Time to end hazing culture in universities

By TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH

Special to The Nation

Students’ human rights being violated by execs turning a blind eye to the excesses

This year is just another year in which we witness a compromise on the infamous Thai university culture of hazing, referred to at Thai universities as “rub-nong”. Although the severity of hazing has gradually scaled down with each annual intake, concerns remain over the violation of human rights and the humiliation of human dignity on campuses, as well as criticism about whether this culture of hazing benefits the students’ ability to learn at all.

This culture is criticised for violating human rights because of a mechanism called the “SOTUS system” (seniority, order, tradition, unity, spirit). This does not simply translate as respect for senior students in order to maintain a hierarchy on campus, but insinuates a form of social suppression for first year students, and treats them as inferior.

Despite rules and regulations to promote and protect human rights at Thai universities developed by the Office of the Higher Education Commission (OHEC) and the Ministry of Education (MOE), there are violations every year, and in some cases there are even fatalities. Will Thai universities continue to compromise on their infamous rub-nong, and allow it to pass on to another generation, even whilst there are increasing numbers of student voices in opposition to it?

All Thai universities claim to strictly implement the rules and regulations of the OHEC and the MOE, and maintain that they actively protect first-year students’ human rights. However, university executives across the country have typically turned a blind eye to such violations on university campuses.

First-year students, especially in universities outside Bangkok, are often forced to behave in a certain way, and are sometimes ordered by their seniors to humiliate themselves and trained as if they were serving in a military.

Eradication of this Thai university culture is not inevitable in the foreseeable future, because it has been both openly and secretly supported by many Thai academics in universities and schools, and also by Thai authorities who believe that this culture helps to reinforce Thailand’s hierarchical structure.

Therefore, the promotion and protection of human rights and human dignity are compromised and sacrificed for perceived campus unity as students conform to SOTUS and remain obedient to their seniors. Thai universities work as machines to reproduce and clone an obedient population for the country instead of equipping younger generations with the knowledge to empower themselves and improve the country.

Supporters of this SOTUS culture, including students, university lecturers and the general public, are deluded by the romantic idea of the Thai concept of “family”, regarded as a core Thai value, especially the concept of “brothers and sisters”. This fantasy ignores the fact that the SOTUS culture involves many elements of human rights violations.

In Thailand, this concept does not simply mean love, affection and kindness between family members, supporting each other in difficult times, but also includes obedience. Under the SOTUS culture, a “family” carries a strong connotation of “obedience” and “submission” towards senior members, while “inferior” members should be looked after by their seniors. Consequently, this university culture acts as a catalyst for the establishment and reinforcement of a Thai patronage system via a romantic delusion.

The concept of professionalism and meritocracy in the Thai labour market and the Thai bureaucracy, in which knowledge, skills and devotion are crucial in getting a job or a promotion, is undermined by the SOTUS culture which directly and indirectly perpetuates the patronage system. This is ironic because a vast majority of students are opposed to the Thai patronage system, while simultaneously hoping to benefit from it in one way or another. This allows the SOTUS culture to maintain its momentum on campus.

Indeed, the persistence of this university culture and its human rights violations demonstrates how Thai academia tolerates and ignores universal concepts of human rights, while embracing instead a Thai definition of human rights, which is far lower.

The second periodic report of Thailand in 2017 by the United Nations Human Rights Committee raised concerns about “the severe and arbitrary restrictions imposed on the right to freedom of opinion and expression”. It therefore recommended Thailand “take all measures necessary to guarantee the enjoyment of freedom of opinion and expression in all their forms”

A call for the eradication of this culture has been growing among younger generations and human rights defenders. For example, the Anti-SOTUS Facebook page has garnered almost 300,000 “likes” and “followers”. However, a social media campaign is ineffective under the current political circumstances in which the country is controlled by the military.

Indeed, allowing SOTUS to continue works for, not against, the military government because many students opposed to the 2014 coup d’etat accept the SOTUS culture. Insofar as the military is concerned, the SOTUS system serves to reinforce subservience and obedience in wider society.

Thai universities can no longer afford to allow the SOTUS culture to persist and reproduce obedient graduates, because the ability to question and challenge seniority or authority is important, and is necessary for Thailand’s future development.

After the introduction of the first National Economic and Social Development Plan in 1961, it took Thailand at least another 35 years to realise that an active population is crucial for development. Consequently, in 1997 the country emphasised human development in its eighth plan. It aimed at substantive educational reforms, specifically in relation to both learning and teaching processes in order to generate active learners. But, after two decades of this ambition, university students remain mostly unchanged.

The persistence of SOTUS will only delay this process and constrain the ability of university students to learn and question.

It is now time for Thai universities to take real action against it, or otherwise let this decay continue to erode the future of the country and its students.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.

My interview in Matichon with respect to whether the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) should grant permission for political parties to organise political activities

My interview in Matichon with respect to whether the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) should grant permission for political parties to organise political activities:

We should not have asked this question now because political parties should have been allowed to function a long time ago. The NCPO perceive political activities as a threat to national security, which I disagree with. In order to prepare Thailand’s return to democracy, political parties should be able to function normally. They should be able to organise party-meetings or other political activities. If these activities are banned it would not be in the interest of Thai democracy.

I argued that it is important for political parties to meet and communicate with the people and their constituents. I do not think that Yingluck’s court case (over allegations of corruption surrounding the implementation of Yingluck’s rice-pledging policy) is the main contributing factor to the NCPO’s ban of political activities. The NCPO might be concerned about the political movement of Yingluck’s power base and their distrust in other political parties.

Indeed, I argued that the NCPO is quite scared of the functioning of democracy, scared of elections, scared of voices of the people and of freedom of speech.

I believe that the NCPO will not grant permission for political parties to organise any political activities until they have set a precise timeline for elections.

If the NCPO truly want to return Thailand to democracy, then it is important to give a permission to political parties to function now. Delaying such permissions will not be in the interests of the NCPO in the long term.

Social tolerance not a substitute for LGBT rights

August 07, 2017 01:00 By Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation

it is time for formal legal recognition of human rights, including LGBT rights and equal marriage

After US President Donald Trump’s distasteful tweet announcing his intention to ban transgender people from serving in the military, there was a strong reaction. His announcement backfired as people within and outside of the United States called on him to uphold the principles of human rights, namely, equality, dignity and rights.

Trump’s tweet reaffirmed public speculation over his LGBT policy, which is starkly different from former president Barack Obama’s recognition of LGBT rights as human rights.

This is of little public concern in Thailand, since most transgender people are not inclined to serve in the military. Though this illustrates the different national perceptions towards the rights of LGBT people in Thailand and the US, the violation of LGBT rights remains an ongoing challenge for both nations and the rest of the world.

Thailand is neither one of the 72 countries where homosexuality is illegal and people can potentially be arrested, as recently observed in the arrest of 40 Nigerian men for performing homosexual acts, nor those eight countries where homosexuality is punishable by death.

With its famous “ladyboy” performances in Pattaya and elsewhere, Thailand is perceived as a very gay-friendly land, and can hardly be described as an anti-gay or anti-LGBT society, in part because there is a high level of social acceptance and tolerance towards members of these minority groups.

Same-sex marriage occasionally receives mainstream media and social media coverage in Thailand, reinforcing its high public support. A cultural ceremony, a marriage ceremony without the accompanying legally binding status of marriage, misleads some Thai people to believe that our country is one of the 24 nations across the globe in which same-sex marriage is legal. Consequently, people are distracted from discussing LGBT rights in a serious manner, and have entered a social comfort zone in which there is an illusion of rights where they don’t actually exist in law. This illusion continues the poor public awareness of the inequalities between genders and sexual orientation in the country.

For example, there are few formal complaints of job discrimination made by LGBT people, but this does not mean that there is no job discrimination against LGBT people in Thailand. Indeed there are instances of discrimination, but they are not normally considered violations of the rights of LGBT people. Rather, they reflect the Thai job market in general, which is dominated by the problem of personal connection and the belief in luck and destiny. Accordingly, there is little connection made with the concept of rights and equality in the job market.

In 2011, at the United Nations convention in Geneva, Switzerland, the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasised that LGBT people are no less human than others, and so LGBT rights are human rights and must be protected by the state. In the same year,  Obama signed a presidential memorandum entitled “International Initiatives to Advance the Human Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Persons,” in order “to ensure that US diplomacy and foreign assistance promote and protect the human rights of LGBT persons”.

US commitment

The declaration reaffirmed the US commitment to the promotion of LGBT rights. To a certain extent, low levels of commitment from the Thai state, and the different values and social practices between Thailand and the West, holds back our country from making progress on LGBT rights.  A majority of Thais, regardless of their sexual preferences or orientation, are confused by the gulf between the existence of widespread social tolerance and officially recognised rights. This confusion leads to a widespread, but erroneous, belief that social tolerance is a legitimate substitute for legally recognising the rights of minorities.

Thailand is little different from its ASEAN neighbours and the rest of Asia, where minority rights are not normally protected and enshrined by the state because cultural walls are erected in the name of national pride. Consequently, what is considered normal and accepted beyond the continent are not often embraced by Asian countries. This prevents Thailand from fully appreciating the universality of rights as proclaimed by the United Nations: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”

In 2015 Singapore announced that the country was not yet ready for same-sex marriage. The same year, in the West, the US legalised same-sex marriage. This summer, Germany became the 15th European country allowing same-sex marriage.

In part, the lack of progress with LGBT rights in Thailand is related to the focus of society and the LGBT community on HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.

The health issues have attracted resources to support work in that area from international donors such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The country’s leading LGBT NGO, the Rainbow Sky Association of Thailand, has also been primarily working on HIV issues rather than the struggle for rights recognition. Also, domestic funding sources focus on HIV because LGBT people and prostitutes are considered to be at a high risk of infection.

However, this year we have observed a shift of support among international donors to a focus on rights and equality. The Embassy of Sweden in Bangkok, in collaboration with USAID and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), have implemented the “Being LGBT in Asia” project to support basic LGBT rights, and address discrimination against LGBT people across the continent.

In Thailand and the rest of Asia, the debate on the promotion of rights is often framed in terms of a clash of values between the East and the West. This is a false argument. LGBT rights are not advanced as Western values. They are an acceptance of fundamental and inalienable human rights and equality for all people of the world. Including the people of the Eastern part of the world.

Appointing envoys

Indeed, one of the most effective Western foreign policy instruments to promote LGBT rights across the globe is the appointment of gay diplomats and ambassadors. They include Ted Osius, appointed as US ambassador to Vietnam in 2014 by Obama, and Brian Davidson, appointed as British ambassador to Thailand in 2016.

These appointments send a strong message to the rest of the world that being gay does not devalue their humanity, and that they are no less capable of performing such senior roles.

This is a call for Thailand and the rest of Asia to wake up and truly reconsider their support for LGBT rights. After all, they are simply recognition of human rights, which Thailand already claims to promote and respect. Nothing else can substitute for that formal recognition.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University.

My interview with respect to the qualification of the steering committee for Thailand’s 20-year national strategy

My interview with respect to the qualification of the steering committee for Thailand’s 20-year national strategy (2017-2036), in Matichon, 7th of August 2017: 

I personally disagree with the introduction of Thailand’s 20-year national strategy (2017-2036) by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), because the existing “five-year National Economic and Social Development Plan” implemented by the Office of the National Economic Development Board (NEDB), is already sufficient to provide guidelines for developments. The 20-year plan is therefore unnecessary. 

However, the 20-year plan is enshrined by the 2017 Constitution of Thailand, and it is indicated that the military government will appoint a steering committee to implement the 20-year plan. I argued that if military involvement is required it will not be in the interests of Thailand because the military tend to focus and excel on security issues. There are many areas of development such as economic, social developmental programmes, in which the military are not experts. Therefore, it is not necessary to include senior military in the steering committee.

Although there are a number of highly qualified persons, there is indication that the NCPO might appoint the very same people who have been working with them, especially those who are not in conflict with them. 

I am hoping to see the appointment of new faces to the steering committee charged with implementing the 20-year plan, so that the committee and development will be in the interests of Thailand, rather than ending up with the same old faces.

My interview in Matichon with respect to the role and contribution of the National Reform Council

My interview in Matichon with respect to the role and contribution of the National Reform Council:

Since the 2014 coup, Thailand has changed little. Reform is a long-term and ongoing process. Indeed, Thailand and Thai people tend to deny changes, for example Thais accept a military culture within the democratic process.

There are different areas of reform such as economic, social, and educational reforms. However, for example, we have seen little educational reform under the current government. We have seen too many tutorial schools in Thailand, and it has become a part of Thai-education culture that students must pay for private tuition at such tutorial schools. Indeed, a large number of these school reflects a failure of the Thai education system which must be addressed before the Thai education system can be improved.

The very same metaphor can be applied to the country. When the government cannot properly function, Thailand should restructure its organisations and ministries in order to improve their long term effectiveness, instead of simply establishing a reform council.

I argue that most problems and recommendations, such as income inequality and education issues which have been highlighted by the National Reform Council are not significantly different from what we already heard from the existing governmental organisations such as the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB).

Indeed, after the 2014 coup we observed greater centralisation and the expansion of bureaucratic power. Government officials remain unresponsive to the demands of the people.

In addition, prior the 2014 coup government officials were rather submissive towards politicians, and they are now very submissive towards the military. It has been observed that government officials work to please the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), rather than seeking to solve the country’s problems.

Thai rice politics and the FUTURE of agricultural subsidies

THE NATION Saturday, July 29, 2017
TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH
SPECIAL TO THE NATION

Each wet season, Thai farmers begin cultivating their annual crop anticipating both natural and market uncertainties. For these farmers, nothing can be taken for granted. Last year excessive rain destroyed much of their crop, this year too little or too much water could do the same. Nevertheless, the uncertainties confronting Thai farmers are typical of the problems farmers face worldwide, thus subsidies remain crucial for the survival of farmers.

The previous Yingluck administration implemented one of the most controversial and expensive farming subsidy policies in Thai history, allegedly costing the state more than Bt500 billion. Her rice-pledging policy was criticised for a lack of substance to help farmers survive in the capitalist market, instead simply putting cash in their hands.

Yingluck’s rice policy has also been fiercely criticised by her political opponents for destroying market mechanisms, and perhaps violating Thailand’s world trade commitments. In a 2013 meeting of the WTO Agriculture Committee, Canada, the US, Australia and the EU questioned whether Thailand had breached its domestic support limits.

Although, 86.5 per cent of farmers were reportedly satisfied with the policy, the rice-pledging scheme was politicised and became one of the main contributing factors to Yingluck’s ouster by military coup in 2014, resulting in allegations against her of corruption and charges she neglected her duty to over- see the scheme.

The Supreme Court rules on August 25, and a guilty verdict would have serious ramifications for the political futures of Yingluck and her Pheu Thai Party, as well as for the ongoing Thai political conflict. But it would also indicate the future prospects of farm subsidies in Thailand.

That there was corruption in the implementation of rice-pledging is undeniable, and rigorous law enforcement is required to handle the case. Indeed, corruption was also observed during the implementation of the rice price-guarantee policy under her predecessor, Abhisit Vejjajiva.

In addition, a number of corruption allegations made against rice-pledging were targeted not at its implementation, but at pre-existing problems in the Thai rice industry, one example being the rigging of scales to measure moisture in farmers’ paddy in the rice mills. It is crucial to scrutinise all stakeholders involved, rather than primarily focusing on politicians.

The public is now questioning whether Thailand should maintain such policies to support rice farmers. Is there any future prospect for rice subsidies?

“I cannot survive with the money from selling rice, now. I used to make just enough money from the [rice- pledging] policy. You don’t understand why it [the subsidy] is important, because you are not a farmer. I still hope this [Prayut] government restores the rice-pledging policy to help us. I borrowed money to buy lots of things for farming,” stated a rice farmer in Si Sa Ket province.

Thai farmers have always received sympathy for their hard work from the urban-middle class, and they have been regarded as the backbone of the nation for centuries. Nevertheless, public sympathy doesn’t necessary translated into support for rice subsidies, especially since the rural populace has been stereotyped as easily falling into debt and expecting to be rescued by the government. The urban-middle class respect is often based on an idealised and romanticised vision of rice farming that fails to reflect the financial vulnerability.

Indeed, the very high price of rice during the Yingluck government was a double-edged sword. Not only did it help provide household liquidity for rice farmers, but it also encouraged farmers to increase their production in order to increase their household income, resulting in oversupply of rice to the market. Rural farmers are typically attracted by economically viable crops, so it is logical that they would seek to maximise their potential profit.

Of course, farm subsidies must not be treated as a form of entitlement, especially in the form of cash payments. Subsidies should be provided as a form of relief programme, which can financially support farmers to be able to compete in the market in the long run.

The military government and its supporters are not entirely convinced of the need for rice subsidies and their importance for the growth of the Thai economy. Indeed, few Thais are aware of the historic contribution rice farmers have made to the economy, since this rarely features in the history books.

Between 1950s and 1970s, the “rice premium” (export tax) was a crucial source of government revenue, used to boost the country’s industrialisation. In 1953, government revenue from rice was 32 per cent of the total revenue. This missing piece of information pre- vents new generations from appreciating the transfer of public resources to subsidise the Thai agricultural sector today.

Rice and agricultural subsidies are often dismissed as populist policy, motivated by politicians’ desire to win elections. A vast majority of Thais still believe that subsidies represent a wasteful use of public resources.

They are correct to an extent, but not entirely. At the very least, farmers have to produce crops in order to obtain support from the government, so there is no such thing as a free lunch for rice farmers. In addition, working in a rice field is not a dream career for any Thai youngster, even those doing degrees in agriculture. Therefore, rice subsidies can also be utilised as a long-term national strategy that secures our ability as a nation to feed ourselves.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.

Thailand’s reconciliation trap is preventing democratic progress

July 22, 2017 01:00 
By Titipol Phakdeewanich 
Special to The Nation

This week, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) launched a nationwide “social contract” as part of its reconciliation plan, which began in March. In essence, the military-drafted social contract aims to reunite the country in the hope that Thai people can move forwards together.

The NCPO says this is a significant step forward since the 2014 coup, and should resolve Thailand’s decade-long political division.  However, military-led reconciliation has met with sceptical responses both inside and outside the country. Observers question whether it can truly reunite Thailand as a nation, or whether it is simply a political ploy for the military to gain trust and legitimacy, rather than allow reconciliation led by all parties involved.  So, can the junta’s dream of forced reconciliation become a reality?

The military is fully aware of public scepticism over its role and involvement in the reconciliation process. Thus it has made clear that it will attend the public reconciliation forums only to listen, not to express any opinion or discuss issues, so as to ensure that “invited participants” are free to express their views on conflict solutions and reconciliation.  

One such forum was held this week at the 21st Military Circle in Nakhon Ratchasima province. An impression it left was that foreign countries and institutions are a potential threat to national security, and their actions and criticism directed at Thailand – particularly in relation to its politics, democracy and human rights since 2014 – are interpreted as a form of intervention. Freedom House classified Thailand as “Not Free” in its 2017 report on political and civil rights. 

Though organised by the military, the NCPO’s reconciliation process is in fact little different from the process pursued under the administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva. Following the 2010 crackdown on red-shirt protesters, Abhisit initiated the National Reform Committee (NRC), chaired by former prime minister Anand Panyarachun. In 2013, we also witnessed reconciliation attempts under the government of Yingluck Shinawatra, who invited the former British prime minister Tony Blair to speak on reconciliation. 

The NCPO’s public forums have delivered similar information to those held under Abhisit’s NRC, with proposals for economic, social and political reforms aimed especially at more equable allocation of public resources. In fact, this latest reconciliation effort is providing no new information, instead only mirroring and repeating data already known to the Thai public and international observers from the earlier process. 

The junta outwardly claims that Thailand is a democratic country moving towards a more democratic environment. However there is plenty of cause for scepticism over whether the military believes that Thailand’s political divide can be bridged through a more democratic environment. 

Throughout the three years since the May 2014 coup, the NCPO has attempted to introduce a military culture as an integral component of “Thai-style” democracy. Inside barracks, power and force, order and commands, are vital to the proper functioning of the Thai military. Seniority based on rank and the strict enforcement of a hierarchical structure is the mechanism that creates unity. Indeed, this kind of military culture is almost identical to the prevailing concept of “Thainess” enshrined in the NCPO’s “Twelve Core Values for a Strong Thailand”. 

The military’s prioritising of reconciliation ahead of democracy and human rights makes complete sense to the vast majority of Thais. This is reinforced by memories of the economic damage caused by chaotic rallies in Bangkok and elsewhere, particularly during the protests in 2010 by the red shirts and in 2013-2014 by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC). 

So what would Thailand be like under a social contract enforced by the military? 

Despite its claims go the contrary, the contract is nothing other than a rejection of genuine representative democracy, in favour of establishing a “Thai-style” democracy, in which liberty and freedom are secondary to “order” and “stability”. The NCPO has repeatedly told the Thai people and the international community that Thailand’s cultural uniqueness cannot be undermined by its international commitments and international law, particularly human rights.  

Instead of falling into a reconciliation trap, the military and other Thai authorities must be more open-minded in acknowledging the issues surrounding country’s political conflicts, which are much wider than income inequality and imbalances. Indeed, Thailand’s political conflicts are seated in a poor understanding and perhaps rejection of the universal concept of human rights, which embrace and endorse dignity, rights, liberty, equality and freedom. These key values are given only a token place in the Thai education system, and have not yet been fully integrated.  

From school to university, young Thais are taught to respect adults, and to “live in harmony and promote unity” so that Thailand can be a peaceful, strong and independent society. These characteristics of “Thainess” are not necessarily anti-democratic and anti-human rights, but the ways in they are taught to young generations are an obstacle for Thailand’s democratic progress. 

Today, it is increasingly difficult to convince a majority of Thais that promotion of democracy and human rights can produce natural reconciliation and minimise conflicts, through greater equality and respect for individual dignity regardless of social background. 

Of course, democracy cannot guarantee equality and unity. But the rule of law is a democratic means to ensure that people’s rights are protected from violation by the state and individuals. In Thailand the law is not always applied equally across all groups. 

Unity and harmony cannot be forced, but are rather a product of the true and honest promotion of equality and rights. This challenge will persist as long as Thailand continues to overrule the universal concept of human rights, and keeps falling into the reconciliation trap and historic pride in its Thainess.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.

My interview in Matichon with respect to the government’s initiative of its new public relation mechanism and body

My interview in Matichon with respect to the government’s initiative of its new public relation mechanism and body: The government seems to believe that there is a communication problem between them and the people, therefore they wanted to ensure that people can receive more information from them than from other sources.

I argued that people have received sufficient information from the government, and it is therefore important for people to receive information from alternative sources rather than receiving one-sided information.

Every government has made good decisions and made mistakes. Thus, people should be able to access both positive and negative reflections on the government.

The problem is that the government tends to deny that mistakes have been made, such as the rejection of the problems concerning freedom of expression and human rights. The government should not accuse criticism as false or misleading information, and stop claiming that such information is a threat to national security.

The problem with Thailand today is that the government has been claiming that itself is the only trustworthy and reliable source of information. This is rather worrying for Thailand.

Indeed, I argued that the government does not really require any PR, because they speak on their own behalf to advertise the good job they are doing. Instead, if the government denies their mistakes, their reputation will be undermined.

Thai-US relations must rest on democratic values, not military ties

opinion July 15, 2017 01:00
By Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Naton


After long speculation on the future of Thai-US relations under the new administration in Washington, a phone call and invitation to the White House from President Donald Trump to Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha sent a clear message that Thailand remains America’s strategic partner.

Although the trip has been postponed, the invitation raised significant concerns among democracy advocates in Thailand. They are worried first that Washington’s new priorities could delay Thailand’s timeline for return to democracy, and second that Trump’s diplomacy is a de facto endorsement for the Thai military to extend its grip on power and gain legitimacy on the global political stage. 

Trump has been clear all along with both the American people and the rest of the world that his administration is all about “America First”. His political rhetoric has been criticised both at home and abroad by many who fear his administration is eroding “American values”, specifically of democracy and human rights, and also US global leadership.

In Bangkok, the US Embassy has attempted to demonstrate that America does and will continue to support democracy and human rights within Thailand. However, the unpredictable nature of Trump leaves pro-democracy groups with significant concerns that Washington could make a U-turn in its foreign policy direction whenever it chooses.

Trump’s speeches typically contain keywords we normally hear from US presidents, such as “democracy”, and “shared interests and values”. Indeed, these are essentially template messages from US presidents and State Secretaries, mentioned repeatedly when they speak to their global partners. Nevertheless, “security” has emerged above these as the most important keyword that Trump uses to address his domestic and foreign audiences. 

How far can the Trump administration continue to be a democratic partner with Thailand?  Trump and General Prayut share a low tolerance of criticism, particularly from the media. With his war against US media giants such as CNN and the New York Times – which he describes as bastions of  “fake news” – Trump has undermined the United States’ role in promoting global press freedom. 

Between 2010 and 2015, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) implemented the Sapan Programme, which was intended to promote democracy in Thailand. One of the main objectives was to empower civil society and the media to function as a check-and-balance mechanism within the political system. Is Trump capable of convincing his Thai partner to believe in this very American democratic element?

Washington’s policy stance towards Bangkok under President Trump’s predecessor Barack Obama appeared to be shaped by principles of democracy and human rights. The Obama administration made clear it regarded human rights as integral to US foreign policy. This is a rather different tone from that we are hearing from the Trump administration. 

Addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated: “It is unreasonable to expect that every foreign policy endeavour will be driven by human rights considerations alone, especially when the security of the American people is at stake.” This statement is in line with Trump’s focus on security, and with Trump as a market-capitalist president – human rights shouldn’t get in the way of American businesses making money.

According to the US government website ForeignAssistance.gov, the 2017 plans forThailand under the Trump administration are weighted 58 per cent towards “Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance” and 42 per cent towards “Peace and Security”. Although these figures may boost hopes for American democratic engagement with Thailand, scepticism remains.

Pursuing security issues might be attractive for the Thai military government, but not necessary for the vast majority of Thais. If Trump’s bilateral dealings with Thailand are overshadowed by US policies on wider regional security issues, particularly the South China Sea and North Korea, then Washington cannot afford to overemphasise its military strength, since this could rekindle  memories of its infamous military engagement during the Vietnam War. Today, a generation of Thais politicised by that war and other events of the 1970s remains sceptical of the US role, and questions its commitment to democracy. 

“I thought I was free to read and believe in what I wanted regarding democracy. I didn’t understand why the Americans and the Thai army went after us, when we believed in communism, if they [America] said that democracy is freedom of expression. I had to choose between escaping to China or being killed like my friends in my hometown [Amnat Charoen],” said a woman who fled Thailand on foot to live in exile in China for almost 18 years during the US insurgency against communism in Indochina.

Before Trump became president Thailand saw occasional protests against the US, especially by Thais annoyed at its “unwelcome” opinions on the state of democracy and human rights here. One might assume these protesters were part of an anti-American movement. However, closer analysis reveals they fall primarily in to two categories – namely anti-American and anti-democracy. 

In order to advance the interests of the US and protect American people in a country like Thailand, the exercise of soft power should be emphasised.

With respect to contemporary American history, most secretaries of state under the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations acknowledged and highlighted the importance of US soft power, “smart” power, and people-to-people diplomacy. 

In 2006, Secretary Condoleezza Rice introduced her idea of “transformational diplomacy”, a move away from depending exclusively on state-to-state relations. Instead, Rice suggested it was time for diplomacy to go beyond foreign capitals, using people-to-people contacts to enhance America’s reputation and interests.
Accordingly, social media have enabled the US Embassy in Bangkok to reach out and engage with young people, in addition to their conventional diplomacy in the capital. This younger generation generally celebrates liberty and freedoms, and craves for a more democratic environment. 

Washington must not dismiss younger people from the equation of Thai-US relations, since they are the driving force for Thai democratic progress. And after all, promoting democracy within Thailand is not only in the interests of the country and the Thai people, but it also serves to benefit US engagement within the region. 

Titipol Phakdeewanich is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.

Thai universal healthcare: Should it be a right with responsibility?

July 11, 2017 01:00 

By Titipol Phakdeewanich 

Special to The Nation 

In 2002, universal healthcare coverage was initiated by the Thai Rak Thai government. Nicknamed the Bt30 healthcare programme in reference to the cost of each medical visit, the scheme gave 49 million people living both above and below the poverty line almost free access to healthcare services.

Universal healthcare was overwhelmingly welcomed by the rural poor, especially in the North and Northeast (Isaan) – the political base of the Pheu Thai Party and its predecessor Thai Rak Thai. The policy remains a cornerstone of Pheu Thai’s platform, allowing it to maintain support and popularity by portraying itself as representing the rural poor.  

Since 2002, however, discussion on revising universal healthcare has been politicised and become politically sensitive. Increasing numbers of people have begun to perceive healthcare as an absolute right, with little consideration of it as a personal responsibility. This has triggered concerns over public expenditure on the programme. 

It is undeniable that a universal healthcare scheme is necessary, and it was originally introduced in compliance with Section 52 of the 1997 Constitution. Indeed, at that time the public was not fully aware that universal healthcare was a constitutional right that the state must provide. 

Most supporters of Thai Rak Thai perceived universal healthcare as a gift from the party, failing to realise it was a duty and responsibility of their representatives to pursue such a policy. This allowed the party to establish a personal bond with them – which in fact is typical of Thai political culture regardless of who is in government.  

Since 2014, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) has pushed for reform of the universal healthcare bill in order to introduce a co-payment scheme. This is partly because so many hospitals and doctors are complaining about the financial burden on the system, and claim that the people have been “spoiled” by the system and are now making too many unnecessary hospital visits. 

However, it is too simplistic to view the rising number of hospital visits and conclude that the universal healthcare scheme has spoiled the people, since the costs of healthcare are not just a medical bill for the rural poor.  

Patients, especially the rural poor, incur expenses every time they access medical treatment, including for travel and lost income from not working. Such expenses are a serious financial burden for a large number of patients and mean that rural people often can’t access hospital treatment even when they need it. However, this fact is generally missing from the healthcare debate among doctors and the middle class. 

“I have to get up at 1am to get here early for the hospital queue,” reports a villager who travelled from a district of Khemarat to the hospital in the city of Ubon Ratchathani recently. “Travelling from a rural part of the province to the hospital is not that easy. Sometimes we have to contribute Bt100 each to rent a truck to take us to the hospital. There are many things that we have to pay for to get here [hospital]. Paying the small amount of Bt30, or not paying at all, really helps us.”  

Healthcare should be free and considered a right for the rural poor, particularly for the 10.5 per cent of population that lives below the national poverty line – but not for all. For those who can afford it, healthcare should be considered a responsibility, for which a co-payment scheme should be applied. 

In addition, Thailand is now considered to be an ageing society, with about 7.5 million people or 11 per cent of the population over the age of 65. The World Bank estimates this figure will rise to 17 million by 2040. Public expenditure on healthcare will almost certainly rise as a result, presenting a big challenge for which the government must be prepared. 

The introduction of a co-payment scheme by the NCPO makes clear financial sense for the government. However, the validity of the move has been undermined by the priorities set for public expenditure under this administration. The NCPO has demonstrated that its spending often does not synchronise with the needs of millions of Thais. Recent examples include the US$393 million spent on submarines from China, and the agreement to purchase four Black Hawk helicopters from the United States. The NCPO claims these purchases are important for national security, despite the country not being at war.      

In his 2016 speech at the UN general assembly, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha highlighted the importance of healthcare: “We also have a continued policy of providing quality healthcare services for all.”  So where does the government’s priority lie now – with national security or with human security? 

This is an important question that must be answered by the military leadership. Can a country be secure without a healthy population? Can the economy prosper with a populace that is left prey to illness?  

Another important question is how much the junta can successfully reduce the public financial burden of healthcare through the introduction of a co-payment scheme. This is not entirely a question of spending priorities, however, but also a matter of political games, in which politicians will play an important role. Providing social welfare is always rewarding for politicians and those in power, because such policies help ensure they maintain public popularity.  

Exactly how much individuals will need to contribute to the co-payment scheme has not yet been finalised. However, this scheme must not become a barrier to accessing healthcare for those who live in poverty. 

Titipol Phakdeewanich is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England. 

Interview: Matichon (In Thai)

My interview in Matichon with respect to the "Police Reform": I disagree with the structure of the reform committee which is chaired by the military. I believe that it should be led by the those who are experts in their respective fields. For example, educational reform cannot be done by the military, for the same logical reason that police reform should be done by the police. However, it is also important to include various groups of stakeholders such as NGOs or representatives of the civil society. #reform #politics #police#politicalscientist

Thai democracy at 85: Matured with wisdom or dying of old age?

June 30, 2017 

By Titipol Phakdeewanich

Special to The Nation

Eighty-five years ago, on June 24, 1932, Thai democracy was born through a coup d’etat that ended absolute monarchy. The time has now come for Thailand to be honest with itself and ask whether democracy is truly necessary for the country and its people.

The decades since 1932 have seen repeated public rejections of democracy. The most recent came with political protests by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) in 2013-2014, which called for military intervention to oust the elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra. 

The PDRC acted as a catalyst for the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) to stage a coup on May 22, 2014, which once again derailed Thailand’s democratic progress. The PDRC movement was the starkest example in recent history of Thais’ rejection of democracy, with millions openly embracing military governance.

Since the 2014 coup, some Thai and foreign observers have been misled into believing that the return to “business as usual” means Thailand is now politically stable. But this perceived calmness is only a consequence of the NCPO’s political suppression of opposition groups, and not a reflection of real unity and reconciliation.

“We have basically been treated the same all along since the 2014 coup – being followed, monitored and told what we can and cannot do, because they [the military] say we should avoid making trouble. ‘The country is now doing well and the military is paving the way towards democracy.’ This is what they told us,” said a red-shirt from a rural area in Ubon Ratchathani province, commenting  anonymously.

His report is typical of many that detail suppression of free speech and politics outside the capital, Bangkok, as a consequence of the NCPO’s campaign of “attitude adjustment”, “visits”, “informing the people”, and “giving guidelines”. The tide of criticism goes largely unreported in the mainstream media, instead finding voice in social media channels such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.

During three years of NCPO rule, Thailand has faced strong criticism from international partners, including the European Union, the United States and the United Nations. The junta has rigorously defended itself, using the rhetoric of “domestic matters”, “Thainess” and “cultural uniqueness” to dismiss its obligations and commitments to international laws and universal principles of democracy, such as compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Meanwhile the NCPO, with support from the PDRC, has been rather successful in demonising democracy at home, while claiming to have reinstalled “Thainess” as part of the reform process. 

Evidence of that success comes in growing calls for the military to stay on in power so it can fulfil its mission of national reform. However, political observers and millions of Thais are now questioning whether the country is actually undergoing genuine reform, or rather being returned to where it was before the bloodless revolution of 1932. 

In fact, Thainess is being utilised by the military with great effect as both a political shield and weapon to convince citizens that their national pride lies in Thailand’s history of avoiding colonisation by the British and the French. The message – that foreigners (specifically Westerners) have different sets of values – is one that has helped the NCPO secure power. This and other cultural values work against the cultivation of democracy in Thailand, and are being utilised by certain groups to justify the country’s retreat from democracy.

When the NCPO launched a reconciliation process in March this year, those invited were asked a set of 10 questions. One stood out: Does comment or criticism from outside the country generate or escalate Thailand’s internal political conflicts? This leading question was intended to frame the government’s critics (especially outside interests and observers) as a threat to national security.

With its military might and self-legitimised political power, the NCPO has waged a successful propaganda programme over the last three years, significantly reinforcing the pre-existing social hierarchy and obedient mindset of many Thais, and effectively suppressed opposition and challenges to state power. It has also managed to demonise pro-democracy groups who oppose military rule, labelling them as troublemakers.

Thais have long been taught to be respect people according to seniority and social status. These principles continue to be recognised as a source of national pride – part of the “Thai character”, while understanding of the concept of equality and dignity of all humans goes neglected. The concept of human rights, a core element of democracy, has been underplayed by the Thai education system and the cultural values it cultivates in youngsters.  

Thai students show little recognition of human rights. Recently, a student at the elite Chulalongkorn University stated “I don’t know human rights, because it is not what I have learned. I am doing a Fine Arts degree.”

It won’t be easy to convince millions of Thais that military intervention is not a shortcut to democratic progress. Gradual evolution is in fact key for democracy, as observed in the United Kingdom which acted as a blueprint for Thai democracy.

Nevertheless, Thais must not mistake democratic principles as a devaluation of Thai cultural heritage and Thainess, because ultimately, democracy is intended to create a more equal society in which everyone is accepted and respected as a human being.

This 85th anniversary of our democracy offers us an opportunity to acknowledge that it is not only Thailand that is culturally unique, but every nation. However, the people of all nations have the right to expect certain similar things – namely, equality, liberty and freedom. Thailand must decide whether it wants to become a fully-fledged democracy, or allow democracy to die of old-age under military rule. 

Titipol Phakdeewanich is dean of the Political Science Faculty at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in the UK.

http://www.asianstudies.su.se/2.35480/seminars/open-seminar-the-construction-of-thainess-and-its-implication-on-democratic-progress-1.318994

http://www.asianstudies.su.se/2.35480/seminars/open-seminar-the-construction-of-thainess-and-its-implication-on-democratic-progress-1.318994

Open Seminar: The construction of Thainess and its implication on democratic progress

EVENT

Date: 05 April 2017, 2.00 PM - 05 April 2017, 3.30 PM 

Venue: TBC

The construction of Thainess and its implication on democratic progress since the 2014 military coup d’état. Dr. Titipol Phakdeewanich, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, Thailand.

Thailand is now entering its third year of the post-2014 Military Coup d’état, led by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) with a small hope to return to a full-fledged democracy. Whilst millions of Thais believe that returning to democracy is neither in the best interests for the country, nor Thai people as a whole.

Over a decade long political divide and the disruptions of multiple street protests, in

addition to endemic problems of corruption, some Thai have lost their faith in representative democracy and now look up to the authoritarian style of government under the military.

This provides a space for the military to reinforce its role and institutionalise itself as a correcting mechanism when democracy fails. The role of the military has been well accepted by millions of Thais, especially in since Mr Thaksin Shinawatra took office with a landslide victory in 2001. The 2006 Military Coup d’état removed Thaksin from office, who now lives in exile. In 2014 his sister, Ms Yingluck Shinawatra, the then Prime Minister was also removed from power by a Military Coup d’état.

After assuming power, the NCPO has highlighted that the concept of ‘Thainess’ is important for the construction of Thai democracy, whilst the concept itself remains vague and rather unclear for both Thais and foreign observers. This paper will attempt to define the so-called ‘Thainess’ with respect to its utilisation in recent Thai history. In addition, this paper will examine whether Thainess can support and reinforce the process of democratisation within Thailand. 

Bio

Dr. Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, in the Province of Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand. He completed his studies and research at the University of Warwick, in the United Kingdom (M.A. in International Political Economy, 1998; Ph.D. in Politics and International Relations, 2005). He was a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), at Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan (January to June, 2014. He is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), at the University of Warwick, United Kingdom (June to August, 2015).

In addition to teaching at his current faculty, Titipol has expanded his focus beyond the theoretical perspectives relating to interest groups, pressure groups, and political participation in the context of both domestic politics and international politics, and has moved more and more into an understanding of the application of theory into practice. This has involved extensive fieldwork, and in addition, the responsibility for organising a variety of projects, and active collaboration with both Thai and international institutions, and with other academics and universities within Thailand and internationally.

Through these ventures, Titipol has developed working relationships with academics, officials from various national and international institutions, and also with local activist groups in the Isan (Northeast) region of Thailand, and beyond.

Furthermore, Titipol has his op-ed articles appear in The Nation, Prachathai, and the Bangkok Post, which have tended to focus on the inter-relationships between the general political discourse, domestic political schisms including the urban-rural divide, and also the implications of the involvement of international institutions and actors in relation to Thailand, in the context of a dynamic and changing world in the early 21st century.

It has been a key component of the work of Titipol, to highlight the plight and injustice in the lives of the rural poor, and to look towards finding actual solutions to these problems, which can have a tangible positive effect on the lives of under-represented and disenfranchised groups such as these, as well as other marginalised groups within Thailand.

Although, since the 2014 military coup d’état led by the National Council for Peace and Order or NCPO, Titipol has been closely monitored by the NCPO, because of his work on democracy and human rights, but he remains committed to work to support the promotion of democracy and human rights within Thailand.

Junta’s soft power and the coming Thai-style democracy

Is the military to become the one-stop-shop for the ills of our society?

The junta still claims to be paving a path back to democracy, even after two fraught years of demoralising and unapologetic military rule. Their hopes of progress now seemingly rest on the long-awaited constitutional referendum scheduled for August 7.

For the generals, this vote is intended to provide concrete assurance to both the Thai public and Western nations that Thailand has not turned its back on democracy. But all the while, the military has been manoeuvring to establish itself as the one-stop-shop for the resolution of Thailand's societal ills.

Moreover, despite its determined efforts to persuade a majority of Thais that the new constitution will benefit the country, this remains in serious doubt for many.

The core concern is the whether the current charter draft can bring a form of democracy that is acceptable to Thais as well as the international community. Critics say its passage would be a crucial step in the military's push to institutionalise its primacy in a "Thai-style" democracy.

The past two years has seen a new norm established for the role of the military, with most Thais more accepting of its expanded civilian remit that they credit with bringing back order to the streets.

In recent months, the military has stepped up its soft-power approach through rural developmental programmes under the Internal Security Operations Command, focusing on the Northeast especially. The aim is to build trust and political support among rural folk who remain suspicious of a military they see as opposed to their interests. Sceptics have been surprised by the discipline and respect displayed by soldiers in developmental interactions with the long-disregarded and disparaged rural poor.

For instance, in politely declining villagers' offer of food and other gifts in return for their help, the military is challenging - albeit in a small way - an entrenched patronage system that underpins social, political and economic injustices in daily life.

Yet that gesture must be placed in the wider context, of a Thailand that remains undemocratic - labelled "Not Free" by rights NGO Freedom House.

"Normal service" was resumed with the release of the Election Commission's official referendum campaign song, which panders to stereotypes of Isaan folk as ignorant, politically unaware and unable to think for themselves, in contrast to the democracy-loving southerners. The lyrics reflect a patronising view prevalent among the urban middle class and came as no surprise to those familiar with Thai political rhetoric.

The junta's current strategy is likely influenced by the outcome of the 2007 constitutional referendum. Yet, while just over 56 per cent voted "yes" to that draft charter, the "no" vote was more than 41 per cent - and 48 per cent of those votes came from Isaan. No surprise then that governmental agencies should paint an unflattering picture of this "rebellious and undeserving constituency".

Resorting to the politics of stereotypes, however, is now preventing Thailand from recognising core principles of democracy such as inclusiveness and equality of opportunity. The attempt to exclude or marginalise large swathes of the populace based on outdated stereotypes obviously violates these principles.

The situation is exacerbated when enough people are convinced by this very approach, which acts to create self-reinforcing societal illusions that Thais are now struggling to break out of.

"I heard that the government will hand out copies of the [draft] constitution, so I am now waiting to read it," said an anonymous farmer from Nam Yuen district, Ubon Ratchathani. "We don't know much about the [constitutional] referendum, because we live in a village and we only hear about it on the news," said another resident of the district who also wished to remain anonymous.

Rather than ignorance, these responses are reflect limits to access of information and freedom of expression - especially when open debate and criticism of the charter draft are forbidden.

Even so, such responses are not so very different from those of middle-class citizens, who are apparently little-the-wiser. The arguments of these more "educated" people are just as likely to reflect what they have gleaned from the news, since few Thais of any social class have actually read the draft constitution.

Disturbing to witness is the extent to which Thais continue happily to play ball with authoritarian state structures in the belief that they will be beneficiaries, even if this means that others must lose out.

With the generals having convinced themselves of their necessary status as Thailand's guardians and caretakers, their prolonged stewardship will likely help instil the same belief in a great many more Thais, also.

And the ultimate consequences? That these prevailing attitudes will almost inevitably characterise the coming "Thai-style" democracy, whether or not the impetus comes from the military/political establishment or a belated grass-roots revival. Meanwhile those hoping for meaningful democratic progress could be left disappointed.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is dean of the Political Science Faculty at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in Britain.