful. 

Yet in certain key respects, today's Thai farmers are not so different from farmers from across the world. Even in the developed West, farmers seemingly cannot survive the market without considerable support from their governments, as evidenced by the Farm Bill in the US, and the Common Agricultural Policy in the European Union. 

In his Common Agricultural Policy blog regarding "Farmers and the EU", Wyn Grant, a professor of politics at the University of Warwick, recently wrote: "When I said 'many' farmers could not survive without the single farm payment, I was corrected by the word 'all'. If this is the case, it is worrying in terms of the viability of British farming. An arable farmer did emphasise that most farmers would prefer to earn a living from the market if they could get a fair price and this led us into a discussion of the economic power of the supermarkets."

We must of course, recognise that the agricultural sector remains a politically sensitive issue from the local level all the way up to the international level. Moreover, the World Trade Organisation has agreed to allow its members all kinds of exemptions, in order that they can support and protect their agricultural markets. 

Nevertheless, a trend has now emerged internationally, which seeks to unwind support for subsidies, overall. This arguably began with the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the forerunner of the WTO) between 1986-1994, which was the first time in which the liberalisation of agricultural trade was so seriously addressed. Reforms such as these have, since then, often acknowledged a stated aim of intending to act to ensure that farmers can develop greater self-reliance.

Today, many rice farmers are not completely dependent on income from their farms, as alternative sources of income, such as seasonal labour migration or remittances from the younger generations who work in the industrial sector, increasingly assist in supporting rural farming families. Therefore, a comprehensive re-examination of the underlying structure of the country's rice economy would be an important starting point, in attempting to more effectively reconsider the role of the government in this. 

The intention to support rice farmers need not be restricted of course to the use of various methods of market intervention. Therefore, in order to realise a more effective long-term strategy when it comes to important matters such as rice policy, it is incumbent on Thai policy-makers that they act to transcend the existing debate, which has thus far, only got us so far.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, in the UK. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University.