Wednesday, 13 June 2012



Queen exemplifies how a monarch can be a stabilising force



The British people have just celebrated the Diamond Jubilee of the reign of Queen Elizabeth II. Her coronation took place on June 2, 1953, after she came to the throne on Feb 6, 1952. Since then, Britain has witnessed changes emerging from within the institution itself, as well as society. Although since the beginning of her reign, Britain has given up its claim to being a global hegemonic power, nevertheless the queen retains her role as head of state of the United Kingdom's constitutional monarchy.
It was once said, "The sun never sets on the British Empire," although the time of this great empire had essentially been brought to an end by World War II. Now at the age of 86, the queen is well established in her popularity. Today, in a role that retains no overt political power, her constitutional role has become symbolic, which gives the queen the opportunity to remain above the political fray. In her time, the monarchy within Britain has therefore, evolved to become primarily a symbol of national unity and of state ceremonial duties, a role which continues to be generally accepted by British society.
The evolution of the British constitution began with the signing of the Magna Carta. The Magna Carta, was signed in Britain in 1215, and is considered by many historians to be one of the great constitutional reform documents the world has seen. It is noteworthy however, that after nearly 800 years, the limitations set on the influence of the institution of the monarchy, did not lead to the removal of the institution itself. In fact, the Magna Carta may have assisted the British monarchy in evolving along with social changes. The quality and integrity of the document prevailed over the long term, and provided for a healthier relationship between the institutions of the state and the citizenry.
Although the British monarchy has appeared increasingly dated from the perspective of the younger generations in recent years, the institution has managed to retain enough relevance, in order to justify its position. As Wyn Grant, professor of politics at the University of Warwick argues: "The UK does still benefit from a constitutional monarchy. The younger generation may perceive the queen as a traditional figure, but Prince William and Kate Middleton have renewed the royal family. The institution has to evolve to keep in step with changes in society."
Another contemporary British academic, Vernon Bogdanor, who writes on the current reign of the queen, said, "The monarchy will come to be seen as a part of society and it will come to be judged in a more practical and utilitarian manner. The philanthropic and charitable work undertaken by the royal family serves the country by propping up civil society, that commonwealth of citizenship outside the state, and also pinpoints social needs otherwise ignored by government and offers a voice to minorities and other deprived groups which are little represented politically."
Britain, which first emerged as a model for the integration of a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system, remains an example that other countries have looked to in developing similar systems.
Of course, there are problems in UK politics as no political system is perfect, and the process of democratic reform is continuous. There have been recent instances of conflicts of interest affecting the UK political process, such as the MP expenses scandal in 2009, which was then followed by the phone-hacking scandal in 2011 that has yet to be resolved.
Nevertheless, there are always questions being asked in relation to the conduct of the democratically elected members of either the legislative or executive branches of the governmental structures of countries around the world.
It is perhaps most especially because of this, that in the case of contemporary Britain, it is therefore widely believed that the apolitical figurehead represented by the monarch, can strongly assist in the separation of powers. This provides more room for the process of checks and balances in order to hold government accountable.
Academics continue to ask questions about the ways in which institutional checks and balances can be integrated into democratic models. In doing so, they intend to mitigate against the tendency of conflicts of interest to compromise politicians because this is something we see playing out all around the world. Even in Britain, the political fallout from these conflicts continues, with politicians from all parties being in one way or another implicated in the ongoing public scandal involving the media group News International.
As far back as 1873, the famous British writer Walter Bagehot in The English Constitution", wrote in a way that is still to a large extent, relevant and applicable today: "The co-existence of a queen's seeming prerogative and a Downing Street's real government is just suited to such a country as this, in such an age as ours." The form of government in place within Britain today remains essentially that, which was described by Bagehot nearly 140 years ago.
Thais have much to learn from the experience of the Queen of England during her reign. We can recognise that the dignity of the monarchy can act to both moderate and stabilise the often fractious political polarisation, and the scenarios that unfold when political rivalries spiral out of control. As evidenced by the recent fighting in Thailand's parliament, no side in the political paradigm will ultimately benefit when actions that undermine the dignity of office and its responsibilities are undertaken, and this behaviour by elected representatives is revealed to the voters.
After 60 years on the throne, the Queen of England has demonstrated how an apolitical figurehead can act to stabilise the political system, in spite of domestic political dramas, international upheavals, and media intrigue. We have not seen evidence of overt tensions between the monarchy and the series of prime ministers from different political parties, who have come and gone over the course of her reign, despite the occasional media revelations.
Indeed, as former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher stated in her autobiographical retelling of her time in office: "Her Majesty brings to bear a formidable grasp of current issues and breadth of experience. And, although the press could not resist the temptation to suggest disputes between the palace and Downing Street, I always found the queen's attitude towards the work of the government absolutely correct."
And as former premier Tony Blair noted: "She [the queen] knew also that while there was a need for the monarchy to evolve with the people, and that its covenant with them unwritten and unspoken, was based on a relationship that allowed for evolution, it should be steady, carefully calibrated and controlled."

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at Ubon Ratchathani University.

Tuesday, 29 May 2012





ECONOMY

Arguing the B300 minimum wage case

'The minimum wage will destroy the industrial sector of Thailand"...
Employers worry that introducing the 300 baht minimum wage will hurt Thailand’s competitiveness. Yet cheaper wages are not the only way to achieve comparative advantage, and this argument should not be used as a justification for keeping the minimum wage as low as possible. APICHART JINAKUL
"We are entering the Asean Economic Community in the very near future, so how can we compete with our neighbours?"... "Foreign investors will move away from Thailand, to places where labour is cheaper, such as China, Cambodia, and Vietnam"...
These are the opinions of the business sector and many economists, apparently prioritising the competitiveness of the Thai economy even if it comes at the expense of workers' living standards.
However, the fact is that in a capitalist free-market economy, undercutting the international price of labour is not the only way to achieve comparative advantage. Such arguments should not be used as a justification for keeping the minimum wage as low as possible.
Indeed, in the transition towards becoming a developed nation, countries must accept that this strategy is unsustainable in the long term, as no developed economy has ever been able to maintain this comparative advantage over developing nations.
What about the future of unskilled workers? Are they expected to resign themselves to a lifetime of low wages to support the supposed "national interest" of Thailand's economy?
When speaking to red shirt supporters in Laos at his public appearance during the Songkran festival, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra said: "Brothers, life will be better now. Prime Minister Yingluck has already implemented the '300 baht' policy. Your children will earn more from work."
As we know by now, any such statements coming from Thaksin will be jumped on immediately by opponents who will level accusations of irresponsible political populism at him.
The income gap in Thailand today is glaringly obvious to anyone who can face up to this fact. To categorically dismiss as irresponsible populism attempts to correct this injustice, however imperfect they may be, implies a serious lack of concern for the plight of millions of decent yet underprivileged Thais.
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker have argued: "Thaksin's populism was more complex than his policy offerings, in that it developed over time in response to social demands. Thaksin may indeed have been opportunistic, but there would have been no opportunity if there had not been a social demand."
As Warren Buffet once argued: "A market system has not worked in terms of poor people."
The intrinsic injustice of this system is interpreted within the anti-capitalist discourse of Thailand as tunniyom samarn, or "evil capitalism".
Moreover, what is often referred to as the "free market" is far from being free of market manipulation.
Notably, when we look at the examples of the most advanced capitalist countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, we find many forms of government intervention.
Indeed, as far as we can recall, there has always been evidence of market failure. And it has been quite common for there to be some degree of government intervention within the market which distort both prices and costs, including labour costs.
Every Friday, a truck takes mothers and fathers from the village of Ban Tadop in Si Sa Ket province to visit their children, by now mostly in their 20s, who are working in factories in Samut Sakhon.
The main reason for the families to undertake this journey is to collect remittance money from their children, and at the same time, to bring them staple foods such as the rice they have grown in the village.
Such efforts are undertaken in order to minimise their child's cost of living, which is higher in Samut Sakhon than in the villages.
Labour migration from the Northeast has been both permanent and seasonal. Both have made an important contribution to improving the quality of life for rural villagers.
To a significant extent, these remittances can help make life more comfortable in the rural provinces, and is an example of how market mechanisms can contribute towards raising living standards when the state does not.
Hoi Kambongsa, a 53-year-old worker from Ban Don Chot, Ubon Ratchathani, said: "The 300 baht [minimum wage] is good for our family, living in a rural village. I don't have a full-time job.
"I receive money from my six children who work in Bangkok, although not very often. But this really helps to make my life a lot easier."
A high percentage of the rural population in the northeastern region today depend on these remittances to at least some degree.
Older generations living in rural areas of provinces such as Ubon Ratchathani typically receive approximately 5,000 baht a year in remittances. Although this figure might not appear to be particularly significant for the urban middle-class, this extra money is needed for their subsistence.
This is also the main contribution of remittances in relation to the economy, boosting grassroots incomes and spending which have the positive benefit of stimulating Thailand's macroeconomy.
The supply of both permanent and seasonal labour from the region stems from what economists call the "opportunity cost" of workers not having a job in their village or district. Moving to work in a factory for even a very low wage becomes the "rational choice".
Some economists make the argument that if there is enough supply of labour for jobs available, there is no need to increase the minimum wage.
It follows from this statement that if workers remain in their current employment, they must be happy with the status quo. However, can this argument be justifiably made if workers have no other options available to them?
Of course not.
Ultimately, there is a moral for us in all of this. We are speaking here of the demographic which has so often come under attack during the political blame game that has accompanied the conflicts afflicting Thailand in recent years.
This demographic is the rural population of the Northeast provinces, who realistically have few choices in life.
To live viably at all, they must work in the fields and subsist by producing rice and selling their surplus. They seize the opportunity of employment as seasonal migrant workers in factories in distant provinces. Very often, they are not even paid the 300-baht figure which is now being introduced as the minimum wage for Thailand.
These are the people from the poorest region of our country who are routinely patronised by other Thais and made to feel as though they are second-class citizens because of their "shortcomings" and their lack of education.
We may only become more genuinely concerned for their well-being and future if we take the time to realise that these very people are the ones producing Thailand's staple rice crops which keep food prices low and help to fuel the lives of all Thais.
Then, perhaps, we would think about the fact that they so often take these low-paying jobs in factories that most other Thais would certainly not undertake. To argue their case then becomes the least we can do.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.
http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/295497/arguing-the-b300-minimum-wage-case


Thursday, 10 May 2012



Will Ampon's death see democracy reborn in Thailand?






The death of Ampon Tangnoppakul, better known as Ah Kong, once again has thrust Section 112 of the constitution into the public limelight. News of his death was widely circulated through online social and alternative news networks before the mainstream and international media picked it up.
The news generated a great deal of emotion among activists, who called for changes to the lese majeste law. But there are few indications at this stage that his case will become a "cause celebre", and serve as the kind of catalyst for democracy that famous or infamous prisoners of conscience have, at times, around the world, like Nelson Mandela of South Africa, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn of Russia, Ai Weiwei of China and Bradley Manning of the United States.
Established political dissidents can take on the power of a state with the political savvy and allies they have developed. Ampon was in the end, a man out of his depth, likely caught up in a game of political intrigue that the 62-year-old man could not have expected.
Ampon was sentenced to 20 years in prison and had not been granted bail prior to his conviction, which violated his human rights because of the disproportionate punishment, and heavy-handed treatment. This was a person who was already suffering from cancer before his arrest, and who had neither the resources nor the level of fitness to escape, if bail had been granted. Neither was he given the opportunity to stay at a hospital for prisoners because of the rationale that his condition was not sufficiently serious. All of this may indicate some political interference in the case.
"It may seem that the impact of disparities of political power has been to distort both the content and the application of human rights doctrines in ways that serve the interest of powerful actors at the expense of others," Charles Beitz, an academic from Princeton University in the US, wrote in an observation not long ago. His words give some insight into our own predicament.
Neither the current government nor the opposition want to take up the case, because the political risks outweigh the potential benefits, and both sides have already fallen victim to the questions relating to Section 112. When the arguments vis-a-vis the law are polarised to such an extent, that any push for reform can lead to the accusation that an attempt is being made to bring down the monarchy itself, then political expediency wins out.
If Thailand is to truly mature as a democracy, politicians need to be encouraged out of their inertia. However, this can perhaps only be done when the population at large demands in sufficient numbers that the principles of fighting for liberty, objectivity and integrity overrides any existing political calculations and manoeuvrings.
In November 2011, the Asian Human Rights Commission named Ampon as a political prisoner, and asked the government to facilitate his immediate release. At the same time, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, an outspoken academic who is now based at Kyoto University's Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, launched his "Free Ah Kong" campaign. This received the support of more than 1,000 people, and more than 500 people sent in their photos with the words "Ah Kong" imprinted on their hands in order to show their support. Although these are in the scheme of things, not high numbers; it is significant in giving weight to the fact that there are people who perceive the injustice below the surface in the Land of Smiles, as Thailand is so often called.
Ampon's death will not change Thailand overnight and may not bring about much extra support in favour of the Nitirat group's proposal to reform the lese majeste law. This is because there are still a large number of powerful royalists in Thailand who refuse to openly acknowledge the impact of the abuse of Section 112 on human rights. Nevertheless, his death will draw attention to the question over the interpretation of the law and the decision by the judges. Furthermore, his death will at least bring into focus the issues of freedom and human rights when it comes to the debate on democracy, which may generate momentum for the progress of democracy in the long term. After all, the push for reforming Section 112 is being done in the name of protecting and promoting the rights of all the citizens of Thailand. And through the story of Ah Kong, we have now learnt how precious life is.
Ampon was like any other citizen of Thailand, in that he was a relatively insignificant person when it comes to the state structures.
There are still questions regarding the veracity of the argument that he even sent the now infamous four text messages at all.
His only mistake then, was to unwittingly become caught up in the larger game of politics, where he quickly found himself out of his depth, and subject to forces far greater than himself. Which is no mistake at all. Does this prove that the human rights of the individual are now being negated in Thailand, simply in order to send out a message for the big picture narrative? Namely, that if you step out of line, this could happen to you also. Was the case of Ampon an opportunity to fire a shot across the bows of the Thai people in order to make it known that you too, might be dispensable if it is politically expedient for that to be done?
Does the death of Ampon mean anything to us, as a society? Maybe not if we are talking about any tangible impact on the reform of Section 112, which he fell victim to. He may yet come to be seen as an icon of the pro-democracy activists, who might take an opportunity to use his memory as a weapon in their fight for change.
This could be the legacy for an individual of this world, who took a chance to speak out, but prematurely lost his life in prison, as a result. Too late for him now. Ah Kong, may you rest in peace. Soon we will find out what the future holds for any others who may also fall victim to abuse of Section 112.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.
http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/292590/will-ampon-death-see-democracy-reborn-in-thailand

Wednesday, 29 February 2012

The lords of democracy



The lords of democracy

Thailand is now most of the way through the first term of the Obama administration, and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has introduced and implemented the concept of "smart power" in relation to US foreign policy, which attempts to strategically combine elements from both "hard power" and "soft power" approaches.

America’s future is linked to the future of the Asia-Pacific region; and the future of this region depends on America.

In 2010, Mrs Clinton indicated an adjustment in US foreign policy and emphasised that, "America's future is linked to the future of the Asia-Pacific region; and the future of this region depends on America." But in a period of immense global flux, both economically and politically, and at a time when the long-accepted paradigms are being thoroughly reassessed by all actors on the world stage, how can the United States hope to reassure its Asian allies that the enduring imperative of maintaining good relations with the US can work to promote mutual interests between them and thus be a win-win scenario for both sides into the future?

In the post-global financial crisis period of uncertainty, opportunities relating to the US economy and its markets have become less promising for Thailand, whilst in relation to China the opposite is actually the case. However, positive economic relations with Washington certainly remain one of the leading priorities for Bangkok. Indeed, at the Council on Foreign Relations in 2010, then prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva commented on the bilateral relationship between Thailand and the US: "I think we can continue to expand on our economic relations ... In the wider picture, of course, the US presence in the region is important for our security, and there are also new areas where we hope to see greater US participation."

However, Thailand cannot expect to simply pick and choose the economic and security benefits from this, or indeed any other, bilateral relationship because there comes with such relationships an obligation to responsibly engage with the wider concerns of other nations, if one can expect such bilateral relationships to further develop and prosper.

Moreover, a reluctance to embrace the opportunities intrinsic to such bilateral relationships will, in any case, only act to weaken Thailand's strategic position within the increasingly multilateral relationship-oriented world of the early 21st century. And from the Western perspective, the pressure is increasingly on from within its own civil society and social discourse, for their governments and corporations to engage more responsibly with developing nations and emerging markets. Accordingly, there is an expectation of tangible progress on issues relating to democracy, freedom of speech, human rights, and the overall development of civil society.

Although we are not yet witnessing the era of absolute decline of US hegemonic power, much of the international discourse is excited by the potential of the emerging powers, in particular China, which is the front-runner. The US continues to believe strongly in its responsibilities when it comes to the promotion of democracy around the world, and is still a primary source of international funding for civil society projects and educational programmes. Nevertheless, what are the indications as to when and whether this engagement can be considered to be a positive contribution, or an intervention in the process of democratisation in another country?

As for China, it is moving towards democratic reforms in its own convoluted way. At the 2011 World Economic Forum, China's Premier Wen Jiabao indicated that his country should introduce more democratic reforms, and emphasised that it would be more practical to begin with the promotion of democracy within the Communist Party itself.

Meanwhile, China's foreign policy remains officially one of "non-interference" in the domestic affairs of other countries, which is in stark contrast to official US policy in this regard.

Overall, when it comes to the process of democratisation and the promotion of civil society, the Chinese state is rendered irrelevant in the context of these discussions.

The history of US "hard power" interventions in Asia, which were by definition undemocratic, has evidently complicated relations between much of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the US, as Noam Chomsky has argued: "The Vietnam affair might end ... in an attempt by our former allies to construct a counterweight to American power."

Even if Thailand's relationship with the United States is made somewhat more difficult by the historical legacy, it would only be self-defeating for Thailand if opportunities for positive engagement with the US both now and into the future, were to be rejected for this reason.

In 2009, Mrs Clinton highlighted that, "We stand for democracy not because we want other countries to be like us, but because we want all people to enjoy the consistent protection of the rights that are naturally theirs ... Democracy has proven the best political system for making human rights a human reality over the long term." And in relation to the fundamental regard for human rights, one can argue with, and even reject, the current US standard or other internationally established standards. But does this then necessarily lead us to argue that human rights are not, indeed, natural rights that we are all entitled to enjoy, for as long as we do not violate the rights of others?

Thailand can sincerely hope not.

Nevertheless, attempts by the West to promote democracy, freedom of speech and expression, and the empowering of civil society around the world, are often perceived as promoting frameworks which fail to give primacy to what can universally be agreed upon. And such perceptions often turn into heightened concerns when it is the United States which is taking the lead in these dynamics. Scepticism over the West, and the US in particular, remains. As Samuel Huntington argued, "What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest." Indeed, the historical and established promotion of human rights and civil society by the West, which has tended to be the main driver in this regard, can never be a claim of ownership over the belief in the imperative for democratic principles and freedoms.

Worldwide, the roles of non-state actors are being promoted more and more, at both national and international levels. Diplomacy is no longer limited to merely the interactions and negotiations between governments and official state representatives, and there is a trend around the world to broaden the interpretation, in order to involve all stakeholders, as foreign policy impacts both directly and indirectly upon the citizens of countries.

After nearly 180 years of US-Thai relations, which have primarily been focused at the level of the state-to-state relationship, it is now incumbent upon all actors to engage in the transition towards a broader level of engagement, and to bring all stakeholders to the table. Notwithstanding the national interests and priorities of state actors, and governmental and non-governmental institutions, the very fact of bringing civil society and the citizenry more and more into the dynamic of relationships, in order that they become more informed and streetwise, is key to any reform. This rebalancing of the power structure in relation to the process of democratisation empowers the people, and keeps the pressure on state actors and institutions to continue to reform and to act more responsibly, regardless of whether or not these powerful players are foreign or domestic.


Titipol Phakdeewanich is a lecturer at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.