Bangkok election will also have national repercussions

Bangkok election will also have national repercussions

Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation February 26, 2013 1:00 am

The fight for political supremacy in Bangkok reflects the city's innate sense of superiority. Regardless of the eventual result of the upcoming Bangkok gubernatorial election, the wider unfolding political scenario we are witnessing across Thailand will inevitably affect the country's fortunes well into the future. Moreover, the interest surrounding the debate over the latest election is not limited to those entitled to vote on election day, because Thais across the nation are sensing that matters concerning Bangkok may likely concern them, also.

To a significant extent, this reality is well understood, at least implicitly, by both the political class and by the Thai population more broadly, and it is in this context that several million Bangkokians are now being asked to decide whom to vote for.

As pre-election polling attempts to discern between the two leading candidates - Sukhumbhand Paribatra of the Democrat Party, and Pongsapat Pongcharoen of the Pheu Thai Party - there is increasing speculation that the later now has a good chance to win in the "land of the Democrats".

The strategies embraced by the respective teams have significantly reflected the current trend towards political polarisation, and political analysts will consider this election to be an important opportunity to gauge the relative strengths of both Pheu Thai and the Democrats, overall. Indeed, even a close second place for Pheu Thai would be considered something of a moral victory in this regard.

In this context, much of what has constituted the various arguments vis-a-vis this election, has tended towards hyperbole and hammed-up political rhetoric, and this has played itself out within the public debate. Notwithstanding the apparent question over whether the key issues are being properly raised, there are now indications that, before too long, the Thai electorate will begin to more effectively cajole the political class into more thoroughly and transparently addressing matters of real substance. 

As a Bangkokian who is considering the various factors at play, Atthayudh Ittatirut states: "I will vote for the Democrat candidate, since I want the Democrats to balance the power of the Pheu Thai government."

It is typical in more established democracies for an electorate that mistrusts the political class to vote in a somewhat contrarian fashion when they believe that institutional checks and balances, and the political system itself, are failing them. In Europe and North America, even relatively popular presidents and prime ministers often come up against broad oppositional majorities at local or state electoral level, and this dynamic is almost continually in flux.

How then will the Thai political system adapt and respond, when voter decision-making becomes increasingly considered and sophisticated, as the democracy itself grows? There is, as things stand, an almost overwhelming sense of mistrust between the major demographics of the Thai electorate, and perhaps this is most especially seen in terms of the rural-urban divide. 

Broadly speaking, these dynamics have been essentially subsumed into the red-yellow colour-coded political paradigm, and so it is elected politicians who are now being tasked with giving voice to the feelings and concerns of local constituents, while also attempting to cohesively reflect the party line. 

But what is perhaps of most concern about the tone of the current debate as it relates to the Bangkok election is the implication that either side may believe it can benefit from an escalation in political rhetoric. Let us hope that both sides, in their zeal for political victory, have only temporarily lost sight of the bigger picture, which is their shared responsibility to find ways to best represent the interests of all Thais. 

Thailand's faltering emergent democracy can hardly afford further fragmentation between the Bangkok-centric perspective and the growing sense of rural and provincial alienation from the capital. When we consider Thai history, an important factor comes into play, which perhaps began with the relocation of the centre of power, over time, from Sukhothai, to Ayutthaya, to Thonburi, then finally to Bangkok. 

The impulse to further draw power into the centre has remained. This is reflected in the primacy Bangkok exhibits in relation to almost all the major considerations, which significantly affect the social, economic and political fortunes of most ordinary Thais. 

Paradoxically, although Bangkok has become a place unto itself, it cannot truly stand by itself. For its sustenance the city depends on daily supplies from outside, just as it depended on the transfer of resources from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector, and also on foreign direct investment, in order to help finance the Bangkok boom of the 1980s and early 1990s.

As the US historian Jerry Muller has recently argued: "… a useful starting point might be the rejection of both the politics of privilege and the politics of resentment and the adoption of a clear view of what capitalism actually involves. …" 

In this era of social and political unrest, therefore, it becomes rather less easy to argue for a sustainable economy for the provinces when Bangkok itself is hardly self-reliant, dependent as it is on the significant compliance of the rest of Thailand. 

The arguments advocating the role of Bangkok as the much-needed commercial and administrative hub of Thailand have of course been made many times, and it is a balancing act to be sure. But within our capital, the hardheaded capitalist mindset so often takes precedence, just as the political drive to win at all costs is equally heightened. This current state of imbalance is unlikely to be sustainable when it comes to the health of the Thai democracy and economy, and the cohesiveness of society overall. 

Ultimately, when individuals from even disadvantaged demographic groups such as the rural poor, learn to cooperate more effectively to challenge the existing paradigm, a solution to injustice has been found. After all, despite the plutocratic allusions of the current societal rift, there is a truth to be found in the words of the philosopher John Rawls: "Society is not so divided that one fairly small sector controls the preponderance of productive resources." When people can truly live with the understanding that force, suppression or fear-mongering cannot correct states of imbalance, then even a less-than-perfect system can begin to learn how to make the necessary corrections. 

Titiplol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University. 

Is our debate over freedom forever in conflict with Thai culture?

Is our debate over freedom forever in conflict with Thai culture?

Wed, 30/01/2013 - 20:58 | by prachatai

Titipol Phakdeewanich

The recent 11-year sentence against Somyot Prueksakasemsuk relating to lèse majesté and Thailand’s defamation laws has, once again, brought into focus questions that seek to fairly examine the current status of human rights and freedom of expression within Thailand. 

Moreover, with arguments referencing the “implication” of what was or what was not said being made explicit within the verdict of this case, a significant precedent has now been set, which will have a profound effect upon many future court decisions.

Such a scenario may not be particularly new to those who closely follow such matters within Thailand, but nevertheless, what may be most problematic is the cementing of a societal context in which it becomes less and less possible to constructively engage with what many Thai people consider to be sensitive issues, and where certain topics are therefore, considered to be off-limits. 

This is all taking place within a society that wants, of course, to be able to make the case to both itself and to the wider world, that it is becoming freer and more democratic. So how then will Thailand respond to this growing societal paradox, without acting to encourage further fragmentation and schism?

As soon as the verdict was announced, across-the-board criticisms emerged out of the international community, and this was in clear contrast to the response from Thai human rights institutions, which were generally rather muted in terms of their own public pronouncements.

Incredibly, despite the attention drawn to this latest case, no official statement concerning this verdict has yet been released by the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand. Inevitably therefore, for as long as there remains such a vacuum within the Thai human rights arena, individuals will necessarily be left to draw their own conclusions from such a notable silence.

In particular, a number of leading international institutions highlighted the problem of placing a priority on defending a sense of national pride as this relates to culture and tradition, over that of human rights, which are internationally recognised, and to which Thailand is a signatory.

This aspect to the case was picked up by a number of Thai defenders of the court decision, who then appealed to arguments implicitly advocating in favour of a sense of Thai exceptionalism, which would in their view, act to justify such a court decision.

The official response from the European Union Heads of Mission in Thailand made the case: “The verdict seriously undermines the right to freedom of expression and press freedom. At the same time, it affects Thailand’s image as a free and democratic society...”

Whilst Navanethem Pillay, a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights argued: “The conviction and extremely harsh sentencing of Somyot sends the wrong signals on freedom of expression in Thailand. The court's decision is the latest indication of a disturbing trend in which lèse majesté charges are used for political purposes.”

In response to the EU, an anonymous message was sent out on Facebook that went on to be shared by a large number of Thai royalists’ online social networks. In the highly politicised context of the ongoing Red-Yellow paradigm, politicking remains a key dynamic of course, in almost any social-political equation.

Nevertheless, it read: “Preserving our beloved Monarchy is the right of the Thai people - not the business of the EU... we have our own distinct culture, much of which has evolved around our beloved monarchy…This may be difficult for Europeans to understand: It is our long-held tradition to pay the utmost respect to our King, with a type of respect that is unique to Asian cultures.”

However, this attempt to conflate the issue of human rights with Thai cultural identity necessarily implies that within Thailand, an individual’s rights are respected only when they do not conflict with the cultural imperative, and that they are therefore, to be considered to be of only relative importance, and not something absolute.

In this regard, this Facebook message is apparently correct in its assertions, as its rationale appears to be rather in line with this latest court decision. This does not however, mean that it must at all follow that such a rationale is a viable approach to resolving such a given situation.

Implying as it does, that those who for what ever reason are not identified with a particular cultural paradigm would do better to stay well out of the way, smacks of intolerance towards the outsider, and is not indicative of a constructive debate.

Moreover, the EU statement might have been made by any dispassionate observer of the situation, and it evidently did not appeal to a sense of wanting to in any way diminish Thai culture. Therefore, it is unfortunate whenever there is an appeal to a sense of indignation that non-Thais are unduly interfering in Thai domestic affairs.

But the thing to remember here, is that it is not so easy to convincingly dismiss the key point that was actually made by the EU. Moreover, such a critique remains just as valid, whether or not it happened to have been made by a Thai or non-Thai observer of the Somyot case.

To some extent, Thai NGOs have been outspoken in openly challenging the court’s decision. Yet for many, these NGOs are considered to be so purely aligned to the aspirations of the Red Shirt movement, that their arguments are almost entirely disregarded by those who may happen to disagree with their politics.

Despite the reasoning of many who continue to perceive the question of freedom of expression as contingent on how it relates to the political Red-Yellow paradigm, this limited perspective only acts to relegate the question of human rights to the level of political gamesmanship.

That Somyot was an editor of a Red Shirt publication means that for many Thais, they cannot see through to the essential importance of the principle of rights, which must be applied equally to all under the law, regardless of political affiliation. It is this state of moral confusion that ultimately acts to undermine all of our intrinsic rights.

If we believe in rights at all, then fundamental human rights cannot be regarded as something negotiable, to be applied as and when it suits any one particular interest group, when it finds itself in the fortuitous position of power.

Historically, and around the world, where significant progress has been made in relation to these essential questions, it is precisely because human rights have been held up as an issue of such fundamental importance, that it must transcend politics and societal variances. So, in the words of Mahatma Gandhi: “Freedom is not worth having if it does not include the freedom to make mistakes.”

This may be a perspective that all Thais would do well to consider, especially when discussing freedom of expression in the context of the Thai cultural heritage. As the world changes over time, we should now more than ever before, fully consider the freedoms that we have never had, in order to create for ourselves a democratic spirit favourable to a constructive national debate, and most importantly perhaps, the necessary commitment to freedom of expression for all.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.

http://prachatai.com/english/node/3503

Red-shirt influence and the constitutional question

Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation January 2, 2013 1:00 am

It is now two years since the phenomenon of the red-shirt "Villages for Democracy" emerged across Thailand, and since December 2010 over 16,000 villages have declared themselves, as this movement continues to evolve and adapt.

Nevertheless, it is extremely significant for both the red shirts and the country at large that the implications of these efforts are yet to be fully realised at the national level. With the arguments over constitutional reform dominating the national political discourse, and also the apparent determination exhibited by the anti-Thaksin coalition to resist reform, the question of the red shirts continues to be the source of much political intrigue.

The capacity to link an emerging grassroots movement to a national political agenda is of critical importance when it comes to an essential question such as this, which relates to the possible return to Thailand of the former prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. This does, of course, do much to explain the political ploys and cryptic arguments from both sides relating to a further rewriting of the Thai Constitution at this time, revealing the high stakes involved.

Then, when we consider the legal requirement for a majority of registered voters to vote on a constitutional referendum, voter turnout and political mobilisation take precedence over the simple technical victory that is sufficient for parliamentary elections. This helps to explain the questionable and anti-democratic rationale of some Democrat Party politicians in attempting to minimise turnout, should the constitutional referendum go ahead as planned.

In this context, it may paradoxically be in the long-term interests of Thaksin, if his opponents are in fact wrong in their assertions that the red-shirt movement is effectively a wholly owned subsidiary of his. Indeed, few red shirts would actually wish to be perceived in such a light. For those within the red-shirt umbrella, the motivation to continue to politically mobilise must therefore be linked to a strong belief that their relationship to Thaksin is both rational and advantageous.

When it comes to the question of the red-shirt villages, for the majority of Thais there continues to be much uncertainty surrounding their formation. Arnon Sannan, who is credited with having established the red-shirt village concept, has recently argued: "I've made it very clear that the red-shirt villages aim to promote democracy and differences. So the non-red shirts should not feel excluded if they believe in democracy."

However, only a few months after the official launch of a number of red-shirt villages in Ubon Ratchathani, Rattana Kampui, the leader of Serichon Ubon - or Free People of Ubon - noted: "I observed rising conflicts within these red-shirt villages, and acknowledgement that some of the villages are more divided. And a number of the locals are in fear of talking politics."

This context reveals that if the red-shirt village movement is dominated by a core of activists who act with the expectation that all community members will inevitably come on board, then they will ultimately face disappointment. If, when facing resistance, they become dogmatic and inflexible in their aims and objectives, then their reasonable claims will be lost in the argument, as the remainder of society feels increasingly isolated from their demands.

As Robert Dahl, a noted writer on democracy, once argued: "Yes, individuals and groups may sometimes be mistaken about their own good. Certainly they may sometimes misperceive what is in their own best interests."

Despite the evident frustration felt by many rural Thais, it remains in their interest to find ways to connect their message with the hearts and minds of the wider Thai population, and this strategy would not be well served by a retreat into isolationism, which has the very real potential to significantly backfire.

The establishment of a red-shirt village creates a geographical zoning, which acts to further alienate these villages from the rest of Thai society, and both sides are now feeling this sense of division. Furthermore, there is the suggestion that these villages are the cause of emerging fragmentation within the broader red-shirt movement, which is weakening their overall position within the red-shirt coalition. Consequently, they risk undermining any opportunity they do have, to effectively contend with the existing power structures of the political establishment.

Indeed, as Francis Fukuyama has recently argued: "It requires a great deal of hard work to persuade people that institutional change is needed in the first place, build a coalition in favour of change that can overcome the resistance of existing stakeholders in the old system." 

In time, the red-shirt movement does have the potential to develop its approach, in order to emerge as a responsive interest group within the Thai political paradigm. This, in and of itself, would assist in better holding government accountable, and if the significance of this prospect was more fully understood, then the opening that this suggests would be more positively accepted by the broader Thai demographic.

In other words, if the red-shirt villages movement can expect to be able to make a strong case to the wider Thai society that they are effective in perceiving problems and constructive in providing solutions, then the evidence for this must be there. As a lack of regard for the rights of the individual, which must be set aside for the alleged benefit of the group collective, has many dangerous precedents, if red-shirt villages can demonstrate that they are developing more democratic and cohesive communities than typically exist across Thailand today, then this achievement will become apparent to the outside observer.

Their recent strategic shift towards the development of more economically oriented cooperatives has the potential to include those who are unaffiliated with the red shirts, and also to reconnect those who have felt themselves marginalised by the often overtly political aspects of this movement. The success stories would greatly assist in the development of an inclusive grassroots undertaking, which could then act to powerfully inform the newly emerging social dynamics of Thailand.

It can be established, therefore, when making the case for Thai democracy and the desire of social-political movements to affect change, that the democratic underpinning in fully respecting the rights of the individual and of political representation is not a partisan case. This concerns all Thais, regardless of their political affiliation or perspective.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.

Reforms on paper will never guarantee our rights

Reforms on paper will never guarantee our rights

Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation December 13, 2012 12:10 am

This week across Thailand and the world, the question of human rights has again been in the spotlight, with Thais marking National Constitution Day, and the world celebrating Human Rights Day. Yet in Thailand and beyond, these rights are still playing catch up to the promise of rights for all. Each and every day that has gone by since key documents were signed, reflects a failure to achieve a reality to which their words may once have aspired.

At this stage, we should hardly doubt that the failure to live up to these principles is intimately bound up with continuing problems within the political system itself - and in this context is the debate to legitimise further constitutional changes.

Although this debate is finding its way back onto the Thai political stage, its fundamental purpose is not to address Chapter 3 of the Thai Constitution regarding the "Rights and Liberties of Thai People". Rather, it is the case that both the Pheu Thai government and the Democrat Party are focused on the ways in which the Constitution implicates on the question of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, and his possible return to Thailand.

The reality of political expediency does not, however, negate the very real need to seriously address the essential question of constitutional reform. At a foundational level, the Constitution of 2007 continues to lack a sufficiently rigorous system of checks and balances, which would act to defend the rights and liberties of all Thai citizens.

It is therefore encouraging that in the minds of the wider public, there are now signs of a greater capacity for discernment in differentiating between an issue of fundamental importance such as basic human rights or the relationship between the individual and the state, and the related political gamesmanship. More pushback from the electorate when it comes to structural failures within the Thai political system is almost certainly a prerequisite for any kind of significant progress to be made.

Regardless of the motives of politicians - or judges, army officers or bureaucrats for that matter - actions to circumnavigate the very system to which they are responsible for upholding, is necessarily a violation of the public's trust.

Since the crackdown on red-shirts protesters in 2010, the focus has increasingly been to highlight rights abuses and violations, which have been committed by the machinery of the state. A range of NGOs and activists from both Thailand and outside have continued to raise these questions, including in the latest annual reports of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, two well-regarded international NGOs.

The rewritten Thai Constitution of 2007 was enacted following the coup of 2006, and little has changed in terms of the way in which the question of rights is addressed. It could perhaps be argued that this is because Thailand already claims to recognise such rights in full. It is, after all, more than half a century since Thailand signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, so it should already be clear to us that whether or not principles expressed in writing are a genuine attempt towards progress, without equivalent progress in the daily experiences of ordinary Thai citizens, those words remain merely aspirations on paper.

And so it goes on. Just last month at the 21st Asean Summit, political leaders reiterated the importance of the "promotion and protection of human rights", as reflected in the adoption of the Asean Human Rights Declaration. Yet, during Cambodia's chair of Asean in 2012, reports exposed the political double standard, as protesters were forcibly prevented from expressing their rights in ways that would have embarrassed the Cambodian political leadership.

In the words of US.Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not just a catalogue of rights and government obligations. It is a time-tested blueprint for successful societies." In this context, when we consider the case of the US, we may well realise that progress is not merely dependant on words and pieces of paper. In addition, the vital contribution of the people in demanding that equal rights be recognised, has played an essential role in the emergence of the US democracy.

For instance, although rights in principle may have long existed for all Americans, when it came to the question of civil rights in the 1960s, it was not until politicians who desired to be on the right side of history could sense a change in the attitudes of the broad demographic that they sought to take up the leadership role in response.

Seemingly then, what is required in the case of Thailand is a sufficient momentum in the societal dynamics, in order that a change can be brought about. A constitution with effective checks and balances? Not yet. A sufficient desire amongst the population for equality for all? Doubtful. Politicians with a desire to emulate historical icons in standing for truth and freedom? We are still waiting.

Today in Thailand, there is a continuing drive to push through further legislation and agreements, and to build institutions that are charged with tackling the very real problem of human injustice. Indeed, more than ten years have passed since the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand was established, and yet over this same period the people from the provinces have taken an initiative in becoming increasingly politically mobilised. Whenever there is a persistent failure to recognise rights, political polarisation and a sense of alienation from the state can always be found, and this is exactly what we continue to witness in Thailand.

When the people justifiably have little confidence in the capacity of institutions to affect change, what would be the appropriate response? An ambitious political leadership may consider the implementation of a highly public strategy to engage the missing links within the social-political paradigm. The issue of institutional implementation is an ongoing problem, and it needs to be opened up to broad public scrutiny. A much-needed campaign to empower Thais to challenge the power of the state and to become the much-needed counterbalance would place more pressure on those who are failing in their role.

Thais may be better served by looking for political leadership that emphasises open admission of the problems faced and the mistakes that have been made, rather than self-serving strategies that indulge the primary interests of politicians and power brokers, and equally, a leadership that resists pandering to the immediate and all-too-often short-sighted personal interests of voters themselves.

Ultimately, the greatest failure of the past decade may have been Thailand's collective inability to effectively respond to the very real concerns of marginalised groups within the country. And although it may be uncomfortable to admit this, such an open acknowledgement may assist in Thailand learning a valuable lesson. Namely, that for as long as clear injustices continue to go unresolved, the opportunity for enduring progress will be forever undermined.

Despite the hype over obama's visit, Thailand must take lead

Despite the hype over obama's visit, Thailand must take lead

Titipol Phakdeewanich

Special to The Nation November 15, 2012 1:00 am

US President Barack Obama will be making his first visit to Thailand this weekend as part of a wider tour of the region, where the focus will be on the East Asia Summit in Cambodia and a historic visit to Myanmar. No doubt there will be significant hype in the national media when President Obama arrives in Thailand, despite this aspect of his tour being primarily a diplomatic courtesy call to mark 180 years of Thai-US relations.

Because of this, we can expect little in the way of real substance to emerge out of any planned meetings with Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra or other senior Thai officials. Today, the old cry of "What will the US do for Thailand?" has lost much of its meaning as international dynamics shift, and an up-to-date grasp of the way in which the world works becomes a key priority.

Back in 2011, before a bilateral meeting between Thailand and the US, President Obama stated: "The United States and Thailand are two of the oldest of allies. We have established a great friendship over the years. We have a wide range of areas of common interest and cooperation."

Despite the warm words of President Obama, however, in the post-global financial crisis period, where key players such as the US and China are busy reassessing their priorities and national interests, a country such as Thailand must be ever increasingly responsible in ensuring its attractiveness for international partners, both economically and politically.

At this time, the fragile state of Thailand's stop-start democracy is being brought into focus. The Pitak Siam Group plans to hold more protests on the November 24 in support of military intervention, once again. This issue will necessarily inform the context as the world's most powerful politician and most influential advocate for democratic progress is set to visit the country. 

What message, then, is inevitably sent out when Thailand is presented with such a rare opportunity to show a US president what the nation can offer? Inevitably - for as long as there continues to exist the possibility of another Thai coup - otherwise-willing international partners will adjust their level of engagement as and when relations become increasingly politically problematic. 

If President Obama remains concerted in his efforts to rebuild the moral authority of the US around the world - which suffered such damage to its reputation during the previous administration - he will be concerned to achieve consistency in his message when it comes to the issues of democracy, human rights and freedom of expression.

In attempting to better engage with a country such as the US, therefore, Thailand must firmly establish itself as a trusted and reliable democratic partner. This remains the responsibility of Thailand. Despite ongoing political instability, the six years that have passed since the last military coup of 2006 will have at least encouraged democratic nations to reach out towards a democratically elected Thai government. 

Notably this month, much of the focus on international relations will be centred around the East Asia Summit in Cambodia, and this has provided the current government with an excellent opportunity to place extra emphasis on building up Thailand's international status.

It is the busiest couple of weeks yet for Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra on the international stage, since taking office last year. First, there was her audience in the UK with Queen Elizabeth, which will be followed by planned meetings with President Obama and then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. This sends out the message that although the Yingluck government's status continues to be questioned by many Thais, this government is fully recognised by Thailand's international partners. 

In politics it is tempting to focus effort where and when there is a greater likelihood of a political return, and for President Obama and his advisors there are a number of factors to consider when it comes to the Asia-Pacific region and Asean. Indonesia and Vietnam especially may appear to offer significant opportunities in this regard, as both nations continue their impressive growth rates and become more democratic. Continued progress on Myanmar also has the potential to be politically rewarding for President Obama.

Thailand’s perceived strategic advantage within mainland Southeast Asia, and economic development opportunities on its borders with Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, have been major incentives for leading actors such as the US, China and the European Union to make the effort required to engage with successive Thai governments. Thailand, however, will not want to risk being perceived as simply a regional transitory hub and strategic base for others.

Therefore, Thailand must act more effectively in proving itself a reliable ally, and in taking a leadership role with regard to international partnership agreements. For example, the Lower Mekong Initiative, which was announced in 2009 by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the foreign ministers of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, has made little progress as of yet.

President Obama may now expect to persuade the Asia-Pacific region and the member countries of Asean to follow his vision in speaking out against political entrenchment, and in attempting to challenge the status quo. But with the ongoing colour-code politics strait-jacketing Thailand's democratic progress, how can any Thai political leader expect to be able to meet the US president halfway? 

Sentiments that remain at the core of US foreign policy were well stated by former president Bill Clinton during his own presidential visit to Thailand in 1996: "The United States will continue to stand with those who stand for freedom in Asia and beyond."

When all things are considered, we may quickly realise that nothing can be taken for granted in the 21st century. International policy-makers and political actors may shift their emphasis and attempt new approaches as they look towards the most promising opportunities and the latest beacons of hope. 

This ought to suggest that Thailand must be careful to avoid missing this key opportunity to re-establish itself at the heart of progress and democracy within the region.

Why money politics is such a challenge to all of us

Why money politics is such a challenge to all of us

Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation November 2, 2012 1:00 am

Just five years ago, during his famous address to announce his campaign for the US presidency, Barack Obama stated: "The cynics and the lobbyists and the special interests who have turned our government into a game only they can afford to play ... they think they own this government. But we're here today to take it back."

But it is now anticipated that incumbent Barack Obama and challenger Mitt Romney, now in their final week of the 2012 presidential campaign, will each manage to spend a new world record of US$1 billion as they battle for the top job in politics. Seemingly then, after four years of Barack Obama's presidency, there is very little sign of a decline in the influence of these lobbyists. It is as though, despite the apparent attempts of the president, they are here to stay after all.

It is often said that money is indeed the root of all evil. Then, in an era of money politics, what does this say about current political systems both in the US and also in Thailand?

Hardly a day goes by without another revelation about the questionable financial affairs of a Thai politician or his business associate. So there is clearly a need to bring reform to the ongoing problem of political corruption here at home.

The approach taken by the US has been to formalise the flow of finances between politicians, corporations and business insiders through the lobby system. Its apparent pitfalls still include the opportunity for big business to insinuate itself ahead of the electorate, within the political process. Nevertheless, this system does at least attempt to increase financial transparency by bringing money from under the table into the light of day. In doing so, such a system provides voters with the opportunity to both scrutinise and hold their political representatives more fully accountable.

Of course, the fact that no system is ever perfect cannot be a valid justification in refusing to entertain new approaches to the question of reform. This applies especially when the evidence for success can be found in other political systems overseas.

Thailand's democracy is somewhat modelled on the British system, where money politics is apparently less of an issue. Even in the case of the historic UK parliamentary scandal of 2009, corruption can still be measured in the thousands of pounds. This is hardly the case in either the US or Thailand, where the figures far exceed that, and where we are talking about millions rather than merely thousands. 

One of the reasons for these differences, and especially between the US and the UK, is to do with the nature of the political career itself. In the UK, one rarely enters politics in order to make a buck, and highly qualified individuals often take a pay cut to enter parliament.

The same cannot be said of either Thailand or the US, however, where the suspicion always remains that individuals are tempted into politics because of a desire for power and the opportunity for wealth that it brings.

Regardless of the political system, however, vested interests will always attempt to find ways to subvert the existing checks and balances. Just as worryingly, such interests are also actively involved in both stalling and subverting any serious future attempts at challenging the ongoing problem of political corruption.

So then, what are we to do? As we become increasingly frustrated at political stagnation, corruption and failed policies that are all reinforced by the entrenched patronage system, positive progress appears less likely. And yes, it would indeed seem to be a daunting and unrealistic task if we are to expect overnight success in much-needed reforms. 

Clearly, in the case of Thailand, it is the patronage system itself that must be thoroughly challenged if we are to resist the tendency to fall yet again straight into the vote-buying scenario come election time.

The Election Commission of Thailand has ultimately failed in its task of ending vote-buying at both the national and local levels. And the evidence that this significant problem persists can be found in the many cases that continue be publicised across Thailand. 

Just this October, in Si Sa Ket, it was revealed that one local candidate running for head of a tambon administrative organisation spent over Bt1 million in the campaign. And even this wasn't enough to secure electoral victory. Most of this spending was for vote-buying, at Bt500-800 per vote, and it went undeclared. But such a scenario is, of course, an old story.

If Thailand is to successfully forge its own system, then a new degree of flexibility in embracing a range of approaches will improve the odds. To a great extent, the real opportunity for political scrutiny begins when there is a raised awareness amongst the population of the possible solutions. In this regard, developing a more formalised lobby system is one thing, and increased respect for due process is another. In addition, term limits may help to dissuade the opportunists who seek a "return on investment" in building a political career over the long term. 

Critically, it is the mindset of the public that ultimately must shift. For as long as it remains normalised in one's mind that the problems are unfixable, and that no change is possible, then this apathy only helps to reinforce systemic problems.

We all know that "money talks". But in the recent words of the US politician Barney Frank, who was one of the more prominent reformers in the wake of the global financial crisis: "When you equate money with speech … the equality principle gets eroded."

Whatever system Thailand ultimately decides upon, it must guarantee that the voices of its people are louder than the noise generated by money as it changes hands.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.

In digital age, youth leave mark on politics

FREE SPEECH

In digital age, youth leave mark on politics

• Published: 27/10/2012 at 12:00 AM
• Newspaper section: News

When considering the emergence of online social media, what can we make of the political engagement of this generation of Thai students and youth?

Whenever we stop to consider the impact of Thai student activism on a national scale, the memories that are conjured up in particular recall the confrontations on the streets between the military government of the 1970s and the students of that generation who were calling for democracy.

In the digital era, with governments not yet able to completely control the flow of information of the new online social media, Thai students and youth are learning a new model of socio-political activism without resorting to attempts to incite any kind of revolution.

In the refuge of cyberspace, Thai students and youth are increasingly taking the opportunity for self expression offered by online dialogue, and especially through social networks such as Facebook and Twitter.

As it remains the case within Thailand that to openly and publicly challenge the paradigms set by the older generations is usually deemed inappropriate, the less direct nature of online interactions provides the opportunity for the younger generation to be able to express their feelings openly, and in a more socially acceptable context. This emerging dynamic can open up the debate, free up freedom of speech, and diversify what is considered to be an "acceptable" opinion in order that constraints can be lifted, and all voices can be heard.

If an open, positive, and meaningful debate is to be encouraged, then a great deal can be achieved when freedom of expression allows the societal tensions that have built up over time, to be released.

The choice increasingly made by students and the youth within Thailand today to spark debate through their online social networks need not be something that unduly unnerves the political establishment. Can the political leaders of today see the opportunity they have in all of this, to step up and positively engage with this emerging approach to social-political dialogue, and actively participate in its ongoing development, as a means towards free and open expression?

Although it is true to say that politicians often have quite an active online social media presence, we must be realistic enough to ask ourselves how much of this may be self-serving and politically expedient, and how much of this is really a genuine attempt to engage with these new generations, who as of yet may not even have cast a vote in an election.

When we look into the dynamics of many online discussions, it is obvious that many initially begin with somewhat pejorative throwaway comments often aimed at letting off steam and venting frustration. However, what it is interesting to note is that such comments can still act to ignite a debate that becomes more balanced and more fully considered, as others are drawn into the debate to contribute new perspectives.

A case in point is the initial fuss over Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra's style of dress when meeting foreign dignitaries, and the ensuing furore, which was generated online. Highly pejorative and personal though these attacks may have been, nevertheless, this did lead many of those polarised minds to investigate further the protocols of diplomacy and dress code and, more importantly, what we should be expecting from our political leadership in the way in which they represent Thailand to the world.

This aspect in and of itself is strikingly positive, and may have acted to introduce many Thais to consider more deeply than ever, how the political process operates at the highest level. Such outcomes can be seen as positive developments when we aspire towards a greater level of engagement with the democratic process, regardless of however trivial the initial fuss generated may indeed have been.

Depending on circumstance, time and place, people may denounce student activism, when perhaps they have forgotten what it feels like to be young and full of passion for things. Others may privately support the activists, when it acts to remind them of their own youthful energy of earlier days. But are we being too romantic, when it comes to the notion of what it means to be an activist who may have to take personal risks in order to protest moral injustice?

Alternatively, might it just be the case that the emerging online socio-political dialogue, which represents the underrepresented voices of the students and the youth, is helping to alert the more responsive political elements within the existing political establishment to make the necessary changes, before the prospects are raised of societal crises emerging? This, after all, is what students and the youth have represented to the political establishment, historically around the world. Namely, that they act as the indicators of where society may be headed, regardless of the political entrenchment of the "old guard", and the more astute observers of a political system have of course, always been somewhat mindful of this dynamic.

Vijitra Sataporn, a high school student from Si Sa Ket argues: "I always want to attend the village public forum's budget, but I am not allowed, because I am only a kid. I think I am a member of this village, so I should have the right to attend." But in this digital era, Thailand's students and youth now have the opportunity afforded by the emergence of online social media and networking, to take on the role of representing to the country in an engaging and constructive manner, the issues that will be the priorities for the new generations, in helping to shape the country that they will inherit in the coming decades.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University