Asean Way means no respect for human rights of the Rohingya

September 29, 2017 01:00

By Titipol Phakdeewanich  Special to The Nation

Western Myanmar is under the world’s spotlight for what the United Nations calls a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya people. From the other side of the globe, the European Union has slammed the crackdown in Rakhine state as “a human rights crisis with serious humanitarian consequences”. 

That concern is apparently not shared by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, of which Myanmar is a member. Asean has remained largely silent on the Rohingya crisis. 

Myanmar’s de-facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her government have been widely condemned for insufficient efforts to resolve the crisis. Fellow Nobel laureate Desmond Tutu recently branded the crisis “slow genocide” and urged Suu Kyi to speak out for justice and human rights. Amnesty International also calls the Myanmar military’s crackdown in Rakhine a “genocide”, intended to erase the minority Rohingya from the map.   

It took Suu Kyi almost four weeks before she finally spoke out against the human rights violations last week. Many suspect her televised address merely intended to dampen criticism from the UN General Assembly session in New York, rather than to protect Rohingya Muslims’ rights. 

Although almost half the population of Myanmar’s Rohingya – more than 400,000 – have already fled to Bangladesh, the exodus is apparently not significant enough for Asean or its members to take a stance on rights violations.

The huge humanitarian crisis in Myanmar confirms a now common observation – that the “Asean Way” fundamentally fails to recognise human rights.

The regional bloc claims that such recognition is in fact enshrined in its Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, leading to the introduction of the 2012 Asean Human Rights Declaration.

The Declaration was strongly criticised by the UN Human Rights Council for failures to embrace and synchronise with the international language of human rights. Nevertheless, it has gone unchanged, with its implementation overruled by the bloc’s fundamental principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs of member states”. Effectively this means that beliefs in cultural supremacy have been maintained at the expense of common humanity.

Despite Asean’s commitment to “strengthen democracy” and “to promote and protect human rights”, the institution and its member states continue to deny the universality of democracy and human rights. This results in the further alienation of their citizens from universal norms.

Asean countries do not welcome criticism of their democracy and human rights records, especially when it comes from the West. Bloc members often resort to combative “East versus West” rhetoric to defend their failures to comply with international commitments, as observed since the 1990s in the discourse of “Asian values” first championed by Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew. 

Of course, East and West have never and never will be the same, but fundamental human rights do not have borders, national identity or ownership. They are simply a birthright and entitlement of all of us.

Increasing international criticism of the Myanmar government’s handling of the Rohingya crisis is a clear signal that Asean must reconsider its non-interference policy in this case, if its human rights mechanism is to retain any credibility. 

However, there is no indication that Asean countries will suspend that policy, which it claims is crucial for the national sovereignty of its members. 

Support for the Asean Way has been growing among neighbouring countries since the previous Rohingya exodus in 2014-’15.

A nationalistic policy of non-interference in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand has been spurred by fears of the financial and security burdens that large numbers of refugees would bring.

These fears are fanned by the social media, while human rights and humanitarian concerns are dismissed by nationalist groups.

 “Take them [the Rohingya] to stay in your home if you are so worried about them!”, is a familiar refrain among Southeast Asian Facebook users. This nationalist mentality allows the non-interference norms to be wielded expediently by the region’s leaders, while the Rohingya suffer as victims of the effective collusion between the Myanmar state and its Asean partners. 

Southeast Asia’s leaders have indicated that changing the Asean Way by removing its focus on the supremacy of cultural norms and non-interference is not an option. This is seen, for example, in the denial of same-sex marriage in Singapore in 2015, and the increasing limitations placed on freedom of expression in Thailand since the 2014 military coup.

Asean leaders will find that human rights cannot be tailored to suit the Asean Way, since this universal value is a birthright and not something that can be limited or dictated by the bloc’s leadership.

The limited humanitarian aid now being offered by Asean is only in recognition of “pseudo-rights” expediently granted to the Rohingya. For as long as the regional bloc fails to protect their full rights as human beings, the existing 2012 Asean Human Rights Declaration will remain merely ornamental, rather than a mechanism to meaningfully promote and protect the fundamental rights of Asean citizens.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England. 

My interview with respect to the meeting between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and his cabinet members, and Chart Thai Party.

My interview with respect to the meeting between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and his cabinet members, and Chart Thai Party during the mobile Cabinet meeting in Supanburi Province, and its implication on the continuing role of the military in Thai politics.

Regardless of the support for the military among politicians or political parties, there is already a strong indication that the military intends to maintain their grip on power, and continue to govern Thailand for perhaps the next ten years or so. The military has already structurally embedded itself in the Thai political landscape through the 2017 Constitutions, through the creation of new government agencies, and via military appointments to various independent organisations.

The meeting between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and Chart Thai Party is not unprecedented in the context of Thai political history. Instead, the meeting merely demonstrates a repetition of the game of power, in which it is quite common for Thai politicians to submit to the military for their own political gains when the military is in charge.

Unfortunately, the cosy relations between the military and politicians only reflects their mutual interests at the expense of democracy. The Chart Thai Party’s support for the military will continue to damage the Thai democracy.

Indeed, the military should have only a very small role, or even none at all in the democratisation of the country. Therefore, the continued role of the military in Thai politics does not indicate a bright future for Thai democracy.

Academic freedom is dying under military rule: Universities must step up

Academic freedom is dying under military rule: Universities must step up
opinion September 09, 2017 01:00 By Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation

Ever since it interrupted Thailand’s democratic progress by seizing power from the people in the 2014 military coup, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) has maintained that suppressing freedom of expression is crucial to its timeline for a return to democracy.

This is despite continuous criticism from within and outside the country over the state of civil liberties under junta rule.

For the past three years, the NCPO has been fairly successful in integrating itself into everyday public and political life. Its critics, meanwhile, have attempted to regain public space to speak out against the current politics of fear and intimidation, enforced in the name of “national security” and “political stability”.

This “new normal” of public acceptance for suppression of dissent against the military raises a question: will Thailand forever overrule the universal concept of free expression and instead develop its own version of democracy without endorsing certain basic civil liberties?

In its 2017 rankings for countries, rights NGO Freedom House rated Thailand’s “Political Rights” at 6, and “Civil Liberties” at 5, using a scale of 1-7, with 7 being “Least Free”. Overall it rated Thailand as “Not Free”. This reflected the position of a country under military rule – though the report was largely rejected by the military’s supporters.  

Out of Thailand’s 65 million people, only a small group – including some academics – have been monitored, harassed or labelled as troublemakers by the NCPO and its supporters.

This relatively small number might explain why Thai people in general have shown little concern at such suppression.

Between 2014 and 2015, during a number of interactions with the military that included “invitations” to its base in Ubon Ratchathani province, I was asked not to organise a public seminar on democracy and human rights, and instead support the democratisation process under the NCPO. The question then arose of whether it is possible to leave democracy and its return in military hands.

In July 2015, the military sent invitations to me and several other representatives from four universities in Ubon Ratchathani. Attached was NCPO Order No 3/2015 on Maintaining Public Order and National Security, which cited Article 44 of the interim constitution, granting absolute power to the prime minister. The invitation said the attachment was merely official procedure, with no intention of threatening the recipients. In reality, it could only be understood as part of the deliberate cultivation of a climate of fear and intimidation against the academic community – a move which demanded a strong response from Thailand’s universities. Unfortunately, the universities remained silent and bowed to NCPO rule.  

On Tuesday, I was again invited to the military base in Ubon Ratchathani, regarding an upcoming seminar on the role of the Thai Human Rights Commission, to be held by the Political Science Faculty at Ubon Ratchathani University. The military warned the event could not go ahead on campus without permission from the NCPO.

A more serious attack on the academic community came recently with the charges laid against Professor Chayan Vaddhanaphuti, organiser of the 13th International Conference on Thai Studies, and a number of attendees. The charges came after criticism of the conference by the NCPO, criticism which Thai universities have remained silent towards. Indeed, none of the country’s 120 private and public universities has shown the courage to defend academic freedom.

Over the past decade, a number of Thai universities have functioned as a political machine against democracy.

(We note here a stark contrast with the pro-democracy movement at Thammasat University and others in the late 1970s.)

Arthit Ourairat, the president and owner of Rangsit University, one of Thailand’s top private universities, was actively involved in the 2013-2014 protests by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC). A large number of senior executives and leading academics from public institutions such as Chulalongkorn, Thammasat and Mahidol universities were also heavily involved in the PDRC, and some continue to serve the military regime.

While leaning towards the junta, Thai universities have been reluctant to protect freedoms on campuses, in part because they consider the military’s attacks on academic freedom as personal problems. Once universities take a lead in endorsing military rule, then academic freedom is in jeopardy.

It is time for Thai universities to re-examine their commitment to protecting academic freedom. The prime purpose of a university is to serve the public and the academic community, not to function as a government agency whose duty is to follow the orders of the junta. Academic voices and events must not be denounced as a threat to national security and the NCPO’s timeline for democracy. This dangerous trend has been inflated by growing distrust in politicians amid polarisation in Thai politics over the past decade, at the expense of freedoms.

Democracy functions on the principles of freedom and liberty, while the military functions by orders and obedience. Thus, democracy and the military are mutually exclusive, existing in opposing realms. Thai universities cannot afford to mislead the public if they want democracy to survive and prosper.

Unfortunately we are unlikely to see Thai universities find the courage to step up and protect academic freedom anytime soon. The ongoing decline of academic freedom in Thailand is therefore not merely the consequence of military pressure, but also due to universities actively permitting that freedom to suffocate under junta suppression.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at  the University of Warwick in England.

A summary of my interview in Matichon

A summary of my interview in Matichon, in relation to uncertainty surrounding the proposed 2018 general elections.

It should be no surprise if the scheduled 2018 elections are postponed due to the possibility of the Pheu Thai party winning. However, the 2017 Thai constitution will generate 250 appointed senators, which is in the interests of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and the military. This will reassure the military that they can secure the appointment of the ‘Prime Minister’.

In fact, I believe that the government also wants to hold the general election because it will be a stamp to legitimise their position in power, and are bolstered by the certainty that they can maintain power after the election. As a result, the international community will have fewer objections to their position in power.

The need for being accepted in the international community is key a factor for the NCPO to stick to its election road map. 

Thaksin founded the Shinawatra dynasty, but the military empowered it

Thaksin founded the Shinawatra dynasty, but the military empowered it 

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH 

SPECIAL TO THE NATION 

The departure of the former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, who fled the country prior to a Supreme Court verdict on her rice-pledging policy, leaves various questions concerning the future of herself and the Shinawatra family, the Pheu Thai Party, and changes in the Thai political landscape. 

It is premature to see her exit as the end of the Shinawatra era in Thai politics, since events after the two military coups of 2006 and 2014 demonstrate that the clan’s influence cannot be abolished simply by military force. Instead, the coups did the reverse, keeping the Shinawatras politically alive and empowered. 

The 2006 coup, led by the Council for Democratic Reform, ousted then-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai government – but it did not diminish his influence. 

In 2014 the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) staged a coup amid escalating violence surrounding protests by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) in 2013- 2014, and removed prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, the Pheu Thai Party leader, from office. 

Her 2011 electoral success had obviously capitalised on the popularity of her brother, Thaksin. Yet her candidacy was perceived by some as a battle to represent Shinawatra family interests, rather than the interests of Pheu Thai voters. During electoral campaigning, she repeated the point she was Thaksin’s sister and reiterated his achievements as a means to gain support. 

After she was ousted by the military in 2014, Yingluck began to establish her own, separate power base during multiple trips across the country, particularly in the North and Northeast, her party’s stronghold. She was successful in boost- ing her popularity and keeping Pheu Thai relevant to its constituents, and also portraying herself as a victim of an illegitimate military intervention and faulty justice system. 

Yet for the Shinawatras’ political opponents, who advocated the coups, the clan is not a victim of military intervention but rather the root of the political divisiveness and problems that made it necessary. 

That leaves an elephant in the room. A large swathe of the Thai middle-class and anti-Thaksin groups have rejected democracy and now embrace military rule. This works in the interests of the Shinawatra family, and allows them to embed and empower themselves in the Thai political environment. 

The Thai Rak Thai Party and its incarnations have not lost an election since coming to power with a landslide victory of over 11 million votes in 2001. In the most recent election in 2011, its successor Pheu Thai won 15.7 million votes, under the guidance of Thaksin from outside Thailand. 

The 2006 and 2014 coups were intended to curtail the power and influence of the clan, but they badly backfired. Meanwhile the military’s continuing role in Thai politics is unlikely to weaken the Shinawatras’ grip in the long term because the military cannot establish trust through coercion. 

Another Shinawatra victory at the polls could well be followed by another military intervention, further empowering the clan. 

If they want to break this cycle, the Thai middle-class and elite cannot continue to blindly dismiss the very core democratic principle of one-man-one- vote, while embracing military rule on the pretext that rural voters are victims of populist policies and vote-buying. 

While vote-buying was indeed a significant problem in Thailand from the 1970s into the 2000s, today it has little significant impact because most voters are fully aware of party manifestos and their implications on public policies. Moreover, middle-class assumptions that rural voters are naive are not only outdated and erroneous, but emphasise the inherent socio-political inequalities which gave rise to Thaksin in the first place. 

Therefore, the 2010 red-shirt protest was not primarily an endorsement of the Shinawatra family, but rather an outcry by the long-ignored rural poor, who wanted to protect their voting rights under the Thai constitution and the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Thailand is a signatory. 

On the one hand, democracy offered Thaksin the opportunity to establish his Shinawatra political dynasty. But on the other, the same democracy offers voters a mechanism to remove the Shinawatra family through an election. 

Political popularity can last a long time, but not forever. When a party in power can no longer satisfy voters’ needs, voting decisions change. This is how representative democracy functions. 

Pheu Thai’s victory was no miracle, but rather a result of research by the party that enabled it to respond to the demands of voters, who were regarded as stockholders in the arena of public policy. This is a fundamental notion of representative democracy, in which parliamentary members represent the interests of the constituents who provided them with a mandate. 

Whether the Shinawatras will now maintain their involvement with Pheu Thai is unclear, but the departure of Yingluck is unlikely to signal the end of the clan’s influence on Thai politics. 

Meanwhile the military has indicated it intends to control the country for the next decade or two, pending permission from the political elite and middle class and their continuing willingness to limit democracy to prevent the return of the Shinawatra clan. 

Nevertheless, we might still see a day when the Shinawatra family vanishes from the Thai political landscape altogether. But only when a genuine democracy is given the opportunity to function without military intervention. 

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England. 

A summary of my interview in Matichon, with respect to the appointment of the first 12 experts, including military and businessmen to the 34-member National Strategy Committee

A summary of my interview in Matichon, with respect to the appointment of the first 12 experts, including military and businessmen to the 34-member National Strategy Committee.

Theoretically speaking, the appointment of businessmen as members of the National Strategy Committee would be good for the country. However, the political attitudes of these committee members must also be considered, in terms of whether they believe in democracy, which is important for the future of Thailand’s political and economic reforms. It will not be in the best interests of Thai democracy if these businessmen only seek to serve their own business interests.

Currently some business groups are satisfied with the current state of “perceived political stability” under the military. However, I would argue that the state of calmness and normalcy under military suppression can not be equated to “political stability”; the two are not the same. The more we accept the military involvement, the less opportunities that are available for democracy to prosper in Thailand.

The appointments demonstrate that the military sticks to the same set of people. It is time to consider appointing new people, and new voices into the circle of this administration. 

The military’s declarations that it has no intention of maintaining its power is unconvincing, because they continue to appoint military officers to the National Strategy Committee, whilst abandoning highly qualified Thai civilians. For example, the appointment of military officers as experts on environmental issues in the National Strategy Committee is unnecessary, because Thailand has a number of environmental experts outside the military circle.

If the military wants to convince the general public that they have no intention of maintaining their grip on power in Thai politics, the first thing they must do is to reduce or cease appointing military personnel to various government committees or bodies. Thus far, we have seen the appointment of military officers in every facet of government.

Time to end hazing culture in universities

By TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH

Special to The Nation

Students’ human rights being violated by execs turning a blind eye to the excesses

This year is just another year in which we witness a compromise on the infamous Thai university culture of hazing, referred to at Thai universities as “rub-nong”. Although the severity of hazing has gradually scaled down with each annual intake, concerns remain over the violation of human rights and the humiliation of human dignity on campuses, as well as criticism about whether this culture of hazing benefits the students’ ability to learn at all.

This culture is criticised for violating human rights because of a mechanism called the “SOTUS system” (seniority, order, tradition, unity, spirit). This does not simply translate as respect for senior students in order to maintain a hierarchy on campus, but insinuates a form of social suppression for first year students, and treats them as inferior.

Despite rules and regulations to promote and protect human rights at Thai universities developed by the Office of the Higher Education Commission (OHEC) and the Ministry of Education (MOE), there are violations every year, and in some cases there are even fatalities. Will Thai universities continue to compromise on their infamous rub-nong, and allow it to pass on to another generation, even whilst there are increasing numbers of student voices in opposition to it?

All Thai universities claim to strictly implement the rules and regulations of the OHEC and the MOE, and maintain that they actively protect first-year students’ human rights. However, university executives across the country have typically turned a blind eye to such violations on university campuses.

First-year students, especially in universities outside Bangkok, are often forced to behave in a certain way, and are sometimes ordered by their seniors to humiliate themselves and trained as if they were serving in a military.

Eradication of this Thai university culture is not inevitable in the foreseeable future, because it has been both openly and secretly supported by many Thai academics in universities and schools, and also by Thai authorities who believe that this culture helps to reinforce Thailand’s hierarchical structure.

Therefore, the promotion and protection of human rights and human dignity are compromised and sacrificed for perceived campus unity as students conform to SOTUS and remain obedient to their seniors. Thai universities work as machines to reproduce and clone an obedient population for the country instead of equipping younger generations with the knowledge to empower themselves and improve the country.

Supporters of this SOTUS culture, including students, university lecturers and the general public, are deluded by the romantic idea of the Thai concept of “family”, regarded as a core Thai value, especially the concept of “brothers and sisters”. This fantasy ignores the fact that the SOTUS culture involves many elements of human rights violations.

In Thailand, this concept does not simply mean love, affection and kindness between family members, supporting each other in difficult times, but also includes obedience. Under the SOTUS culture, a “family” carries a strong connotation of “obedience” and “submission” towards senior members, while “inferior” members should be looked after by their seniors. Consequently, this university culture acts as a catalyst for the establishment and reinforcement of a Thai patronage system via a romantic delusion.

The concept of professionalism and meritocracy in the Thai labour market and the Thai bureaucracy, in which knowledge, skills and devotion are crucial in getting a job or a promotion, is undermined by the SOTUS culture which directly and indirectly perpetuates the patronage system. This is ironic because a vast majority of students are opposed to the Thai patronage system, while simultaneously hoping to benefit from it in one way or another. This allows the SOTUS culture to maintain its momentum on campus.

Indeed, the persistence of this university culture and its human rights violations demonstrates how Thai academia tolerates and ignores universal concepts of human rights, while embracing instead a Thai definition of human rights, which is far lower.

The second periodic report of Thailand in 2017 by the United Nations Human Rights Committee raised concerns about “the severe and arbitrary restrictions imposed on the right to freedom of opinion and expression”. It therefore recommended Thailand “take all measures necessary to guarantee the enjoyment of freedom of opinion and expression in all their forms”

A call for the eradication of this culture has been growing among younger generations and human rights defenders. For example, the Anti-SOTUS Facebook page has garnered almost 300,000 “likes” and “followers”. However, a social media campaign is ineffective under the current political circumstances in which the country is controlled by the military.

Indeed, allowing SOTUS to continue works for, not against, the military government because many students opposed to the 2014 coup d’etat accept the SOTUS culture. Insofar as the military is concerned, the SOTUS system serves to reinforce subservience and obedience in wider society.

Thai universities can no longer afford to allow the SOTUS culture to persist and reproduce obedient graduates, because the ability to question and challenge seniority or authority is important, and is necessary for Thailand’s future development.

After the introduction of the first National Economic and Social Development Plan in 1961, it took Thailand at least another 35 years to realise that an active population is crucial for development. Consequently, in 1997 the country emphasised human development in its eighth plan. It aimed at substantive educational reforms, specifically in relation to both learning and teaching processes in order to generate active learners. But, after two decades of this ambition, university students remain mostly unchanged.

The persistence of SOTUS will only delay this process and constrain the ability of university students to learn and question.

It is now time for Thai universities to take real action against it, or otherwise let this decay continue to erode the future of the country and its students.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.

My interview in Matichon with respect to whether the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) should grant permission for political parties to organise political activities

My interview in Matichon with respect to whether the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) should grant permission for political parties to organise political activities:

We should not have asked this question now because political parties should have been allowed to function a long time ago. The NCPO perceive political activities as a threat to national security, which I disagree with. In order to prepare Thailand’s return to democracy, political parties should be able to function normally. They should be able to organise party-meetings or other political activities. If these activities are banned it would not be in the interest of Thai democracy.

I argued that it is important for political parties to meet and communicate with the people and their constituents. I do not think that Yingluck’s court case (over allegations of corruption surrounding the implementation of Yingluck’s rice-pledging policy) is the main contributing factor to the NCPO’s ban of political activities. The NCPO might be concerned about the political movement of Yingluck’s power base and their distrust in other political parties.

Indeed, I argued that the NCPO is quite scared of the functioning of democracy, scared of elections, scared of voices of the people and of freedom of speech.

I believe that the NCPO will not grant permission for political parties to organise any political activities until they have set a precise timeline for elections.

If the NCPO truly want to return Thailand to democracy, then it is important to give a permission to political parties to function now. Delaying such permissions will not be in the interests of the NCPO in the long term.

Social tolerance not a substitute for LGBT rights

August 07, 2017 01:00 By Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation

it is time for formal legal recognition of human rights, including LGBT rights and equal marriage

After US President Donald Trump’s distasteful tweet announcing his intention to ban transgender people from serving in the military, there was a strong reaction. His announcement backfired as people within and outside of the United States called on him to uphold the principles of human rights, namely, equality, dignity and rights.

Trump’s tweet reaffirmed public speculation over his LGBT policy, which is starkly different from former president Barack Obama’s recognition of LGBT rights as human rights.

This is of little public concern in Thailand, since most transgender people are not inclined to serve in the military. Though this illustrates the different national perceptions towards the rights of LGBT people in Thailand and the US, the violation of LGBT rights remains an ongoing challenge for both nations and the rest of the world.

Thailand is neither one of the 72 countries where homosexuality is illegal and people can potentially be arrested, as recently observed in the arrest of 40 Nigerian men for performing homosexual acts, nor those eight countries where homosexuality is punishable by death.

With its famous “ladyboy” performances in Pattaya and elsewhere, Thailand is perceived as a very gay-friendly land, and can hardly be described as an anti-gay or anti-LGBT society, in part because there is a high level of social acceptance and tolerance towards members of these minority groups.

Same-sex marriage occasionally receives mainstream media and social media coverage in Thailand, reinforcing its high public support. A cultural ceremony, a marriage ceremony without the accompanying legally binding status of marriage, misleads some Thai people to believe that our country is one of the 24 nations across the globe in which same-sex marriage is legal. Consequently, people are distracted from discussing LGBT rights in a serious manner, and have entered a social comfort zone in which there is an illusion of rights where they don’t actually exist in law. This illusion continues the poor public awareness of the inequalities between genders and sexual orientation in the country.

For example, there are few formal complaints of job discrimination made by LGBT people, but this does not mean that there is no job discrimination against LGBT people in Thailand. Indeed there are instances of discrimination, but they are not normally considered violations of the rights of LGBT people. Rather, they reflect the Thai job market in general, which is dominated by the problem of personal connection and the belief in luck and destiny. Accordingly, there is little connection made with the concept of rights and equality in the job market.

In 2011, at the United Nations convention in Geneva, Switzerland, the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasised that LGBT people are no less human than others, and so LGBT rights are human rights and must be protected by the state. In the same year,  Obama signed a presidential memorandum entitled “International Initiatives to Advance the Human Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Persons,” in order “to ensure that US diplomacy and foreign assistance promote and protect the human rights of LGBT persons”.

US commitment

The declaration reaffirmed the US commitment to the promotion of LGBT rights. To a certain extent, low levels of commitment from the Thai state, and the different values and social practices between Thailand and the West, holds back our country from making progress on LGBT rights.  A majority of Thais, regardless of their sexual preferences or orientation, are confused by the gulf between the existence of widespread social tolerance and officially recognised rights. This confusion leads to a widespread, but erroneous, belief that social tolerance is a legitimate substitute for legally recognising the rights of minorities.

Thailand is little different from its ASEAN neighbours and the rest of Asia, where minority rights are not normally protected and enshrined by the state because cultural walls are erected in the name of national pride. Consequently, what is considered normal and accepted beyond the continent are not often embraced by Asian countries. This prevents Thailand from fully appreciating the universality of rights as proclaimed by the United Nations: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”

In 2015 Singapore announced that the country was not yet ready for same-sex marriage. The same year, in the West, the US legalised same-sex marriage. This summer, Germany became the 15th European country allowing same-sex marriage.

In part, the lack of progress with LGBT rights in Thailand is related to the focus of society and the LGBT community on HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.

The health issues have attracted resources to support work in that area from international donors such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The country’s leading LGBT NGO, the Rainbow Sky Association of Thailand, has also been primarily working on HIV issues rather than the struggle for rights recognition. Also, domestic funding sources focus on HIV because LGBT people and prostitutes are considered to be at a high risk of infection.

However, this year we have observed a shift of support among international donors to a focus on rights and equality. The Embassy of Sweden in Bangkok, in collaboration with USAID and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), have implemented the “Being LGBT in Asia” project to support basic LGBT rights, and address discrimination against LGBT people across the continent.

In Thailand and the rest of Asia, the debate on the promotion of rights is often framed in terms of a clash of values between the East and the West. This is a false argument. LGBT rights are not advanced as Western values. They are an acceptance of fundamental and inalienable human rights and equality for all people of the world. Including the people of the Eastern part of the world.

Appointing envoys

Indeed, one of the most effective Western foreign policy instruments to promote LGBT rights across the globe is the appointment of gay diplomats and ambassadors. They include Ted Osius, appointed as US ambassador to Vietnam in 2014 by Obama, and Brian Davidson, appointed as British ambassador to Thailand in 2016.

These appointments send a strong message to the rest of the world that being gay does not devalue their humanity, and that they are no less capable of performing such senior roles.

This is a call for Thailand and the rest of Asia to wake up and truly reconsider their support for LGBT rights. After all, they are simply recognition of human rights, which Thailand already claims to promote and respect. Nothing else can substitute for that formal recognition.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University.

My interview with respect to the qualification of the steering committee for Thailand’s 20-year national strategy

My interview with respect to the qualification of the steering committee for Thailand’s 20-year national strategy (2017-2036), in Matichon, 7th of August 2017: 

I personally disagree with the introduction of Thailand’s 20-year national strategy (2017-2036) by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), because the existing “five-year National Economic and Social Development Plan” implemented by the Office of the National Economic Development Board (NEDB), is already sufficient to provide guidelines for developments. The 20-year plan is therefore unnecessary. 

However, the 20-year plan is enshrined by the 2017 Constitution of Thailand, and it is indicated that the military government will appoint a steering committee to implement the 20-year plan. I argued that if military involvement is required it will not be in the interests of Thailand because the military tend to focus and excel on security issues. There are many areas of development such as economic, social developmental programmes, in which the military are not experts. Therefore, it is not necessary to include senior military in the steering committee.

Although there are a number of highly qualified persons, there is indication that the NCPO might appoint the very same people who have been working with them, especially those who are not in conflict with them. 

I am hoping to see the appointment of new faces to the steering committee charged with implementing the 20-year plan, so that the committee and development will be in the interests of Thailand, rather than ending up with the same old faces.

My interview in Matichon with respect to the role and contribution of the National Reform Council

My interview in Matichon with respect to the role and contribution of the National Reform Council:

Since the 2014 coup, Thailand has changed little. Reform is a long-term and ongoing process. Indeed, Thailand and Thai people tend to deny changes, for example Thais accept a military culture within the democratic process.

There are different areas of reform such as economic, social, and educational reforms. However, for example, we have seen little educational reform under the current government. We have seen too many tutorial schools in Thailand, and it has become a part of Thai-education culture that students must pay for private tuition at such tutorial schools. Indeed, a large number of these school reflects a failure of the Thai education system which must be addressed before the Thai education system can be improved.

The very same metaphor can be applied to the country. When the government cannot properly function, Thailand should restructure its organisations and ministries in order to improve their long term effectiveness, instead of simply establishing a reform council.

I argue that most problems and recommendations, such as income inequality and education issues which have been highlighted by the National Reform Council are not significantly different from what we already heard from the existing governmental organisations such as the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB).

Indeed, after the 2014 coup we observed greater centralisation and the expansion of bureaucratic power. Government officials remain unresponsive to the demands of the people.

In addition, prior the 2014 coup government officials were rather submissive towards politicians, and they are now very submissive towards the military. It has been observed that government officials work to please the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), rather than seeking to solve the country’s problems.

Thai rice politics and the FUTURE of agricultural subsidies

THE NATION Saturday, July 29, 2017
TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH
SPECIAL TO THE NATION

Each wet season, Thai farmers begin cultivating their annual crop anticipating both natural and market uncertainties. For these farmers, nothing can be taken for granted. Last year excessive rain destroyed much of their crop, this year too little or too much water could do the same. Nevertheless, the uncertainties confronting Thai farmers are typical of the problems farmers face worldwide, thus subsidies remain crucial for the survival of farmers.

The previous Yingluck administration implemented one of the most controversial and expensive farming subsidy policies in Thai history, allegedly costing the state more than Bt500 billion. Her rice-pledging policy was criticised for a lack of substance to help farmers survive in the capitalist market, instead simply putting cash in their hands.

Yingluck’s rice policy has also been fiercely criticised by her political opponents for destroying market mechanisms, and perhaps violating Thailand’s world trade commitments. In a 2013 meeting of the WTO Agriculture Committee, Canada, the US, Australia and the EU questioned whether Thailand had breached its domestic support limits.

Although, 86.5 per cent of farmers were reportedly satisfied with the policy, the rice-pledging scheme was politicised and became one of the main contributing factors to Yingluck’s ouster by military coup in 2014, resulting in allegations against her of corruption and charges she neglected her duty to over- see the scheme.

The Supreme Court rules on August 25, and a guilty verdict would have serious ramifications for the political futures of Yingluck and her Pheu Thai Party, as well as for the ongoing Thai political conflict. But it would also indicate the future prospects of farm subsidies in Thailand.

That there was corruption in the implementation of rice-pledging is undeniable, and rigorous law enforcement is required to handle the case. Indeed, corruption was also observed during the implementation of the rice price-guarantee policy under her predecessor, Abhisit Vejjajiva.

In addition, a number of corruption allegations made against rice-pledging were targeted not at its implementation, but at pre-existing problems in the Thai rice industry, one example being the rigging of scales to measure moisture in farmers’ paddy in the rice mills. It is crucial to scrutinise all stakeholders involved, rather than primarily focusing on politicians.

The public is now questioning whether Thailand should maintain such policies to support rice farmers. Is there any future prospect for rice subsidies?

“I cannot survive with the money from selling rice, now. I used to make just enough money from the [rice- pledging] policy. You don’t understand why it [the subsidy] is important, because you are not a farmer. I still hope this [Prayut] government restores the rice-pledging policy to help us. I borrowed money to buy lots of things for farming,” stated a rice farmer in Si Sa Ket province.

Thai farmers have always received sympathy for their hard work from the urban-middle class, and they have been regarded as the backbone of the nation for centuries. Nevertheless, public sympathy doesn’t necessary translated into support for rice subsidies, especially since the rural populace has been stereotyped as easily falling into debt and expecting to be rescued by the government. The urban-middle class respect is often based on an idealised and romanticised vision of rice farming that fails to reflect the financial vulnerability.

Indeed, the very high price of rice during the Yingluck government was a double-edged sword. Not only did it help provide household liquidity for rice farmers, but it also encouraged farmers to increase their production in order to increase their household income, resulting in oversupply of rice to the market. Rural farmers are typically attracted by economically viable crops, so it is logical that they would seek to maximise their potential profit.

Of course, farm subsidies must not be treated as a form of entitlement, especially in the form of cash payments. Subsidies should be provided as a form of relief programme, which can financially support farmers to be able to compete in the market in the long run.

The military government and its supporters are not entirely convinced of the need for rice subsidies and their importance for the growth of the Thai economy. Indeed, few Thais are aware of the historic contribution rice farmers have made to the economy, since this rarely features in the history books.

Between 1950s and 1970s, the “rice premium” (export tax) was a crucial source of government revenue, used to boost the country’s industrialisation. In 1953, government revenue from rice was 32 per cent of the total revenue. This missing piece of information pre- vents new generations from appreciating the transfer of public resources to subsidise the Thai agricultural sector today.

Rice and agricultural subsidies are often dismissed as populist policy, motivated by politicians’ desire to win elections. A vast majority of Thais still believe that subsidies represent a wasteful use of public resources.

They are correct to an extent, but not entirely. At the very least, farmers have to produce crops in order to obtain support from the government, so there is no such thing as a free lunch for rice farmers. In addition, working in a rice field is not a dream career for any Thai youngster, even those doing degrees in agriculture. Therefore, rice subsidies can also be utilised as a long-term national strategy that secures our ability as a nation to feed ourselves.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.

Thailand’s reconciliation trap is preventing democratic progress

July 22, 2017 01:00 
By Titipol Phakdeewanich 
Special to The Nation

This week, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) launched a nationwide “social contract” as part of its reconciliation plan, which began in March. In essence, the military-drafted social contract aims to reunite the country in the hope that Thai people can move forwards together.

The NCPO says this is a significant step forward since the 2014 coup, and should resolve Thailand’s decade-long political division.  However, military-led reconciliation has met with sceptical responses both inside and outside the country. Observers question whether it can truly reunite Thailand as a nation, or whether it is simply a political ploy for the military to gain trust and legitimacy, rather than allow reconciliation led by all parties involved.  So, can the junta’s dream of forced reconciliation become a reality?

The military is fully aware of public scepticism over its role and involvement in the reconciliation process. Thus it has made clear that it will attend the public reconciliation forums only to listen, not to express any opinion or discuss issues, so as to ensure that “invited participants” are free to express their views on conflict solutions and reconciliation.  

One such forum was held this week at the 21st Military Circle in Nakhon Ratchasima province. An impression it left was that foreign countries and institutions are a potential threat to national security, and their actions and criticism directed at Thailand – particularly in relation to its politics, democracy and human rights since 2014 – are interpreted as a form of intervention. Freedom House classified Thailand as “Not Free” in its 2017 report on political and civil rights. 

Though organised by the military, the NCPO’s reconciliation process is in fact little different from the process pursued under the administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva. Following the 2010 crackdown on red-shirt protesters, Abhisit initiated the National Reform Committee (NRC), chaired by former prime minister Anand Panyarachun. In 2013, we also witnessed reconciliation attempts under the government of Yingluck Shinawatra, who invited the former British prime minister Tony Blair to speak on reconciliation. 

The NCPO’s public forums have delivered similar information to those held under Abhisit’s NRC, with proposals for economic, social and political reforms aimed especially at more equable allocation of public resources. In fact, this latest reconciliation effort is providing no new information, instead only mirroring and repeating data already known to the Thai public and international observers from the earlier process. 

The junta outwardly claims that Thailand is a democratic country moving towards a more democratic environment. However there is plenty of cause for scepticism over whether the military believes that Thailand’s political divide can be bridged through a more democratic environment. 

Throughout the three years since the May 2014 coup, the NCPO has attempted to introduce a military culture as an integral component of “Thai-style” democracy. Inside barracks, power and force, order and commands, are vital to the proper functioning of the Thai military. Seniority based on rank and the strict enforcement of a hierarchical structure is the mechanism that creates unity. Indeed, this kind of military culture is almost identical to the prevailing concept of “Thainess” enshrined in the NCPO’s “Twelve Core Values for a Strong Thailand”. 

The military’s prioritising of reconciliation ahead of democracy and human rights makes complete sense to the vast majority of Thais. This is reinforced by memories of the economic damage caused by chaotic rallies in Bangkok and elsewhere, particularly during the protests in 2010 by the red shirts and in 2013-2014 by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC). 

So what would Thailand be like under a social contract enforced by the military? 

Despite its claims go the contrary, the contract is nothing other than a rejection of genuine representative democracy, in favour of establishing a “Thai-style” democracy, in which liberty and freedom are secondary to “order” and “stability”. The NCPO has repeatedly told the Thai people and the international community that Thailand’s cultural uniqueness cannot be undermined by its international commitments and international law, particularly human rights.  

Instead of falling into a reconciliation trap, the military and other Thai authorities must be more open-minded in acknowledging the issues surrounding country’s political conflicts, which are much wider than income inequality and imbalances. Indeed, Thailand’s political conflicts are seated in a poor understanding and perhaps rejection of the universal concept of human rights, which embrace and endorse dignity, rights, liberty, equality and freedom. These key values are given only a token place in the Thai education system, and have not yet been fully integrated.  

From school to university, young Thais are taught to respect adults, and to “live in harmony and promote unity” so that Thailand can be a peaceful, strong and independent society. These characteristics of “Thainess” are not necessarily anti-democratic and anti-human rights, but the ways in they are taught to young generations are an obstacle for Thailand’s democratic progress. 

Today, it is increasingly difficult to convince a majority of Thais that promotion of democracy and human rights can produce natural reconciliation and minimise conflicts, through greater equality and respect for individual dignity regardless of social background. 

Of course, democracy cannot guarantee equality and unity. But the rule of law is a democratic means to ensure that people’s rights are protected from violation by the state and individuals. In Thailand the law is not always applied equally across all groups. 

Unity and harmony cannot be forced, but are rather a product of the true and honest promotion of equality and rights. This challenge will persist as long as Thailand continues to overrule the universal concept of human rights, and keeps falling into the reconciliation trap and historic pride in its Thainess.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.

My interview in Matichon with respect to the government’s initiative of its new public relation mechanism and body

My interview in Matichon with respect to the government’s initiative of its new public relation mechanism and body: The government seems to believe that there is a communication problem between them and the people, therefore they wanted to ensure that people can receive more information from them than from other sources.

I argued that people have received sufficient information from the government, and it is therefore important for people to receive information from alternative sources rather than receiving one-sided information.

Every government has made good decisions and made mistakes. Thus, people should be able to access both positive and negative reflections on the government.

The problem is that the government tends to deny that mistakes have been made, such as the rejection of the problems concerning freedom of expression and human rights. The government should not accuse criticism as false or misleading information, and stop claiming that such information is a threat to national security.

The problem with Thailand today is that the government has been claiming that itself is the only trustworthy and reliable source of information. This is rather worrying for Thailand.

Indeed, I argued that the government does not really require any PR, because they speak on their own behalf to advertise the good job they are doing. Instead, if the government denies their mistakes, their reputation will be undermined.

Thai-US relations must rest on democratic values, not military ties

opinion July 15, 2017 01:00
By Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Naton


After long speculation on the future of Thai-US relations under the new administration in Washington, a phone call and invitation to the White House from President Donald Trump to Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha sent a clear message that Thailand remains America’s strategic partner.

Although the trip has been postponed, the invitation raised significant concerns among democracy advocates in Thailand. They are worried first that Washington’s new priorities could delay Thailand’s timeline for return to democracy, and second that Trump’s diplomacy is a de facto endorsement for the Thai military to extend its grip on power and gain legitimacy on the global political stage. 

Trump has been clear all along with both the American people and the rest of the world that his administration is all about “America First”. His political rhetoric has been criticised both at home and abroad by many who fear his administration is eroding “American values”, specifically of democracy and human rights, and also US global leadership.

In Bangkok, the US Embassy has attempted to demonstrate that America does and will continue to support democracy and human rights within Thailand. However, the unpredictable nature of Trump leaves pro-democracy groups with significant concerns that Washington could make a U-turn in its foreign policy direction whenever it chooses.

Trump’s speeches typically contain keywords we normally hear from US presidents, such as “democracy”, and “shared interests and values”. Indeed, these are essentially template messages from US presidents and State Secretaries, mentioned repeatedly when they speak to their global partners. Nevertheless, “security” has emerged above these as the most important keyword that Trump uses to address his domestic and foreign audiences. 

How far can the Trump administration continue to be a democratic partner with Thailand?  Trump and General Prayut share a low tolerance of criticism, particularly from the media. With his war against US media giants such as CNN and the New York Times – which he describes as bastions of  “fake news” – Trump has undermined the United States’ role in promoting global press freedom. 

Between 2010 and 2015, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) implemented the Sapan Programme, which was intended to promote democracy in Thailand. One of the main objectives was to empower civil society and the media to function as a check-and-balance mechanism within the political system. Is Trump capable of convincing his Thai partner to believe in this very American democratic element?

Washington’s policy stance towards Bangkok under President Trump’s predecessor Barack Obama appeared to be shaped by principles of democracy and human rights. The Obama administration made clear it regarded human rights as integral to US foreign policy. This is a rather different tone from that we are hearing from the Trump administration. 

Addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated: “It is unreasonable to expect that every foreign policy endeavour will be driven by human rights considerations alone, especially when the security of the American people is at stake.” This statement is in line with Trump’s focus on security, and with Trump as a market-capitalist president – human rights shouldn’t get in the way of American businesses making money.

According to the US government website ForeignAssistance.gov, the 2017 plans forThailand under the Trump administration are weighted 58 per cent towards “Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance” and 42 per cent towards “Peace and Security”. Although these figures may boost hopes for American democratic engagement with Thailand, scepticism remains.

Pursuing security issues might be attractive for the Thai military government, but not necessary for the vast majority of Thais. If Trump’s bilateral dealings with Thailand are overshadowed by US policies on wider regional security issues, particularly the South China Sea and North Korea, then Washington cannot afford to overemphasise its military strength, since this could rekindle  memories of its infamous military engagement during the Vietnam War. Today, a generation of Thais politicised by that war and other events of the 1970s remains sceptical of the US role, and questions its commitment to democracy. 

“I thought I was free to read and believe in what I wanted regarding democracy. I didn’t understand why the Americans and the Thai army went after us, when we believed in communism, if they [America] said that democracy is freedom of expression. I had to choose between escaping to China or being killed like my friends in my hometown [Amnat Charoen],” said a woman who fled Thailand on foot to live in exile in China for almost 18 years during the US insurgency against communism in Indochina.

Before Trump became president Thailand saw occasional protests against the US, especially by Thais annoyed at its “unwelcome” opinions on the state of democracy and human rights here. One might assume these protesters were part of an anti-American movement. However, closer analysis reveals they fall primarily in to two categories – namely anti-American and anti-democracy. 

In order to advance the interests of the US and protect American people in a country like Thailand, the exercise of soft power should be emphasised.

With respect to contemporary American history, most secretaries of state under the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations acknowledged and highlighted the importance of US soft power, “smart” power, and people-to-people diplomacy. 

In 2006, Secretary Condoleezza Rice introduced her idea of “transformational diplomacy”, a move away from depending exclusively on state-to-state relations. Instead, Rice suggested it was time for diplomacy to go beyond foreign capitals, using people-to-people contacts to enhance America’s reputation and interests.
Accordingly, social media have enabled the US Embassy in Bangkok to reach out and engage with young people, in addition to their conventional diplomacy in the capital. This younger generation generally celebrates liberty and freedoms, and craves for a more democratic environment. 

Washington must not dismiss younger people from the equation of Thai-US relations, since they are the driving force for Thai democratic progress. And after all, promoting democracy within Thailand is not only in the interests of the country and the Thai people, but it also serves to benefit US engagement within the region. 

Titipol Phakdeewanich is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.

Thai universal healthcare: Should it be a right with responsibility?

July 11, 2017 01:00 

By Titipol Phakdeewanich 

Special to The Nation 

In 2002, universal healthcare coverage was initiated by the Thai Rak Thai government. Nicknamed the Bt30 healthcare programme in reference to the cost of each medical visit, the scheme gave 49 million people living both above and below the poverty line almost free access to healthcare services.

Universal healthcare was overwhelmingly welcomed by the rural poor, especially in the North and Northeast (Isaan) – the political base of the Pheu Thai Party and its predecessor Thai Rak Thai. The policy remains a cornerstone of Pheu Thai’s platform, allowing it to maintain support and popularity by portraying itself as representing the rural poor.  

Since 2002, however, discussion on revising universal healthcare has been politicised and become politically sensitive. Increasing numbers of people have begun to perceive healthcare as an absolute right, with little consideration of it as a personal responsibility. This has triggered concerns over public expenditure on the programme. 

It is undeniable that a universal healthcare scheme is necessary, and it was originally introduced in compliance with Section 52 of the 1997 Constitution. Indeed, at that time the public was not fully aware that universal healthcare was a constitutional right that the state must provide. 

Most supporters of Thai Rak Thai perceived universal healthcare as a gift from the party, failing to realise it was a duty and responsibility of their representatives to pursue such a policy. This allowed the party to establish a personal bond with them – which in fact is typical of Thai political culture regardless of who is in government.  

Since 2014, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) has pushed for reform of the universal healthcare bill in order to introduce a co-payment scheme. This is partly because so many hospitals and doctors are complaining about the financial burden on the system, and claim that the people have been “spoiled” by the system and are now making too many unnecessary hospital visits. 

However, it is too simplistic to view the rising number of hospital visits and conclude that the universal healthcare scheme has spoiled the people, since the costs of healthcare are not just a medical bill for the rural poor.  

Patients, especially the rural poor, incur expenses every time they access medical treatment, including for travel and lost income from not working. Such expenses are a serious financial burden for a large number of patients and mean that rural people often can’t access hospital treatment even when they need it. However, this fact is generally missing from the healthcare debate among doctors and the middle class. 

“I have to get up at 1am to get here early for the hospital queue,” reports a villager who travelled from a district of Khemarat to the hospital in the city of Ubon Ratchathani recently. “Travelling from a rural part of the province to the hospital is not that easy. Sometimes we have to contribute Bt100 each to rent a truck to take us to the hospital. There are many things that we have to pay for to get here [hospital]. Paying the small amount of Bt30, or not paying at all, really helps us.”  

Healthcare should be free and considered a right for the rural poor, particularly for the 10.5 per cent of population that lives below the national poverty line – but not for all. For those who can afford it, healthcare should be considered a responsibility, for which a co-payment scheme should be applied. 

In addition, Thailand is now considered to be an ageing society, with about 7.5 million people or 11 per cent of the population over the age of 65. The World Bank estimates this figure will rise to 17 million by 2040. Public expenditure on healthcare will almost certainly rise as a result, presenting a big challenge for which the government must be prepared. 

The introduction of a co-payment scheme by the NCPO makes clear financial sense for the government. However, the validity of the move has been undermined by the priorities set for public expenditure under this administration. The NCPO has demonstrated that its spending often does not synchronise with the needs of millions of Thais. Recent examples include the US$393 million spent on submarines from China, and the agreement to purchase four Black Hawk helicopters from the United States. The NCPO claims these purchases are important for national security, despite the country not being at war.      

In his 2016 speech at the UN general assembly, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha highlighted the importance of healthcare: “We also have a continued policy of providing quality healthcare services for all.”  So where does the government’s priority lie now – with national security or with human security? 

This is an important question that must be answered by the military leadership. Can a country be secure without a healthy population? Can the economy prosper with a populace that is left prey to illness?  

Another important question is how much the junta can successfully reduce the public financial burden of healthcare through the introduction of a co-payment scheme. This is not entirely a question of spending priorities, however, but also a matter of political games, in which politicians will play an important role. Providing social welfare is always rewarding for politicians and those in power, because such policies help ensure they maintain public popularity.  

Exactly how much individuals will need to contribute to the co-payment scheme has not yet been finalised. However, this scheme must not become a barrier to accessing healthcare for those who live in poverty. 

Titipol Phakdeewanich is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.