I was quoted in The Nation: 4th Anniversary of the 2014 Coup

I was quoted in The Nation:
However, military power alone would not enable the survival of the junta for long unless it also has strong support from big corporations, which dominate the Thai economy.
The military has enjoyed increased acceptance from big businesses, says Titipol Phakdeewanich, dean of political science at Ubon Ratchathani University. “When they are doing well in their businesses, getting wealthier or getting benefits facilitated by government policies like Pracha Rath, it is no surprise that they support [the military],” he points out.

A summary of my Interview in Khaosod, with respect to the NCPO’s establishment of political allies

Despite the claim made by Prime Minster Prayut Chan-O-Cha: the establishment of political allies and attracting existing politicians [by the NCPO] (especially former MPs and influential provincial political figures) is a typical path to power in Thai politics, he argued that this is an unacceptable element of the Thai political culture and is undemocratic.

Therefore, Gen Prayut’s claim reflects that he and the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), including the military, accept the ongoing political culture, despite the 2014 coup-maker disapproving it as a form of decay in Thai democracy.

He argued that the way Thai politicians change parties prior to elections is a reflection of politics without ideological basis. Instead, this pattern of behaviour demonstrates that Thai politicians prioritise their personal interests over the interests of the public. They only tend to move to join those with a high possibility of electoral success, or to those who are well endowed with financial resources.

Therefore, Gen Prayut’s acceptance of unacceptable elements of Thai political culture is a reflection of the lack of reform before the next election – despite the NCPO justifying their coup on the basis that they would reform Thai politics.

Indeed, this is only a repetition of the same old pattern of Thai politics because money and power attract politicians.

Today, we have observed that the NCPO has been using all kinds of state mechanisms to establish and strengthen their relations with political power-brokers and with business and political groups.

Supporting democracy is not a priority for politicians who have already declared themselves as supporters of the NCPO, in the attempt to ensure that the military will remain in power after the election. Therefore, it is important for Thais to not vote for them if we want democracy to survive in Thailand. 

The upcoming elections will not be free and fair because the NCPO has continued to suppress freedom of expression and restrict political activities. Therefore, it is important for the NCPO to allow all parties and actors to have their liberties and political freedoms in the event of an election in order to ensure that it is free and fair. 

A summary of my Interview in Matichon:

The 2018 Constitution is already designed to facilitate the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and the military to maintain political power, even after the return to democracy, for example through the NCPO-appointed Senate members who can vote to select the Prime Minister. 

If we consider the political stance of the Democrat Party, we cannot entirely trust them (particularly the party’s support for democracy), because they have been a supporter of the military’s role in Thai politics. Therefore, the public can see no indication that the Democrat Party will not support the military in the future. 

With reference to Thai political history, we have observed compromises between the military and political parties when they share common interests. Recently, we have also observed newly registered political parties expressing their support for General Prayut Chan-O-Cha to be the next prime minister. 

It is important for all political parties to demonstrate their stance against the appointment of an unelected prime minister. If the House of Representatives stays firm on this matter, then it could act as an effective mechanism to minimise the opportunity for Thailand to have an unelected prime minister. 

I questioned recent Democrat Party announcement of their opposition to an unelected prime minister, about whether it is only intended to boost its popularity against amongst young voters, who are now leaning towards the Future Forward Party, rather than a committed intention to oppose the appointment of an unelected prime minister. This facelift strategy of the Democrat Party is unlikely to significantly improve the damaged reputation of the party as an anti-democratic party.

Indeed, in the current political context, the term “unelected prime minister” is implicitly used to refer to either the military or General Prayut Chan-O-Cha. Thus, this implies the continuity of the NCPO and the military after the return to democracy, despite falling support for Prayut remaining in power.

If “unelected prime minister” is a highly qualified person or a successful businessman, there perhaps be less resistance. Therefore, if General Prayut Chan-O-Cha and the NCPO intend to continue their roles in Thai politics, they will have to go through political channels, just like other politicians. 

My comments with respect to the decision of the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) to vote down all seven new Election Commissioner candidates and its political implications.

My comments with respect to the decision of the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) to vote down all seven new Election Commissioner candidates and its political implications.

Whether it was intentional or not, the National Legislative Assembly’s (NLA) rejection of the Election Commissioner candidates acted as a tactic to buy time for the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). This will provide more opportunity or the military to run their political campaign, which is not fair for political parties. If we are to discuss “free and fair elections”, we must also consider the political circumstances preceding elections. The upcoming election (so long as it is not once again postponed by the NCPO) cannot be described as a free and fair election because the military is able to exercise its absolute power to manipulate state mechanisms in order to mobilise their popularity.

The rejection of the Election Commissioner candidates can result in further delays to the election, which I believe it is a mechanism to buy time for the NCPO, whilst they also already have Article 44 to exercise absolute power at their convenience. Delays to the election timeline have more to do with the readiness of the Thai military to compete at the polls, rather than the readiness of the country, despite the NCPO’s claims that Thailand as a country is unready for elections.

I am not convinced, like many other Thais and political observers, that the NLA’s decision to reject the Election Commissioner candidates was independent and without any influence from the NCPO. After all, the NLA was appointed by the NCPO, so they have been voting consistently along with the demands of the NCPO, rather than responding to the demands of the people of Thailand.

Indeed, I argued that we cannot just look at the problems on the surface or just simply believe that the NLA’s rejection of the Election Commissioner candidates is a problem with either the selection process or the selecting committee.

This rejection simply reflects the undemocratic nature of the current political system in Thailand under the military junta, where the voices of the military are at the centre of the power structure.

Can Thailand rely on the Democrat Party for democracy?

Can Thailand rely on the Democrat Party for democracy?
opinion January 10, 2018 01:00
By Titipol Phakdeewanich 
Special to The Nation

As questions linger over whether an election will take place as scheduled in November this year, coup-maker General Prayut Chan-o-cha has signalled the political game has already begun – by declaring himself a former soldier who is now a politician. That in turn has placed the military’s cosy relations with anti-democratic groups in the spotlight.

At the end of 2017, the Democrat Party, formerly a supporter and beneficiary of military intervention (especially after the previous 2006 coup) began to make a U-turn. The party leadership is now speaking out against the junta the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and pressing for an election as scheduled.

In the current political landscape, the Democrat Party could be a significant driving force in kick-starting Thai democracy after four years of junta rule. Yet how realistic is it to place the responsibility for democratic progress in the hands of the Democrat Party? The party last won an election three decades ago in 1992, since when its popularity has plunged wit the emergence of Thaksin Shinawatra’s Pheu Thai Party. 

Nevertheless, the Democrats maintain a strong power base in the South, source of the vast majority of demonstrators for the People’s Democratic Reform Committee-led protests of 2013-2014. Those yellow-shirt protests led to the May 2014 military coup that sought to orchestrate political reform via undemocratic means.

But with only 6.2 million voters in the South, the Democrat Party would lack sufficient support to win an election. By contrast, the political power base of Pheu Thai in the North and Northeast registered 24.9 million voters at the 2011 election. 

However, the South remains important to the successful re-emergence of democracy in Thailand, which can only happen if the Democrat Party shows determination in persuading its constituents that democratic culture and power transitions are the way forward rather than accepting military interventions.

Throughout the ongoing political conflict, the Democrats have continued to undermine the rights of rural voters, especially those in the Northeast, with the rhetoric of vote-buying. At the same time, the party itself has shown it lacks fundamental democratic values and understanding by supporting military intervention in 2006 and 2014. This has intensified the anti-democratic sentiment among its supporters across the country.

“I think elections are good for us because at least we get to choose [our representatives] every four years. Democracy can also help hold politicians accountable as I could see Yingluck [Shinawatra] being scrutinised after she was ousted from office. But with the military [in power] we cannot check them,” said a farmer with four years of compulsory education from the Northeast province of Ubon Ratchathani, expressing why democracy matters to her. 

Recently, the PDRC has once again stirred anti-democratic sentiment among its audience with Facebook videos released last month. The clips highlight PDRC political activities and reiterate the perceived necessity of the 2014 military intervention and its crucial role of eradicating the Shinawatra dynasty from politics.

The videos were intended to re-energise both the NCPO and the PDRC’s popularity and prominence and prevent them slipping into the political margins. They used the old political mantra – highlighting their fight against the elected Yingluck government’s abuse of power, and against her brother Thaksin Shinawatra through their platform of anti-corruption, reform and the rebuilding of Thailand.

These may be persuasive for many PDRC supporters, but others have been made sceptical by a series of corruption scandals surrounding the NCPO that have been quietly resolved by military-legal rulings. The most recent case, the luxury watches and other valuables adorning General Prawit Wongsuwan, Deputy PM and Defence Minister, have sowed more doubt about the NCPO’s anti-corruption credentials and practice.

As the influence of its mantra against corruption fades, the PDRC believes that its ongoing anti-Shinawatra platform is still an effective political instrument for its allies, the Democrat Party and the NCPO. However, the potential effectiveness of that platform at an election is likely overstated.

Prayut’s declaration that he is now a politician cannot be taken as a confirmation of a November 2018 election, but it leaves no doubt as to the NCPO/military’s intention to maintain a central role in Thai governance and politics. The orders and laws enacted by this government reaffirm the determination of the military to create an illiberal democracy.

It is time for both the Democrat Party and the PDRC to revisit their political strategies and redefine their understanding of democracy, as well as learning to respect the voices and the rights of rural people. Taking such action would help them gain more votes and support from the people though democratic means, but it would also greatly contribute to democratic progress within Thailand. 

The right of rural residents in the Northeast and North to help choose the government is already registered; it’s now time for this right to be registered in the hearts and minds of the Democrat Party and its supporters.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the UK’s University of Warwick.

My interview with respect to the NCPO’s Announcement No. 53/2560 (2017), relating to the implementation of Article 44 to amend the Political Party Act, in order to allow political activities.

My interview with respect to the NCPO’s Announcement No. 53/2560 (2017), relating to the implementation of Article 44 to amend the Political Party Act, in order to allow political activities.

This Announcement will affect the membership of political parties, which is likely to effect the Democrat Party more than the Pheu Thai Party. The existing political parties claimed that this amendment might result in a reduction of party members, however, this might not significantly affect the election results.

In relation to the voting decisions of constituents, party membership is not as important as party manifestos and the political stance of the political parties, whilst higher membership levels do not necessarily translate into higher votes in an election.

According to observations, the Democrat Party has more registered members than the Pheu Thai Party, however the Democrat Party has failed to win any general election since the implementation of the 1997 ‘Democratic’ Constitution in 2001.

With respect to the Thai political culture, local influential figures can normally influence voting decisions more than party membership.

Despite being political allies, the Democracy Party cannot take the support from the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) for granted, because there is an indication that the PDRC is leaning towards the military.

In Southern Thailand, Suthep Thaugsuban, the leader of the PDRC has, and continues to be more influential than Abhisit Vejjajiva, the leader of the Democrat Party. Therefore, there it is likely that the Democrat Party will maintain its cozy relationship with Suthep in order to ensure continued support in the South.

Additionally, voters may also consider the extent to which parties are supportive of either democracy or the military when deciding on which party to vote for.

Nevertheless, the NCPO must set one rule to apply for all parties, rather than rules for existing political parties which are distinct from newly registered parties. The NCPO’s Announcement No. 53/2560 (2017) raises a question of whether it is intended to pave the way for the military to maintain its central role after the election.

My interview with respect to the National Legislative Assembly of Thailand’s decision to allow the commissioners of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) to remain in their positions until the end of their 9 year-term.

My interview with respect to the National Legislative Assembly of Thailand’s decision to allow the commissioners of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) to remain in their positions until the end of their 9 year-term.

Whether the NACC commissioners were to remain in power or be replaced by new appointments there will not be a significant difference, because it has been observed that the NACC has not been functioning absolutely independently.

If the existing commissioners were to be replaced by new appointments, it is very likely that the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) would exercise its influence over the appointments. Therefore, the influence of the NCPO would have a significant implication for the functioning of the NACC.

Recently, we have already observed that the NACC has not yet indicated clear actions against the case of the expensive watches of General Prawit Wongsuwan, Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense.

The existing NACC commissioners have been functioning well with regards to scrutinising politicians – which is politically expedient for the NCPO - whilst neglecting to effectively scrutinise corruption cases against other government officials such as the military, police, and senior government officials. Instead, the NACC has been acting as a machinery of the NCPO in scrutinising the NCPO’s political opposition.

Apparently, a decision not to replace the NACC commissioners is because the NCPO is now facing a number of politically sensitive issues, especially the case of General Prawit’s watches, which the NACC is rushing to end in the interests of the NCPO and the military. The sooner the case ends, the sooner the NACC can help to diminish political resistance against the NCPO.

Therefore, I argued that a decision to keep or replace the NACC commissioners is primarily based on the political expediency of the NCPO, rather than a qualification to serve the interests of Thailand.

BBC: A summary of my commentary relating to the Thai Constitution

A summary of my commentary relating to the Thai Constitution, in an interview conducted with BBC Thai, in the context of Thai Constitution Day:

I argued that politicians are not the main contributing factor in Thai constitutional failure [i.e. the resorting to military coups d’état, and the multiple rewriting of constitutions]. Rather, it is the more fundamental problem of law enforcement within Thailand, and its often evident favouring of those who are in power.

Also, we continue to observe the more overt abuse of power. Although Thaksin Shinawatra may have been one of the contributing factors in the 1997 constitutional’s eventual failure [with the military coup d’état of 2006], obviously enough, Thailand’s political problems did not stem from him.

Recently, we have observed many well publicised corruption scandals that then went quiet without being properly scrutinised, or investigated.

[Of course, Thailand, like other countries, has never had a perfect constitution, nevertheless…] The probable main reason that Thailand has had so many constitutions, is because such a large number of Thai reject many of the notions of democracy. I therefore argued that more Thai must learn to advocate for democratic means in the amending of their constitution - instead of this resorting to military coups d’état, which should now be totally unnecessary. Indeed, I stated that Thai people need to better understand that independently functioning agencies [outside of the military] must be in place, in order to better challenge Thailand’s endemic problem of corruption.

http://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-42286951

If we understood human rights, we wouldn’t sacrifice them for military rule

If we understood human rights, we wouldn’t sacrifice them for military rule
opinion December 09, 2017 01:00 By Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation

Tomorrow, the United Nations (UN) will commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

Meanwhile Thailand, a state party to the declaration, remains under military rule with rights and freedoms curtailed ever since the 2014 coup carried out by the National Council for Peace and Order.

Ahead of the scheduled November 2018 elections, Thais are now calling for the return of normal civil liberty and freedoms. The two main political parties, Pheu Thai and the Democrats, have been pushing the NCPO junta to lift the political ban imposed over national security concerns.

The junta has continuously denied basic rights, including political rights, through strict control of public expression. Although the NCPO recently announced “human rights” as a policy priority and a national agenda, the military continues to contest the universality of human rights, claiming that national peace, security and the need to reunify have priority.

One crucial question for the NCPO is, if rights are granted by the military, can they be considered human rights?

Supporters of the military should consider a further question: Is Thailand sacrificing its commitments to the universal principle of human rights in order to facilitate the NCPO’s timeline for a return to democracy, or to maintain the military’s continued grip on power?

Throughout Thailand’s 85 years of attempts at democracy, the military has been able to reassert its central role in the political system by claiming it is defending Thailand’s cultural heritage and social order and eliminating corruption.

With a history of 19 attempted and 12 successful military coups, political rights have repeatedly been taken away, with no unified voice among Thais against the actions of the military. This was particularly so with the 2006 and 2014 coups, when a vast majority of Thais were willing to sacrifice their voting rights for military rule under the illusion that the military was an anti-corruption agent.

The concept of voting rights is enshrined in Article 21 of the UDHR: “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government”. But that concept is still poorly understood by many in the Thai establishment and middle class. They continue instead to disparage voting rights for the rural poor, citing their low levels of educational attainment.

Meanwhile the poor have no one in power to represent their interests and alleviate their condition. 

“The economy is doing so badly for me, I am desperate for elections so that I can vote for who I want to be in Parliament,” a local farmer from Si Sa Ket province said recently, speaking anonymously. 

It is time Thailand placed the universal principle of human rights on the education curriculum, alongside Thai history and cultural heritage. That move would help the nation break through the cultural barrier that exists around human rights.

While Thailand has abided by its commitments to the United Nations, including on human rights, since the inception of the UN in 1946, many Thais barely recognise the concepts of human dignity, equality and liberty because of an overriding social hierarchy they are told is central to being Thai – their Thainess. 

Embracing the principles of human rights, however, does not diminish the quality of being Thai, because being born as a Thai person is after all being born as a human in a country called Thailand. Hence, it is a mistake to view national boundaries as a border that must be defended from the intrusion of “alien” human rights.

Indeed, accepting the universality of human rights cannot be simply equated with the destruction of the uniqueness and dignity of Thai culture. Instead, cultural change is a normal consequence of development, in order to create a just society where everyone is equally respected as a human. 

Therefore, arguments about the need to preserve both Thai cultural uniqueness and national security not only delay the progress of human rights in Thailand. They also undermine the development of an equal and democratic society and deny the ability of Thai people to scrutinise and hold authorities to account.

Absolute trust in state authority simply lends absolute power to those who have it, leaving the public interest unprotected. 

The promotion and protection of universal human rights is not only a mechanism to promote dignity, rights and liberty of individuals, but also to take back power from the state, so that people are empowered to challenge its authority. 

Unfortunately, the Thai military and their supporters continue to rely on the notion of Thainess (Thai exceptionalism) to justify their lack of commitment to universal human rights. 

This remains an ongoing challenge for Thailand, because the military has successfully consolidated its power, and embedded itself at the centre of the country’s politics. This presents a challenge to the UN Human Rights Council in its efforts to promote fundamental rights for Thai people, as it celebrates the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.

A summary of my interview in Matichon, with respect to comments from the Pheu Thai Party on the ban of political activities by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO)

A summary of my interview in Matichon, with respect to comments from the Pheu Thai Party on the ban of political activities by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO)

I argued that all of the justifications announced by the NCPO and military are unreasonable and invalid because those justifications were driven solely by the NCPO’s perceptions.

Indeed, no political activities should have been prohibited in the first place, and political parties should have been permitted to function freely soon after the 2014 military coup d’état.

I argued that the central reason for the continuation of the political ban is fundamentally based on the NCPO securing and maintain its grip on power; by limiting freedom of expression, there is no credible threat to the NCPO’s absolute power. Meanwhile, the political ban is also an effective way of controlling what people know, through the NCPO’s control of access to alternative sources of information ensuring that people only get a one-sided view.

It has been observed that the ban of political activities have been implemented in a very selective manner, because a few members of the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) are able to meet with local communities without being identified for what they are; a political organisation. Similar actions from opponents of the NCPO, however, are normally accused of being politically motivated.

Disagreements are normal in a democratic society, therefore, if the NCPO argues that disagreements are a threat to security, this reflects a lack of understanding of some basic principles of a democratic culture.

It has been rather clear that the NCPO and the military will maintain its grip on power if there is a General Election in 2018. Thus, elections are not an indication for the end of military control and dictatorship. Instead, it is likely that the military is consolidating a Thai version of “illiberal democracy,” characterised by imposing limitations on freedoms and liberty. This form of democracy will not be in the interests of the country, because such a scenario will ensure that the state will have greater power than the people. As a result, the state machinery will be less transparent, and exacerbate Thailand’s existing corruption problems.

-Titipol Phakdeewanich-

A summary of my interview with respect to the maintaining of the political ban by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO)

A summary of my interview with respect to the maintaining of the political ban by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO):

The current state of Thai politics is mostly interpreted by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), while its justification to deny the lifting of political ban is political disorder.

Question arise again over the NCPO’s definition of political disorder. I argued that when there are disagreements with the NCPO, the disagreements cannot be simply classified as political sedition and inciting dissent.

Denying the ability for political parties to organise any political activities is a denial of democracy, which undermines confidence in the NCPO’s democratic timeline to return to democracy in November 2018.

I argued that the NCPO continues to maintain its political ban, partly,  because of diminishing pressure from the international community, for example Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-O-Cha’s trip to Washington was a form of endorsement from the US.

The US administration, under President Donald Trump, has sent out a rather clear message that it intends to turn a blind eye towards Thai democracy, almost giving a green light to the Thai military government.

The maintenance of the political ban demonstrates that Thailand has been intentionally violating its international commitment to the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

Indeed, the political ban does not only affect political parties but it is also disadvantageous for Thai constituents. Instead the political ban only serves the interests of the NCPO itself, as beyond the NCPO itself, information is very limited.

My interview with respect to the interpretation of the 2017 Constitution; Section 268

My interview with respect to the interpretation of the 2017 Constitution; “Section 268: Election of members of the House of Representatives under this Constitution shall be held within one hundred and fifty days as from the date the organic laws under Section 267 (1), (2), (3) and (4) have come into force.”

            According to the 2017 constitution, there are two main interpretations of Section 268; by the government; and by politicians.

            If the government argues that Section 268 did not clearly state the election timeline, then the law must be interpreted in the interests of the people, meaning that elections must be held within 150 days. This period is sufficient for elections to be completed.

            Indeed, the Thai electoral timeline has been delayed multiple times by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), and it is time to return power to the people.

            The NCPO interpreted the “one hundred and fifty days” in Section 268 as a period to set the election date rather than the period for elections to be completed. This interpretation raises a question about the November 2018 election timeline, as announced by Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-O-Cha, as to whether it is to be postponed, or if there will be election at all in 2018.

            Additionally, the interpretation of Section 268 by the NCPO and the Government demonstrates the apparent intention to once again extend the election timeline, which is not in interests of democracy.

            The interpretation of the “one hundred and fifty days” in Section 268 by politicians is more beneficial for the people and democracy, because they argued that elections must be completed within 150 days of the date the organic laws under Section 267 (1), (2), (3) and (4) have come into force.

            If either party requests the court to interpret this Section, it will further delay a return to democracy, despite the law already clearly stipulating that the “Election of members of the House of Representatives under this Constitution shall be held within one hundred and fifty days."

 

Prayut’s trip to Washington confirms US non-interventionist foreign policy opinion

Prayut’s trip to Washington confirms US non-interventionist foreign policy opinion

October 03, 2017 01:00 By Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation
Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha answered President Donald Trump’s invitation yesterday by paying a call at the White House.

The trip cannot be simply treated as a restoration of US-Thai relations that were soured by the 2014 coup staged by Prayut and the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO).

The meeting between the two leaders in fact signals a departure from America’s role as democratic champion in Thailand and Southeast Asia, while establishing a comfort zone for the military government to operate both in the Thai political landscape and in US-Thai relations. 

The Trump administration is now establishing a non-interventionist foreign policy in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world, echoing China’s foreign policy stance since the mid-1950s. 

In the diplomatic language of the White House, Trump and Prayut were to “discuss ways to strengthen and broaden bilateral relations and enhance cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region”, with Thailand hoping that this would re-energise their relations.

The photo opportunity for Prayut and Trump, against the backdrop of the world’s most powerful office, reaffirms speculation that Trump’s “America First” foreign policy platform is putting US national interests above the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights.

Whether intended or not, the White House yesterday endorsed the NCPO’s “Thai-style democracy” – characterised by the suppression of political freedoms and free expression – and also accepted its rhetoric that Thailand is “not ready for democracy”. This could result in further delays in the Thai democratic timeline set by the NCPO.

The meeting rejects the democratic principle in the US constitution embodied in the words “We The People”, while endorsing the authoritarian and elitist model of governance in Southeast Asia. 

Despite growing criticism of Trump’s democracy and human rights record, the US remains a global leader of liberal democracy. As such, a meeting with the US president is a visa for dictators and strongmen to enter the democratic world and whitewash themselves and their records. It enables them to legitimise their position at home and redefine democratic norms in a way that fits their regimes. 

Thus, democracy without liberty and freedom is labelled illiberal democracy. Is this the form of democracy that best fits Thailand? Is this a form of governance that the US seeks to promote across the globe, following its engagement in the infamous Vietnam War it claimed was for democracy?

Washington’s imitation of Beijing’s “non-interference policy” not only undermines democratic progress in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world, but it also raises questions about America’s competence to review and criticise the state of democracy and human rights in foreign countries.

The US State Department’s 2017 Trafficking in Persons report kept Thailand on the “Tier 2 Watch List”, due to its failure to meet minimum standards. Yet Thailand is working hard to meet benchmarks set by the US, which proves that criticism from outside can improve human rights in the country.

Former secretary of state Madeleine Albright emphasises that the promotion of democratic freedoms beyond America’s borders is a duty of the US government. Thus, if the US decides to compromise on the current state of Thai democracy and human rights, it will work in favour of the junta and against the Thai people. 

In his inaugural speech at the United Nations, Trump said “we do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example for everyone to watch”. Nevertheless, the president must understand that protecting universal values of democracy cannot be considered as intervening in a foreign country’s affairs, while lending support to a dictator certainly constitutes intervention. 

The US Embassy in Bangkok has remained aloof to persisting anti-American and anti-democratic sentiment in Thailand, especially in the Thai political divide of the past decade. 

Trump’s compromise with the Thai junta will help soften anti-American sentiment among conservative Thais, while damaging the United States’ core foreign policy values – democracy and human rights. 

“I don’t think the US should have invited him [Prayut] to the White House, because he did not come to power by an election. As such, he cannot represent the country”, comments a student from a university in the Northeast of Thailand, speaking anonymously.

Although US non-interference is not entirely a replication of its Chinese counterpart, Washington appears to be leaning further towards Beijing’s understanding of foreign policy.

Today, the world is increasingly concerned that Trump’s “America First” actually means “America Alone”, especially since the US departure from the Paris Climate Agreement. Under Trump, invitations to the White House are primarily intended to serve private US interests, while traditional American values and concern at the human rights records of allies take a back seat. One glaring example is the invite extended to Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, whose war on drugs has seen at least 7,000 people assassinated in extra-judicial killings. 

If the Trump administration wishes to maintain US leadership in promoting democracy beyond its borders, then it must reconsider its non-interference foreign policy stance. Otherwise the US will become just another China in Southeast Asia.   

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.

My in-depth interview with respect to the state of Thai politics

My in-depth interview with respect to the state of Thai politics:

Although the literal translation of the headline is rather provocative; “The Military Must Leave Politics”, I discussed various topics related to the current state of Thai politics.

In summary, I argued that:

• Many Thais are now in denial to accept that they are rejecting democracy as a form of governance and are instead resorting to an authoritarian form of governance.

• The current state of normalcy is a result of political suppression by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), which undermines the necessity of democracy because people are misled by the fabricated calmness. Therefore, they have become more convinced that Thai democracy requires the military.

• Primarily, the timeline to return to democracy largely depends on the ability of the military to maintain its grip on power.

• Since the 2014 coup, many Thais have been misled into believing that the problem of corruption fundamentally stems from politicians, and it is, therefore, important to get rid of politicians. However according to various research, corruption is embedded in all sectors, so it is important to look beyond politicians and promote transparency in order to enhance people’s ability to monitor those in power.

• The military have signaled that the country’s democratic timeline will be delayed.

• I believe that the military is desperate for elections because it offers a means for their power to be legitimized, but the tendency for a Phue Thai Party victory increases paranoia.

• I do not think there will be a violent confrontation or bloodshed if the general elections are postponed from 2018. This is in part because compromise is a key component of the Thai mentality.

• I think military coups d'états will continue to be part of Thai politics, because it has taken root in the Thai political system as a correcting mechanism for when democracy fails. This creates problems for the progress of democracy in Thailand, because large numbers of Thai people do not believe that democracy has the ability to correct itself.

Asean Way means no respect for human rights of the Rohingya

September 29, 2017 01:00

By Titipol Phakdeewanich  Special to The Nation

Western Myanmar is under the world’s spotlight for what the United Nations calls a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya people. From the other side of the globe, the European Union has slammed the crackdown in Rakhine state as “a human rights crisis with serious humanitarian consequences”. 

That concern is apparently not shared by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, of which Myanmar is a member. Asean has remained largely silent on the Rohingya crisis. 

Myanmar’s de-facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her government have been widely condemned for insufficient efforts to resolve the crisis. Fellow Nobel laureate Desmond Tutu recently branded the crisis “slow genocide” and urged Suu Kyi to speak out for justice and human rights. Amnesty International also calls the Myanmar military’s crackdown in Rakhine a “genocide”, intended to erase the minority Rohingya from the map.   

It took Suu Kyi almost four weeks before she finally spoke out against the human rights violations last week. Many suspect her televised address merely intended to dampen criticism from the UN General Assembly session in New York, rather than to protect Rohingya Muslims’ rights. 

Although almost half the population of Myanmar’s Rohingya – more than 400,000 – have already fled to Bangladesh, the exodus is apparently not significant enough for Asean or its members to take a stance on rights violations.

The huge humanitarian crisis in Myanmar confirms a now common observation – that the “Asean Way” fundamentally fails to recognise human rights.

The regional bloc claims that such recognition is in fact enshrined in its Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, leading to the introduction of the 2012 Asean Human Rights Declaration.

The Declaration was strongly criticised by the UN Human Rights Council for failures to embrace and synchronise with the international language of human rights. Nevertheless, it has gone unchanged, with its implementation overruled by the bloc’s fundamental principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs of member states”. Effectively this means that beliefs in cultural supremacy have been maintained at the expense of common humanity.

Despite Asean’s commitment to “strengthen democracy” and “to promote and protect human rights”, the institution and its member states continue to deny the universality of democracy and human rights. This results in the further alienation of their citizens from universal norms.

Asean countries do not welcome criticism of their democracy and human rights records, especially when it comes from the West. Bloc members often resort to combative “East versus West” rhetoric to defend their failures to comply with international commitments, as observed since the 1990s in the discourse of “Asian values” first championed by Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew. 

Of course, East and West have never and never will be the same, but fundamental human rights do not have borders, national identity or ownership. They are simply a birthright and entitlement of all of us.

Increasing international criticism of the Myanmar government’s handling of the Rohingya crisis is a clear signal that Asean must reconsider its non-interference policy in this case, if its human rights mechanism is to retain any credibility. 

However, there is no indication that Asean countries will suspend that policy, which it claims is crucial for the national sovereignty of its members. 

Support for the Asean Way has been growing among neighbouring countries since the previous Rohingya exodus in 2014-’15.

A nationalistic policy of non-interference in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand has been spurred by fears of the financial and security burdens that large numbers of refugees would bring.

These fears are fanned by the social media, while human rights and humanitarian concerns are dismissed by nationalist groups.

 “Take them [the Rohingya] to stay in your home if you are so worried about them!”, is a familiar refrain among Southeast Asian Facebook users. This nationalist mentality allows the non-interference norms to be wielded expediently by the region’s leaders, while the Rohingya suffer as victims of the effective collusion between the Myanmar state and its Asean partners. 

Southeast Asia’s leaders have indicated that changing the Asean Way by removing its focus on the supremacy of cultural norms and non-interference is not an option. This is seen, for example, in the denial of same-sex marriage in Singapore in 2015, and the increasing limitations placed on freedom of expression in Thailand since the 2014 military coup.

Asean leaders will find that human rights cannot be tailored to suit the Asean Way, since this universal value is a birthright and not something that can be limited or dictated by the bloc’s leadership.

The limited humanitarian aid now being offered by Asean is only in recognition of “pseudo-rights” expediently granted to the Rohingya. For as long as the regional bloc fails to protect their full rights as human beings, the existing 2012 Asean Human Rights Declaration will remain merely ornamental, rather than a mechanism to meaningfully promote and protect the fundamental rights of Asean citizens.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England. 

My interview with respect to the meeting between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and his cabinet members, and Chart Thai Party.

My interview with respect to the meeting between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and his cabinet members, and Chart Thai Party during the mobile Cabinet meeting in Supanburi Province, and its implication on the continuing role of the military in Thai politics.

Regardless of the support for the military among politicians or political parties, there is already a strong indication that the military intends to maintain their grip on power, and continue to govern Thailand for perhaps the next ten years or so. The military has already structurally embedded itself in the Thai political landscape through the 2017 Constitutions, through the creation of new government agencies, and via military appointments to various independent organisations.

The meeting between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and Chart Thai Party is not unprecedented in the context of Thai political history. Instead, the meeting merely demonstrates a repetition of the game of power, in which it is quite common for Thai politicians to submit to the military for their own political gains when the military is in charge.

Unfortunately, the cosy relations between the military and politicians only reflects their mutual interests at the expense of democracy. The Chart Thai Party’s support for the military will continue to damage the Thai democracy.

Indeed, the military should have only a very small role, or even none at all in the democratisation of the country. Therefore, the continued role of the military in Thai politics does not indicate a bright future for Thai democracy.

Academic freedom is dying under military rule: Universities must step up

Academic freedom is dying under military rule: Universities must step up
opinion September 09, 2017 01:00 By Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation

Ever since it interrupted Thailand’s democratic progress by seizing power from the people in the 2014 military coup, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) has maintained that suppressing freedom of expression is crucial to its timeline for a return to democracy.

This is despite continuous criticism from within and outside the country over the state of civil liberties under junta rule.

For the past three years, the NCPO has been fairly successful in integrating itself into everyday public and political life. Its critics, meanwhile, have attempted to regain public space to speak out against the current politics of fear and intimidation, enforced in the name of “national security” and “political stability”.

This “new normal” of public acceptance for suppression of dissent against the military raises a question: will Thailand forever overrule the universal concept of free expression and instead develop its own version of democracy without endorsing certain basic civil liberties?

In its 2017 rankings for countries, rights NGO Freedom House rated Thailand’s “Political Rights” at 6, and “Civil Liberties” at 5, using a scale of 1-7, with 7 being “Least Free”. Overall it rated Thailand as “Not Free”. This reflected the position of a country under military rule – though the report was largely rejected by the military’s supporters.  

Out of Thailand’s 65 million people, only a small group – including some academics – have been monitored, harassed or labelled as troublemakers by the NCPO and its supporters.

This relatively small number might explain why Thai people in general have shown little concern at such suppression.

Between 2014 and 2015, during a number of interactions with the military that included “invitations” to its base in Ubon Ratchathani province, I was asked not to organise a public seminar on democracy and human rights, and instead support the democratisation process under the NCPO. The question then arose of whether it is possible to leave democracy and its return in military hands.

In July 2015, the military sent invitations to me and several other representatives from four universities in Ubon Ratchathani. Attached was NCPO Order No 3/2015 on Maintaining Public Order and National Security, which cited Article 44 of the interim constitution, granting absolute power to the prime minister. The invitation said the attachment was merely official procedure, with no intention of threatening the recipients. In reality, it could only be understood as part of the deliberate cultivation of a climate of fear and intimidation against the academic community – a move which demanded a strong response from Thailand’s universities. Unfortunately, the universities remained silent and bowed to NCPO rule.  

On Tuesday, I was again invited to the military base in Ubon Ratchathani, regarding an upcoming seminar on the role of the Thai Human Rights Commission, to be held by the Political Science Faculty at Ubon Ratchathani University. The military warned the event could not go ahead on campus without permission from the NCPO.

A more serious attack on the academic community came recently with the charges laid against Professor Chayan Vaddhanaphuti, organiser of the 13th International Conference on Thai Studies, and a number of attendees. The charges came after criticism of the conference by the NCPO, criticism which Thai universities have remained silent towards. Indeed, none of the country’s 120 private and public universities has shown the courage to defend academic freedom.

Over the past decade, a number of Thai universities have functioned as a political machine against democracy.

(We note here a stark contrast with the pro-democracy movement at Thammasat University and others in the late 1970s.)

Arthit Ourairat, the president and owner of Rangsit University, one of Thailand’s top private universities, was actively involved in the 2013-2014 protests by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC). A large number of senior executives and leading academics from public institutions such as Chulalongkorn, Thammasat and Mahidol universities were also heavily involved in the PDRC, and some continue to serve the military regime.

While leaning towards the junta, Thai universities have been reluctant to protect freedoms on campuses, in part because they consider the military’s attacks on academic freedom as personal problems. Once universities take a lead in endorsing military rule, then academic freedom is in jeopardy.

It is time for Thai universities to re-examine their commitment to protecting academic freedom. The prime purpose of a university is to serve the public and the academic community, not to function as a government agency whose duty is to follow the orders of the junta. Academic voices and events must not be denounced as a threat to national security and the NCPO’s timeline for democracy. This dangerous trend has been inflated by growing distrust in politicians amid polarisation in Thai politics over the past decade, at the expense of freedoms.

Democracy functions on the principles of freedom and liberty, while the military functions by orders and obedience. Thus, democracy and the military are mutually exclusive, existing in opposing realms. Thai universities cannot afford to mislead the public if they want democracy to survive and prosper.

Unfortunately we are unlikely to see Thai universities find the courage to step up and protect academic freedom anytime soon. The ongoing decline of academic freedom in Thailand is therefore not merely the consequence of military pressure, but also due to universities actively permitting that freedom to suffocate under junta suppression.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at  the University of Warwick in England.

A summary of my interview in Matichon

A summary of my interview in Matichon, in relation to uncertainty surrounding the proposed 2018 general elections.

It should be no surprise if the scheduled 2018 elections are postponed due to the possibility of the Pheu Thai party winning. However, the 2017 Thai constitution will generate 250 appointed senators, which is in the interests of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and the military. This will reassure the military that they can secure the appointment of the ‘Prime Minister’.

In fact, I believe that the government also wants to hold the general election because it will be a stamp to legitimise their position in power, and are bolstered by the certainty that they can maintain power after the election. As a result, the international community will have fewer objections to their position in power.

The need for being accepted in the international community is key a factor for the NCPO to stick to its election road map. 

Thaksin founded the Shinawatra dynasty, but the military empowered it

Thaksin founded the Shinawatra dynasty, but the military empowered it 

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH 

SPECIAL TO THE NATION 

The departure of the former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, who fled the country prior to a Supreme Court verdict on her rice-pledging policy, leaves various questions concerning the future of herself and the Shinawatra family, the Pheu Thai Party, and changes in the Thai political landscape. 

It is premature to see her exit as the end of the Shinawatra era in Thai politics, since events after the two military coups of 2006 and 2014 demonstrate that the clan’s influence cannot be abolished simply by military force. Instead, the coups did the reverse, keeping the Shinawatras politically alive and empowered. 

The 2006 coup, led by the Council for Democratic Reform, ousted then-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai government – but it did not diminish his influence. 

In 2014 the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) staged a coup amid escalating violence surrounding protests by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) in 2013- 2014, and removed prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, the Pheu Thai Party leader, from office. 

Her 2011 electoral success had obviously capitalised on the popularity of her brother, Thaksin. Yet her candidacy was perceived by some as a battle to represent Shinawatra family interests, rather than the interests of Pheu Thai voters. During electoral campaigning, she repeated the point she was Thaksin’s sister and reiterated his achievements as a means to gain support. 

After she was ousted by the military in 2014, Yingluck began to establish her own, separate power base during multiple trips across the country, particularly in the North and Northeast, her party’s stronghold. She was successful in boost- ing her popularity and keeping Pheu Thai relevant to its constituents, and also portraying herself as a victim of an illegitimate military intervention and faulty justice system. 

Yet for the Shinawatras’ political opponents, who advocated the coups, the clan is not a victim of military intervention but rather the root of the political divisiveness and problems that made it necessary. 

That leaves an elephant in the room. A large swathe of the Thai middle-class and anti-Thaksin groups have rejected democracy and now embrace military rule. This works in the interests of the Shinawatra family, and allows them to embed and empower themselves in the Thai political environment. 

The Thai Rak Thai Party and its incarnations have not lost an election since coming to power with a landslide victory of over 11 million votes in 2001. In the most recent election in 2011, its successor Pheu Thai won 15.7 million votes, under the guidance of Thaksin from outside Thailand. 

The 2006 and 2014 coups were intended to curtail the power and influence of the clan, but they badly backfired. Meanwhile the military’s continuing role in Thai politics is unlikely to weaken the Shinawatras’ grip in the long term because the military cannot establish trust through coercion. 

Another Shinawatra victory at the polls could well be followed by another military intervention, further empowering the clan. 

If they want to break this cycle, the Thai middle-class and elite cannot continue to blindly dismiss the very core democratic principle of one-man-one- vote, while embracing military rule on the pretext that rural voters are victims of populist policies and vote-buying. 

While vote-buying was indeed a significant problem in Thailand from the 1970s into the 2000s, today it has little significant impact because most voters are fully aware of party manifestos and their implications on public policies. Moreover, middle-class assumptions that rural voters are naive are not only outdated and erroneous, but emphasise the inherent socio-political inequalities which gave rise to Thaksin in the first place. 

Therefore, the 2010 red-shirt protest was not primarily an endorsement of the Shinawatra family, but rather an outcry by the long-ignored rural poor, who wanted to protect their voting rights under the Thai constitution and the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Thailand is a signatory. 

On the one hand, democracy offered Thaksin the opportunity to establish his Shinawatra political dynasty. But on the other, the same democracy offers voters a mechanism to remove the Shinawatra family through an election. 

Political popularity can last a long time, but not forever. When a party in power can no longer satisfy voters’ needs, voting decisions change. This is how representative democracy functions. 

Pheu Thai’s victory was no miracle, but rather a result of research by the party that enabled it to respond to the demands of voters, who were regarded as stockholders in the arena of public policy. This is a fundamental notion of representative democracy, in which parliamentary members represent the interests of the constituents who provided them with a mandate. 

Whether the Shinawatras will now maintain their involvement with Pheu Thai is unclear, but the departure of Yingluck is unlikely to signal the end of the clan’s influence on Thai politics. 

Meanwhile the military has indicated it intends to control the country for the next decade or two, pending permission from the political elite and middle class and their continuing willingness to limit democracy to prevent the return of the Shinawatra clan. 

Nevertheless, we might still see a day when the Shinawatra family vanishes from the Thai political landscape altogether. But only when a genuine democracy is given the opportunity to function without military intervention. 

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.