Sunday, 20 December 2015
Sunday, 22 November 2015
The army camp creeps on to the uni campus
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Thursday, 13 August 2015
What hope for Thai democracy when tyranny rules at university?
What hope for Thai democracy when tyranny rules at university?
TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH
Outdated hazing rituals expose Thailand's abiding societal schism
These first few weeks of the new Thai university year again bring into focus the euphemistically titled tradition of "rub nong" - (welcoming the newcomer). These rituals, with a well-established format that plays on the naivete of first-year students, are a thoroughly dehumanising group induction into university life.
Year after year, rub nong and its various hazing-style practices leave their unwitting victims psychologically and sometimes physically scarred. Serious injuries have resulted - and still it goes on, under the noses of university authorities.
Despite this, many former and current university students regard these rituals with surprising affection as part of a Thai cultural tradition of social bonding, where everyone gets to become your "brother" or "sister".
A standard argument is that older and more worldly students can help support their younger and inexperienced counterparts - which, in principle, sounds like a reasonable claim.
But for several generations of students, rub nong has been a calculated enforcement of a rigid social hierarchy on campus that they must endure.
A reality of obedience and subordination outweighs the ideal of friendship and equality, and the practices adopted by senior students who implement these rituals are well-honed and ruthlessly enacted. Over recent years, veiled threats and coercive group psychology have been the trend, though outright violence still takes place on occasion.
The latter help ramp up an overbearing pressure to conform to the norms of this menacing regime.
Fear over who might be singled-out next for displeasing those who run this mini-mafia means most students simply keep their heads down. And so this often fanatical effort to boss student life prevails unchallenged, aided by the indifference (or ambivalence) of university and government authorities.
Advocates often justify the practice by claiming rub nong prepares students for the harsh world waiting for them after graduation. In reality, this claim is an attempt to rationalise their own unthinking authoritarian approach to life.
Do the legions of university seniors already implicated - whether from actions this week or 20 years ago - share any secret sense of shame at their part in the dehumanisation of their innocent fellows, even while they publicly remain shameless and defiant in their advocacy for it? Perhaps. Perhaps not. But either way, rub nong and the cultural climate it helps engender remains as Thailand's shame, regardless of how much we continue to avoid the issue.
"Life on campus is not what I expected. I thought I would have freedom, but I don't think that I have it at all. Seniority is extremely embedded here, and it is secretly supported by the university executive, who believe in this kind of authoritarian system. I don't think that I have any hope for a better student life here, because my rights do not mean anything to the university."
These are the words of a student currently based at a northern university, speaking on condition of anonymity.
It is clear that concerns about rub nong and the welfare of students are not a priority for the authorities, despite lip service paid by the Education Ministry and university authorities in recent years.
Although human rights now often get a mention at the start of the new academic year, this is still largely a token effort. Rub nong's perpetrators can disregard the official platitudes, safe in the knowledge that serious action is seldom taken.
For those of us who once had such high hopes for Thailand's development, it is dismaying to note that rituals which violate basic norms of universal human rights still retain a semblance of legitimacy.
Worse still, rub nong - along with other similarly absurd authoritarian propositions continually spouted by talking heads, street-level wannabes and every totalitarian enforcer - excite those Thais who regard such things as actually worth fighting for.
All this, of course, is taking place at a time when Thailand is subject to increasingly severe scrutiny by much of the international community over its abandonment of democracy.
And the country's already damaged international standing is now being even further undermined by a focus on the broader question of human rights violations. In this context, it is disturbing that the prevalence of rub nong evidences a strong generational desire to disavow basic democratic and human rights tenets. And this, while Thailand is in the midst of a prolonged and worrisome dynamic of social-political disintegration. Such ingrained authoritarianism bodes ill for both our future domestic prospects and our reputation abroad.
Even if a semblance of democracy is re-established in the country, then the ongoing prevalence of pernicious and divisive university rituals that help enshrine the Thai patronage system will inform the much-vaunted and idealised "Thai-style" democracy to come.
Future generations will gain little solace from denouncing the authorities of today. For those generations will, by then, surely be forced to do some soul-searching over the part they played in defending authoritarian norms.
Without a far more determined effort to question the prevailing Thai mentality - and especially its most damaging aspects, which are already penetrating the minds of yet another generation - why should anyone who claims to be serious about the current process of Thai reform expect things to change for the better?
TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, in the UK. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University.
Year after year, rub nong and its various hazing-style practices leave their unwitting victims psychologically and sometimes physically scarred. Serious injuries have resulted - and still it goes on, under the noses of university authorities.
Despite this, many former and current university students regard these rituals with surprising affection as part of a Thai cultural tradition of social bonding, where everyone gets to become your "brother" or "sister".
A standard argument is that older and more worldly students can help support their younger and inexperienced counterparts - which, in principle, sounds like a reasonable claim.
But for several generations of students, rub nong has been a calculated enforcement of a rigid social hierarchy on campus that they must endure.
A reality of obedience and subordination outweighs the ideal of friendship and equality, and the practices adopted by senior students who implement these rituals are well-honed and ruthlessly enacted. Over recent years, veiled threats and coercive group psychology have been the trend, though outright violence still takes place on occasion.
The latter help ramp up an overbearing pressure to conform to the norms of this menacing regime.
Fear over who might be singled-out next for displeasing those who run this mini-mafia means most students simply keep their heads down. And so this often fanatical effort to boss student life prevails unchallenged, aided by the indifference (or ambivalence) of university and government authorities.
Advocates often justify the practice by claiming rub nong prepares students for the harsh world waiting for them after graduation. In reality, this claim is an attempt to rationalise their own unthinking authoritarian approach to life.
Do the legions of university seniors already implicated - whether from actions this week or 20 years ago - share any secret sense of shame at their part in the dehumanisation of their innocent fellows, even while they publicly remain shameless and defiant in their advocacy for it? Perhaps. Perhaps not. But either way, rub nong and the cultural climate it helps engender remains as Thailand's shame, regardless of how much we continue to avoid the issue.
"Life on campus is not what I expected. I thought I would have freedom, but I don't think that I have it at all. Seniority is extremely embedded here, and it is secretly supported by the university executive, who believe in this kind of authoritarian system. I don't think that I have any hope for a better student life here, because my rights do not mean anything to the university."
These are the words of a student currently based at a northern university, speaking on condition of anonymity.
It is clear that concerns about rub nong and the welfare of students are not a priority for the authorities, despite lip service paid by the Education Ministry and university authorities in recent years.
Although human rights now often get a mention at the start of the new academic year, this is still largely a token effort. Rub nong's perpetrators can disregard the official platitudes, safe in the knowledge that serious action is seldom taken.
For those of us who once had such high hopes for Thailand's development, it is dismaying to note that rituals which violate basic norms of universal human rights still retain a semblance of legitimacy.
Worse still, rub nong - along with other similarly absurd authoritarian propositions continually spouted by talking heads, street-level wannabes and every totalitarian enforcer - excite those Thais who regard such things as actually worth fighting for.
All this, of course, is taking place at a time when Thailand is subject to increasingly severe scrutiny by much of the international community over its abandonment of democracy.
And the country's already damaged international standing is now being even further undermined by a focus on the broader question of human rights violations. In this context, it is disturbing that the prevalence of rub nong evidences a strong generational desire to disavow basic democratic and human rights tenets. And this, while Thailand is in the midst of a prolonged and worrisome dynamic of social-political disintegration. Such ingrained authoritarianism bodes ill for both our future domestic prospects and our reputation abroad.
Even if a semblance of democracy is re-established in the country, then the ongoing prevalence of pernicious and divisive university rituals that help enshrine the Thai patronage system will inform the much-vaunted and idealised "Thai-style" democracy to come.
Future generations will gain little solace from denouncing the authorities of today. For those generations will, by then, surely be forced to do some soul-searching over the part they played in defending authoritarian norms.
Without a far more determined effort to question the prevailing Thai mentality - and especially its most damaging aspects, which are already penetrating the minds of yet another generation - why should anyone who claims to be serious about the current process of Thai reform expect things to change for the better?
TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, in the UK. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University.
Thursday, 28 May 2015
The vainglorious constitutional quest of a junta UNDER STRESS
The vainglorious constitutional quest of a junta UNDER STRESS
THE CHARTER DRAFTERS' CLAIM THAT 'THE CITIZEN IS THE CENTRE|OF THIS CONSTITUTION' IS SOUNDING INCREASINGLY HOLLOW
Last week's conciliatory announcement by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) that citizens will have the opportunity to either reject or consent to a new constitution is unconvincing as a show of democratic intent.
One year on from the military coup of May 22, the country remains fundamentally divided as to whether we should even attempt a return to democracy.
What will be the consequences of this seemingly intractable social-political predicament for Thailand?
Growing signs of equivocation in the junta indicate that the intent remains to press ahead with its imperatives for a new constitution - whether or not a referendum is, in the end, held. The protracted pretence would then be over, and with it, any semblance of credibility among those who ache for more tangible democratic foundations.
The various "yeas" and "nays" that continually emerge from the junta and its subordinate institutions - only to be followed by more dashed hopes for Thailand's democratic progress - only risk further alienating the now tantalised voters-in-waiting. It is also worrisome that this protracted Thai impasse contains so many echoes of our pre-democratic and authoritarian eras of history.
All the while, voices from the international community - including the United Nations, the European Union, the United States and Japan - have remained resolute in their insistence that Thailand must return power to its people through an open and democratic election. The resulting economic pressure being brought to bear on Thailand makes the options for its leadership that much more stark.
So it seems strange that a leadership whose declared intent is to forge a successful transition towards democracy is so unenthusiastic about the opportunity to establish democratic norms.
Such a discrepancy only further undermines the credibility of this Thai leadership among critics both in Thailand and beyond.
Despite a new timeline that suggests democratic elections could be held soon as late next year, delays in ratifying the new constitution indicate Thailand is unlikely to attain democratic normalcy anytime soon. Nevertheless, the current draft of what is intended to be the 19th Thai constitution is still being determinedly scrutinised by citizens as they look for ways to assert their voices as Thailand's stakeholders-at-large.
It is thus becoming incumbent on all sides to recognise the importance of an open civil society as a means of promoting constructive dialogue, learn the value of cooperation, and make reasonable concessions as part of an undertaking to bridge Thailand's pernicious societal divide.
Without a greater general sense of reason and flexibility, it is likely to matter little whether the question of the constitution is settled via a supposedly exhaustive redrafting, or through a disjointed series of amendments. Thai history indicates that any such result will be thoroughly unsatisfactory and unworkable.
Provincial Thais, especially those from the North and Northeast, remain the scapegoats of choice over Thailand's continuing ills. Both the emerging urban middle class and the establishment continue to make the most of any opportunity to characterise the rural poor as "uneducated" and "self-serving".
Disenfranchised rural Thais
"The drafting of a constitution is not my job, I am only a rural person. What I say doesn't mean anything to anyone. I want the constitution to work for us [people within his village], but we're not part of it. Only people in the city or Bangkok can say what they want, not us [rural people]."
These are the words of a rural Thai voter, who wished to remain anonymous, living by the Mekong River on the Thailand-Laos border in Khong Chiam district, Ubon Ratchathani province.
His words are profound because they convey a simple, clear and direct truth that withstands the inane stereotyping to which rural Isaan (northeastern) Thais are routinely subjected. They also undermine the convoluted rationalising of those who would seek to contrive reasons for why a population that is already among the most marginalised should be continually disregarded and disenfranchised.
Fortunately for Thailand, the question of the correlation between educational attainment and the right to vote was also raised by political philosopher John Stuart Mill: "I regard it as wholly inadmissible that any person should participate in the suffrage [have voting rights] without being able to read, write and, I will add, perform the common operations of arithmetic." In other words, the attainment of basic literacy was his simple prerequisite for access to the ballot box.
Even though Mill was not advocating voting rights for all, he was in favour of more inclusion. And this was in the context of a still rather undemocratic 19th-century Britain, where women did not have the right to vote, and an era far removed from our own 21st-century information age. It was also at a time when only about three-quarters of the British population had attained basic literacy - a figure now exceeded by the Thailand of today.
Most Thais, wherever they live, now enjoy increased access to information, in one way or another. The fact that even remote rural areas of Thailand can sometimes have better Internet access than urban areas is acting to support greater critical thinking among the rural population. The stereotypes of irredeemably naive or ignorant rural citizens are becoming more and more outdated, and more politically untenable.
Historically, a common argument made against Thai liberal democracy is that Thailand is not ready because the people are "not well-educated". This mentality is reflected in the main arguments of the People's Democratic Reform Committee in 2013 and 2014, during the build-up to the coup. We could characterise these as the "never-quite-ready-yet" arguments of Thai political rhetoric.
Mill's Britain never did adopt a written constitution. But post-revolutionary France and America did go in that direction, making significant social-political advances in the meantime, as their emerging democratic systems adapted and evolved even amid the inevitable ups and the downs. In contrast, Thailand's hesitant and unconvincing stop-start attempts at democracy are evidence of its own failures - and the fallout is its plight.
Democracy means inclusivity
Ultimately, the value that a political system places on inclusiveness is a key indicator of democratic progress.
Thai leadership must now recognise this fact by holding a free, fair and open constitutional referendum, followed by bona fide democratic elections. After all, the Constitutional Drafting Committee, which operates under the authority of the NCPO, has repeatedly highlighted, that: "[The] citizen is the centre of this constitution, where power is in the hands of the citizen."
For the Thai junta to summarily declare that a "perfect" constitution has now been drafted - after 18 failed and jettisoned "attempts" - is an incredible claim. In a country where groundless, bombastic public rhetoric has been the order of the day for so long, is there any good reason why such claims should be regarded favourably this time around?
TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, in the UK. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University.
One year on from the military coup of May 22, the country remains fundamentally divided as to whether we should even attempt a return to democracy.
What will be the consequences of this seemingly intractable social-political predicament for Thailand?
Growing signs of equivocation in the junta indicate that the intent remains to press ahead with its imperatives for a new constitution - whether or not a referendum is, in the end, held. The protracted pretence would then be over, and with it, any semblance of credibility among those who ache for more tangible democratic foundations.
The various "yeas" and "nays" that continually emerge from the junta and its subordinate institutions - only to be followed by more dashed hopes for Thailand's democratic progress - only risk further alienating the now tantalised voters-in-waiting. It is also worrisome that this protracted Thai impasse contains so many echoes of our pre-democratic and authoritarian eras of history.
All the while, voices from the international community - including the United Nations, the European Union, the United States and Japan - have remained resolute in their insistence that Thailand must return power to its people through an open and democratic election. The resulting economic pressure being brought to bear on Thailand makes the options for its leadership that much more stark.
So it seems strange that a leadership whose declared intent is to forge a successful transition towards democracy is so unenthusiastic about the opportunity to establish democratic norms.
Such a discrepancy only further undermines the credibility of this Thai leadership among critics both in Thailand and beyond.
Despite a new timeline that suggests democratic elections could be held soon as late next year, delays in ratifying the new constitution indicate Thailand is unlikely to attain democratic normalcy anytime soon. Nevertheless, the current draft of what is intended to be the 19th Thai constitution is still being determinedly scrutinised by citizens as they look for ways to assert their voices as Thailand's stakeholders-at-large.
It is thus becoming incumbent on all sides to recognise the importance of an open civil society as a means of promoting constructive dialogue, learn the value of cooperation, and make reasonable concessions as part of an undertaking to bridge Thailand's pernicious societal divide.
Without a greater general sense of reason and flexibility, it is likely to matter little whether the question of the constitution is settled via a supposedly exhaustive redrafting, or through a disjointed series of amendments. Thai history indicates that any such result will be thoroughly unsatisfactory and unworkable.
Provincial Thais, especially those from the North and Northeast, remain the scapegoats of choice over Thailand's continuing ills. Both the emerging urban middle class and the establishment continue to make the most of any opportunity to characterise the rural poor as "uneducated" and "self-serving".
Disenfranchised rural Thais
"The drafting of a constitution is not my job, I am only a rural person. What I say doesn't mean anything to anyone. I want the constitution to work for us [people within his village], but we're not part of it. Only people in the city or Bangkok can say what they want, not us [rural people]."
These are the words of a rural Thai voter, who wished to remain anonymous, living by the Mekong River on the Thailand-Laos border in Khong Chiam district, Ubon Ratchathani province.
His words are profound because they convey a simple, clear and direct truth that withstands the inane stereotyping to which rural Isaan (northeastern) Thais are routinely subjected. They also undermine the convoluted rationalising of those who would seek to contrive reasons for why a population that is already among the most marginalised should be continually disregarded and disenfranchised.
Fortunately for Thailand, the question of the correlation between educational attainment and the right to vote was also raised by political philosopher John Stuart Mill: "I regard it as wholly inadmissible that any person should participate in the suffrage [have voting rights] without being able to read, write and, I will add, perform the common operations of arithmetic." In other words, the attainment of basic literacy was his simple prerequisite for access to the ballot box.
Even though Mill was not advocating voting rights for all, he was in favour of more inclusion. And this was in the context of a still rather undemocratic 19th-century Britain, where women did not have the right to vote, and an era far removed from our own 21st-century information age. It was also at a time when only about three-quarters of the British population had attained basic literacy - a figure now exceeded by the Thailand of today.
Most Thais, wherever they live, now enjoy increased access to information, in one way or another. The fact that even remote rural areas of Thailand can sometimes have better Internet access than urban areas is acting to support greater critical thinking among the rural population. The stereotypes of irredeemably naive or ignorant rural citizens are becoming more and more outdated, and more politically untenable.
Historically, a common argument made against Thai liberal democracy is that Thailand is not ready because the people are "not well-educated". This mentality is reflected in the main arguments of the People's Democratic Reform Committee in 2013 and 2014, during the build-up to the coup. We could characterise these as the "never-quite-ready-yet" arguments of Thai political rhetoric.
Mill's Britain never did adopt a written constitution. But post-revolutionary France and America did go in that direction, making significant social-political advances in the meantime, as their emerging democratic systems adapted and evolved even amid the inevitable ups and the downs. In contrast, Thailand's hesitant and unconvincing stop-start attempts at democracy are evidence of its own failures - and the fallout is its plight.
Democracy means inclusivity
Ultimately, the value that a political system places on inclusiveness is a key indicator of democratic progress.
Thai leadership must now recognise this fact by holding a free, fair and open constitutional referendum, followed by bona fide democratic elections. After all, the Constitutional Drafting Committee, which operates under the authority of the NCPO, has repeatedly highlighted, that: "[The] citizen is the centre of this constitution, where power is in the hands of the citizen."
For the Thai junta to summarily declare that a "perfect" constitution has now been drafted - after 18 failed and jettisoned "attempts" - is an incredible claim. In a country where groundless, bombastic public rhetoric has been the order of the day for so long, is there any good reason why such claims should be regarded favourably this time around?
TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, in the UK. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University.
Wednesday, 6 May 2015
The English translation of my interview with Matichon
On the 4th of May, 2015, I was interviewed by a journalist from Matichon. The journalist wanted to know about my positions, with regard to the case that is now being made within Thailand, for a constitutional referendum to be a prerequisite for the new Thai constitution. Relative to most of the rest of the main Thai media publications, Matichon has been generally considered to be a strong advocate for just such a referendum.
The following is my translation-interpretation into English (as it is not possible to make a direct translation or transliteration from Thai into English) of the interview, which appeared in print, on the 6th of May, 2015. I have taken it upon myself to insert a certain amount of additional contextualisation within the brackets, in order to account for the places where the print interview paraphrased my arguments - something, which would have been done, either, because the publication may now regard such details as being fairly self-evident to their Thai readership, or, because of print-space constraints:
“[I would argue that in terms of the questions relating to the legitimacy of the new Thai constitution, and therefore, the importance of holding a constitutional referendum…] In principle, once they are agreed upon, the laws should then be accepted by all the stakeholders within the country. However, although some of the members are, evidently, properly qualified and trustworthy [in terms of their educational background], there remains the question of the overall legitimacy of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC). All of those on the CDC were appointed by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), and so this has raised these questions of legitimacy, and those [questions] of the draft of the new constitution.
There are a number of problems with the current draft of the new constitution. It contradicts with a major statement made by the CDC, which highlighted that: “[The] citizen is the centre of this constitution, where power is in the hands of the citizen.” Nevertheless, there are a number of articles within this draft of the constitution, which act to undermine the power of the citizens of Thailand, such as the introduction of more selected and appointed members to replace the elected members. The process of selection and appointment will result in questions over the qualifications and the legitimacy of those who would be appointed. [This is because it has already been observed that appointments can also bring about the problems of conflict of interest, and abuse of power and public resources for personal gain. Examples include cases of appointing family members to be assistants and secretaries of the members of the existing National Legislative Council.]
I would like to emphasise that the holding of a referendum [for any new Thai constitution] is an important matter, which has to be recognised and prioritised by those who are in power, today. The holding of a constitutional referendum will bring a greater sense of legitimacy to an attempt to confirm that the constitution is actually being accepted by all of the stakeholders within Thailand, and this will then provide the CDC with more legitimacy. The sooner a [democratic general] election is held within Thailand, the better it will be for the country, overall. However, I remain rather pessimistic about this issue. I do not believe that Thailand will hold such an election in the very near future.
Indeed, if the NCPO and the government were to hold elections soon, then the pressure from the international community, such as that from the European Union and the U.S., would decline. Thailand need not perceive these kinds of pressures and their opinions as a form of [unwarranted] intervention, because Thailand is [itself] part of the international community. Moreover, Thailand cannot truly isolate itself from the international community, because of the complexity of economic relations and other interests between this country, and the rest of the world.
There are two main things that those who are in power, would have to do now; firstly, holding a referendum for the new constitution, and secondly, holding an [a general] election. However, I am not optimistic that they would listen to academics, or take any of my advice. There have been a number of statements from different groups of stakeholders within Thai society, which have been ignored by those who are in power, today. Nevertheless, given the current political circumstances, at least we still have a bit of room to speak out, even if there is, now, very limited space for much freedom of expression.”
Thursday, 12 February 2015
US-Thai relations: A question of democracy versus obscurity?
US-Thai relations: A question of democracy versus obscurity?
Thailand cannot afford to indulge in go-it-alone nationalism at a time when our status as a regional hub is under threat
Amid the fallout from the increasingly vociferous anti-American sentiment being expressed in Thailand, one question comes to the fore: Is the historically close Thai-US relationship truly in jeopardy?
Those who listened carefully to the fairly standard remarks on the need for democratic progress delivered recently by Daniel Russel, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, might well ask what all the fuss is about. Nevertheless, the way in which this story plays out may tell us whether the 182-year Thai-US relationship is under threat.
W Patrick Murphy, the chargé d'affaires at the US Embassy, was invited to appear before the National Legislative Assembly yesterday, where he would likely have been asked to account for the recent statement made by Russel. But Murphy declined the invitation and the US State Department responded by saying it had no desire to further inflame the situation, but neither would it backtrack on its position regarding democracy.
The hollow and bombastic reaction among sections of the Thai public and media is predictable, though it is hardly meant for an international audience, beyond any US policymakers concerned enough to take notice. But, slowly and surely, it is sending out the message that Thailand may no longer be worth the trouble - especially when there are more pressing concerns within the region and further afield.
In other words, what if a broad range of interests begins to take more seriously, and at face value, the histrionic and irascible Thai assertions of unwelcome and unwarranted outside influence? What then for Thailand?
Continuance of the "glory days" of a Thailand at the hub of mainland Southeast Asia is no longer a given. Indeed, it is evident that as important outside actors go about the process of re-evaluating their efforts to engage with Asean, the trend is leading away from Thailand.
In remarks made during his visit to India last month, President Barack Obama said: "In this region, India can play a positive role in helping countries forge a better future, from Burma [Myanmar] to Sri Lanka, where today there's new hope for democracy."
With regard to Myanmar, the European Union lifted its trade sanctions back in April 2013, before sending its first ambassador five months later. In contrast, the EU delegation to Thailand has gradually scaled back its role and presence, downgrading its regional office for mainland Southeast Asia to a national office.
Meanwhile in neighbouring Laos, Japan is funding construction and development of the East-West Economic Corridor as part of the Greater Mekong Sub-region Programme (GMS). The economic corridor will open up regional economic and developmental opportunities and has already attracted a US$5.6-million investment made by Toyota Boshoku in the Savannakhet-Xeno Special Economic Zone in Laos.
Two years ago, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) chose Laos as the base for its newly launched key regional development programme, the "SDC Mekong Region Strategy, 2013-17". Notably, Thailand is the only Mekong-basin country not included in the strategy. (As a medium-income country, it is no longer considered to be in particular need of foreign aid.)
At a time when our regional neighbours are recognising the necessity of building a range of international relationships, hostile attitudes in Thailand may convince outside actors to steer clear of the Kingdom. And if it continues, this tendency will exacerbate the sense of alienation from the West that Thais are already beginning to feel.
Amid this complex field of global influences, Thailand risks outmanoeuvring itself by fixating on a strategy of playing off the US' Asia pivot against greater engagement with China, in an attempt to maximise Thai political, economic and other strategic interests.
Two key recent examples relate to this concern. First is the launch this week of Thai-US Cobra Gold military exercises just days after the latest improved Thai-China military ties were announced by China's Defence Minister, General Chang Wanquan. Second is the emergence of the US' Lower Mekong Initiative as a rival to the China-backed GMS - the leading developmental programme for mainland Southeast Asia.
The interplay of influences that now govern international dynamics - whether political, economic, social or otherwise -necessarily involve both state and non-state actors. For instance, the decision-making of international investors is increasingly contingent on the prospects for democracy and human rights within developing nations.
This is worrying for Thailand, where some observers detect an ulterior motive in the indignant accusations of US "meddling" in Thai affairs. Does the advocating of a new go-it-alone Thailand, then, smack of a form of nationalist sentiment that can usefully distract from more profound and pressing home-grown problems?
The longstanding effort to find others to blame for all and sundry - including the seemingly intractable societal rift - is a strategy that risks running out of enemies. Forever scapegoating either the Shinawatra family, as unduly influential, or the rural poor, by stereotyping them as lacking any understanding of the country's problems, may wear thin with even the most radical. Where better to look then, than in the direction of the predominant foreign superpower with a tarnished reputation?
A more crucial question is whether Thais are sufficiently committed to making the necessary efforts to change an abiding sense of societal division and mistrust, and in this way, aid in the restoration of Thai democracy. This would necessitate a far more reasoned and conciliatory approach than we are now witnessing.
Thais who are able to identify with the very real and valid concerns of the rural poor in particular, must surely recognise a glaring absurdity. Namely, the directing of a similar blame-game strategy against the weakest and most marginalised Thais and, at the very same time, against the strongest world power, the US.
Democracy, in and of itself, is not something that the US has ownership over, but it is something that Thailand can finally choose to abandon, to its detriment. Along with that abandoning would likely go any hope of significant future progress for the Kingdom. Ultimately, Thailand's future prospects hinge on recognising the importance of a swift reorientation back towards democracy, and the acknowledgement that the US remains an enduring ally.
Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.
Those who listened carefully to the fairly standard remarks on the need for democratic progress delivered recently by Daniel Russel, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, might well ask what all the fuss is about. Nevertheless, the way in which this story plays out may tell us whether the 182-year Thai-US relationship is under threat.
W Patrick Murphy, the chargé d'affaires at the US Embassy, was invited to appear before the National Legislative Assembly yesterday, where he would likely have been asked to account for the recent statement made by Russel. But Murphy declined the invitation and the US State Department responded by saying it had no desire to further inflame the situation, but neither would it backtrack on its position regarding democracy.
The hollow and bombastic reaction among sections of the Thai public and media is predictable, though it is hardly meant for an international audience, beyond any US policymakers concerned enough to take notice. But, slowly and surely, it is sending out the message that Thailand may no longer be worth the trouble - especially when there are more pressing concerns within the region and further afield.
In other words, what if a broad range of interests begins to take more seriously, and at face value, the histrionic and irascible Thai assertions of unwelcome and unwarranted outside influence? What then for Thailand?
Continuance of the "glory days" of a Thailand at the hub of mainland Southeast Asia is no longer a given. Indeed, it is evident that as important outside actors go about the process of re-evaluating their efforts to engage with Asean, the trend is leading away from Thailand.
In remarks made during his visit to India last month, President Barack Obama said: "In this region, India can play a positive role in helping countries forge a better future, from Burma [Myanmar] to Sri Lanka, where today there's new hope for democracy."
With regard to Myanmar, the European Union lifted its trade sanctions back in April 2013, before sending its first ambassador five months later. In contrast, the EU delegation to Thailand has gradually scaled back its role and presence, downgrading its regional office for mainland Southeast Asia to a national office.
Meanwhile in neighbouring Laos, Japan is funding construction and development of the East-West Economic Corridor as part of the Greater Mekong Sub-region Programme (GMS). The economic corridor will open up regional economic and developmental opportunities and has already attracted a US$5.6-million investment made by Toyota Boshoku in the Savannakhet-Xeno Special Economic Zone in Laos.
Two years ago, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) chose Laos as the base for its newly launched key regional development programme, the "SDC Mekong Region Strategy, 2013-17". Notably, Thailand is the only Mekong-basin country not included in the strategy. (As a medium-income country, it is no longer considered to be in particular need of foreign aid.)
At a time when our regional neighbours are recognising the necessity of building a range of international relationships, hostile attitudes in Thailand may convince outside actors to steer clear of the Kingdom. And if it continues, this tendency will exacerbate the sense of alienation from the West that Thais are already beginning to feel.
Amid this complex field of global influences, Thailand risks outmanoeuvring itself by fixating on a strategy of playing off the US' Asia pivot against greater engagement with China, in an attempt to maximise Thai political, economic and other strategic interests.
Two key recent examples relate to this concern. First is the launch this week of Thai-US Cobra Gold military exercises just days after the latest improved Thai-China military ties were announced by China's Defence Minister, General Chang Wanquan. Second is the emergence of the US' Lower Mekong Initiative as a rival to the China-backed GMS - the leading developmental programme for mainland Southeast Asia.
The interplay of influences that now govern international dynamics - whether political, economic, social or otherwise -necessarily involve both state and non-state actors. For instance, the decision-making of international investors is increasingly contingent on the prospects for democracy and human rights within developing nations.
This is worrying for Thailand, where some observers detect an ulterior motive in the indignant accusations of US "meddling" in Thai affairs. Does the advocating of a new go-it-alone Thailand, then, smack of a form of nationalist sentiment that can usefully distract from more profound and pressing home-grown problems?
The longstanding effort to find others to blame for all and sundry - including the seemingly intractable societal rift - is a strategy that risks running out of enemies. Forever scapegoating either the Shinawatra family, as unduly influential, or the rural poor, by stereotyping them as lacking any understanding of the country's problems, may wear thin with even the most radical. Where better to look then, than in the direction of the predominant foreign superpower with a tarnished reputation?
A more crucial question is whether Thais are sufficiently committed to making the necessary efforts to change an abiding sense of societal division and mistrust, and in this way, aid in the restoration of Thai democracy. This would necessitate a far more reasoned and conciliatory approach than we are now witnessing.
Thais who are able to identify with the very real and valid concerns of the rural poor in particular, must surely recognise a glaring absurdity. Namely, the directing of a similar blame-game strategy against the weakest and most marginalised Thais and, at the very same time, against the strongest world power, the US.
Democracy, in and of itself, is not something that the US has ownership over, but it is something that Thailand can finally choose to abandon, to its detriment. Along with that abandoning would likely go any hope of significant future progress for the Kingdom. Ultimately, Thailand's future prospects hinge on recognising the importance of a swift reorientation back towards democracy, and the acknowledgement that the US remains an enduring ally.
Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.
Friday, 26 December 2014
Happy New Year 2015: "Voicing our Right to Question"
My personal New Year's notebook for 2015.
I hope that my photography can fairly reflect the wider picture of today's Thailand.
-Titipol-
Thursday, 11 December 2014
An academic reflects on his experience at a Thai military base
An academic reflects on his experience at a Thai military base
Since the coup in May, speculation has been rife about what really goes on behind the scenes when Thai civilians find themselves face-to-face with military officers. On December 1, I found myself in that position. As an academic in the political science faculty of a university in the heartland of the opposition to the current government, I was understandably wary.
As we approached the Ubon Ratchathani military base I recalled stories others had told about their experiences with the military over these past few months.
The number of Thais who have been "invited" for "attitude adjustment" is probably in the hundreds, though the exact figure remains unclear. Some have made claims of human rights abuses, but these are often difficult to prove, and this has encouraged speculation. Also, much of the reporting of these episodes has been sensationalised for political purposes, as both sides of the Thai socio-political divide resort to exaggerated allegations in the battle to influence the public debate.
I must acknowledge that, on that day, we were respectfully treated throughout our time at the base. Yet this cannot be taken as evidence that academic freedom is guaranteed under the current administration. This is especially so given that an increasing number of academic activities are now subject to close monitoring and scrutiny by the military.
As Thailand attempts to address and correct the historical failures which have brought the country to this point, the importance of defending academic and student freedom needs to be continually argued for. In modern Thai history, celebrated advocates for such freedoms have also recognised the responsibility that comes with speaking out.
In the attempt to heal the societal rift, universities, academics and students have a vital role to play, in helping to find ways to break through the cultural barriers, by supporting a vigorous but also tolerant public dialogue. To this end, a learning process that more openly explores the ideas and experiences of those from both within Thailand and beyond will bring more creativity to the area of problem-solving.
While efforts are made to evolve a more viable democratic system, a new level of understanding must also be achieved. Democracy is not just about elections. Thailand has much work to do in the development of a more informed social-political involvement, where citizens maintain the right to speak out in holding their government accountable.
If academic activities are considered a threat to the security of the state, then all Thais should be concerned for the future of reform. Millions of Thais have placed their hope in reforms as a means of getting Thailand to a better place. But the question is whether the country can make real progress without academic and intellectual freedoms that come as part of freedom of expression.
It is true that some of the military's recent decision-making has seemed unnecessarily arbitrary and reflexive. But we should also be able to acknowledge their difficulty, in that this is all happening at a time when they are adapting - for better or worse - to their new role as enforcers for a government forging policy without a democratic mandate.
Unfortunately, this has only exacerbated the breakdown of the relationship between Thai citizens and the state, and it is in this context that the recent Thai student protests have gained international attention.
Things took a turn for the worse following protests by the Dao Din student group against Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, during his visit to Khon Kaen province on November 19. It's no surprise that since then, the military has focused more attention on academic activities.
The military has asked universities in the Northeast to keep student activists under control, claiming that Dao Din is plotting a regional protest network against the government and the National Council for Peace and Order.
Critics point to this as evidence of the military's excessive desire for control.
This controlling mentality has likely been exacerbated by increasing doubts within the military of its ability to retain public belief that its continued authority is both necessary and justified. All this is the result of six months of mediocre and unpersuasive attempts to convince the public that it is making sufficient progress in returning the country to democracy.
Our meeting with military officers focused on the position and role of our university. It was something of a relief that the discussion took the form of an open dialogue, and it was significantly more informative and constructive than I had anticipated.
In recognising the need for reform - and with it, the need to hear all voices - an open dialogue that allows for concessions and compromises provides the different sides with the opportunity to make climb-downs and to rebuild trust. This must be better than risking further clamp-downs, and with them, an even more poisonous and pernicious sense of public mistrust.
An escalation of confrontation and suppression leading to a tragedy like the 1976 student massacre in Bangkok is something no one wants to see.
Recent global history furnishes plenty of examples of authorities becoming increasingly hardline in attempts to suppress radical elements. And the battleground has so often been the universities, with both academics and students sometimes targeted.
In the Thai case, with the outcome still uncertain, it is the responsibility of all sides to work towards a common understanding, before the misunderstandings escalate tensions further.
In the end, Thai students and academics could aid progress amid this undemocratic status quo by acting to raise the standard of the societal debate through the force of reasoned argument. In contrast, dramatic (and likely futile) sloganeering is likely to provide those with a more authoritarian zeal with the ammunition they need. This will only act to further quell the voices of those who continue to legitimately question the direction that Thailand is currently taking.
Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani.
The number of Thais who have been "invited" for "attitude adjustment" is probably in the hundreds, though the exact figure remains unclear. Some have made claims of human rights abuses, but these are often difficult to prove, and this has encouraged speculation. Also, much of the reporting of these episodes has been sensationalised for political purposes, as both sides of the Thai socio-political divide resort to exaggerated allegations in the battle to influence the public debate.
I must acknowledge that, on that day, we were respectfully treated throughout our time at the base. Yet this cannot be taken as evidence that academic freedom is guaranteed under the current administration. This is especially so given that an increasing number of academic activities are now subject to close monitoring and scrutiny by the military.
As Thailand attempts to address and correct the historical failures which have brought the country to this point, the importance of defending academic and student freedom needs to be continually argued for. In modern Thai history, celebrated advocates for such freedoms have also recognised the responsibility that comes with speaking out.
In the attempt to heal the societal rift, universities, academics and students have a vital role to play, in helping to find ways to break through the cultural barriers, by supporting a vigorous but also tolerant public dialogue. To this end, a learning process that more openly explores the ideas and experiences of those from both within Thailand and beyond will bring more creativity to the area of problem-solving.
While efforts are made to evolve a more viable democratic system, a new level of understanding must also be achieved. Democracy is not just about elections. Thailand has much work to do in the development of a more informed social-political involvement, where citizens maintain the right to speak out in holding their government accountable.
If academic activities are considered a threat to the security of the state, then all Thais should be concerned for the future of reform. Millions of Thais have placed their hope in reforms as a means of getting Thailand to a better place. But the question is whether the country can make real progress without academic and intellectual freedoms that come as part of freedom of expression.
It is true that some of the military's recent decision-making has seemed unnecessarily arbitrary and reflexive. But we should also be able to acknowledge their difficulty, in that this is all happening at a time when they are adapting - for better or worse - to their new role as enforcers for a government forging policy without a democratic mandate.
Unfortunately, this has only exacerbated the breakdown of the relationship between Thai citizens and the state, and it is in this context that the recent Thai student protests have gained international attention.
Things took a turn for the worse following protests by the Dao Din student group against Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, during his visit to Khon Kaen province on November 19. It's no surprise that since then, the military has focused more attention on academic activities.
The military has asked universities in the Northeast to keep student activists under control, claiming that Dao Din is plotting a regional protest network against the government and the National Council for Peace and Order.
Critics point to this as evidence of the military's excessive desire for control.
This controlling mentality has likely been exacerbated by increasing doubts within the military of its ability to retain public belief that its continued authority is both necessary and justified. All this is the result of six months of mediocre and unpersuasive attempts to convince the public that it is making sufficient progress in returning the country to democracy.
Our meeting with military officers focused on the position and role of our university. It was something of a relief that the discussion took the form of an open dialogue, and it was significantly more informative and constructive than I had anticipated.
In recognising the need for reform - and with it, the need to hear all voices - an open dialogue that allows for concessions and compromises provides the different sides with the opportunity to make climb-downs and to rebuild trust. This must be better than risking further clamp-downs, and with them, an even more poisonous and pernicious sense of public mistrust.
An escalation of confrontation and suppression leading to a tragedy like the 1976 student massacre in Bangkok is something no one wants to see.
Recent global history furnishes plenty of examples of authorities becoming increasingly hardline in attempts to suppress radical elements. And the battleground has so often been the universities, with both academics and students sometimes targeted.
In the Thai case, with the outcome still uncertain, it is the responsibility of all sides to work towards a common understanding, before the misunderstandings escalate tensions further.
In the end, Thai students and academics could aid progress amid this undemocratic status quo by acting to raise the standard of the societal debate through the force of reasoned argument. In contrast, dramatic (and likely futile) sloganeering is likely to provide those with a more authoritarian zeal with the ammunition they need. This will only act to further quell the voices of those who continue to legitimately question the direction that Thailand is currently taking.
Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani.
An apparently impromptu visit from three military personnel, who are from the Ubon Ratchathani military base.
At around 5pm this afternoon, our faculty received an apparently impromptu visit from three military personnel, who are from the Ubon Ratchathani military base. I was personally told that this visit was simply a routine check, and they also claimed that, each day, one of the ‘teams’ from their military base, visits some part of the Ubon Ratchathani University campus. They walked around, taking the photographs that they wanted; not only of the Faculty of Political Science building, but, also, of the students. All this happened on the day following a human rights event that I organised - which was principally supported by the Delegation of the European Union to Thailand, along with the United Nations Development Programme and the Law Reform Commission of Thailand as the event’s co-supporters - which was held on our university campus.
Wednesday, 10 December 2014
To all those who share an interest in the proceedings relating to the Human Rights event, which was held at Ubon Ratchathani University, on the 10th of December, 2014, and was entitled: “Democracy and Human Rights within Thailand and the EU - a Forum of Exchange”:
I would like to take this opportunity to say a few words about this human rights event, which was held, today, at Ubon Ratchathani University, Thailand. The event was entitled: “Democracy and Human Rights within Thailand and the EU - a Forum of Exchange”, and we intended that it should reflect a shared spirit of recognition and celebration, being held, as it was, on this ‘International Human Rights Day’, 2014.
With regard to the raising of questions relating to the state of human rights within Thailand at the present time, we understood that these matters must, of course, be necessarily approached with the requisite degree of sensitivity, and caution. Such concerns remained in the forefront of our minds, in the lead-up to the event, itself.
Indeed, there had been quite a concern as to whether the event would, ultimately, be able to take place, given the current social-political climate within Thailand. After various discussions with officials and officers from both the military and police in the weeks leading up to event, we were in the end, allowed to hold the event as planned, but with a certain caveat. This was with the understanding that we “must not discuss politics”. In addition, outside observers were in attendance at the event, in order to monitor what was said.
The event was principally supported by the European Union, and, in addition, the United Nations Development Programme and the Law Reform Commission of Thailand were the co-supporters. Therefore, I would especially like to thank the Delegation of the European Union to Thailand for its generous support in this effort to promote issues relating to democracy and human rights within Thailand.
I must particularly thank Miss. Sandra De Waele, the First Counsellor, Head of Political, Press and Information Section, from the Delegation of the European Union to Thailand, and also, Dr. Nirun Pitakwatchara, and the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, for their very much appreciated contributions.
In addition, I would also like to thank Mr. Luc Stevens, the United Nations (UN) Resident Coordinator and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Representative to Thailand, for his kind support, and attendance at this event.
I would also like to thank Mr. Erik Svedahl, Minister Counsellor / Deputy Head of Mission from the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Bangkok, and Ms. Pichaya Fitts, a Political Officer from the Embassy of Sweden in Bangkok, and all those others who travelled all the way to Ubon Ratchathani, in order to be in attendance.
We hope that we will, indeed, be able to continue in our efforts to support a process of positive reform for Thailand. The promotion of human rights within Thailand cannot, surely, be limited to the holding of one-off-events, and so, therefore, we remain committed in our endeavours, as we continue in this work.
Monday, 1 December 2014
We were invited to the Royal Thai Military base in Ubon Ratchathani, in order to discuss, with senior military officers, the position and role of Ubon Ratchathani University, in relation to the possible student and academic activities, which are planned to take place within Isan (the North-eastern region of Thailand). Furthermore, we discussed the role of the political scientists who are based at Thailand’s universities, in the context of the current social-political climate. We also explored the important question of how much academic freedom there is, at present, in the undertaking to both promote and improve the study of political science; as this is a discipline, which retains its importance, especially at this critical juncture in the evolution and reform of Thailand’s political system. I believe that for all of us present, this was both an informative and constructive dialogue.
Friday, 13 June 2014
Wednesday, 5 February 2014
Utopian visions cannot justify Thai democratic sabotage
Sun, 02/02/2014 - 11:37 | by prachatai
Today’s Thai general election results are now looming, and with the Pheu Thai Party government positioned to secure a likely victory, anti-government protesters will be intent on finding more ways to delegitimise their nation’s political process. Over recent years, the Thai political system has been able to resist the pressure to concede much to the demands of the Bangkok protesters who still remain defiant.
This is in large part because it is now over a decade since millions of relatively poor rural Thais began to experience a sense of political mobilisation. Because they are now visibly able to express priorities that are rather different from those of the more middle class anti-government protesters, the risk that voicing opinions will only intensify national polarisation remains as a key sticking point in promoting democratic ideals.
So it seems that we can expect Thailand’s continuing political crisis to only ratchet up further, in the aftermath of the implications of the results becoming clear to a population now on the edge. This election result may soon come to be recognised as the watershed moment, when it became impossible to reconcile a political polarisation that has seemingly escalated out of control.
The prevailing question in the run-up to the election focused on whether Thailand must institute political reforms before or after the electoral process could unfold. It is now implicit that voter turnout and the percentage share of the result can be considered as a form of referendum on the democratic legitimacy of the country. So in a certain sense, this may remind us of the Bangladesh elections of just last month.
Increasingly resolute stances were expressed during the pre-election public debate, and this also indicates that the sought-after fix to avoid a more extreme response will not likely be found in time. Whether or not serious violence is immediately triggered in the aftermath of the results, a marked change in thinking across Thai society is now desperately needed.
The prevalent uncompromising attitudes will ensure that a significant break with the past will be that much more difficult to accomplish, and this will be self-defeating for the great majority of Thais, who remain socio-economically marginalised by the establishment interests operating out of Bangkok.
Despite their public denials, the anti-government coalition led by the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) have entertained ideas that might be seen to encourage physical action by protesters to impede the rights of Thais to access many polling stations. This will probably happen mainly within Bangkok and the south. Resort to such measures will clearly undermine both the election, and also the democratic process itself.
With their carefully stage-managed battle plan about to be realised soon, we will discover their level of determination to fight this cause to the end. Although they have often proclaimed their message with an extreme air of self-righteous, many from within their own ranks may have still hoped that things could have been achieved without recourse to anything more than political bluster.
Nevertheless, they apparently remain committed to seeing out their campaign for reform, with their current slogan “Shut Down Bangkok, Restart Thailand”. In time for the election, it was revealed that Suthep Thaugsuban, the Secretary General of the PDRC, wrote to the United States President Barack Obama: “I will argue that Thai citizens are morally responsible to rise up and demand removal of both Yingluck and the influence of Thaksin, then define and implement the reform necessary to ensure that the Kingdom of Thailand remains free from unjust and corrupt leaders in the future. Most importantly, a reform that will bring about free and fair elections and a truly representative government.”
Suthep might reasonably maintain that his group represents the interests of all those who are in agreement. Despite this, concerns should rightly be raised, if some interpret the subtext as a claim to be speaking on behalf of an entire country. Also, whilst the PDRC is entirely within its rights to argue that democracy is not merely about elections, it is also basic common sense to understand and respect the essential right of all to be able to cast their votes freely.
When the PDRC is already advocating that it is right and even necessary to violate the voting rights of others – as happened during the recent advance voting process – then why should anybody be expected to take on trust the notion that the PDRC reforms are truly intended to promote democracy and equality for all Thais?
Thomas Paine, the political philosopher and activist of the 18th century, in attempting to contend with the challenges of his own time, once wrote: “Common sense will tell us, that the power which hath endeavoured to subdue us, is of all others, the most improper to defend us.” Evidently, the political scenario unfolding within Thailand today is not unique.
Problems of concentrated political power, patron-client relationships and conflicts of interest exist in all countries, to differing degrees. Despite the concerns relating to the continuing influence of the Shinawatra name, any amount of legislation and reform must be balanced with the requisite level of intent to implement policy.
Despite its rather different context, the United States has its own history of political dynasty making. This has been most apparent in recent times of course, with the Bush family, the Clintons and perhaps, most famously, the Kennedys. As we speak, we know there is much talk of Hillary Clinton and her chances of becoming president in 2016. Although the power of the US political lobby has long been recognised, it has over recent years been subjected to increased levels of scrutiny, and is now frequently criticised as being corrupt and riddled with conflicts of interest.
In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has continued to dominate the Diet (Japanese parliament), since the party’s establishment in 1955. For Japan, the cost of farm subsidies has been a major criticism, and the way in which the LDP government allocates its budget attracts the criticism that the LDP’s relationship to its rural constituent power-base remains rather too cosy.
One way or another, corrupt undercurrents – such as the Thai patronage system – can be observed in political systems all around the world, and so it is no secret that such problems persist. Despite this, the most effective democratic mechanisms act to support and evolve a range of checks and balances. This way, whatever has been historically instituted can be corrected within a more symbiotic and cooperative relationship.
For it is the revolutionary zeal of history that is now being encouraged by the modern Thai protesters, as they seek to overcome societal problems with a blank slate approach often taken by political fundamentalists. It is highly dangerous for Thailand to entertain such a prospect, because the political divergences are so sectarian in their nature, and are based on provincial, ethnic, and class-based distinctions.
In the context of the current disintegration that millions of Thais are now actively playing a part in encouraging, it is incumbent on more Thais to be asking the pertinent questions. For instance, in claiming to be challenging injustice – allegedly perpetrated by those who may be misusing the power of the state – when does it become legitimate for you to then violate the basic rights of others, in order to accomplish your supposed goal?
Ultimately, the recognition of key safeguards such as due process may appear, to an embittered and agitated public, to be an unsatisfactory compromise. Yet it remains the case that little else holds open the possibility of effectively bringing corrupt politicians to account, without otherwise encouraging a culture in which it continues to be acceptable to resort to the necessarily divisive mentality of further encouraging a climate of mob rule.
Titipol Phakdeewanich is a Visiting Research Scholar at the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University, Japan. He is based at Ubon Ratchathani University, Thailand.
Saturday, 28 December 2013
Getting to the root of Thailand’s woes
28 Dec 2013
The Straits Times By TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH
Getting to the root of Thailand’s woes
THAILAND’S politics is again attracting the interest of the international community, with the very survival of Thai democracy increasingly brought into question. There is seemingly no end in sight to Thai political brinksmanship, and the opposition Democrat Party – which retains the support of much of the old-guard establishment – stands by its decision to boycott the general election, scheduled for Feb 2 next year.
Despite the Puea Thai government’s determination to ensure that the election will still take place, whether or not the vote can be held remains in question. The People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) – a coalition of Democrat members and anti-government protesters – remains adamant that the current democratic arrangement be suspended and that an unelected “People’s Council” assume the role of running the country.
The PDRC has already tried, albeit in vain, to disrupt the electoral process by preventing candidates of political parties from entering the venue for party-list registration in Bangkok. They also plan to disrupt the constituency-based registration across the country when the process begins today. They continue to insist that the networks of patronage relating to former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra be dismantled before any election is held.
However, a historical and deeply embedded patronage system continues to permeate Thai society at all levels. It is, therefore, impossible to separate this factor from the corruption that so strongly informs the political character of Thailand today.
Corruption undoubtedly predates any notion of democracy in the country. Yet, there is now a general tendency for Thais to assume that corruption and patronage are a consequence of the existing electoral system. For many Thais, therefore, the integrity of the existing election process remains questionable. And this in turn provides a pretext for those who would attempt to undermine the democratic mandate of the current government.
It is regularly contended that were it not for the inordinate power of key political figures such as Thaksin, Thailand would be able to move forward. But is it realistic that corruption in Thailand – disappointingly ranked 102 out of 177 nations on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 – can be effectively remediated through non-democratic means?
The last decade has been a difficult one for Thai democracy. There was a coup in 2006, a constitutional redrafting in 2007, and a series of public protests and crackdowns. Throughout this period, it has been the long disregarded and disaffected majority of Thais from the provinces who have, relatively speaking, retained the most confidence in Thailand’s democratic forms.
It is these rural poor who have, to an increasing degree, come to view what passes for democracy as something that can at least begin to respond to their legitimate claims for increased recognition. Significantly, these are the voters who were historically ignored by an indifferent political elite ensconced primarily in Bangkok. Any significant and tangible response to the situation of the rural poor should understandably be expected to attract a certain loyalty.
This is the context that has provided the recent Thaksin-inspired populist governments with the opportunity to retain a plausible legitimacy and an enduring appeal with the majority of Thais. Accordingly, fresh elections will likely result in another clear endorsement of the Puea Thai party, led by Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra.
The now highly Thaksin-phobic protesters appear to be aware of this to some extent. Nevertheless, they are prepared to endorse almost any contrivance or ostensible rationale to undermine the established tenets of democracy and representation, in order to see a swift end to the influence of the Shinawatra family in Thai politics.
Ultimately, Thailand’s broad societal impasse may demonstrate to the world that its outward show of advancing representative democracy was merely a pretence. The country’s assumed status as a democratic standard-bearer for mainland South-east Asia may soon be over as well.
An anonymous onlooker from undemocratic Laos (living close to the Thai border in Savannakhet province) voiced her concern: “I am not sure about democracy because I can see a lot of problems in Thailand from Thai TV. One day “red shirts” (pro-Thaksin supporters), and another day some others come out on the street. So I don’t think democracy is good for Laos.”
Much of the international community – including the United States and the European Union – has been focusing on a number of specific issues. These include the right to protest, the weakening of voting rights, and the likely impact on foreign investments. Moreover, many foreigners are evidently concerned about how the issue may affect economic prospects throughout the wider region. The recent crisis has coincided with a close to four-year low for the Thai baht against most of the major international currencies.
Although vote-buying still persists as a result of the deep-rooted influence of patronage, it is no longer as decisive a factor in electoral outcomes as it used to be. Rather, voters have increasingly come to value the importance of holding politicians to account in relation to policy delivery. Farmer Nu Keawmanee, from Ubon Ratchathani province, said: “I like the 30-baht health-care policy because it really helps poor people. So, I want a government that has policies to meet the demands of rural people like me.” She was referring to the universal health-care programme introduced by the Thaksin government in 2002.
In their desperate desire to put an end to Thaksin’s influence, his opponents continue to discount the broader reality when making their case. The fact is that the misdeeds of any Thai government have always reflected the inherently anti-democratic patronage system.
This is a historical injustice, which remains largely in place today. It enables those from within the Thai political and business elite to maintain their privileged positions. The failure to deal with this central issue, and instead remain preoccupied with the political fortunes of one man, is to distract attention from a perennial problem of critical importance.
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