Interview on political ban.

I argued that "a ban on social network political campaigning illustrates how much the NCPO fears losing popularity to its opposition. Whilst the pro-military camp have been granted more freedom to campaign, the upcoming elections will not be not free and fair because the restrictions on social network political campaigning undermines the ability of political parties to freely communicate with the people and their constituents."

My interview on the relaxation of the ban on political activities

My interview on the relaxation of the ban on political activities.

Although the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) allowed political activities to resume, this is not a return of political freedoms to the Thai people and political parties. We should not just focus on a partial political freedom, but we must stay focused on the Thai people’s political freedoms. 

To a certain extent, the NCPO remaining in power is a sign that the upcoming election cannot be described as a free and fair with respect to the international standards. The NCPO can still utilise legal tools to dictate the election. 

A ban on social networks political campaigning illustrates that the upcoming elections are not free and fair, because those restrictions undermines the ability of political parties to freely communicate with the people and their constituents. 

Whilst the NCPO and its supporters are able to make their political moves, their opponents are closely monitored. It has been observed that the NCPO and the military government have been able to mobilise their popularity while the next election is under speculation. 

The NCPO have partially granted political freedom but it is time to fully return political liberty and freedom to the Thai people.

It is important for people to be able to discuss politics within the remit of the law rather than under the control of the NCPO. Therefore, the NCPO should end its role in Thai politics. If the NCPO continues to remain active the legitimacy of the upcoming elections will be undermined and questioned by both the Thai people and the international community. 

A summary of my interview in Matichon, with respect to the restrictions on political campaign online, imposed by the Thai military government.

Whether the political campaigns are on the internet (social medias, online-campaigns) or not, politician should be free to run their campaigns.

The maintaining of restrictions, imposed by the military government, demonstrates that the upcoming election is not “free and fair”, and fail to meet international standards, because of the suppression of freedom of expression and political freedoms.

A free and fair election is not only determined by what happens on the election day, but it is also important to consider the level of liberty and freedom before people vote. Currently, most political parties are allowed to function their political duties and activities. Political parties should be able to freely communicate with their members and supporters.

It has been observed that the supporters of the military have been able to enjoy more liberty and freedom to make their political move. There is not an equal playing filed in Thai politics under the military government.

Indeed, a high level of control, imposing on online-political campaigns, reflects the military’s concerns about young voices, who normally oppose the military rule.

It is time for Thais to question and raise their concerns over the ongoing suppressions of freedom of expressions, and its implication on the future of democracy in Thailand. 

With respect to the legal charges against Mr Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit with online offences, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) demonstrates that fear and intimidations remains a crucial political tactics for the military. The NCPO has been implementing all of the available legal tools to suppress their political oppositions, in order to prevent criticism on themselves. The NCPO cannot claim that they are not politicians, so that they should not be criticised on the same grounds, because their role is now functioning within the Thai political realm. 

It is important for the NCPO to eliminate all of the political restrictions, imposing on their political opponents. At this stage, it is important for politicians and political parties to be able to enjoy the very same liberty and freedom within the Thai political landscape. So that Thai people can properly have a chance to know their potential candidates.

Matichon Editorial Column: Defending Academic Freedom

Quoted in The Nation

Quoted in The Nation:

"Despite all the legal complications having been cleared, political scientist Titipol Phakdeewanich from Ubon Ratchathani University said he had doubts that the election would take place next February.

“After all, it is the National Council for Peace and Order [NCPO] who will make the decision, not the Constitutional Court’s verdict,” he said.“Only when the junta itself announces the election date, can we be sure the election will take place.”

However, Titipol said that the NCPO should want an election as it was the only way to legitimise the military’s power in politics. But its decision to call one depends largely on whether or not it was certain that it could maintain its grip after the election, he said.

Titipol said there was a 70 to 90 per cent likelihood that the poll would be held. Considering the current circumstances – including the inauguration of the Action Coalition for Thailand Party, backed by former protest leader Suthep Thaugsuban – the academic said he believed the NCPO was ready for the election."

Last hurdle to Thai election cleared as parties law approved

Last hurdle to Thai election cleared as parties law approved: Activists sceptical over pledge of February poll, insist on vote this year

A summary of my interview in Matichon regarding the Constitutional Court’s ruling and its implications on the prospects for the 2019 Election.

A summary of my interview in Matichon regarding the Constitutional Court’s ruling and its implications on the prospects for the 2019 Election.

The Constitutional Court ruled that the organic bill on the election of MPs is valid and does not contradict with the 2017 constitution. However, this is not a guarantee for the long-awaited February 2019 Election. Thailand and a large number of its people have long been ready for elections and a return to democracy, whilst the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and the military are not yet ready to compete in the polls.

Despite protesting that military officers are not politicians, the military perceives new political parties, such as the Forward Future Party as political rivals.

The election will take place whenever the military is confident about the support they would get at the polls, as well as in the stability of their grip on power after the election.

One cannot ignore the fact that the NCPO can still implement Article 44 whenever it suits their political interests [including by postponing elections].

Despite numerous postponements to the electoral timeline, the NCPO’s recent indication to ensure the February 2019 election goes ahead may simply be a political ploy to minimise public resistance to the NCPO, and to buy time in the wake of protests and demonstrations of the “pro-election group”. It is too naive to take the NCPO’s election timeline seriously at this stage.

In addition, the post-election political circumstances in Malaysia may have raised some significant concerns amongst the NCPO, in relation to the potential scrutiny if the NCPO’s opposition wins a majority of seats and is able to wrest power. This is because of ongoing questions against the issue of corruption and transparency within the NCPO.

If the NCPO is genuine about returning to democracy, then there is no legitimate reason to ban political activities of political parties, especially of the Democrat Party and the Pheu Thai Party.

The NCPO has been using the mechanism of the state and public resources to mobilise its popularity, whilst preventing its political rivals, such as the Democrat Party and the Pheu Thai Party from campaigning.

In addition, I argued that if there is an indication that the Pheu Thai Party can convincingly win most of the seats in the North and the Northeast, and it is therefore very likely that the February 2019 election will be delayed once again.

In addition to the 250 appointed senators, the NCPO understands that support from MPs are crucial for the post-election politics. Therefore, we have seen the establishment of cosy relationships between the NCPO and many existing political groups.

Quoted in "SPECIAL REPORT: Reform a failure, but junta’s grip still strong", in The Nation

Quoted in "SPECIAL REPORT: Reform a failure, but junta’s grip still strong", in The Nation:

"Despite all this, Prayut has retained a level of support even in the Northeast, a red-shirt stronghold. Here, the military has been clever enough to recruit from among low-income rural families, winning their loyalty by providing livelihoods, says Titipol Phakdeewanich, dean of political science at the region’s Ubon Ratchathani University.

“Except for the anti-coup hardcore, many people [in the region] don’t really hate Prayut although sentiment in the social media is very strong against him,” said Titipol, citing informal research he conducted in Ubon Ratchathani and neighbouring Yasothon and Amnat Charoen.
Some government policies, such as the rice price guarantee, had benefited the locals, he added.

A summary of my interview on Suthep Thaugsuban’s new political party named “Ruam Palang Prachachat Thai".

A summary of my interview on Suthep Thaugsuban’s new political party named “Ruam Palang Prachachat Thai".

...
Because of the mutual interests between Suthep Thaugsuban, the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), and the military, it is very likely that the new political party under Suthep’s leadership will support the military remaining in power.

I don’t think that this party will specifically support Gen Prayut Chan-O-Cha, somehow Prayut might not be the next prime minster. However, Suthep’s party is intended to maintain and strengthen its relationship with the NCPO and the military in order to support the military to remain in power.

There have been a number of indications that the NCPO and the military want to maintain their grip on power after the election, such as by reaching out to local politically influential people in the provinces of Buriram and Chonburi.

Although Suthep is popular in the south, his political charisma is overshadowed by the former Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai. Indeed, I argued that the Democrat party has been able to maintain its stronghold in the south not because of Mr Abhisit Vejjajiva, but largely as a result of Chuan Leekpai’s political charisma and influence in the South.

These pictures were sent to me from police special branch in Ubon Ratchathani. How thoughtful of them to take an interest in my interviews and articles.

Quoted on Pro-Democracy Protest in Bangkok Post

In Bangkok Post: "Titipol Phakdeewanich, dean of Ubon Ratchathani University's Faculty of Political Sciences, said the government was quite careful and tried to prevent violence which could have led to a negative image of the regime and affected its legitimacy." 

Quoted on Academic freedom

In The Nation: "Titipol Phakdeewanich, dean of political science at Ubon Ratchathani University, told The Nation that NCPO and the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) called him yesterday to ask if he was planning to attend the event at Thammasat University and whether he was aware if any other university staff and students were planning to go."

I was quoted in The Nation: 4th Anniversary of the 2014 Coup

I was quoted in The Nation:
However, military power alone would not enable the survival of the junta for long unless it also has strong support from big corporations, which dominate the Thai economy.
The military has enjoyed increased acceptance from big businesses, says Titipol Phakdeewanich, dean of political science at Ubon Ratchathani University. “When they are doing well in their businesses, getting wealthier or getting benefits facilitated by government policies like Pracha Rath, it is no surprise that they support [the military],” he points out.

A summary of my Interview in Khaosod, with respect to the NCPO’s establishment of political allies

Despite the claim made by Prime Minster Prayut Chan-O-Cha: the establishment of political allies and attracting existing politicians [by the NCPO] (especially former MPs and influential provincial political figures) is a typical path to power in Thai politics, he argued that this is an unacceptable element of the Thai political culture and is undemocratic.

Therefore, Gen Prayut’s claim reflects that he and the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), including the military, accept the ongoing political culture, despite the 2014 coup-maker disapproving it as a form of decay in Thai democracy.

He argued that the way Thai politicians change parties prior to elections is a reflection of politics without ideological basis. Instead, this pattern of behaviour demonstrates that Thai politicians prioritise their personal interests over the interests of the public. They only tend to move to join those with a high possibility of electoral success, or to those who are well endowed with financial resources.

Therefore, Gen Prayut’s acceptance of unacceptable elements of Thai political culture is a reflection of the lack of reform before the next election – despite the NCPO justifying their coup on the basis that they would reform Thai politics.

Indeed, this is only a repetition of the same old pattern of Thai politics because money and power attract politicians.

Today, we have observed that the NCPO has been using all kinds of state mechanisms to establish and strengthen their relations with political power-brokers and with business and political groups.

Supporting democracy is not a priority for politicians who have already declared themselves as supporters of the NCPO, in the attempt to ensure that the military will remain in power after the election. Therefore, it is important for Thais to not vote for them if we want democracy to survive in Thailand. 

The upcoming elections will not be free and fair because the NCPO has continued to suppress freedom of expression and restrict political activities. Therefore, it is important for the NCPO to allow all parties and actors to have their liberties and political freedoms in the event of an election in order to ensure that it is free and fair. 

A summary of my Interview in Matichon:

The 2018 Constitution is already designed to facilitate the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and the military to maintain political power, even after the return to democracy, for example through the NCPO-appointed Senate members who can vote to select the Prime Minister. 

If we consider the political stance of the Democrat Party, we cannot entirely trust them (particularly the party’s support for democracy), because they have been a supporter of the military’s role in Thai politics. Therefore, the public can see no indication that the Democrat Party will not support the military in the future. 

With reference to Thai political history, we have observed compromises between the military and political parties when they share common interests. Recently, we have also observed newly registered political parties expressing their support for General Prayut Chan-O-Cha to be the next prime minister. 

It is important for all political parties to demonstrate their stance against the appointment of an unelected prime minister. If the House of Representatives stays firm on this matter, then it could act as an effective mechanism to minimise the opportunity for Thailand to have an unelected prime minister. 

I questioned recent Democrat Party announcement of their opposition to an unelected prime minister, about whether it is only intended to boost its popularity against amongst young voters, who are now leaning towards the Future Forward Party, rather than a committed intention to oppose the appointment of an unelected prime minister. This facelift strategy of the Democrat Party is unlikely to significantly improve the damaged reputation of the party as an anti-democratic party.

Indeed, in the current political context, the term “unelected prime minister” is implicitly used to refer to either the military or General Prayut Chan-O-Cha. Thus, this implies the continuity of the NCPO and the military after the return to democracy, despite falling support for Prayut remaining in power.

If “unelected prime minister” is a highly qualified person or a successful businessman, there perhaps be less resistance. Therefore, if General Prayut Chan-O-Cha and the NCPO intend to continue their roles in Thai politics, they will have to go through political channels, just like other politicians. 

My comments with respect to the decision of the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) to vote down all seven new Election Commissioner candidates and its political implications.

My comments with respect to the decision of the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) to vote down all seven new Election Commissioner candidates and its political implications.

Whether it was intentional or not, the National Legislative Assembly’s (NLA) rejection of the Election Commissioner candidates acted as a tactic to buy time for the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). This will provide more opportunity or the military to run their political campaign, which is not fair for political parties. If we are to discuss “free and fair elections”, we must also consider the political circumstances preceding elections. The upcoming election (so long as it is not once again postponed by the NCPO) cannot be described as a free and fair election because the military is able to exercise its absolute power to manipulate state mechanisms in order to mobilise their popularity.

The rejection of the Election Commissioner candidates can result in further delays to the election, which I believe it is a mechanism to buy time for the NCPO, whilst they also already have Article 44 to exercise absolute power at their convenience. Delays to the election timeline have more to do with the readiness of the Thai military to compete at the polls, rather than the readiness of the country, despite the NCPO’s claims that Thailand as a country is unready for elections.

I am not convinced, like many other Thais and political observers, that the NLA’s decision to reject the Election Commissioner candidates was independent and without any influence from the NCPO. After all, the NLA was appointed by the NCPO, so they have been voting consistently along with the demands of the NCPO, rather than responding to the demands of the people of Thailand.

Indeed, I argued that we cannot just look at the problems on the surface or just simply believe that the NLA’s rejection of the Election Commissioner candidates is a problem with either the selection process or the selecting committee.

This rejection simply reflects the undemocratic nature of the current political system in Thailand under the military junta, where the voices of the military are at the centre of the power structure.

Can Thailand rely on the Democrat Party for democracy?

Can Thailand rely on the Democrat Party for democracy?
opinion January 10, 2018 01:00
By Titipol Phakdeewanich 
Special to The Nation

As questions linger over whether an election will take place as scheduled in November this year, coup-maker General Prayut Chan-o-cha has signalled the political game has already begun – by declaring himself a former soldier who is now a politician. That in turn has placed the military’s cosy relations with anti-democratic groups in the spotlight.

At the end of 2017, the Democrat Party, formerly a supporter and beneficiary of military intervention (especially after the previous 2006 coup) began to make a U-turn. The party leadership is now speaking out against the junta the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and pressing for an election as scheduled.

In the current political landscape, the Democrat Party could be a significant driving force in kick-starting Thai democracy after four years of junta rule. Yet how realistic is it to place the responsibility for democratic progress in the hands of the Democrat Party? The party last won an election three decades ago in 1992, since when its popularity has plunged wit the emergence of Thaksin Shinawatra’s Pheu Thai Party. 

Nevertheless, the Democrats maintain a strong power base in the South, source of the vast majority of demonstrators for the People’s Democratic Reform Committee-led protests of 2013-2014. Those yellow-shirt protests led to the May 2014 military coup that sought to orchestrate political reform via undemocratic means.

But with only 6.2 million voters in the South, the Democrat Party would lack sufficient support to win an election. By contrast, the political power base of Pheu Thai in the North and Northeast registered 24.9 million voters at the 2011 election. 

However, the South remains important to the successful re-emergence of democracy in Thailand, which can only happen if the Democrat Party shows determination in persuading its constituents that democratic culture and power transitions are the way forward rather than accepting military interventions.

Throughout the ongoing political conflict, the Democrats have continued to undermine the rights of rural voters, especially those in the Northeast, with the rhetoric of vote-buying. At the same time, the party itself has shown it lacks fundamental democratic values and understanding by supporting military intervention in 2006 and 2014. This has intensified the anti-democratic sentiment among its supporters across the country.

“I think elections are good for us because at least we get to choose [our representatives] every four years. Democracy can also help hold politicians accountable as I could see Yingluck [Shinawatra] being scrutinised after she was ousted from office. But with the military [in power] we cannot check them,” said a farmer with four years of compulsory education from the Northeast province of Ubon Ratchathani, expressing why democracy matters to her. 

Recently, the PDRC has once again stirred anti-democratic sentiment among its audience with Facebook videos released last month. The clips highlight PDRC political activities and reiterate the perceived necessity of the 2014 military intervention and its crucial role of eradicating the Shinawatra dynasty from politics.

The videos were intended to re-energise both the NCPO and the PDRC’s popularity and prominence and prevent them slipping into the political margins. They used the old political mantra – highlighting their fight against the elected Yingluck government’s abuse of power, and against her brother Thaksin Shinawatra through their platform of anti-corruption, reform and the rebuilding of Thailand.

These may be persuasive for many PDRC supporters, but others have been made sceptical by a series of corruption scandals surrounding the NCPO that have been quietly resolved by military-legal rulings. The most recent case, the luxury watches and other valuables adorning General Prawit Wongsuwan, Deputy PM and Defence Minister, have sowed more doubt about the NCPO’s anti-corruption credentials and practice.

As the influence of its mantra against corruption fades, the PDRC believes that its ongoing anti-Shinawatra platform is still an effective political instrument for its allies, the Democrat Party and the NCPO. However, the potential effectiveness of that platform at an election is likely overstated.

Prayut’s declaration that he is now a politician cannot be taken as a confirmation of a November 2018 election, but it leaves no doubt as to the NCPO/military’s intention to maintain a central role in Thai governance and politics. The orders and laws enacted by this government reaffirm the determination of the military to create an illiberal democracy.

It is time for both the Democrat Party and the PDRC to revisit their political strategies and redefine their understanding of democracy, as well as learning to respect the voices and the rights of rural people. Taking such action would help them gain more votes and support from the people though democratic means, but it would also greatly contribute to democratic progress within Thailand. 

The right of rural residents in the Northeast and North to help choose the government is already registered; it’s now time for this right to be registered in the hearts and minds of the Democrat Party and its supporters.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the UK’s University of Warwick.

My interview with respect to the NCPO’s Announcement No. 53/2560 (2017), relating to the implementation of Article 44 to amend the Political Party Act, in order to allow political activities.

My interview with respect to the NCPO’s Announcement No. 53/2560 (2017), relating to the implementation of Article 44 to amend the Political Party Act, in order to allow political activities.

This Announcement will affect the membership of political parties, which is likely to effect the Democrat Party more than the Pheu Thai Party. The existing political parties claimed that this amendment might result in a reduction of party members, however, this might not significantly affect the election results.

In relation to the voting decisions of constituents, party membership is not as important as party manifestos and the political stance of the political parties, whilst higher membership levels do not necessarily translate into higher votes in an election.

According to observations, the Democrat Party has more registered members than the Pheu Thai Party, however the Democrat Party has failed to win any general election since the implementation of the 1997 ‘Democratic’ Constitution in 2001.

With respect to the Thai political culture, local influential figures can normally influence voting decisions more than party membership.

Despite being political allies, the Democracy Party cannot take the support from the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) for granted, because there is an indication that the PDRC is leaning towards the military.

In Southern Thailand, Suthep Thaugsuban, the leader of the PDRC has, and continues to be more influential than Abhisit Vejjajiva, the leader of the Democrat Party. Therefore, there it is likely that the Democrat Party will maintain its cozy relationship with Suthep in order to ensure continued support in the South.

Additionally, voters may also consider the extent to which parties are supportive of either democracy or the military when deciding on which party to vote for.

Nevertheless, the NCPO must set one rule to apply for all parties, rather than rules for existing political parties which are distinct from newly registered parties. The NCPO’s Announcement No. 53/2560 (2017) raises a question of whether it is intended to pave the way for the military to maintain its central role after the election.

My interview with respect to the National Legislative Assembly of Thailand’s decision to allow the commissioners of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) to remain in their positions until the end of their 9 year-term.

My interview with respect to the National Legislative Assembly of Thailand’s decision to allow the commissioners of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) to remain in their positions until the end of their 9 year-term.

Whether the NACC commissioners were to remain in power or be replaced by new appointments there will not be a significant difference, because it has been observed that the NACC has not been functioning absolutely independently.

If the existing commissioners were to be replaced by new appointments, it is very likely that the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) would exercise its influence over the appointments. Therefore, the influence of the NCPO would have a significant implication for the functioning of the NACC.

Recently, we have already observed that the NACC has not yet indicated clear actions against the case of the expensive watches of General Prawit Wongsuwan, Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense.

The existing NACC commissioners have been functioning well with regards to scrutinising politicians – which is politically expedient for the NCPO - whilst neglecting to effectively scrutinise corruption cases against other government officials such as the military, police, and senior government officials. Instead, the NACC has been acting as a machinery of the NCPO in scrutinising the NCPO’s political opposition.

Apparently, a decision not to replace the NACC commissioners is because the NCPO is now facing a number of politically sensitive issues, especially the case of General Prawit’s watches, which the NACC is rushing to end in the interests of the NCPO and the military. The sooner the case ends, the sooner the NACC can help to diminish political resistance against the NCPO.

Therefore, I argued that a decision to keep or replace the NACC commissioners is primarily based on the political expediency of the NCPO, rather than a qualification to serve the interests of Thailand.

BBC: A summary of my commentary relating to the Thai Constitution

A summary of my commentary relating to the Thai Constitution, in an interview conducted with BBC Thai, in the context of Thai Constitution Day:

I argued that politicians are not the main contributing factor in Thai constitutional failure [i.e. the resorting to military coups d’état, and the multiple rewriting of constitutions]. Rather, it is the more fundamental problem of law enforcement within Thailand, and its often evident favouring of those who are in power.

Also, we continue to observe the more overt abuse of power. Although Thaksin Shinawatra may have been one of the contributing factors in the 1997 constitutional’s eventual failure [with the military coup d’état of 2006], obviously enough, Thailand’s political problems did not stem from him.

Recently, we have observed many well publicised corruption scandals that then went quiet without being properly scrutinised, or investigated.

[Of course, Thailand, like other countries, has never had a perfect constitution, nevertheless…] The probable main reason that Thailand has had so many constitutions, is because such a large number of Thai reject many of the notions of democracy. I therefore argued that more Thai must learn to advocate for democratic means in the amending of their constitution - instead of this resorting to military coups d’état, which should now be totally unnecessary. Indeed, I stated that Thai people need to better understand that independently functioning agencies [outside of the military] must be in place, in order to better challenge Thailand’s endemic problem of corruption.

http://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-42286951

If we understood human rights, we wouldn’t sacrifice them for military rule

If we understood human rights, we wouldn’t sacrifice them for military rule
opinion December 09, 2017 01:00 By Titipol Phakdeewanich
Special to The Nation

Tomorrow, the United Nations (UN) will commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

Meanwhile Thailand, a state party to the declaration, remains under military rule with rights and freedoms curtailed ever since the 2014 coup carried out by the National Council for Peace and Order.

Ahead of the scheduled November 2018 elections, Thais are now calling for the return of normal civil liberty and freedoms. The two main political parties, Pheu Thai and the Democrats, have been pushing the NCPO junta to lift the political ban imposed over national security concerns.

The junta has continuously denied basic rights, including political rights, through strict control of public expression. Although the NCPO recently announced “human rights” as a policy priority and a national agenda, the military continues to contest the universality of human rights, claiming that national peace, security and the need to reunify have priority.

One crucial question for the NCPO is, if rights are granted by the military, can they be considered human rights?

Supporters of the military should consider a further question: Is Thailand sacrificing its commitments to the universal principle of human rights in order to facilitate the NCPO’s timeline for a return to democracy, or to maintain the military’s continued grip on power?

Throughout Thailand’s 85 years of attempts at democracy, the military has been able to reassert its central role in the political system by claiming it is defending Thailand’s cultural heritage and social order and eliminating corruption.

With a history of 19 attempted and 12 successful military coups, political rights have repeatedly been taken away, with no unified voice among Thais against the actions of the military. This was particularly so with the 2006 and 2014 coups, when a vast majority of Thais were willing to sacrifice their voting rights for military rule under the illusion that the military was an anti-corruption agent.

The concept of voting rights is enshrined in Article 21 of the UDHR: “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government”. But that concept is still poorly understood by many in the Thai establishment and middle class. They continue instead to disparage voting rights for the rural poor, citing their low levels of educational attainment.

Meanwhile the poor have no one in power to represent their interests and alleviate their condition. 

“The economy is doing so badly for me, I am desperate for elections so that I can vote for who I want to be in Parliament,” a local farmer from Si Sa Ket province said recently, speaking anonymously. 

It is time Thailand placed the universal principle of human rights on the education curriculum, alongside Thai history and cultural heritage. That move would help the nation break through the cultural barrier that exists around human rights.

While Thailand has abided by its commitments to the United Nations, including on human rights, since the inception of the UN in 1946, many Thais barely recognise the concepts of human dignity, equality and liberty because of an overriding social hierarchy they are told is central to being Thai – their Thainess. 

Embracing the principles of human rights, however, does not diminish the quality of being Thai, because being born as a Thai person is after all being born as a human in a country called Thailand. Hence, it is a mistake to view national boundaries as a border that must be defended from the intrusion of “alien” human rights.

Indeed, accepting the universality of human rights cannot be simply equated with the destruction of the uniqueness and dignity of Thai culture. Instead, cultural change is a normal consequence of development, in order to create a just society where everyone is equally respected as a human. 

Therefore, arguments about the need to preserve both Thai cultural uniqueness and national security not only delay the progress of human rights in Thailand. They also undermine the development of an equal and democratic society and deny the ability of Thai people to scrutinise and hold authorities to account.

Absolute trust in state authority simply lends absolute power to those who have it, leaving the public interest unprotected. 

The promotion and protection of universal human rights is not only a mechanism to promote dignity, rights and liberty of individuals, but also to take back power from the state, so that people are empowered to challenge its authority. 

Unfortunately, the Thai military and their supporters continue to rely on the notion of Thainess (Thai exceptionalism) to justify their lack of commitment to universal human rights. 

This remains an ongoing challenge for Thailand, because the military has successfully consolidated its power, and embedded itself at the centre of the country’s politics. This presents a challenge to the UN Human Rights Council in its efforts to promote fundamental rights for Thai people, as it celebrates the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration.

TITIPOL PHAKDEEWANICH is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.