Run Against Lung (Uncle)

My interview in Matichon (In Thai), regarding the implication of "Run Against Lung (Uncle)" on the future of Thai politics. I primarily argue that the situation will likely not escalate to violence. Given Thailand's political history, most political confrontations were largely a result of state repression or military intervention in Thai politics.”

A summary and reflection of my interview in Matichon with respect to an interview with Reuters of General Apirat Kongsompong, the Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army.

A summary and reflection of my interview in Matichon with respect to an interview with Reuters of General Apirat Kongsompong, the Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army.

General Apirat’s interview shows the intention of the military to support the government to control—rather than to serve—the people. [Since the 2014 coup d’état, both Thai and foreign observers have witnessed the arbitrary use of power by the military leadership.] His disregard for fundamental democratic norms such as the “freedom expression” undermines the voices of young people who disagree with the military government.

He portrays young Thais as naïve and vulnerable to “fake news”, arguing that they are more likely to be convinced by“alternative” sources of information rather than “the genuine information provided by the government and military. 

However, due to the Internet and other forms of technology, young Thais have better access to information than before. They have become more critical and analytical towards the state of democracy and human rights in Thailand. Furthermore, they are less likely to be intimated by the state and feel more encouraged to scrutinise Thai authority figures. As a matter of fact, the military and the Thai authority are not immune to scrutiny or criticism.


In addition, General Apirat’s interview highlights the embedded and continued hierarchical structure of Thai society. The cultural expectation of respecting adults, or “kaorob phuyai”, does not simply mean to be respectful, it carries a strong connotation of being obedient. The military and the Thai authority actively encourages and advocates for such a hierarchy, and uses it as another form of suppression. In general, kaorob phuyai acts to restrict the ability of people to question authority.

Interview on the Constitutional Court ruling

My interview on the Constitutional Court ruling that the calculation of the Party-List MPs by the Election Commission did not violate the 2017 Constitution. 

I primarily argue that the court ruling was rather predictable and did not have a significant impact on Thailand’s political landscape post-election, largely because Thai politics has been influenced and dictated by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and the military since the 2014 coup. People have been questioning the integrity and neutrality of the country’s independent bodies, especially the Election Commission (EC), specifically whether it is actually assisting the country return to democracy and serving the interests of the people.

Quoted in The Nation , with respect to the 2019 Thai Election Campaign

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/politics/30365119

I was interviewed and quoted in The Nation , with respect to the 2019 Thai Election Campaign:

This time around, though, many other parties are also embracing populist policies.

The main message candidates have been delivering to voters has not changed much, with many parties’ political discourses still “trapped” in either the fight for democracy or populist policies, said Titipol Phakdeewanich, dean of political science at Ubon Ratchathani University.

The Democrat and Future Forward parties are leaning towards populism, while the pro-junta Phalang Pracharat is disguising its policies under the theme of “reconciliation”, he said. 

“But in reality, these discourses do not reflect any changes in Thai politics,” he said. 

For instance, he said, the Democrat and Future Forward parties are offering a welfare state but have yet to show how it will be sustainable or if recipients would be self-reliant.

Phalang Pracharat Party is relying on the reconciliation discourse to explain why the military is still necessary to maintain order. It doesn’t understand true democracy, Titipol said.

The political discourse used by pro-junta parties is undermining the progress of Thai democracy, he added.

However, he said, though the election is not expected to bring massive change to society, it will at least encourage voters to pay more attention to democracy.

“I think this election is more like a referendum on democracy or an indicator of how desperately Thai voters want democracy, rather than actually returning to true democracy. What we will have is just pseudo-democracy,” he said. “This election is being held just so that Thailand can be a part of international democracy. Otherwise it will be difficult for it to promote its economic policies internationally.”

Titipol, who lectures on political communication, said the most important concern was not about what politicians convey to voters, but rather voters being open to two-sided information.

“It doesn’t matter who you support, but you should make time to listen to all opinions so you can make a good decision,” he said.

Election a tipping point for ‘Thai-style democracy’

Election a tipping point for ‘Thai-style democracy’

February 08, 2019 01:00 By Titipol Phakdeewanich 

special to The Nation

Officially, Monday’s registration of election candidates was not a significant milestone for Thai democracy. Nevertheless the excitement it generated among pro-democracy Thais, political parties and their candidates has sparked anxiety for the country’s anti-democratic movement.

This year’s election will certainly be crucial for the future of democracy in Thailand, though the outcome is in reality fairly predictable. The 2017 military-written Constitution incorporates legal mechanisms designed to enable the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), the military junta, to retain its grip on power after the election. 

Before the NCPO finally agreed to hold the poll, there had been ongoing political disputes – both in the real world and on social media – over the merits of elections versus continued military rule. These fights will persist ahead of next month’s election, whose result will indicate whether Thais want a liberal democracy, or the so-called “Thai-style democracy”, in which the universality of human rights is denied. 

Junta’s record 

Last week, Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha spoke to the nation about his achievements during almost five years in power, claiming to have made significant contributions to Thailand. The pro-military Phalang Pracharat Party hopes to capitalise on Prayut’s many populist programmes, such as the much-criticised welfare card for the poor, to gain votes. 

Prayut’s economic achievements will hardly convince the rural population and many other Thai voters, but his claim to have brought political stability, through military suppression, remains convincing to people across the political spectrum. This will not, however, easily transfer into votes. These days, rural Thais make more complex voting decisions than the typical picture of vote-buying suggests.

Meanwhile the persistence of Shinawatra-phobia continues to serve the interests of Phalang Pracharat, the Democrat Party and the Ruam Palang Prachachart Thai Party, especially in wooing urban-middle class voters.

In the rural North, the picture is still very different.     

“I trust Thaksin because his party delivered what they promised us: we can go to hospital when we are ill now. We remember a big drop in the drug problem when Thaksin was prime minister,” said a villager who preferred to remain anonymous, referring to PM Thaksin Shinawatra’s drug war, whose extrajudicial killings were criticised as violating human rights.

Voter loyalty?

The incumbent Pheu Thai party won almost 16 million votes in the 2011 election, sweeping the North and Northeast (Isaan), under the leadership of Yingluck Shinawatra. Although it was thanks to her brother’s legacy that she won 265 of the 500 seats in the House of Representatives, Yingluck also rejuvenated the Shinawatra brand by introducing popular rice subsidies (a policy that eventually brought her downfall) and other policies that were greatly welcomed by rural populations, especially in Isaan. Pheu Thai’s long history and success in the region underscores the loyalty rural voters feel towards the party.

Nevertheless, voter loyalty won’t be the only factor in the party’s performance. Embedded patronage networks – especially in rural villages where politicians tend to portray themselves as generous patrons rather than public servants – will also be key. As a consequence, Pheu Thai may suffer in areas where their former MPs have been poached by Phalang Pracharat.

However, public trust in Pheu Thai’s ability to deliver promises remains high compared to its political rivals, especially the Democrats and Phalang Pracharat.

Will election restore democracy?

The NCPO will likely maintain its grip on power, either with Prayut or another surrogate as next prime minister. The voting power of the 250 NCPO-appointed senators, enshrined in the 2017 constitution, assures that. So the question arises, why have elections at all?

The vote will be a crucial barometer of whether Thailand is moving forward. A regional beacon for democracy and development during the 1990s and early 2000s, Thailand’s democratic progress was abruptly halted and reversed by the 2006 and 2014 military coups.

The erosion of democracy and retrenchment of authoritarianism was hardly new, being a facet of Thai politics since the bloodless 1932 revolution. Since then, a group of conservative Thais among the political establishment have remained convinced that it is premature for the country to become a  “Western-style” or “liberal” democracy. Over time, this group re-enforced its so-called Thai-style democracy, which limits freedom of expression and denies the universality of human rights. 

Thai history over the past decade is in line with a global trend for democratic decline. However, the emergence of newcomers such as the Future Forward Party has not only encouraged a new generation to enter politics but also influenced old parties like the Democrats to provide space for political newbies. 

Of course, the parade of fresh, young faces won’t change Thai politics overnight. The conservative political establishment is deep-rooted and enduring, but political newcomers can bring fresh ideas to Thailand’s democratic movement in the long term.

Effects of campaign restrictions

Despite domestic and international criticism, the junta continues to defend its ability to ensure a “free and fair election”, denying the need for international observers from the European Union or the UN. 

NCPO-imposed restrictions may force more “constructive” campaigning, especially among anti-junta politicians. In Isaan, where campaign rallies are being closely monitored, many Pheu Thai candidates have avoided criticising the NCPO. Instead, they are focusing on a more positive discourse, with slogans such as: “Brothers, it’s your voices, your power to choose in March” and “Brothers, we can take our power back by going to the polls and voting against them.” This helps to instil a core democratic value in the minds of voters – “people power ”.

There’s no doubt however that a cloud of fear and intimidation hangs over the election. The NCPO has not created an equal playing field for all parties. Indeed, the restrictions will likely reward longstanding parties because of existing voter loyalty, with newcomers suffering as a consequence.

Ultimately, the election can only meet international standards if the NCPO takes a neutral stance. Without that neutrality, the national vote is nothing more than a means to legitimise and prolong the military’s political power.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.

A summary of my interview with respect to the 2019 Electoral Timeline

A summary of my interview with respect to the 2019 Electoral Timeline

I personally do not believe the recent Thai electoral timeline, namely that general elections will be held on the 24th of February 2019. The primary reason is that the military-led National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) can still enforce Article 44 in order to protect its current political position.

The NCPO will continue to go ahead with the announced timeline as long as it maintains the ability to compete against any opposition parties with the help of military-allied parties at the polls.

The scheduled 2019 election cannot be described as either free or fair election as long as the NCPO remains active on the Thai political landscape. It is possible that Article 44 will be enforced in favour of parties allied to the military, at the expense of the military’s opposition.

Interview on political ban.

I argued that "a ban on social network political campaigning illustrates how much the NCPO fears losing popularity to its opposition. Whilst the pro-military camp have been granted more freedom to campaign, the upcoming elections will not be not free and fair because the restrictions on social network political campaigning undermines the ability of political parties to freely communicate with the people and their constituents."

My interview on the relaxation of the ban on political activities

My interview on the relaxation of the ban on political activities.

Although the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) allowed political activities to resume, this is not a return of political freedoms to the Thai people and political parties. We should not just focus on a partial political freedom, but we must stay focused on the Thai people’s political freedoms. 

To a certain extent, the NCPO remaining in power is a sign that the upcoming election cannot be described as a free and fair with respect to the international standards. The NCPO can still utilise legal tools to dictate the election. 

A ban on social networks political campaigning illustrates that the upcoming elections are not free and fair, because those restrictions undermines the ability of political parties to freely communicate with the people and their constituents. 

Whilst the NCPO and its supporters are able to make their political moves, their opponents are closely monitored. It has been observed that the NCPO and the military government have been able to mobilise their popularity while the next election is under speculation. 

The NCPO have partially granted political freedom but it is time to fully return political liberty and freedom to the Thai people.

It is important for people to be able to discuss politics within the remit of the law rather than under the control of the NCPO. Therefore, the NCPO should end its role in Thai politics. If the NCPO continues to remain active the legitimacy of the upcoming elections will be undermined and questioned by both the Thai people and the international community. 

A summary of my interview in Matichon, with respect to the restrictions on political campaign online, imposed by the Thai military government.

Whether the political campaigns are on the internet (social medias, online-campaigns) or not, politician should be free to run their campaigns.

The maintaining of restrictions, imposed by the military government, demonstrates that the upcoming election is not “free and fair”, and fail to meet international standards, because of the suppression of freedom of expression and political freedoms.

A free and fair election is not only determined by what happens on the election day, but it is also important to consider the level of liberty and freedom before people vote. Currently, most political parties are allowed to function their political duties and activities. Political parties should be able to freely communicate with their members and supporters.

It has been observed that the supporters of the military have been able to enjoy more liberty and freedom to make their political move. There is not an equal playing filed in Thai politics under the military government.

Indeed, a high level of control, imposing on online-political campaigns, reflects the military’s concerns about young voices, who normally oppose the military rule.

It is time for Thais to question and raise their concerns over the ongoing suppressions of freedom of expressions, and its implication on the future of democracy in Thailand. 

With respect to the legal charges against Mr Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit with online offences, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) demonstrates that fear and intimidations remains a crucial political tactics for the military. The NCPO has been implementing all of the available legal tools to suppress their political oppositions, in order to prevent criticism on themselves. The NCPO cannot claim that they are not politicians, so that they should not be criticised on the same grounds, because their role is now functioning within the Thai political realm. 

It is important for the NCPO to eliminate all of the political restrictions, imposing on their political opponents. At this stage, it is important for politicians and political parties to be able to enjoy the very same liberty and freedom within the Thai political landscape. So that Thai people can properly have a chance to know their potential candidates.

Matichon Editorial Column: Defending Academic Freedom

Quoted in The Nation

Quoted in The Nation:

"Despite all the legal complications having been cleared, political scientist Titipol Phakdeewanich from Ubon Ratchathani University said he had doubts that the election would take place next February.

“After all, it is the National Council for Peace and Order [NCPO] who will make the decision, not the Constitutional Court’s verdict,” he said.“Only when the junta itself announces the election date, can we be sure the election will take place.”

However, Titipol said that the NCPO should want an election as it was the only way to legitimise the military’s power in politics. But its decision to call one depends largely on whether or not it was certain that it could maintain its grip after the election, he said.

Titipol said there was a 70 to 90 per cent likelihood that the poll would be held. Considering the current circumstances – including the inauguration of the Action Coalition for Thailand Party, backed by former protest leader Suthep Thaugsuban – the academic said he believed the NCPO was ready for the election."

Last hurdle to Thai election cleared as parties law approved

Last hurdle to Thai election cleared as parties law approved: Activists sceptical over pledge of February poll, insist on vote this year

A summary of my interview in Matichon regarding the Constitutional Court’s ruling and its implications on the prospects for the 2019 Election.

A summary of my interview in Matichon regarding the Constitutional Court’s ruling and its implications on the prospects for the 2019 Election.

The Constitutional Court ruled that the organic bill on the election of MPs is valid and does not contradict with the 2017 constitution. However, this is not a guarantee for the long-awaited February 2019 Election. Thailand and a large number of its people have long been ready for elections and a return to democracy, whilst the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and the military are not yet ready to compete in the polls.

Despite protesting that military officers are not politicians, the military perceives new political parties, such as the Forward Future Party as political rivals.

The election will take place whenever the military is confident about the support they would get at the polls, as well as in the stability of their grip on power after the election.

One cannot ignore the fact that the NCPO can still implement Article 44 whenever it suits their political interests [including by postponing elections].

Despite numerous postponements to the electoral timeline, the NCPO’s recent indication to ensure the February 2019 election goes ahead may simply be a political ploy to minimise public resistance to the NCPO, and to buy time in the wake of protests and demonstrations of the “pro-election group”. It is too naive to take the NCPO’s election timeline seriously at this stage.

In addition, the post-election political circumstances in Malaysia may have raised some significant concerns amongst the NCPO, in relation to the potential scrutiny if the NCPO’s opposition wins a majority of seats and is able to wrest power. This is because of ongoing questions against the issue of corruption and transparency within the NCPO.

If the NCPO is genuine about returning to democracy, then there is no legitimate reason to ban political activities of political parties, especially of the Democrat Party and the Pheu Thai Party.

The NCPO has been using the mechanism of the state and public resources to mobilise its popularity, whilst preventing its political rivals, such as the Democrat Party and the Pheu Thai Party from campaigning.

In addition, I argued that if there is an indication that the Pheu Thai Party can convincingly win most of the seats in the North and the Northeast, and it is therefore very likely that the February 2019 election will be delayed once again.

In addition to the 250 appointed senators, the NCPO understands that support from MPs are crucial for the post-election politics. Therefore, we have seen the establishment of cosy relationships between the NCPO and many existing political groups.

Quoted in "SPECIAL REPORT: Reform a failure, but junta’s grip still strong", in The Nation

Quoted in "SPECIAL REPORT: Reform a failure, but junta’s grip still strong", in The Nation:

"Despite all this, Prayut has retained a level of support even in the Northeast, a red-shirt stronghold. Here, the military has been clever enough to recruit from among low-income rural families, winning their loyalty by providing livelihoods, says Titipol Phakdeewanich, dean of political science at the region’s Ubon Ratchathani University.

“Except for the anti-coup hardcore, many people [in the region] don’t really hate Prayut although sentiment in the social media is very strong against him,” said Titipol, citing informal research he conducted in Ubon Ratchathani and neighbouring Yasothon and Amnat Charoen.
Some government policies, such as the rice price guarantee, had benefited the locals, he added.

A summary of my interview on Suthep Thaugsuban’s new political party named “Ruam Palang Prachachat Thai".

A summary of my interview on Suthep Thaugsuban’s new political party named “Ruam Palang Prachachat Thai".

...
Because of the mutual interests between Suthep Thaugsuban, the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), and the military, it is very likely that the new political party under Suthep’s leadership will support the military remaining in power.

I don’t think that this party will specifically support Gen Prayut Chan-O-Cha, somehow Prayut might not be the next prime minster. However, Suthep’s party is intended to maintain and strengthen its relationship with the NCPO and the military in order to support the military to remain in power.

There have been a number of indications that the NCPO and the military want to maintain their grip on power after the election, such as by reaching out to local politically influential people in the provinces of Buriram and Chonburi.

Although Suthep is popular in the south, his political charisma is overshadowed by the former Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai. Indeed, I argued that the Democrat party has been able to maintain its stronghold in the south not because of Mr Abhisit Vejjajiva, but largely as a result of Chuan Leekpai’s political charisma and influence in the South.

These pictures were sent to me from police special branch in Ubon Ratchathani. How thoughtful of them to take an interest in my interviews and articles.

Quoted on Pro-Democracy Protest in Bangkok Post

In Bangkok Post: "Titipol Phakdeewanich, dean of Ubon Ratchathani University's Faculty of Political Sciences, said the government was quite careful and tried to prevent violence which could have led to a negative image of the regime and affected its legitimacy." 

Quoted on Academic freedom

In The Nation: "Titipol Phakdeewanich, dean of political science at Ubon Ratchathani University, told The Nation that NCPO and the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) called him yesterday to ask if he was planning to attend the event at Thammasat University and whether he was aware if any other university staff and students were planning to go."

I was quoted in The Nation: 4th Anniversary of the 2014 Coup

I was quoted in The Nation:
However, military power alone would not enable the survival of the junta for long unless it also has strong support from big corporations, which dominate the Thai economy.
The military has enjoyed increased acceptance from big businesses, says Titipol Phakdeewanich, dean of political science at Ubon Ratchathani University. “When they are doing well in their businesses, getting wealthier or getting benefits facilitated by government policies like Pracha Rath, it is no surprise that they support [the military],” he points out.

A summary of my Interview in Khaosod, with respect to the NCPO’s establishment of political allies

Despite the claim made by Prime Minster Prayut Chan-O-Cha: the establishment of political allies and attracting existing politicians [by the NCPO] (especially former MPs and influential provincial political figures) is a typical path to power in Thai politics, he argued that this is an unacceptable element of the Thai political culture and is undemocratic.

Therefore, Gen Prayut’s claim reflects that he and the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), including the military, accept the ongoing political culture, despite the 2014 coup-maker disapproving it as a form of decay in Thai democracy.

He argued that the way Thai politicians change parties prior to elections is a reflection of politics without ideological basis. Instead, this pattern of behaviour demonstrates that Thai politicians prioritise their personal interests over the interests of the public. They only tend to move to join those with a high possibility of electoral success, or to those who are well endowed with financial resources.

Therefore, Gen Prayut’s acceptance of unacceptable elements of Thai political culture is a reflection of the lack of reform before the next election – despite the NCPO justifying their coup on the basis that they would reform Thai politics.

Indeed, this is only a repetition of the same old pattern of Thai politics because money and power attract politicians.

Today, we have observed that the NCPO has been using all kinds of state mechanisms to establish and strengthen their relations with political power-brokers and with business and political groups.

Supporting democracy is not a priority for politicians who have already declared themselves as supporters of the NCPO, in the attempt to ensure that the military will remain in power after the election. Therefore, it is important for Thais to not vote for them if we want democracy to survive in Thailand. 

The upcoming elections will not be free and fair because the NCPO has continued to suppress freedom of expression and restrict political activities. Therefore, it is important for the NCPO to allow all parties and actors to have their liberties and political freedoms in the event of an election in order to ensure that it is free and fair. 

A summary of my Interview in Matichon:

The 2018 Constitution is already designed to facilitate the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and the military to maintain political power, even after the return to democracy, for example through the NCPO-appointed Senate members who can vote to select the Prime Minister. 

If we consider the political stance of the Democrat Party, we cannot entirely trust them (particularly the party’s support for democracy), because they have been a supporter of the military’s role in Thai politics. Therefore, the public can see no indication that the Democrat Party will not support the military in the future. 

With reference to Thai political history, we have observed compromises between the military and political parties when they share common interests. Recently, we have also observed newly registered political parties expressing their support for General Prayut Chan-O-Cha to be the next prime minister. 

It is important for all political parties to demonstrate their stance against the appointment of an unelected prime minister. If the House of Representatives stays firm on this matter, then it could act as an effective mechanism to minimise the opportunity for Thailand to have an unelected prime minister. 

I questioned recent Democrat Party announcement of their opposition to an unelected prime minister, about whether it is only intended to boost its popularity against amongst young voters, who are now leaning towards the Future Forward Party, rather than a committed intention to oppose the appointment of an unelected prime minister. This facelift strategy of the Democrat Party is unlikely to significantly improve the damaged reputation of the party as an anti-democratic party.

Indeed, in the current political context, the term “unelected prime minister” is implicitly used to refer to either the military or General Prayut Chan-O-Cha. Thus, this implies the continuity of the NCPO and the military after the return to democracy, despite falling support for Prayut remaining in power.

If “unelected prime minister” is a highly qualified person or a successful businessman, there perhaps be less resistance. Therefore, if General Prayut Chan-O-Cha and the NCPO intend to continue their roles in Thai politics, they will have to go through political channels, just like other politicians.