Wednesday, 6 May 2015

The English translation of my interview with Matichon

On the 4th of May, 2015, I was interviewed by a journalist from Matichon. The journalist wanted to know about my positions, with regard to the case that is now being made within Thailand, for a constitutional referendum to be a prerequisite for the new Thai constitution. Relative to most of the rest of the main Thai media publications, Matichon has been generally considered to be a strong advocate for just such a referendum.

The following is my translation-interpretation into English (as it is not possible to make a direct translation or transliteration from Thai into English) of the interview, which appeared in print, on the 6th of May, 2015. I have taken it upon myself to insert a certain amount of additional contextualisation within the brackets, in order to account for the places where the print interview paraphrased my arguments - something, which would have been done, either, because the publication may now regard such details as being fairly self-evident to their Thai readership, or, because of print-space constraints:


“[I would argue that in terms of the questions relating to the legitimacy of the new Thai constitution, and therefore, the importance of holding a constitutional referendum…] In principle, once they are agreed upon, the laws should then be accepted by all the stakeholders within the country. However, although some of the members are, evidently, properly qualified and trustworthy [in terms of their educational background], there remains the question of the overall legitimacy of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC). All of those on the CDC were appointed by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), and so this has raised these questions of legitimacy, and those [questions] of the draft of the new constitution.

There are a number of problems with the current draft of the new constitution. It contradicts with a major statement made by the CDC, which highlighted that: “[The] citizen is the centre of this constitution, where power is in the hands of the citizen.” Nevertheless, there are a number of articles within this draft of the constitution, which act to undermine the power of the citizens of Thailand, such as the introduction of more selected and appointed members to replace the elected members. The process of selection and appointment will result in questions over the qualifications and the legitimacy of those who would be appointed. [This is because it has already been observed that appointments can also bring about the problems of conflict of interest, and abuse of power and public resources for personal gain. Examples include cases of appointing family members to be assistants and secretaries of the members of the existing National Legislative Council.]

I would like to emphasise that the holding of a referendum [for any new Thai constitution] is an important matter, which has to be recognised and prioritised by those who are in power, today. The holding of a constitutional referendum will bring a greater sense of legitimacy to an attempt to confirm that the constitution is actually being accepted by all of the stakeholders within Thailand, and this will then provide the CDC with more legitimacy. The sooner a [democratic general] election is held within Thailand, the better it will be for the country, overall. However, I remain rather pessimistic about this issue. I do not believe that Thailand will hold such an election in the very near future.

Indeed, if the NCPO and the government were to hold elections soon, then the pressure from the international community, such as that from the European Union and the U.S., would decline. Thailand need not perceive these kinds of pressures and their opinions as a form of [unwarranted] intervention, because Thailand is [itself] part of the international community. Moreover, Thailand cannot truly isolate itself from the international community, because of the complexity of economic relations and other interests between this country, and the rest of the world.

There are two main things that those who are in power, would have to do now; firstly, holding a referendum for the new constitution, and secondly, holding an [a general] election. However, I am not optimistic that they would listen to academics, or take any of my advice. There have been a number of statements from different groups of stakeholders within Thai society, which have been ignored by those who are in power, today. Nevertheless, given the current political circumstances, at least we still have a bit of room to speak out, even if there is, now, very limited space for much freedom of expression.”



Thursday, 12 February 2015

US-Thai relations: A question of democracy versus obscurity?


US-Thai relations: A question of democracy versus obscurity?

Thailand cannot afford to indulge in go-it-alone nationalism at a time when our status as a regional hub is under threat

Amid the fallout from the increasingly vociferous anti-American sentiment being expressed in Thailand, one question comes to the fore: Is the historically close Thai-US relationship truly in jeopardy?

Those who listened carefully to the fairly standard remarks on the need for democratic progress delivered recently by Daniel Russel, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, might well ask what all the fuss is about. Nevertheless, the way in which this story plays out may tell us whether the 182-year Thai-US relationship is under threat.

W Patrick Murphy, the chargĂ© d'affaires at the US Embassy, was invited to appear before the National Legislative Assembly yesterday, where he would likely have been asked to account for the recent statement made by Russel. But Murphy declined the invitation and the US State Department responded by saying it had no desire to further inflame the situation, but neither would it backtrack on its position regarding democracy. 

The hollow and bombastic reaction among sections of the Thai public and media is predictable, though it is hardly meant for an international audience, beyond any US policymakers concerned enough to take notice. But, slowly and surely, it is sending out the message that Thailand may no longer be worth the trouble - especially when there are more pressing concerns within the region and further afield. 

In other words, what if a broad range of interests begins to take more seriously, and at face value, the histrionic and irascible Thai assertions of unwelcome and unwarranted outside influence? What then for Thailand? 

Continuance of the "glory days" of a Thailand at the hub of mainland Southeast Asia is no longer a given. Indeed, it is evident that as important outside actors go about the process of re-evaluating their efforts to engage with Asean, the trend is leading away from Thailand. 

In remarks made during his visit to India last month, President Barack Obama said: "In this region, India can play a positive role in helping countries forge a better future, from Burma [Myanmar] to Sri Lanka, where today there's new hope for democracy." 

With regard to Myanmar, the European Union lifted its trade sanctions back in April 2013, before sending its first ambassador five months later. In contrast, the EU delegation to Thailand has gradually scaled back its role and presence, downgrading its regional office for mainland Southeast Asia to a national office.

Meanwhile in neighbouring Laos, Japan is funding construction and development of the East-West Economic Corridor as part of the Greater Mekong Sub-region Programme (GMS). The economic corridor will open up regional economic and developmental opportunities and has already attracted a US$5.6-million investment made by Toyota Boshoku in the Savannakhet-Xeno Special Economic Zone in Laos.

Two years ago, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) chose Laos as the base for its newly launched key regional development programme, the "SDC Mekong Region Strategy, 2013-17". Notably, Thailand is the only Mekong-basin country not included in the strategy. (As a medium-income country, it is no longer considered to be in particular need of foreign aid.) 

At a time when our regional neighbours are recognising the necessity of building a range of international relationships, hostile attitudes in Thailand may convince outside actors to steer clear of the Kingdom. And if it continues, this tendency will exacerbate the sense of alienation from the West that Thais are already beginning to feel. 

Amid this complex field of global influences, Thailand risks outmanoeuvring itself by fixating on a strategy of playing off the US' Asia pivot against greater engagement with China, in an attempt to maximise Thai political, economic and other strategic interests. 

Two key recent examples relate to this concern. First is the launch this week of Thai-US Cobra Gold military exercises just days after the latest improved Thai-China military ties were announced by China's Defence Minister, General Chang Wanquan. Second is the emergence of the US' Lower Mekong Initiative as a rival to the China-backed GMS - the leading developmental programme for mainland Southeast Asia.

The interplay of influences that now govern international dynamics - whether political, economic, social or otherwise -necessarily involve both state and non-state actors. For instance, the decision-making of international investors is increasingly contingent on the prospects for democracy and human rights within developing nations.

This is worrying for Thailand, where some observers detect an ulterior motive in the indignant accusations of US "meddling" in Thai affairs. Does the advocating of a new go-it-alone Thailand, then, smack of a form of nationalist sentiment that can usefully distract from more profound and pressing home-grown problems? 

The longstanding effort to find others to blame for all and sundry - including the seemingly intractable societal rift - is a strategy that risks running out of enemies. Forever scapegoating either the Shinawatra family, as unduly influential, or the rural poor, by stereotyping them as lacking any understanding of the country's problems, may wear thin with even the most radical. Where better to look then, than in the direction of the predominant foreign superpower with a tarnished reputation?

A more crucial question is whether Thais are sufficiently committed to making the necessary efforts to change an abiding sense of societal division and mistrust, and in this way, aid in the restoration of Thai democracy. This would necessitate a far more reasoned and conciliatory approach than we are now witnessing. 

Thais who are able to identify with the very real and valid concerns of the rural poor in particular, must surely recognise a glaring absurdity. Namely, the directing of a similar blame-game strategy against the weakest and most marginalised Thais and, at the very same time, against the strongest world power, the US. 

Democracy, in and of itself, is not something that the US has ownership over, but it is something that Thailand can finally choose to abandon, to its detriment. Along with that abandoning would likely go any hope of significant future progress for the Kingdom. Ultimately, Thailand's future prospects hinge on recognising the importance of a swift reorientation back towards democracy, and the acknowledgement that the US remains an enduring ally.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.

Friday, 26 December 2014

Happy New Year 2015: "Voicing our Right to Question"

My personal New Year's notebook for 2015.
I hope that my photography can fairly reflect the wider picture of today's Thailand.
-Titipol-

 





Thursday, 11 December 2014

An academic reflects on his experience at a Thai military base


An academic reflects on his experience at a Thai military base

Since the coup in May, speculation has been rife about what really goes on behind the scenes when Thai civilians find themselves face-to-face with military officers. On December 1, I found myself in that position. As an academic in the political science faculty of a university in the heartland of the opposition to the current government, I was understandably wary.

As we approached the Ubon Ratchathani military base I recalled stories others had told about their experiences with the military over these past few months.

The number of Thais who have been "invited" for "attitude adjustment" is probably in the hundreds, though the exact figure remains unclear. Some have made claims of human rights abuses, but these are often difficult to prove, and this has encouraged speculation. Also, much of the reporting of these episodes has been sensationalised for political purposes, as both sides of the Thai socio-political divide resort to exaggerated allegations in the battle to influence the public debate.

I must acknowledge that, on that day, we were respectfully treated throughout our time at the base. Yet this cannot be taken as evidence that academic freedom is guaranteed under the current administration. This is especially so given that an increasing number of academic activities are now subject to close monitoring and scrutiny by the military.

As Thailand attempts to address and correct the historical failures which have brought the country to this point, the importance of defending academic and student freedom needs to be continually argued for. In modern Thai history, celebrated advocates for such freedoms have also recognised the responsibility that comes with speaking out.

In the attempt to heal the societal rift, universities, academics and students have a vital role to play, in helping to find ways to break through the cultural barriers, by supporting a vigorous but also tolerant public dialogue. To this end, a learning process that more openly explores the ideas and experiences of those from both within Thailand and beyond will bring more creativity to the area of problem-solving.

While efforts are made to evolve a more viable democratic system, a new level of understanding must also be achieved. Democracy is not just about elections. Thailand has much work to do in the development of a more informed social-political involvement, where citizens maintain the right to speak out in holding their government accountable.

If academic activities are considered a threat to the security of the state, then all Thais should be concerned for the future of reform. Millions of Thais have placed their hope in reforms as a means of getting Thailand to a better place. But the question is whether the country can make real progress without academic and intellectual freedoms that come as part of freedom of expression.

It is true that some of the military's recent decision-making has seemed unnecessarily arbitrary and reflexive. But we should also be able to acknowledge their difficulty, in that this is all happening at a time when they are adapting - for better or worse - to their new role as enforcers for a government forging policy without a democratic mandate.

Unfortunately, this has only exacerbated the breakdown of the relationship between Thai citizens and the state, and it is in this context that the recent Thai student protests have gained international attention.

Things took a turn for the worse following protests by the Dao Din student group against Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, during his visit to Khon Kaen province on November 19. It's no surprise that since then, the military has focused more attention on academic activities.

The military has asked universities in the Northeast to keep student activists under control, claiming that Dao Din is plotting a regional protest network against the government and the National Council for Peace and Order.

Critics point to this as evidence of the military's excessive desire for control.

This controlling mentality has likely been exacerbated by increasing doubts within the military of its ability to retain public belief that its continued authority is both necessary and justified. All this is the result of six months of mediocre and unpersuasive attempts to convince the public that it is making sufficient progress in returning the country to democracy.

Our meeting with military officers focused on the position and role of our university. It was something of a relief that the discussion took the form of an open dialogue, and it was significantly more informative and constructive than I had anticipated.

In recognising the need for reform - and with it, the need to hear all voices - an open dialogue that allows for concessions and compromises provides the different sides with the opportunity to make climb-downs and to rebuild trust. This must be better than risking further clamp-downs, and with them, an even more poisonous and pernicious sense of public mistrust.

An escalation of confrontation and suppression leading to a tragedy like the 1976 student massacre in Bangkok is something no one wants to see.

Recent global history furnishes plenty of examples of authorities becoming increasingly hardline in attempts to suppress radical elements. And the battleground has so often been the universities, with both academics and students sometimes targeted.

In the Thai case, with the outcome still uncertain, it is the responsibility of all sides to work towards a common understanding, before the misunderstandings escalate tensions further.

In the end, Thai students and academics could aid progress amid this undemocratic status quo by acting to raise the standard of the societal debate through the force of reasoned argument. In contrast, dramatic (and likely futile) sloganeering is likely to provide those with a more authoritarian zeal with the ammunition they need. This will only act to further quell the voices of those who continue to legitimately question the direction that Thailand is currently taking.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani.

An apparently impromptu visit from three military personnel, who are from the Ubon Ratchathani military base.


At around 5pm this afternoon, our faculty received an apparently impromptu visit from three military personnel, who are from the Ubon Ratchathani military base. I was personally told that this visit was simply a routine check, and they also claimed that, each day, one of the ‘teams’ from their military base, visits some part of the Ubon Ratchathani University campus. They walked around, taking the photographs that they wanted; not only of the Faculty of Political Science building, but, also, of the students. All this happened on the day following a human rights event that I organised - which was principally supported by the Delegation of the European Union to Thailand, along with the United Nations Development Programme and the Law Reform Commission of Thailand as the event’s co-supporters - which was held on our university campus.



Wednesday, 10 December 2014

To all those who share an interest in the proceedings relating to the Human Rights event, which was held at Ubon Ratchathani University, on the 10th of December, 2014, and was entitled: “Democracy and Human Rights within Thailand and the EU - a Forum of Exchange”: 


I would like to take this opportunity to say a few words about this human rights event, which was held, today, at Ubon Ratchathani University, Thailand. The event was entitled: “Democracy and Human Rights within Thailand and the EU - a Forum of Exchange”, and we intended that it should reflect a shared spirit of recognition and celebration, being held, as it was, on this ‘International Human Rights Day’, 2014.

With regard to the raising of questions relating to the state of human rights within Thailand at the present time, we understood that these matters must, of course, be necessarily approached with the requisite degree of sensitivity, and caution. Such concerns remained in the forefront of our minds, in the lead-up to the event, itself.

Indeed, there had been quite a concern as to whether the event would, ultimately, be able to take place, given the current social-political climate within Thailand. After various discussions with officials and officers from both the military and police in the weeks leading up to event, we were in the end, allowed to hold the event as planned, but with a certain caveat. This was with the understanding that we “must not discuss politics”. In addition, outside observers were in attendance at the event, in order to monitor what was said.

The event was principally supported by the European Union, and, in addition, the United Nations Development Programme and the Law Reform Commission of Thailand were the co-supporters. Therefore, I would especially like to thank the Delegation of the European Union to Thailand for its generous support in this effort to promote issues relating to democracy and human rights within Thailand. 

I must particularly thank Miss. Sandra De Waele, the First Counsellor, Head of Political, Press and Information Section, from the Delegation of the European Union to Thailand, and also, Dr. Nirun Pitakwatchara, and the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, for their very much appreciated contributions.

In addition, I would also like to thank Mr. Luc Stevens, the United Nations (UN) Resident Coordinator and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Representative to Thailand, for his kind support, and attendance at this event. 

I would also like to thank Mr. Erik Svedahl, Minister Counsellor / Deputy Head of Mission from the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Bangkok, and Ms. Pichaya Fitts, a Political Officer from the Embassy of Sweden in Bangkok, and all those others who travelled all the way to Ubon Ratchathani, in order to be in attendance.


We hope that we will, indeed, be able to continue in our efforts to support a process of positive reform for Thailand. The promotion of human rights within Thailand cannot, surely, be limited to the holding of one-off-events, and so, therefore, we remain committed in our endeavours, as we continue in this work.









Monday, 1 December 2014


We were invited to the Royal Thai Military base in Ubon Ratchathani, in order to discuss, with senior military officers, the position and role of Ubon Ratchathani University, in relation to the possible student and academic activities, which are planned to take place within Isan (the North-eastern region of Thailand). Furthermore, we discussed the role of the political scientists who are based at Thailand’s universities, in the context of the current social-political climate. We also explored the important question of how much academic freedom there is, at present, in the undertaking to both promote and improve the study of political science; as this is a discipline, which retains its importance, especially at this critical juncture in the evolution and reform of Thailand’s political system. I believe that for all of us present, this was both an informative and constructive dialogue.




















Wednesday, 5 February 2014

Utopian visions cannot justify Thai democratic sabotage

    

Today’s Thai general election results are now looming, and with the Pheu Thai Party government positioned to secure a likely victory, anti-government protesters will be intent on finding more ways to delegitimise their nation’s political process. Over recent years, the Thai political system has been able to resist the pressure to concede much to the demands of the Bangkok protesters who still remain defiant.
 
This is in large part because it is now over a decade since millions of relatively poor rural Thais began to experience a sense of political mobilisation. Because they are now visibly able to express priorities that are rather different from those of the more middle class anti-government protesters, the risk that voicing opinions will only intensify national polarisation remains as a key sticking point in promoting democratic ideals.
 
So it seems that we can expect Thailand’s continuing political crisis to only ratchet up further, in the aftermath of the implications of the results becoming clear to a population now on the edge. This election result may soon come to be recognised as the watershed moment, when it became impossible to reconcile a political polarisation that has seemingly escalated out of control.
 

The prevailing question in the run-up to the election focused on whether Thailand must institute political reforms before or after the electoral process could unfold. It is now implicit that voter turnout and the percentage share of the result can be considered as a form of referendum on the democratic legitimacy of the country. So in a certain sense, this may remind us of the Bangladesh elections of just last month.
 
Increasingly resolute stances were expressed during the pre-election public debate, and this also indicates that the sought-after fix to avoid a more extreme response will not likely be found in time. Whether or not serious violence is immediately triggered in the aftermath of the results, a marked change in thinking across Thai society is now desperately needed.
 
The prevalent uncompromising attitudes will ensure that a significant break with the past will be that much more difficult to accomplish, and this will be self-defeating for the great majority of Thais, who remain socio-economically marginalised by the establishment interests operating out of Bangkok.
 
Despite their public denials, the anti-government coalition led by the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) have entertained ideas that might be seen to encourage physical action by protesters to impede the rights of Thais to access many polling stations. This will probably happen mainly within Bangkok and the south. Resort to such measures will clearly undermine both the election, and also the democratic process itself.
 
With their carefully stage-managed battle plan about to be realised soon, we will discover their level of determination to fight this cause to the end. Although they have often proclaimed their message with an extreme air of self-righteous, many from within their own ranks may have still hoped that things could have been achieved without recourse to anything more than political bluster.
 
Nevertheless, they apparently remain committed to seeing out their campaign for reform, with their current slogan “Shut Down Bangkok, Restart Thailand”. In time for the election, it was revealed that Suthep Thaugsuban, the Secretary General of the PDRC, wrote to the United States President Barack Obama: “I will argue that Thai citizens are morally responsible to rise up and demand removal of both Yingluck and the influence of Thaksin, then define and implement the reform necessary to ensure that the Kingdom of Thailand remains free from unjust and corrupt leaders in the future. Most importantly, a reform that will bring about free and fair elections and a truly representative government.”
 
Suthep might reasonably maintain that his group represents the interests of all those who are in agreement. Despite this, concerns should rightly be raised, if some interpret the subtext as a claim to be speaking on behalf of an entire country. Also, whilst the PDRC is entirely within its rights to argue that democracy is not merely about elections, it is also basic common sense to understand and respect the essential right of all to be able to cast their votes freely.
 
When the PDRC is already advocating that it is right and even necessary to violate the voting rights of others – as happened during the recent advance voting process – then why should anybody be expected to take on trust the notion that the PDRC reforms are truly intended to promote democracy and equality for all Thais?
Thomas Paine, the political philosopher and activist of the 18th century, in attempting to contend with the challenges of his own time, once wrote: “Common sense will tell us, that the power which hath endeavoured to subdue us, is of all others, the most improper to defend us.” Evidently, the political scenario unfolding within Thailand today is not unique.
 
Problems of concentrated political power, patron-client relationships and conflicts of interest exist in all countries, to differing degrees. Despite the concerns relating to the continuing influence of the Shinawatra name, any amount of legislation and reform must be balanced with the requisite level of intent to implement policy.
 
Despite its rather different context, the United States has its own history of political dynasty making. This has been most apparent in recent times of course, with the Bush family, the Clintons and perhaps, most famously, the Kennedys. As we speak, we know there is much talk of Hillary Clinton and her chances of becoming president in 2016. Although the power of the US political lobby has long been recognised, it has over recent years been subjected to increased levels of scrutiny, and is now frequently criticised as being corrupt and riddled with conflicts of interest.
 
In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has continued to dominate the Diet (Japanese parliament), since the party’s establishment in 1955. For Japan, the cost of farm subsidies has been a major criticism, and the way in which the LDP government allocates its budget attracts the criticism that the LDP’s relationship to its rural constituent power-base remains rather too cosy.
 
One way or another, corrupt undercurrents – such as the Thai patronage system – can be observed in political systems all around the world, and so it is no secret that such problems persist. Despite this, the most effective democratic mechanisms act to support and evolve a range of checks and balances. This way, whatever has been historically instituted can be corrected within a more symbiotic and cooperative relationship.
 
For it is the revolutionary zeal of history that is now being encouraged by the modern Thai protesters, as they seek to overcome societal problems with a blank slate approach often taken by political fundamentalists. It is highly dangerous for Thailand to entertain such a prospect, because the political divergences are so sectarian in their nature, and are based on provincial, ethnic, and class-based distinctions.  
 
In the context of the current disintegration that millions of Thais are now actively playing a part in encouraging, it is incumbent on more Thais to be asking the pertinent questions. For instance, in claiming to be challenging injustice – allegedly perpetrated by those who may be misusing the power of the state – when does it become legitimate for you to then violate the basic rights of others, in order to accomplish your supposed goal?
 
Ultimately, the recognition of key safeguards such as due process may appear, to an embittered and agitated public, to be an unsatisfactory compromise. Yet it remains the case that little else holds open the possibility of effectively bringing corrupt politicians to account, without otherwise encouraging a culture in which it continues to be acceptable to resort to the necessarily divisive mentality of further encouraging a climate of mob rule.
 
Titipol Phakdeewanich is a Visiting Research Scholar at the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University, Japan. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University, Thailand.

Saturday, 28 December 2013

Getting to the root of Thailand’s woes

28 Dec 2013 
The Straits Times By TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH
Getting to the root of Thailand’s woes

THAILAND’S politics is again attracting the interest of the international community, with the very survival of Thai democracy increasingly brought into question. There is seemingly no end in sight to Thai political brinksmanship, and the opposition Democrat Party – which retains the support of much of the old-guard establishment – stands by its decision to boycott the general election, scheduled for Feb 2 next year.

Despite the Puea Thai government’s determination to ensure that the election will still take place, whether or not the vote can be held remains in question. The People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) – a coalition of Democrat members and anti-government protesters – remains adamant that the current democratic arrangement be suspended and that an unelected “People’s Council” assume the role of running the country.

The PDRC has already tried, albeit in vain, to disrupt the electoral process by preventing candidates of political parties from entering the venue for party-list registration in Bangkok. They also plan to disrupt the constituency-based registration across the country when the process begins today. They continue to insist that the networks of patronage relating to former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra be dismantled before any election is held.
However, a historical and deeply embedded patronage system continues to permeate Thai society at all levels. It is, therefore, impossible to separate this factor from the corruption that so strongly informs the political character of Thailand today.
Corruption undoubtedly predates any notion of democracy in the country. Yet, there is now a general tendency for Thais to assume that corruption and patronage are a consequence of the existing electoral system. For many Thais, therefore, the integrity of the existing election process remains questionable. And this in turn provides a pretext for those who would attempt to undermine the democratic mandate of the current government.

It is regularly contended that were it not for the inordinate power of key political figures such as Thaksin, Thailand would be able to move forward. But is it realistic that corruption in Thailand – disappointingly ranked 102 out of 177 nations on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 – can be effectively remediated through non-democratic means?

The last decade has been a difficult one for Thai democracy. There was a coup in 2006, a constitutional redrafting in 2007, and a series of public protests and crackdowns. Throughout this period, it has been the long disregarded and disaffected majority of Thais from the provinces who have, relatively speaking, retained the most confidence in Thailand’s democratic forms.

It is these rural poor who have, to an increasing degree, come to view what passes for democracy as something that can at least begin to respond to their legitimate claims for increased recognition. Significantly, these are the voters who were historically ignored by an indifferent political elite ensconced primarily in Bangkok. Any significant and tangible response to the situation of the rural poor should understandably be expected to attract a certain loyalty.

This is the context that has provided the recent Thaksin-inspired populist governments with the opportunity to retain a plausible legitimacy and an enduring appeal with the majority of Thais. Accordingly, fresh elections will likely result in another clear endorsement of the Puea Thai party, led by Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra.

The now highly Thaksin-phobic protesters appear to be aware of this to some extent. Nevertheless, they are prepared to endorse almost any contrivance or ostensible rationale to undermine the established tenets of democracy and representation, in order to see a swift end to the influence of the Shinawatra family in Thai politics.

Ultimately, Thailand’s broad societal impasse may demonstrate to the world that its outward show of advancing representative democracy was merely a pretence. The country’s assumed status as a democratic standard-bearer for mainland South-east Asia may soon be over as well.

An anonymous onlooker from undemocratic Laos (living close to the Thai border in Savannakhet province) voiced her concern: “I am not sure about democracy because I can see a lot of problems in Thailand from Thai TV. One day “red shirts” (pro-Thaksin supporters), and another day some others come out on the street. So I don’t think democracy is good for Laos.”

Much of the international community – including the United States and the European Union – has been focusing on a number of specific issues. These include the right to protest, the weakening of voting rights, and the likely impact on foreign investments. Moreover, many foreigners are evidently concerned about how the issue may affect economic prospects throughout the wider region. The recent crisis has coincided with a close to four-year low for the Thai baht against most of the major international currencies.

Although vote-buying still persists as a result of the deep-rooted influence of patronage, it is no longer as decisive a factor in electoral outcomes as it used to be. Rather, voters have increasingly come to value the importance of holding politicians to account in relation to policy delivery. Farmer Nu Keawmanee, from Ubon Ratchathani province, said: “I like the 30-baht health-care policy because it really helps poor people. So, I want a government that has policies to meet the demands of rural people like me.” She was referring to the universal health-care programme introduced by the Thaksin government in 2002.

In their desperate desire to put an end to Thaksin’s influence, his opponents continue to discount the broader reality when making their case. The fact is that the misdeeds of any Thai government have always reflected the inherently anti-democratic patronage system.

This is a historical injustice, which remains largely in place today. It enables those from within the Thai political and business elite to maintain their privileged positions. The failure to deal with this central issue, and instead remain preoccupied with the political fortunes of one man, is to distract attention from a perennial problem of critical importance.








Friday, 13 December 2013

Weakening voting rights will only provoke greater division

Weakening voting rights will only provoke greater division

A society in which we disregard the voice of others when they dare to disagree with us can no longer address social, political and economic challenges

Thailand's contentious and fragile democratic arrangement has come under increasing pressure in recent days, culminating in a remarkable concession from the Pheu Thai government led by Yingluck Shinawatra. On Monday it dissolved Parliament ahead of another anti-Thaksin march on Government House. 

However, the move is unlikely to assuage protesters' anger at corruption in government. Meanwhile, for hardline government supporters, this concession was a step too far.

Anti-government protesters led by former Democrat MP Suthep Thaugsuban are pursuing a campaign to free Thai politics of Shinawatra family influence. Although still uncertain, their main proposal is to suspend electoral democracy and establish a "people's council" as the country's interim leadership. 

The members of this council will almost certainly be unelected, which inevitably brings its legitimacy and representative nature into question. Unsurprisingly, many sceptics have described this idea as little more than a coup in disguise.

What kind of a future society is Thailand then creating for itself, when a mass of citizens are now prepared to ignore their constitutionally enshrined voting rights in an attempt to challenge entrenched political corruption? How can such a regressive move - rescinding long-fought-for democratic rights - help achieve resolution to this latest national dispute?

The right to vote extends to the underprivileged majority in rural provinces. Although this demographic may not be regarded as having minority status, their experiences and overall quality of life indicate just such an inferior position.

Millions of Thailand's rural population continue to subsist as an effective underclass, without the privilege of a secure economic status or the realistic possibility of accessing high-quality education. In their stereotypical perceptions of this majority, the Bangkok middle-class remain harsh and closed-minded, behaving towards them as if they were second-class citizens. 

Such social division and injustice was thrown into sharp relief last week by the death of Nelson Mandela. Reflecting on the life and legacy of this rare individual, we may find ourselves better able to understand that it is the quality of moral fortitude that challenges injustice, and that this is what history will ultimately recognise. 

During his time in office, Mandela was able to support the rights of the disenfranchised black majority and also those of minorities not only because of his established political capital, but also because of his essential humanity. And importantly, South Africans were increasingly coming to accept, sometimes against their own immediate self-interest, that the apartheid status quo was no longer tenable.

"We have travelled too far along the road to freedom to turn back now," said Mandela, after a 1992 massacre of protesters in Bisho and before he became president. "We shall not be deterred by the threats or the actions of the forces of the past. Our people have the right to hope, the right to a future, the right to life itself. No power on this earth can destroy the thirst for human dignity."

It is alarming to hear protesters in Bangkok attempting to blame the problem of vote-buying on a lack of education among the rural majority. Is Thailand now witnessing the attempt to establish a precedent of removing individuals' right to vote (an inherent human right) because of their alleged failings?

Isaan resident Rattana Kampui is one among many who strongly disagrees with the anti-government protesters: "I am from Ubon Ratchathani but I have a national ID card so I should have the right to vote. I only want my voice to be heard just like those in Bangkok. Suthep's 'people's council' will only make me feel like I am no longer a citizen of Thailand, because my voice and my vote will mean nothing to this council." 

With millions of disaffected Thais now feeling the same, and with the reconciliation process evidently stalled, there is little hope that the divide between Bangkok and the rest of Thailand can be bridged any time soon. 

A society in which we disregard the voice of others when they dare to disagree with us can no longer intelligently address escalating social, political or economic challenges. Yet, this is Thai society today as we observe it, where voters often question the motives or rationale of those with different perspectives, without bothering to question their own. 

The anti-government coalition seeks to justify its stance by focusing on the problem of vote-buying. But the reality is that in Shinawatra strongholds and elsewhere, vote-buying is no longer the decisive factor it once was. Voter behaviour today has become a much more complex matter. 

Furthermore, that a populist political mandate was at all achievable, first by Thai Rak Thai and now by Pheu Thai, is indicative of the many historical injustices that existed before most Thais had even heard of Thaksin. No amount of evasive political argument can change this fact, despite continual attempts to divert attention away from the "elephant in the room" of Thailand's social inequality.

The unfolding of the current crisis has an air of inevitability given the seeming refusal of most Thais to consider the possibility they might be blinded by prejudice, or that those of a different political persuasion might have valid claims. 

Is it really credible to deny the link between deep-rooted political corruption and the voting decisions of millions? When those decisions continue to be dictated by short-term decision-making and motivations that are essentially self-serving, then politics will play out accordingly. 

Until Thai voters prove themselves capable of examining such questions with greater objectivity, we cannot expect a miraculous change. In the meantime, the game of brinkmanship being played by our political class will very likely push Thailand to the edge of yet another abyss. And the damage will, as usual, be felt most by those who are already the most marginalised in society.


Thursday, 29 August 2013




Tony Blair in Thailand: What we can learn


Much has now been written in an attempt to make sense of the dramatic confrontation that we witnessed in parliament last week, which resulted in the sadly not unprecedented scenario of having police on the floor of the House. Thailand likely senses that the political drama between the government and the opposition will almost inevitably continue, and realistically, why should the country expect otherwise? Their respective positions are already well established, and we now see a demonstration of what amounts to a zero-sum game, too often favoured by Thai political strategists.
Whilst the rules-of-the-game established through various interpretations of parliamentary democracy around the world are intended to discourage such unbecoming scenes, it has not yet been possible to prevent such examples from recurring in Thailand. This does not at all mean that Thailand should be resigned to the mentality of fatalism, as it can still learn to manage more effectively and challenge the underlying reasons for the recent events in parliament.
There is a more than unfortunate irony in the continued inability of Thailand’s political representatives to debate convincingly such fundamental reforms as the terms of democracy itself. Recent events are rather indicative of the health of the system as it is today, and so this problem is especially significant now.
Could it even be possible that we are now witnessing an unconscious cry-for-help from the Thai political class? Is this their way of demonstrating to Mr Tony Blair, the former British Prime Minister, just how needed he might be in Thailand at this time? Although Mr Blair is due to visit next week as part of a foreign delegation to assist Thailand with its stalled reconciliation process, he may also have the skills needed to help the country’s politicians after their faltering attempts in the crucial debates over Senate reform.
It is true that most of the political opposition and many others across the country are now unsympathetic to the idea of bringing Mr Blair to Thailand. Yet his premiership saw a historic accomplishment in ending over thirty years of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, and a near equivalent to the challenge of the Thai reconciliation process in attempting to heal profound societal divisions. Although an immediate significant breakthrough seems unlikely, the approach that Mr Blair brings to the table may well prove instructive.
At the time of his ascendancy in British politics, Mr Blair was recognised for his ability to perceive before others could the political opportunity to bring together a variety of antagonists. He arguably achieved this not only in Northern Ireland, but also over British constitutional reform, the modernisation of his own Labour Party, and in shifting the British political spectrum towards his way of thinking.
The Senate reform debates so far reveal one overriding concern of the opposition, as their argument has focused on a reading of Thai political history as power in the grip of a small, yet powerful group in the political arena. Their fear seems to be that if the amendment to the constitution passed with the introduction of an all-elected Senate, the Pheu Thai party would inevitably wield unrestrained power over House and Senate.
Whilst it is unsurprising that they take this position, and its exponents clearly have every right to voice their concerns, a number of representatives in the House have resorted to the questionable tactic of hyperbolic fear-mongering to make their point. As a consequence, this approach has inevitably conveyed a message of distrust in the ability of the Thai people as a whole, to think sufficiently rationally or tactically, when it comes to voting.
The tone of the debate in the House explicitly reflected the concern that the Pheu Thai party, and by implication former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, would achieve absolute control of both the House and Senate. Thaksin’s detractors apparently fear that the political arena has become his fiefdom, supposedly because the Pheu Thai Party can expect to secure forever its support in the North and Northeast of Thailand, where most of the Thai population live.
But for a country to be continually obsessed over the intentions of one man in exile, is to miss the point when we observe the way society operates. In acting to challenge the everyday inequalities found all around them, Thai people would learn more about why they find themselves in a situation where power brokers wield inordinate power.
The stalling tactics used during the debates are a form of gamesmanship. Yet this approach also reveals how unsustainable it is to rely on a strategy that goes against both the essential tenets of democratic representation, and the imperative to modernise and reform. After all, resistance to progress is the refuge of those who are losing the argument.
We only have to ask Mr Blair’s primary political opponents from within the British Conservative Party – who lost power for over a decade – for an answer as to why they took so long to respond positively to his challenge. The question may be asked whether the Thai opposition will persist with their existing approach.
In his autobiography, Mr Blair acknowledged the inherent problem of an appointment-based system: “The danger with appointment is cronyism, placemenship, patronage and so on, but that can be countered by a different system of nomination…”
When Mr Blair was Prime Minister, the British government introduced the House of Lords Act 1999, which sought to phase out the hereditary nature of the upper house through the introduction of a majority of appointees. This historic step forwards in the reform of the House of Lords was not the end of the question, as the debate continues. 
We should also consider the words of Thomas Jefferson, an early US President and cosignatory of the US Constitution: “I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome direction, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education. This is the true corrective of abuses of constitutional power.”
Continually finding one reason or another to deny the fullest democratic representation of the people is not the way to support an emerging democracy. This only serves to justify a resistance to reform that encourages the opportunism of vested interests and further delay what will be, for Thailand, a difficult yet necessary learning experience.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University